Daniel 159780 v. McCarthy

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided March 4, 2020·No. 3:19-cv-08040·Unknown

Opinion

WO SKC Chad Duane Daniel, No. CV 19-08040-PCT-MTL (MTM) Plaintiff, v. ORDER Chris McCarthy, et al., Defendants.

Plaintiff Chad Duane Daniel, who is currently confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence in Florence, Arizona, brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants move for summary judgment based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Doc. 24.) Plaintiff was informed of his rights and obligations to respond pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Doc. 32), and he failed to file a timely response. Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s “Motion to Discuss Summary Judgment on Behalf of the Plaintiff in Conjunction with the Memorandum and Points that Follow (with good cause appearing)” (Doc. 59). The Court will deny both Motions. I. Background On screening of Plaintiff’s one-count Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff stated failure-to-protect claims against Defendants Apache County Jail Sergeant Chris McCarthy and Nurse Destiny based on their failures to place Plaintiff on suicide watch or intervene in his injurious suicide attempt while he was in jail custody, and the Court directed Defendants to answer these claims. (Doc. 6.) After filing their Motion for Summary Judgment based on failure to exhaust, Defendants filed a Motion to Stay (Doc. 26), seeking to stay this action while their Motion for Summary Judgment was pending. The Court granted the Motion to Stay to the extent that it limited discovery to evidence concerning exhaustion, pending resolution of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Doc. 39.) In the same Order, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. 38), in which Plaintiff sought an additional 45 days to respond to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and it gave Plaintiff until November 14, 2019 to respond. (Doc. 39.) A month after the extended deadline for Plaintiff to respond to Defendants’ pending Motion for Summary Judgment passed without a response, Plaintiff filed a second Motion seeking additional time to respond (Doc. 49), and the Court denied the Motion on the grounds that Plaintiff had not shown good cause or excusable neglect for failing to seek an extension of the response deadline. (Doc. 53.) II. Legal Standards A. Summary Judgment A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). The movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–89 (1968); however, it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court does not make credibility determinations; it must believe the nonmovant’s evidence and draw all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255; Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). Where the nonmovant is a pro se litigant, the court must consider as evidence in opposition to summary judgment all of the nonmovant’s contentions set forth in a verified complaint or motion. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004). B. Exhaustion Legal Standard Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner must exhaust “available” administrative remedies before filing an action in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). The prisoner must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable rules. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006). Exhaustion is required for all suits about prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002), regardless of the type of relief offered through the administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). The defendant bears the initial burden to show that there was an available administrative remedy and that the prisoner did not exhaust it. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014); see Brown, 422 F.3d at 936-37 (a defendant must demonstrate that applicable relief remained available in the grievance process). Once that showing is made, the burden shifts to the prisoner, who must either demonstrate that he, in fact, exhausted administrative remedies or “come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. The ultimate burden, however, rests with the defendant. Id. Summary jud

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