Daniel I Gregory v. Department of the Navy

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJuly 24, 2024
DocketPH-315H-20-0089-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Daniel I Gregory v. Department of the Navy (Daniel I Gregory v. Department of the Navy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Daniel I Gregory v. Department of the Navy, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

DANIEL A. GREGORY, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, PH-315H-20-0089-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, DATE: July 24, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Daniel A. Gregory , Fort Meade, Maryland, pro se.

Kimberly Karle , Esquire, Portsmouth, Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his removal appeal for failure to prosecute. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant's petition for review, and VACATE the initial decision, but we DISMISS the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

BACKGROUND ¶2 On December 2, 2019, the appellant filed the instant appeal challenging the agency’s decision to terminate him during his probationary period. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1. In an acknowledgment order dated December 3, 2019, the administrative judge informed the appellant of how to establish Board jurisdiction as a probationary or non-probationary employee and ordered him to file evidence and argument showing why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 2 at 2-5. The administrative judge further informed the appellant that his failure to respond may result in the imposition of sanctions. Id. at 1. The appellant did not respond to this order. ¶3 After the agency moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and moved for sanctions, IAF, Tab 4 at 6-11, Tab 8 at 4-6, the administrative judge issued a December 26, 2019 Order to Show Cause directing the appellant to show cause as to why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, IAF, Tab 9 at 1. The order stated that the appellant’s response must be received no later than January 3, 2020. Id. After the response window lapsed, the administrative judge issued an initial decision on January 6, 2020, dismissing the appeal for failure to prosecute. IAF, Tab 10, Initial Decision. ¶4 The appellant filed a timely petition for review on January 14, 2020. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. He argues that he was unable to respond because the orders were issued during the Christmas holiday. Id. at 3. He further argues that, during this time, he was caring for his wife who had recently been diagnosed with cancer. Id.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

The administrative judge erred in dismissing the appeal for failure to prosecute. ¶5 Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a sanction that may be imposed if a party fails to prosecute or defend an appeal. Leseman v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 139, ¶ 6 (2015); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.43(b). The imposition of such a 3

sanction should be imposed only when a party has failed to exercise basic due diligence in complying with an order or has exhibited negligence or bad faith in its efforts to comply. Leseman, 122 M.S.P.R. 139, ¶ 6. An administrative judge should not resort to the imposition of sanctions unless necessary to serve the ends of justice. Holland v. Department of Labor, 108 M.S.P.R. 599, ¶ 9 (2008). Absent a showing of abuse of discretion, the Board will not reverse an administrative judge’s determination regarding sanctions. Wiggins v. Department of the Air Force, 113 M.S.P.R. 443, ¶ 11 (2010). ¶6 Here, the record does not reflect that the appellant exercised negligence or bad faith in his efforts to comply. Furthermore, we disagree that the appellant failed to exercise basic due diligence in complying with the administrative judge’s orders under the circumstances. First, the appellant was pro se. See Tully v. Department of Justice, 95 M.S.P.R. 481, ¶ 11 (2004) (stating that dismissal for failure to prosecute is a drastic sanction that should not be imposed lightly, especially when the appellant is not represented). Second, as set forth above, the administrative judge set the response date to the Order to Show Cause between December 26, 2019, and January 3, 2020—a narrow window falling during the holiday period. Third, the appellant’s wife was undergoing chemotherapy, which the appellant explained in his initial appeal and reiterates on review. IAF, Tab 1 at 5; PFR File, Tab 1. Finally, the appellant was provided with only approximately 1 month to comply from the time the administrative judge first issued the acknowledgment order to when the initial decision was issued. Cf. Heckman v. Department of the Interior, 106 M.S.P.R. 210, ¶ 16 (2007) (finding that the administrative judge did not abuse her discretion by dismissing the appellant's claims for failure to prosecute when the appellant did not comply with multiple orders over a period of nearly 2½ months). ¶7 The administrative judge justifiably may have been frustrated with the appellant’s lack of responses to the acknowledgment and show cause orders. However, the extreme sanction of dismissal for failure to prosecute does not serve 4

the ends of justice here. See Tully, 95 M.S.P.R. 481, ¶¶ 10, 12 (vacating an administrative judge’s dismissal for failure to prosecute because the sanction was too severe although the pro se appellant had twice failed to file prehearing submissions and to appear for prehearing conferences). Accordingly, we find that the administrative judge abused his discretion in dismissing the appeal for failure to prosecute, and we vacate the initial decision. However, for the reasons set forth below, we find that remand is not necessary because the Board lacks jurisdiction over this appeal

The appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. ¶8 The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Whether an individual in the competitive service has the right to appeal an adverse action depends on whether he is an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A). See Walker v. Department of the Army, 119 M.S.P.R. 391, ¶ 5 (2013). Title 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A) defines an “employee” as an individual in the competitive service who (i) is not serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment, or (ii) has completed 1 year of current continuous service under other than a temporary appointment limited to 1 year or less. 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A). The two prongs of the statutory definition are distinct and provide alternatives by which an individual may be found to be an employee with appeal rights. McCormick v. Department of the Air Force, 307 F.3d 1339, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

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Daniel I Gregory v. Department of the Navy, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/daniel-i-gregory-v-department-of-the-navy-mspb-2024.