Dana Ricketts v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement

• Court: District Court, W.D. Louisiana
• Decided: April 29, 2026
• Docket: 6:26-cv-00667
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

DANA RICKETTS CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-0667

SECTION P VS. JUDGE ALEXANDER C. VAN HOOK

U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY ENFORCEMENT

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Dana Ricketts,1 a detainee at South Louisiana ICE Processing Center in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) who proceeds pro se, petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.2 For reasons below, the Court should dismiss the petition as premature. Background

Petitioner is a citizen of Jamaica. She entered the United States of America in August 1990. [doc. # 1-2, p. 3]. She states that ICE detained her on February 28, 2023. Id. at 3. On September 17, 2025, an immigration judge ordered her removed from the United States. Id. Petitioner appealed the removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”); the appeal is pending. [doc. # 1, p. 2].

1 Petitioner’s “A-Number” is 042-464-279.

2 This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636, and the standing orders of the Court. Petitioner filed this proceeding on February 20, 2026. [doc. # 1, p. 8]. Citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), she claims that she has been detained for an unreasonable period and that ICE is not likely to remove her in the near future. [doc. #s 1, p. 6; 1-2, p. 2]. She states, “According to ICE Dos there is no estimated date of departure, it remains indefinite.” [doc. # 1-

2, p. 3]. Petitioner seeks immediate release from custody. [doc. # 1, p. 7]. Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), the Court has federal subject-matter jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by aliens claiming they are being detained “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). However, the ‘REAL ID Act’ of 2005 divests federal courts of jurisdiction over several categories of immigration proceedings. See Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231 (2005). District courts may not review challenges to final orders of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5); Moreira v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 709, 712 (5th Cir. 2007). And no federal court may review any

action that is committed to the discretion of the Attorney General or the DHS Secretary, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), including decisions “regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole,” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). The Supreme Court recognized a distinction between challenges to individual, discretionary detention decisions—which are prohibited—and “challenges to the statutory framework that permits [an] alien’s detention without bail”—which remain cognizable under the habeas statute. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 (2018) (internal alterations omitted) (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516 (2003)); see Aracely, R. v. Nielsen, 319 F. Supp. 3d 110, 135 (D.D.C. 2018) (“While§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) undoubtedly bars judicial review of individual parole decisions, courts have declined to apply it to claims challenging the legality of policies and processes governing discretionary decisions under the INA.”). Despite any statutory limitations on judicial review, federal courts retain “jurisdiction to review [an alien’s] detention insofar as that detention presents constitutional issues,” Oyelude v.

Chertoff, 125 F. App’x 543, 546 (5th Cir. 2005), such as “questions of law regarding the AG’s statutory authority or the regulatory framework” governing immigration detention, Garza-Garcia v. Moore, 539 F. Supp. 2d 899, 903 (S.D. Tex. 2007); see also Maldonado v. Macias, 150 F. Supp. 3d 788, 794 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (“[E]ven after the passage of the REAL ID Act, district courts retain the power to hear statutory and constitutional challenges to civil immigration detention under § 2241 when those claims do not challenge a final order of removal, but instead challenge the detention itself.”). Law and Analysis In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (emphasis added), the Supreme Court held that if an alien is detained for six months after a final order of removal, and if the alien

petitioning for habeas corpus “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. “[A]n alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. Petitioner’s claim, however, is premature because her appeal before the BIA is pending and thus her order of removal is not final. See Lopez Acosta v. Rosen, 2021 WL 54772, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 6, 2021) (“Because Lopez Acosta is currently pursuing administrative remedies below, he is no longer subject to a final order of removal . . . .”); Castillo-Rodriguez v. I.N.S., 929 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1991) (“The order of the immigration judge, then, is not final when a timely appeal is taken to the Board.”). Under 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(47), an “order of deportation” becomes final upon the earlier of: “(i) a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such order; or (ii) the

expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.” Likewise, under 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1, “An order of removal made by the immigration judge . . . shall become final: (a) Upon dismissal of an appeal by the Board of Immigration Appeals . . . .” See Agyei-Kodie v. Holder, 418 F. App'x 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2011). The Court should dismiss Petitioner’s claims. Recommendation For the reasons above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner Dana Ricketts’s petition be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to her right to re-file her Zadvydas claim should her confinement become unconstitutional. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s motion to terminate mandatory

ICE detention, [doc. # 2], and motion for appointed counsel, [doc. # 4], be DENIED AS MOOT. Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of any objections or response to the district judge at the time of filing. Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass vy. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (5" Cir. 1996). In Chambers, Monroe, Louisiana, this 29" day of April, 2026.

Kayla Dye McClusky United States Magistrate Judge