Dandy v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Dandy v. State

518 S.E.2d 907, 238 Ga. App. 435, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 2482, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 837

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedJune 3, 1999

DocketA99A0849

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 518 S.E.2d 907 (Dandy v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Dandy v. State, 518 S.E.2d 907, 238 Ga. App. 435, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 2482, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 837 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).

Pincite

Opinion

Johnson, Chief Judge.

A jury found Henry Dandy guilty of possession of cocaine. Dandy appeals from the judgment of conviction entered on the verdict and the denial of his motion for new trial. For the following reasons, we affirm.

1. Dandy contends the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict because the state failed to prove venue. The indictment charged Dandy with possessing cocaine in Muscogee County. The arresting officer testified that the offense was committed in Muscogee County. We note that there was no evidence that the offense was committed in any other county. The evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury’s finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the crime charged was committed in Muscogee County. See Pryor v. State, 231 Ga. App. 136, 137 (3) (497 SE2d 805) (1998); Joiner v. State, 231 Ga. App. 61, 63 (497 SE2d 642) (1998).

2. Dandy complains that the state failed to introduce this evidence of venue before resting its case, and argues that the trial court erred in permitting the state to reopen its case so that it could introduce evidence establishing venue. This enumeration is without merit.

It is within the trial court’s discretionary power to permit the state to reopen its case after the close of evidence and to introduce further evidence. See Thompson v. State, 175 Ga. App. 645, 646 (1) (b) (334 SE2d 312) (1985); Morris v. State, 170 Ga. App. 849, 850 (2) (318 *436 SE2d 517) (1984). We find no abuse of discretion. See Bryan v. State, 168 Ga. App. 711-712 (1) (310 SE2d 533) (1983). Because the trial court was authorized to allow the case to be reopened, and because sufficient evidence of venue was introduced upon reopening, we need not decide whether the circumstantial evidence of venue introduced before the case was reopened was sufficient to prove venue. See generally Davis v. State, 225 Ga. App. 564, 566 (3) (484 SE2d 284) (1997) (venue may be proved by circumstantial evidence); and Frisbey v. State, 236 Ga. App. 883, 885 (2) (514 SE2d 453) (1999) (evidence of venue sufficient where officer testified as to which county he worked for and there was no evidence conflicting with conclusion that venue was in that county).

Decided June 3, 1999 — Cert. applied for. William J. Mason, for appellant. Henry A. Dandy, Jr., pro se. J. Gray Conger, District Attorney, Mark A. Casto, Frances D. Hakes, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.

Judgment affirmed.

Pope, P. J., and Smith, J., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Johnson, Chief Judge.

A jury found Henry Dandy guilty of possession of cocaine. Dandy appeals from the judgment of conviction entered on the verdict and the denial of his motion for new trial. For the following reasons, we affirm.

1. Dandy contends the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict because the state failed to prove venue. The indictment charged Dandy with possessing cocaine in Muscogee County. The arresting officer testified that the offense was committed in Muscogee County. We note that there was no evidence that the offense was committed in any other county. The evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury’s finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the crime charged was committed in Muscogee County. See Pryor v. State, 231 Ga. App. 136, 137 (3) (497 SE2d 805) (1998); Joiner v. State, 231 Ga. App. 61, 63 (497 SE2d 642) (1998).

2. Dandy complains that the state failed to introduce this evidence of venue before resting its case, and argues that the trial court erred in permitting the state to reopen its case so that it could introduce evidence establishing venue. This enumeration is without merit.

It is within the trial court’s discretionary power to permit the state to reopen its case after the close of evidence and to introduce further evidence. See Thompson v. State, 175 Ga. App. 645, 646 (1) (b) (334 SE2d 312) (1985); Morris v. State, 170 Ga. App. 849, 850 (2) (318 *436 SE2d 517) (1984). We find no abuse of discretion. See Bryan v. State, 168 Ga. App. 711-712 (1) (310 SE2d 533) (1983). Because the trial court was authorized to allow the case to be reopened, and because sufficient evidence of venue was introduced upon reopening, we need not decide whether the circumstantial evidence of venue introduced before the case was reopened was sufficient to prove venue. See generally Davis v. State, 225 Ga. App. 564, 566 (3) (484 SE2d 284) (1997) (venue may be proved by circumstantial evidence); and Frisbey v. State, 236 Ga. App. 883, 885 (2) (514 SE2d 453) (1999) (evidence of venue sufficient where officer testified as to which county he worked for and there was no evidence conflicting with conclusion that venue was in that county).

Decided June 3, 1999 — Cert. applied for. William J. Mason, for appellant. Henry A. Dandy, Jr., pro se. J. Gray Conger, District Attorney, Mark A. Casto, Frances D. Hakes, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.

Judgment affirmed.

Pope, P. J., and Smith, J., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

518 S.E.2d 907, 238 Ga. App. 435, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 2482, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 837, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dandy-v-state-gactapp-1999.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack