1 2
3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE
9 10 DAMIA BJURLING, CASE NO. C25-5559JLR 11 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 12 ALEC JOHNSON, et al., 13 Defendants. 14
15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Before the court are (1) Defendant Police Chief Shelby Parker’s motion to dismiss 17 (MTD (Dkt. # 31)) and Plaintiff Damia Bjurling’s motions for (2) entry of default against 18 Chief Parker and Defendant Calvin Earl Holder, III, (together, “Defendants”) (Def. Mot. 19 (Dkt. # 34)); (3) joinder of new defendants (MFJ (Dkt. # 39)); (4) a protective order 20 against Chief Parker, (MPO (Dkt. # 44)); and (5) leave to amend her second amended 21 complaint and for sanctions against counsel for non-party Intercity Transit (MTA (Dkt. 22 # 46).). Chief Parker opposes Ms. Bjurling’s motion for entry of default (Def. Mot. Resp. 1 (Dkt. # 38)), and did not respond to Ms. Bjurling’s other motions (see generally Dkt.). 2 Ms. Bjurling opposes Chief Parker’s motion to dismiss. (MTD Resp. (Dkt. # 36).) The
3 court has considered the parties’ submissions, the relevant portions of the record, and the 4 governing law. Being fully advised,1 the court DENIES Ms. Bjurling’s motions for entry 5 of default, joinder, a protective order, leave to amend, and sanctions; and GRANTS Chief 6 Parker’s motion to dismiss. 7 II. BACKGROUND 8 The court set forth much of the factual and procedural background of this matter in
9 its August 8, 2025 order dismissing Ms. Bjurling’s amended complaint (see, e.g., 8/8/25 10 Order (Dkt. # 14) at 2-4) and does not repeat that background here except as relevant. On 11 August 10, 2025, Ms. Bjurling filed a second amended complaint against former 12 Defendant Alec Johnson, Chief Parker, and Mr. Holder in which she alleged that 13 Defendants’ joint actions violated her rights under the First, Eighth, Tenth, and
14 Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Americans with Disabilities Act 15 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132; the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f); and 16 multiple state statutes. (See 2d Am. Compl. (“SAC”) (Dkt. # 18) at 5, 8, 13.) Ms. 17 Bjurling, who alleges that she was sexually assaulted by non-party Demmeitrick Swansey 18 on July 21, 2025, asserts that: (1) Mr. Holder recorded the sexual assault and violated a
19 Vulnerable Adult Protection Order (“VAPO”) to which Mr. Holder is subject; 20 1 Ms. Bjurling requests oral argument on Chief Parker’s motion to dismiss. (See MTD 21 Resp. at 1.) The court, however, concludes that oral argument would not assist in its resolution of that motion. See Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(4) (providing that all motions will be 22 decided by the court without oral argument unless otherwise court ordered). 1 (2) Olympia police officers2 “downgraded” the criminal charges against Mr. Swansey 2 and Mr. Holder to misdemeanors and failed to record or retain body-camera footage; and
3 (3) Mr. Johnson and Mr. Holder’s conduct violated the ADA and the FHA and resulted in 4 injuries to Ms. Bjurling and her service dog that required medical and veterinary care. 5 (Id. at 13.) 6 On August 11, 2025, the court dismissed Ms. Bjurling’s claims against Mr. 7 Johnson and directed Ms. Bjurling to serve the filed version of the second amended 8 complaint on Chief Parker and Mr. Holder. (8/11/25 Order (Dkt. # 19) at 3-5.) On
9 August 15, 2025, Ms. Bjurling filed an affidavit stating that she had personally served 10 Chief Parker “[v]ia Postal Service on Council [sic] Mix Sanders Thompson PLLC” on 11 August 15, 2025. (Parker Service Aff. (Dkt. # 25) at 2.) On August 22, 2025, Ms. 12 Bjurling filed an affidavit stating that she had personally served Mr. Holder by first-class 13 mail to his residence on August 20, 2025. (Holder Service Aff. (Dkt. # 26) at 1, 4.)
14 On September 13, 2025, Ms. Bjurling filed a motion for default judgment, which 15 the court denied because default had not yet been entered against Defendants as required 16 by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 and Local Civil Rule 55(b)(1). (See generally 17 MDJ (Dkt. # 27); 9/17/25 Order (Dkt. # 30).) Chief Parker filed the instant motion to 18 dismiss on September 17, 2025 (see MTD), and Ms. Bjurling filed the instant motion for
19 entry of default on September 19, 2025 (see Def. Mot.). 20 21
2 Although Ms. Bjurling mentions “Officers Spithaler, Davis, and Supervisor Sparks” in 22 her second amended complaint (id. at 8, 13), she does not name them as defendants. 1 On September 28, 2025, Ms. Bjurling filed a motion to join Olympic Health & 2 Recovery Services, Lucy Stern, South Sound Behavioral Hospital, and Providence Health
3 & Services as new defendants in this matter for their roles in her civil commitment over 4 the past five years. (MFJ at 2 (contending that Ms. Bjurling has “endured five years of 5 repeated unlawful [Involuntary Treatment Act] detentions”).) 6 On October 9, 2025, Ms. Bjurling filed a motion for injunctive relief3 to prohibit 7 “[Chief] Parker and her agents” from subjecting Ms. Bjurling to civil commitment and to 8 direct the Thurston County Superior Court to comply with federal law. (MPO at 1, 3.)
9 On October 20, 2025, Ms. Bjurling filed a motion to amend her complaint to add claims 10 that “Intercity Transit’s counsel acted in coordination with or on behalf of Chief 11 Parker[]” to retaliate against her and to impose sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 on 12 counsel for Intercity Transit for “unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying proceedings 13 in coordination with [Chief Parker].” (MTA at 1-2.)
14 III. ANALYSIS 15 Below, the court reviews the parties’ motions and addresses each Defendant in 16 turn. In doing so, the court is mindful that Ms. Bjurling is proceeding pro se and, 17 therefore, the court is required to construe her pleadings liberally. See McGuckin v. 18
19 3 Ms. Bjurling specifically petitions the court for the following relief: (1) a protective 20 order prohibiting Chief Parker and all Designated Crisis Responders (“DCR”) from subjecting her to any crisis response; (2) a temporary restraining order preventing DCR agents from accessing her housing, medical, or behavioral records; (3) an order sealing all DCR-related 21 documentation tied to her ADA filing and neurodivergent status; (4) appointment of a federal monitor or special master to oversee DCR conduct and ensure compliance of federal law; and 22 (5) any other relief the court deems appropriate. (MPO at 4.) 1 Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992). Nevertheless, a pro se litigant must follow 2 the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants. See, e.g., Briones v. Riviera Hotel
3 & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir. 1997). 4 A. Chief Shelby Parker 5 The court first reviews Ms. Bjurling’s motion for entry of default against Chief 6 Paker and then considers Chief Parker’s motion to dismiss this action with prejudice 7 pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 8 1. Ms. Bjurling’s Motion for Entry of Default Against Chief Parker
9 An entry of default is appropriate “when a party against whom a judgment for 10 affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 55(a). To prevail, Ms. Bjurling must show that she properly served Chief Parker because 12 “[b]efore a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the 13 procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied.” Omni Cap. Int’l, Ltd.
14 v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987); see Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe 15 Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (“In the absence of service of process . . . a 16 court ordinarily may not exercise power over a party the complaint names as 17 defendant.”). Ms. Bjurling bears the burden of showing that service was valid. 18 Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2004). Typically, this burden is satisfied
19 by submitting an affidavit from a process server, which acts as “prima facie evidence of 20 valid service.” SEC v. Internet Sols. for Bus., Inc., 509 F.3d 1161, 1166 (9th Cir. 2007) 21 (citation omitted). Unless some defect in service is shown on the face of the return, the 22 1 process server’s affidavit is entitled to a presumption of correctness and may be 2 overcome only by “strong and convincing evidence.” Id.
3 Here, it is clear from the face of the service affidavit that Ms. Bjurling did not 4 properly serve Chief Parker . First, Ms. Bjurling, who is a party to this action, signed the 5 affidavit of service. (See Parker Service Aff.) Service was thus invalid on this basis 6 alone. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2) (providing that “[a]ny person who is at least 18 years 7 old and not a party may serve a summons and complaint”) (emphasis added). 8 Second, even if a non-party had signed the affidavit of service, Ms. Bjurling’s
9 attempted service would still be improper because first class mail is not an authorized 10 method of service. Because Chief Parker is an individual within a judicial district of the 11 United States, she must be served in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 4(e)(2), which requires Ms. Bjurling to (1) deliver the summons and second amended 13 complaint to Chief Parker personally, (2) leave a copy of each at Chief Parker’s dwelling
14 or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there, or 15 (3) deliver a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive 16 service of process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2). Rule 4(e)(1) also authorizes service by 17 following state law governing service in courts of general jurisdiction in the same district. 18 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). Under Washington law, Ms. Bjurling may serve Chief Parker
19 by (1) delivering a copy to Chief Parker personally or (2) leaving a copy at the house of 20 Chief Parker’s usual abode with some person of suitable age and discretion who resides 21 there. RCW 4.28.080(14). Neither state nor federal law authorizes service by mail. See 22 Smith v. Weber, No. C13-5207RJB, 2013 WL 12191398, at *6 (W.D. Wash. July 30, 1 2013) (affirming that Washington state laws do not permit service of a summons by 2 mail); see United States v. Wen-Bing Soong, 650 F. App'x 425, 427-28 (9th Cir. 2016)
3 (affirming Rule 4(e) only provides for service on an individual by “leaving a copy of the 4 summons and complaint at the individual’s dwelling or place of abode with someone of 5 suitable age. . . or following state law for [service]”). Thus, Ms. Bjurling has not met her 6 burden of showing proper service on Chief Parker. As a result, the court must deny Ms. 7 Bjurling’s motion for entry of default against Chief Parker for lack of personal 8 jurisdiction.
9 2. Chief Parker’s Motion to Dismiss 10 Chief Parker moves to dismiss this action for lack of personal jurisdiction under 11 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2); for insufficient service of process under Rule 12 12(b)(5), and for failure to state a claim under Rule12(b)(6). Dismissal is warranted 13 under Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(5) because, as discussed above, the court lacks personal
14 jurisdiction over Chief Parker because Ms. Bjurling failed to properly serve her. The 15 court concludes that dismissal of Ms. Bjurling’s claims against Chief Parker is also 16 warranted under Rule 12(b)(6). 17 Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal when a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim 18 upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
19 8(a)(2) (requiring the plaintiff to provide “a short and plain statement of the claim 20 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). Under this standard, the court construes 21 the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Livid 22 Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2005), and asks 1 whether the claim contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 2 relief that is plausible on its face,’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
3 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility 4 when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 5 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 6 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Ms. Bjurling must plausibly allege 7 (1) that she suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by 8 federal statute and (2) the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under
9 color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Thus, she must include in her 10 complaint short, plain statements specifying: (1) the constitutional or statutory right she 11 believes was violated; (2) the name or names of the person, persons, or entity who 12 violated the right; (3) exactly what each individual or entity did or failed to do and when 13 they did or failed to do it; (4) how the action or inaction of each individual or entity is
14 connected to the violation of the her rights; and (5) what specific injury she suffered 15 because of the individual or entity’s conduct. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 16 377 (1976). 17 Having reviewed the allegations in the second amended complaint in the light 18 most favorable to Ms. Bjurling, the court concludes that she fails to state a claim against
19 Chief Parker. Ms. Bjurling asserts that she was injured as a result of violations of her 20 constitutional rights under the First, Eighth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments; the 21 separation of powers under Articles I and II; and her statutory rights under the ADA and 22 the FHA. (SAC at 5, 8, 13.) Ms. Bjurling, however, alleges only that Chief Parker, “in a 1 supervisory capacity and through counsel, demonstrated awareness of recording 2 requirements yet [the] Olympia [Police Department] failed to record key interactions in
3 violation of RCW 10.109.” (SAC at 6; see also id. at 13 (alleging that Chief Parker’s 4 “counsel acknowledged the intent to record depositions, underscoring the importance of 5 video evidence”).) Thus, Ms. Bjurling fails to plausibly allege (1) what Chief Parker did 6 or failed to do, (2) when Chief Parker did or failed to do it, (3) what specific injury Ms. 7 Bjurling suffered as a result of Chief Parker’s conduct, and (4) how the injury is 8 connected to the alleged violation of Ms. Bjurling’s constitutional or statutory rights. See
9 Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 377. Accordingly, the court grants Chief Parker’s motion to dismiss.4 10 B. Mr. Holder 11 The court first considers Ms. Bjurling’s motion for entry of default against Mr. 12 Holder and then reviews her claims against Mr. Holder pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 13 § 1915(e)(2)(B).
14 1. Motion for Entry of Default Against Mr. Holder 15 The court denies Ms. Bjurling’s motion for entry of default against Mr. Holder for 16 the same reasons it denied her motion for entry of default against Chief Parker. First, Ms. 17 Bjurling, who is a party to this action, signed the affidavit of service. (See Holder 18 Service Aff.) Service was thus improper on this basis alone. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2).
19 Second, Ms. Bjurling mailed the summons to Mr. Holder via first-class mail, which is not 20 an authorized method of service under state or federal law. (See Holder Service Aff.); 21
4 Because the court dismisses this action for failure to state a claim, it need not address 22 Chief Parker’s arguments regarding qualified immunity. 1 see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e); RCW 4.28.080(14). Thus, Ms. Bjurling fails to meet her burden 2 to show she properly served Mr. Holder. Consequently, the court lacks personal
3 jurisdiction over Mr. Holder and must deny Ms. Bjurling’s motion for entry of default. 4 See Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 350. 5 2. § 1915 Review of Federal Claims against Mr. Holder 6 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a federal district court must dismiss a claim 7 filed IFP “at any time” if it determines (1) the action is frivolous or malicious; (2) the 8 action fails to state a claim; or (3) the action seeks relief from a defendant who is immune
9 from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 10 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to 11 prisoners.”). 12 The court liberally construes Ms. Bjurling’s second amended complaint to raise 13 claims against Mr. Holder for violations of the ADA and the FHA in connection with her
14 status as an “adult with autism.” (SAC at 7-8, 13.) Ms. Bjurling fails, however, to 15 plausibly allege that Mr. Holder’s conduct violated these statutes. 16 First, to state a claim for disability discrimination under Title II of the ADA, 42 17 U.S.C. § 12132, Ms. Bjurling must plausibly allege that: (1) she is an individual with a 18 disability; (2) she is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some
19 public entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) she was either excluded from 20 participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, programs, or 21 activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such 22 exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff’s disability. 1 Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). A “public entity” is any state or 2 local government; any department or agency of a state or local government; and any
3 commuter authority, including the National Railroad Passenger Corporation. 42 U.S.C. 4 § 12132. Here, Ms. Bjurling’s Title II claim against Mr. Holder fails because she cannot 5 plausibly allege that Mr. Holder, a private individual, is a public entity. 6 Second, to state a claim for disability discrimination under Title III of the ADA, 7 42 U.S.C. § 12182, Ms. Bjurling must plausibly allege that: (1) she is disabled within the 8 meaning of the ADA; (2) Mr. Holder is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a
9 place of public accommodation; and (3) she was denied public accommodations by Mr. 10 Holder because of her disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a)-(b); Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 11 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). Ms. Bjurling’s Title III claim against Mr. Holder fails 12 because she cannot plausibly allege that Mr. Holder, a private individual, is a private 13 entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation.
14 Third, to state a claim for disability discrimination under the FHA, Ms. Bjurling 15 must plausibly allege that: (1) that she is handicapped within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 16 § 3602(h); (2) that Mr. Holder knew or should reasonably be expected to know of the 17 handicap; (3) that accommodation of the handicap may be necessary to afford the 18 handicapped person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; (4) that the
19 accommodation is reasonable; and (5) that Mr. Holder refused to make the requested 20 accommodation. Dubois v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 21 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006); 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). As a fellow tenant, Mr. Holder’s 22 conduct is only regulated by the FHA through traditional agency principles. Meyer v. 1 Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 290-91 (2003) (affirming that courts should determine FHA 2 principal liability “in accordance with traditional principles of vicarious liability”); 24
3 C.F.R. § 100.7(b) (“A person is vicariously liable for discriminatory housing practice by 4 the person’s agent or employee[.]”). Ms. Bjurling’s § 3604(f) claim against Mr. Holder 5 fails because she has not plausibly alleged that Mr. Holder, as a fellow tenant, is directly 6 or vicariously liable for a discriminatory housing practice. 7 Finally, to state a claim for discriminatory harassment under the FHA, Ms. 8 Bjurling must plausibly allege that she was subjected to: (1) severe or pervasive
9 harassment; (2) that was based on a protected characteristic; and (3) that Mr. Holder is 10 responsible for the resulting hostile housing environment. Morris v. W. Hayden Ests. 11 First Addition Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 104 F.4th 1128, 1147 (9th Cir. 2024); 42 U.S.C. 12 § 3604(b). Vicarious liability attaches for individual tenants acting as agents of 13 landlords, Harris, 183 F.3d 1054, but not for individual tenants who undertake
14 discriminatory conduct in their individual capacity, see generally 24 C.F.R. § 100.7. Ms. 15 Bjurling alleges in her second amended complaint that Mr. Holder attacked her by 16 “throwing things” and chasing her and her service dog, causing her to fall on stairs. 17 (SAC at 8.) Because Ms. Bjurling has not alleged that Mr. Holder was acting as an agent 18 for her landlord, however, Mr. Holder is not a proper defendant for a FHA harassment
19 claim. See Morris, 104 F.4th at 1147-48 (affirming that, under certain circumstances, 20 property owners are liable for the discriminatory acts of third parties) (citing 24 C.F.R. 21 § 100.7(a)(iii)). Ms. Bjurling also does not sufficiently allege that Mr. Holder’s attack 22 1 was motivated by discriminatory intent based on a protected characteristic. 2 Consequently, she fails to state a claim against Mr. Holder for a violation of the FHA.
3 Thus, the court dismisses Ms. Bjurling’s remaining federal claims against Mr. 4 Holder pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 5 C. Leave to Amend 6 When granting a motion to dismiss, a district court is generally required to grant 7 the plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request to amend the complaint was made, unless 8 the complaint could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts. Cook, Perkiss
9 & Liehe, Inc. v. N. California Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990); 10 see also Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that courts in the 11 Ninth Circuit liberally construe Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) to allow leave to 12 amend unless amendment would be futile). Nevertheless, the court has “particularly 13 broad” discretion to deny leave to amend “where [a] plaintiff has previously amended the
14 complaint.” Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 15 (9th Cir. 2011). 16 Here, the court has provided Ms. Bjurling both ample guidance and multiple 17 opportunities to amend her claims against Defendants. (See 7/7/25 Order at 4; see also 18 8/8/25 Order at 3-4.) Because Ms. Bjurling’s second amended complaint still suffers
19 from the same deficiencies the court identified in its prior orders, the court concludes that 20 Ms. Bjurling could not possibly cure the defects in her complaint by the allegation of 21 other facts and that further leave to amend would be futile. Therefore, the court declines 22 1 to grant Ms. Bjurling further leave to amend the second amended complaint and 2 dismisses her federal claims against Chief Parker and Mr. Holder with prejudice.
3 D. Supplemental Jurisdiction 4 When a district court has original jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s federal claims, it 5 also has supplemental jurisdiction to decide related state law claims. See Pell v. Nunez, 6 99 F.4th 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)). When a district court 7 “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” however, it “may 8 decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C.
9 § 1367(c)(3). In determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the court 10 considers several factors, including judicial economy, comity, convenience, and fairness. 11 See O’Connor v. State of Nevada, 27 F.3d 357, 363 (9th Cir. 1994), as amended (July 1, 12 1994), as amended (July 12, 1994). 13 The court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Ms. Bjurling’s state-law claims
14 against Defendants. Ms. Bjurling brings a state-law claim against Chief Parker for 15 violation of RCW 10.109, which pertains to law enforcement body camera requirements. 16 (SAC at 8-9.) She also brings state-law claims against Mr. Holder for recording an 17 alleged sexual assault perpetrated by Mr. Swansey in violation of RCW 7.105, which 18 governs vulnerable adult protection orders, and RCW 74.34, which governs abuse of
19 vulnerable adults. (SAC at 7, 13.) The court previously dismissed all federal claims 20 against Mr. Johnson for alleged Constitutional violations under the Fourteenth 21 Amendment and statutory violations under the ADA and the FHA pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 22 1 § 1915(e)(2)(B).5 (See 8/11/25 Order at 4.) Given the absence of viable federal claims 2 against Defendants, the court determines that the interests of judicial economy, comity,
3 convenience, and fairness weigh against exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Ms. 4 Bjurling’s state-law claims against Defendants. Therefore, the court exercises its 5 discretion and declines supplemental jurisdiction over Ms. Bjurling’s remaining state-law 6 claims. These claims are, therefore, dismissed without prejudice. 7 E. Joinder of New Defendants 8 Although Rule 18(a) permits a party asserting a claim to join “as many claims as it
9 has against an opposing party,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), “unrelated claims against different 10 defendants belong in different suits,” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). 11 Permissive joinder, which is governed by Rule 20, is “designed to promote judicial 12 economy, and reduce inconvenience, delay, and added expense.” Coughlin v. Rogers, 13 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997). Therefore, a plaintiff may bring claims against
14 multiple defendants only if (1) the claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence, 15 or series of transactions and occurrences, and (2) there are common questions of law or 16 fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 623 F.2d 17 18
19 5 Although the court denied Ms. Bjurling leave to further amend her allegations against 20 Mr. Johnson, it erroneously dismissed Mr. Johnson from this action without prejudice. (See id. at 4-5 & n.5.) Accordingly, the court corrects its August 11, 2025 order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) (allowing the court to correct a mistake in an 21 order on its own motion). Ms. Bjurling’s claims against Mr. Johnson are dismissed from this action with prejudice for the reasons set forth in the August 11, 2025 order. (See generally 22 8/11/25 Order.) 1 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980) (setting forth Rule 20(a)’s specific requirements for the 2 permissive joinder of parties).
3 Here, Ms. Bjurling attempts to raise for the first time in her motion for joinder 4 claims against Olympic Health & Recovery Services, Lucy Stern, South Sound 5 Behavioral Hospital, and Providence Health & Services arising out of her past civil 6 commitments. (MFJ at 2 (asserting that these claims arise out of a five-year history of 7 civil commitments).) These new claims, however, do not arise out of the same 8 transaction or occurrence as her claims against Chief Parker and Mr. Holder, nor do they
9 have questions of fact or law in common with those claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); 10 see, e.g., Coughlin, 130 F.3d at 1351 (denying permissive joinder when there is no 11 common question of law or fact). Consequently, the court denies Ms. Burling’s motion 12 to join claims against the new defendants to the current litigation. 13 F. Injunctive Relief
14 “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must show that: (1) she is likely to 15 succeed on the merits, (2) she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 16 preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in her favor, and (4) an injunction is in 17 the public interest.” Farris v. Seabrook, 677 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Winter 18 v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). The standard applicable to a
19 motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) is “substantially identical” to the 20 preliminary injunction standard. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 21 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). A TRO is an “extraordinary remedy that may only 22 1 be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” See Winter, 2 555 U.S. at 22. It is “never awarded as of right.” See id. at 24.
3 Ms. Bjurling’s petition for a TRO necessarily fails because she has not established 4 that she is likely to succeed on the merits, that she is likely to suffer irreparable harm 5 absent preliminary relief, that the balance of equities weigh in her favor, or that an 6 injunction is in the public interest. To the contrary, none of her federal claims against 7 any Defendants survive this order. Consequently, the court denies Ms. Burling’s motion 8 for a protective order against Chief Parker.
9 G. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 Sanctions 10 A federal district court may impose 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions at its discretion. 11 Haynes v. City & Cty. of San Fransico, 688 F.3d 984, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming that 12 a court has “substantial leeway” when deciding whether to impose § 1927 sanctions). 13 Section 1927 sanctions are appropriate when an attorney “recklessly or intentionally
14 misled the court[,]” Barnd v. City of Tacoma, 664 F.2d 1339, 1343 (9th Cir. 1982), and 15 require a finding of bad faith, In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., Sec. Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th 16 Cir. 1996). 17 The court declines to impose sanctions on counsel for Intercity Transit. Intercity 18 Transit is not a party to this matter (see generally Dkt.), and Ms. Bjurling has not
19 established that its counsel “unreasonably and vexatiously multipl[ied] proceedings in 20 coordination with [Chief Parker].” (MTA at 1.) She also has not shown that counsel 21 acted in bad faith. Barnd, 664 F.2d at 1343. Thus, the court denies her motion for 22 § 1927 sanctions against counsel for Intercity Transit. 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES Ms. Bjurling’s motion for entry of
3 default (Dkt. # 34); motion for joinder of new defendants (Dkt. # 39); request for 4 injunctive relief (Dkt. # 44); and motion to amend the second amended complaint and 5 impose sanctions against counsel for Intercity Transit (Dkt. # 46); and GRANTS Chief 6 Parker’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. # 31). The court DISMISSES Ms. Bjurling’s claims 7 against Chief Parker and Mr. Johnson with prejudice. The court further DECLINES to 8 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Ms. Bjurling’s state law claims against
9 Defendants and DISMISSES those claims without prejudice to Ms. Bjurling refiling 10 those claims in state court. 11 12 Dated this 3 1st day of October, 2025. A 13 JAMES L. ROBART 14 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22