Daniel Aguilar Chavez v. Warden, California City Detention Facility

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: June 25, 2026
• Docket: 1:26-cv-03023
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DANIEL AGUILAR CHAVEZ (A- Case No. 1:26-cv-3023-DC-JDP NUMBER: 221-452-360), 12 Petitioner, 13 ORDER v. 14

15 WARDEN, CALIFORNIA CITY DETENTION FACILITY, 16 Respondent. 17 18 On April 21, 2026, petitioner, an immigration detainee who is representing himself, filed a 19 petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. On May 12, 2026, the court 20 ordered respondent to provide petitioner with a bond hearing. ECF No. 8. On May 27, 2026, 21 respondent moved to dismiss, alleging that a bond hearing was held and, therefore, that the 22 petition is moot. ECF No. 10. On June 15, 2026, respondent informed the court that petitioner 23 has been subject to a final order of removal since April 10, 2026. ECF Nos. 12 & 15. For the 24 following reasons, I recommend that respondent’s motion to dismiss be denied and that the 25 petition be denied. 26 Background 27 Petitioner came to the United States from Guatemala without permission at an unknown 28 time. ECF No. 7-1 at 1. He was detained by ICE on February 27, 2026, after a misdemeanor 1 arrest. Id. On March 10, 2026, an immigration judge granted petitioner voluntary departure 2 “under safeguards,” meaning that he would stay in ICE custody until his departure. ECF No. 15- 3 1. That voluntary departure order expired on April 10, 2026 with petitioner still in ICE custody. 4 Id.; ECF No. 15. The expiration of the voluntary departure order renders it a final removal order. 5 ECF No. 15-1 at 1. On June 18, 2026, respondent indicated that “removal is in progress.” ECF 6 No. 15. The ICE detainee locator still shows petitioner in ICE custody, though it appears 7 petitioner has been moved to a facility in Louisiana.1 8 Procedural History 9 Petitioner filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion for a temporary 10 restraining order on April 21, 2026, claiming that his detention violated due process.2 ECF Nos. 11 1, 2. The court ordered briefing on the motion for temporary restraining order on April 22, 2026 12 and ordered respondent to answer the petition. ECF No. 6. In its answer, respondent argued that 13 petitioner could be mandatorily held pending removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 14 § 1225(b)(2). ECF No. 7 at 1. 15 On May 12, 2026, the court granted petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order 16 and ordered that petitioner be afforded a bond hearing “at which the government shall bear the 17 burden of justifying Petitioner’s continued detention by clear and convincing evidence.” ECF 18 No. 8. On May 27, 2026, respondent moved to dismiss the petition as moot and filed a status 19 report indicating that a bond hearing was held, at which petitioner was denied bond. ECF No. 10. 20 Because it was unclear whether the bond hearing complied with the court’s order 21 regarding the allocation of burden, I ordered respondent to file a transcript or audio recording of 22 the bond hearing. ECF No. 14. Respondent asked to be excused from this requirement for two 23

24 1 I will direct the Clerk of Court to serve a copy of these findings and recommendations on petitioner at this facility. 25 2 Petitioner filed a motion for appointment of counsel. ECF No. 3. There currently exists 26 no absolute right to appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings. See Nevius v. Sumner, 105 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 1996). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, the court can appoint counsel at any 27 stage of the case “if the interests of justice so require.” See Rule 8(c), Fed. R. Governing § 2254 Cases. I do not find that the interests of justice require appointment of counsel at the present 28 time. Petitioner’s motion to appoint counsel is therefore denied. 1 reasons. First, respondent argued that because petitioner “has not alleged that his bond hearing 2 was defective,” the court could not consider whether the bond hearing complied with its earlier 3 order. ECF No. 12 at 1. Second, and more significantly, respondent informed the court that 4 petitioner is “now subject to a final order of removal.” Id. 5 I ordered respondent to file a copy of the removal order. ECF No. 14. Respondent filed a 6 copy of the voluntary departure order from March 10, 2026, and explained that this order became 7 a final order of removal on April 10, 2026. See ECF No. 15. Indeed, the immigration judge’s 8 order provides that in the event petitioner did not voluntarily depart from the United States by 9 April 9, 2026, then “the following order . . . shall become immediately effective: [petitioner] shall 10 be removed to Guatemala.” ECF No. 15-1 at 1. Accordingly, because petitioner did not 11 voluntarily depart by that time, his removal order became administratively final on April 10, 12 2026.3 See id. 13 Legal Standard 14 A federal court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner shows that his custody violates 15 federal law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3), 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-75 16 (2000). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of 17 that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 18 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a 19 petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 20 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of 21 reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have 22 been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction 23 includes challenges to immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 24 25

26 3 Notably, significant time elapsed, and substantial court resources were consumed, during the time between when the removal order became final and when the court was informed of the 27 order. See ECF Nos. 12 & 15. Neither respondent’s answer, ECF No. 7, nor its motion to dismiss, ECF No. 10, communicated that petitioner had been subject to a final order of removal 28 under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). 1 Analysis 2 Respondent’s motion to dismiss argues that the matter is moot because petitioner received 3 a bond hearing. See ECF No. 10. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that when a 4 noncitizen “is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United 5 States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C. 6 § 1231(a)(1)(A). Relevant here, the removal period begins on the “date the order of removal 7 becomes administratively final.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B). Moreover, detention during the removal 8 period is mandatory. See id. § 1231(a)(2)(A) (“During the removal period, the Attorney General 9 shall detain the alien.”). The Court of Appeals has held that this period of detention “passes 10 constitutional scrutiny” because there is no danger of indefinite detention; on the contrary, the 11 provision authorizes “detention for 90 days only.” Khotesouvan v. Morones, 386 F.3d 1298, 1301 12 (9th Cir. 2004). 13 Here, the immigration judge’s order granting voluntary departure states that, in the event 14 petitioner did not voluntarily depart from the United States by April 9, 2026, then “the following 15 order . . . shall become immediately effective: [petitioner] shall be removed to Guatemala.” ECF 16 No. 15-1 at 1. This language complies with the regulatory framework, which provides that an 17 order of removal becomes final “upon overstay of the voluntary departure period.” See 8 C.F.R. 18 § 1241.1(f). Indeed, the Court of Appeals has held that where, as here, a noncitizen does not 19 depart during the voluntary departure period, an order of removal becomes “administratively 20 final” on the “first day of [the petitioner’s] overstay.” Diouf v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 1222, 1229 21 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, because petitioner did not depart by April 9, 2026, his removal 22 order became administratively final on April 10, 2026, and he therefore is subject to mandatory 23 detention during his removal period, which runs through July 9, 2026. See 8 U.S.C. 24 §§ 1231(a)(1)(A), (2)(A). Notably, this mandatory detention does not violate petitioner’s due 25 process rights. See Khotesouvan, 386 F.3d at 1301. 26 It also bears mention that after the removal period expires in July 2026, petitioner could 27 still be subject to discretionary detention. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). In Zadvydas, the Supreme 28 Court addressed a challenge to prolonged detention under this section and held that: 1 We do have reason to believe, however, that Congress previously doubted the constitutionality of detention for more than six months. 2 Consequently, for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts, we recognize that period. After this 6-month period, once 3 the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the 4 Government must respond with evidence sufficient. 5 533 U.S. at 701 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 6 Accordingly, petitioner’s detention is “presumptively reasonable” until six months 7 following when the order of removal became final. See id. 8 Conclusion 9 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 10 1. Petitioner’s motion for the appointment of counsel, ECF No. 3, is DENIED. 11 2. The Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of these findings and recommendations to 12 petitioner at the following address: Winn Correctional Center, 560 Gum Spring Road, Winnfield, 13 LA 71483. 14 Further, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: 15 1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 10, be DENIED. 16 2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 1, be DENIED. 17 3. The Clerk of Court be ordered to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 18 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 19 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days of 20 service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the 21 court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to 22 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed 23 within fourteen days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 24 objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See 25 Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 26 1991). 27 28 1 ITIS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ June 25, 2026 Q_———— 4 JEREMY D. PETERSON 5 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28