D'Andrea Harris v. United States Postal Service

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedDecember 16, 2022
DocketCH-0752-16-0501-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of D'Andrea Harris v. United States Postal Service (D'Andrea Harris v. United States Postal Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
D'Andrea Harris v. United States Postal Service, (Miss. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

D’ANDREA L. HARRIS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, CH-0752-16-0501-I-1

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, DATE: December 16, 2022 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Catherine O. Marks, Chicago, Illinois, for the appellant.

Rebecca L. Heeter, Esquire, Chicago, Illinois, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial d ecision, which dismissed her suspension appeal for lack of jurisdiction . Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND ¶2 The appellant, who is employed as a Level 07 Lead Sales Clerk, filed a Board appeal, challenging the agency’s decision to place her in an emergency off-duty status (without pay) and change her work schedule. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 2, Tab 9, Initial Decision (ID) at 2. She alleged the actions were taken in reprisal for her equal employment opportunity (EEO) activit y. IAF, Tab 1 at 2. The administrative judge apprised the appellant of her burden to establish jurisdiction over her appeal, including that she was a Postal employee over whom the Board had jurisdiction, and afforded her an opportunity to provide additional argument and evidence on the jurisdictional issue. IAF, Tab 2 at 2-3. The appellant’s response only provided more details about the complained-of personnel actions and her reprisal claims, which were immaterial to the identified jurisdictional issue. IAF, Tab 7. ¶3 The administrative judge issued an initial decision, dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, without holding the appellant’s requested hearing. IAF, Tab 1 at 1, ID at 7. The administrative judge considered the undisputed facts that 3

the appellant had served in the U.S. Army from August 6, 1980, until she was honorably discharged on October 27, 1981, and that at the time of filing her appeal, she had completed 1 year of current, continuous service. ID at 2, 4. She nonetheless found that the appellant did not nonfrivolously allege that she was an employee, as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B) or 39 U.S.C. § 1005(a)(4), with chapter 75 adverse action appeal rights. ID at 3-7. Specifically, the administrative judge found that the appellant was not a manager, supervisor, or confidential employee. ID at 4. She further found that the appellant was not preference eligible, as she did not meet the statutory definition of a veteran because she did not serve during the time periods enumerated in 5 U.S.C. § 2108(1) or receive a campaign badge or expeditionary medal, and she did not claim to be or provide evidence that she was a disabled veteran. ID at 4-6. The administrative judge also noted that this finding was consistent with the appellant’s initial appeal form, in which she indicated that she was not entitled to veterans’ preference. ID at 6. Finally, she found that in the absence of an otherwise appealable action, the Board lacked jurisdiction over the appellan t’s EEO reprisal claims. ID at 7. ¶4 The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. 2 The agency has filed a response, to which the appellant has replied. PFR File, Tabs 5-6.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW ¶5 To appeal an adverse action under chapter 75, a Postal Service employee must be covered by 39 U.S.C. § 1005(a) or 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B). 5 U.S.C.

2 On September 13, 2016, the appellant filed with the Board’s Central Regional Office her “Response to Jurisdiction,” challenging the administrative judge’s dismissal of her appeal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3, 5, 24. The Central Regional Office forwarded the filing to the Clerk of the Board, who properly docketed it as a petition for review. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2, 5-7; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(1) (explaining that a petition for review is a pleading in which a party contends that an initial decision was incorrectly decided in whole or in part). 4

§ 7511(b)(8). Thus, the individual must be a preference eligible, a management or supervisory employee, or an employee engaged in personnel work in other than a purely nonconfidential clerical capacity; and must have completed 1 year of current continuous service in the same or similar position. Toomey v. U.S. Postal Service, 71 M.S.P.R. 10, 12 (1996). ¶6 The appellant challenges the administrative judge’s finding that her position is not supervisory or managerial, arguing, for the first time on review, that her position is equivalent to a supervisory position. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-7. She further claims, for the first time on review, that she is entitled to veterans’ preference because she is a “service connected veteran.” Id. She seeks to provide new evidence in support of those contentions: (1) a document, dated March 19, 1987, indicating that she was discharged from the U.S. Army Reserves on that date; (2) an undated position description and qualification standards for her position; and (3) a Department of Labor, Family Medical Leave Act certification prepared by her physician in 2014 concerning her health condition at that time. 3 PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-17. ¶7 The Board generally will not consider an argument raised for the first time in a petition for review absent a showing that it is based on new and material evidence not previously available despite the party’s due diligence. Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R.

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D'Andrea Harris v. United States Postal Service, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dandrea-harris-v-united-states-postal-service-mspb-2022.