Daniel C. Parra v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: February 2, 2012
• Docket: 01-11-00300-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued February 2, 2012.

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-11-00300-CV

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Daniel C. Parra, Appellant

V.

The State of Texas, Appellee

On Appeal from the 157th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2010-78122

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Texas inmate Daniel C. Parra appeals the dismissal of his pro se suit for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking the return of personal property that the State had seized from him in connection with his arrest and conviction on charges of possession with intent to deliver certain illegal drugs.  Before Parra filed this suit, those funds became the subject of a forfeiture action in which the trial court entered judgment against Parra.  Parra contends that the trial court in this proceeding abused its discretion in dismissing his suit as having no arguable basis in law or fact.  Finding no error, we affirm.

Background

In early 2006, Parra was arrested and indicted for the felony offenses of possession with intent to deliver at least 400 grams of cocaine and delivery of more than four grams of 3, 4 methylenedioxymethamphetamine.  At the same time, the State seized approximately $55,929 in currency and a 1988 Porsche Boxster from Parra.  The State instituted a civil forfeiture proceeding.  After Parra answered, the State sent him written discovery, including a request for admissions, to his address at the Texas Department of Corrections.  When Parra did not timely respond, the State moved to deem its request for admissions admitted and moved for judgment on the deemed admissions.  The trial court granted the State’s motion and signed a final judgment against Parra’s claim to the property (the civil forfeiture judgment).  Parra did not appeal that judgment.  Three years later, he filed this suit.

Dismissal under Chapter 14

Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code applies to an inmate who files a lawsuit accompanied by an affidavit or unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs.   See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.002 (West 2002).  When an inmate files an unsworn declaration of inability to pay, the trial court has broad discretion to dismiss the suit as frivolous or malicious. Id. § 14.003(a)(2) (West 2002); Lentworth v. Trahan, 981 S.W.2d 720, 722 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.).  

Standard of Review

To obtain reversal of a Chapter 14 dismissal, the inmate must show that the trial court’s action was arbitrary or unreasonable in light of all the circumstances.  Thomas, 52 S.W.3d at 294.  A trial court properly dismisses a suit brought under Chapter 14 when the inmate fails to comply with the statute’s requirements.  Brewer v. Simental, 268 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 14.002(a), 14.004, 14.005 (West 2002), and Bell v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice–Inst. Div., 962 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied)). 

A court also may dismiss the suit if it finds that the suit is frivolous or malicious—that is, if the claims raised in the suit have no arguable basis in law or fact.  See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(a)(2), (b)(2) (West 2002).  When a trial court dismisses a suit without conducting an evidentiary hearing, we may affirm the dismissal only if the inmate’s claims have no arguable basis in law.  Sawyer v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 983 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); Lentworth, 981 S.W.2d at 722.  We review de novo the legal question of whether the inmate’s claims have an arguable basis in law.  Scott v. Gallagher, 209 S.W.3d 262, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Sawyer, 983 S.W.2d at 311. 

Preclusive Effect of Civil Forfeiture Judgment

Parra complains that the trial court erred in dismissing his suit as frivolous based on res judicata.  Res judicata precludes relitigation of claims that have been finally adjudicated on their merits or that arise out of the same subject matter and could have been litigated in the prior action.  Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex. 1992); Smith v. Brown, P.C., 51 S.W.3d 376, 379 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).  The elements of res judicata are (1) a prior, final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) parties who are identical or share the same interests; and (3) a second action based on the same claims that were raised or could have been raised in the first action.  Smith, 51 S.W.3d at 379 (citing Amstadt v. United States Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996)).

Here, both the civil forfeiture suit and Parra’s claims in this case arise out of the State’s seizure of certain of Parra’s personal property on or about January 1, 2006.  The civil forfeiture judgment shows that both Parra and the State were parties in that proceeding.  Parra does not dispute these facts, but contends that res judicata does not bar his suit because the trial court that issued the civil forfeiture lacked competent jurisdiction over him.  He claims that he had no notice of the suit or the judgment.  He also disputes the authenticity of the answer to the suit filed under his name.  This challenge, however, does not provide any arguable basis for questioning the validity of the prior judgment in this case. 

“A collateral attack is an attempt to avoid the binding force of a judgment in a proceeding not instituted for the purpose of correcting, modifying, or vacating the judgment, but in order to obtain some specific relief which the judgment currently stands as a bar against.”  Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2005).  “Collateral attacks on final judgments are generally disallowed because it is the policy of the law to give finality to the judgments of the courts.”  Id. at 345.  For this reason, when reviewing a collateral attack, we presume the validity of the judgment under attack.  Shackelford v. Barton, 156 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2004, pet. denied); Toles v. Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899, 914 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.).  

A litigant challenging the validity of a judgment in another court may not use extrinsic evidence to establish a lack of jurisdiction.  Holloway v. Starnes, 840 S.W.2d 14, 18 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied); Huffstutlar v. Koons, 789 S.W.2d 707, 710 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, orig. proceeding) (en banc).  The jurisdictional defect must be apparent from the face of the judgment.  Waldron v. Waldron, 614 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1981, no writ).  If a court having potential jurisdiction renders a judgment that is regular on its face and which contains recitations stating that the court’s potential jurisdiction has been activated, the judgment is voidable, not void, and may be set aside only by direct attack.  Id.  As happened here, jurisdictional recitals in the judgment control the rest of the record so that, even though other parts of the record may show a lack of jurisdiction, if the judgment recites the contrary, the collateral attack fails.  Holloway, 840 S.W.2d at 18; Huffstutlar, 789 S.W.2d at 710; see Narvaez v. Maldonado, 127 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.); Toles, 113 S.W.3d at 914.  The trial court, therefore, properly declined to consider Parra’s written statement denying his appearance in the civil forfeiture case in determining the applicability of res judicata to Parra’s suit.

Parra also complains of the trial court’s failure to address his “First Supplemental Petition for Bill of Review” or grant his request for a hearing.  “A bill of review is brought as a direct attack on a judgment that is no longer appealable or subject to a motion for new trial.”  Frost Nat’l Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 504 (Tex. 2010) (citing King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003)).  “Because it is a direct attack, a bill of review must be brought in the court that rendered the original judgment, and only that court has jurisdiction over the bill.”  Id.; Solomon, Lambert, Roth & Assocs. Inc. v. Kidd, 904 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist. 1995, no writ).  Here, the trial court did not render the original judgment.  The trial court thus had no authority to consider Parra’s direct attack on the civil forfeiture judgment.  Parra can raise this challenge only in the civil forfeiture court. 

The civil forfeiture judgment recites that “The Pro-Se Respondent, DANIEL CHAVEZ PARRA, . . . filed his Answer to Plaintiff’s Original Notice of Seizure and Forfeiture on April 3, 2006.”  For purposes of this collateral attack, this recital conclusively shows that the trial court had jurisdiction over Parra in that proceeding.[1]  The evidence conclusively satisfies the three elements of res judicata, so no hearing was necessary.  The civil forfeiture judgment disposed of Parra’s claims to the seized property on their merits, and Parra may not relitigate them in this suit.  We hold that the trial court properly concluded that no arguable legal basis existed for challenging the validity of the civil forfeiture judgment.

Conclusion

          The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Parra’s suit as frivolous.  We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                      Jane Bland

                                                                      Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Bland and Huddle.

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[1]         The judgment’s recitation also disposes of Parra’s contention that he was not properly served with citation.  See Tex. R. Civ. P. 120.