Damarion Ford v. State of Arkansas

2025 Ark. App. 459

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
• Decided: October 1, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 459 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CR-24-807

DAMARION FORD Opinion Delivered October 1, 2025

APPELLANT APPEAL FROM GARLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 26CR-23-252]

HONORABLE RALPH C. OHM, STATE OF ARKANSAS JUDGE

APPELLEE AFFIRMED

STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge

Appellant, Damarion Ford, was tried by a jury in the Garland County Circuit Court

and found guilty of one count of simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms, one count

of felon in possession of a firearm, one count of possession of methamphetamine, and one

count of possession of drug paraphernalia. Following a trifurcated jury trial, Ford was

sentenced as a habitual offender to twenty-five years’ imprisonment with a $10,000 fine. For

his sole point on appeal, Ford contends the circuit court erred in denying his motions for

directed verdict because the State failed to present substantial evidence that he actually or

constructively possessed the firearm, methamphetamine, and paraphernalia. We affirm.

On March 13, 2023, Ford was pulled over by Hot Springs Police Department Patrol

Officer Morgan Murray, and he was subsequently charged in the Garland County Circuit

Court. Due to the nature of Ford’s charges, the parties agreed to a trifurcated trial—a process by which the State would present evidence of simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms,

possession of less than two grams of methamphetamine, and possession of drug

paraphernalia, then the jury would be instructed, deliberate, and return verdicts on those

three counts. Next, the same process would take place for the charge of possession of a

firearm by certain persons. After the jury returned a guilty verdict for that count, the jury

would sentence Ford on all four counts at once.

On September 10, 2024, Ford’s two-day jury trial began. The evidence presented at

trial showed that on the day of Ford’s arrest, he learned that his wife, Jennifer Jones, had

filed for divorce. Jones testified that when Ford heard she had filed for divorce, Ford struck

her with a gun he had purchased a week or two earlier while Jones was with him. Ford then

left the couple’s home in Jones’s blue car. Jones, driving her daughter’s white car, later

located Ford at his daughter’s house and waited outside for Ford to leave. Jones testified she

began to follow Ford and called the police because he was driving erratically.

Officer Murray responded to the dispatch call. Dispatch alerted Officer Murray to a

rolling disturbance involving a previous domestic battery and an individual armed with a

firearm and provided him with a description of the vehicles Ford and Jones were driving.

Officer Murray located the blue and white cars and pulled over Ford and Jones. When the

blue car driven by Ford stopped, an unidentified passenger fled into the woods, and a small

black bag fell out of the open passenger-side door. Officer Murray testified that Ford and

Jones got out of their cars, and he issued commands for Jones to get back inside her car and

for Ford to sit on the ground. Jones complied with this request, but Ford refused; instead,

2 he walked between the two cars and bent down beside the front bumper of the white car.

Officer Murray testified this angle was outside the view of his patrol-car camera and his body

camera, but the remaining footage was played for the jury.

Officers searched the black bag and found Ford’s driver’s license, his wallet, a 9mm

handgun, a syringe containing a yellow substance, and a set of digital scales. Ford admitted

the black bag was his but denied ownership of the firearm. Officers also found a plastic bag

containing a white crystalline substance on the ground underneath the front bumper of the

white car where Ford had bent down instead of complying with Officer Murray’s commands

to sit on the ground. Officer Murray testified that it appeared that someone had just dropped

the bag on the ground because it had “no damage, no weathering, and no layer of dust.”

The white crystalline substance weighed 0.7997 grams and tested positive for

methamphetamine.

The State rested its case after presenting the above evidence, and Ford moved for a

directed verdict on the three charges before the jury at this stage. Ford argued that the State

failed to prove he actually or constructively possessed the contraband. Ford added that the

black bag containing the firearm and drug paraphernalia fell from the car when the passenger

fled. While Ford admitted he was in close proximity to where the methamphetamine was

found, he claimed Jones may have dropped the drugs on the ground when she walked from

the white car to the blue car before getting back into the white car as ordered. The circuit

court denied the motions, and the defense rested without presenting any evidence.

3 The jury was then instructed on the charges before them, and after deliberations, it

returned three guilty verdicts on simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms, possession

of less than two grams of methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The

circuit court then presented the parties’ stipulation to the jury that Ford is a convicted felon.

Ford did not move for a directed verdict on the charge of possession of a firearm by certain

persons. The court instructed the jury, the State briefly made a closing argument, and the

jury deliberated. It then returned a verdict of guilty for possession of a firearm by certain

persons. The jury sentenced Ford as a habitual offender to twenty-five years’ imprisonment

with a $10,000 fine.

A motion for directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Benton

v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 223, 599 S.W.3d 353. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence, our standard of review is whether the jury’s verdict is supported by substantial

evidence; evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, is sufficient to support a conviction if

it compels a conclusion and passes beyond speculation or conjecture. Smith v. State, 2022

Ark. App. 422, 654 S.W.3d 701. In making such a determination, we view the evidence in

the light most favorable to the State, considering only the evidence that supports the guilty

verdict. Id. Witness credibility is for the jury alone to determine; the jury may believe all or

part of any witness’s testimony and may resolve inconsistencies or conflicts in the evidence.

Wray v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 465, 678 S.W.3d 431.

On appeal, Ford challenges the sufficiency of the evidence introduced against him.

Specifically, he claims the State presented insufficient evidence to establish constructive

4 possession of the contraband. The State asserts that Ford’s challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence concerning the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm and possession-of-

methamphetamine charges is precluded from appellate review because (1) Ford failed to

move for a directed verdict on the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm charge; and (2) Ford’s

argument at trial that the State’s evidence was deficient to support the possession-of-

methamphetamine charge differs from the argument he makes on appeal.

To preserve a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument for appellate review, a defendant

must move for directed verdict at the close of the State’s evidence and at the close of all the

evidence. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(a). A motion for directed verdict shall state the specific

grounds therefor. Brown v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 427, 468 S.W.3d 282. The failure of a

defendant to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at the times and in the manner

required will constitute a waiver of any question pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence

to support the verdict or judgment. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c). Because Ford failed to move

for a directed verdict on the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm charge, it will not be addressed

on appeal. However, we hold that Ford’s motion as to the charge of possession of

methamphetamine is preserved for our review.

Here, it is undisputed that Ford was not in actual physical possession of the

contraband at the time of the traffic stop. However, in drug cases, it is not necessary that

the State prove literal physical possession of the contraband; possession of contraband can

be proved by constructive possession, which is the control or right to control the contraband.

Hare v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 223, 687 S.W.3d 158. Constructive possession may be

5 established by circumstantial evidence. Id. Constructive possession requires the State to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the accused exercised care, control, or management

over the contraband, and (2) the accused knew the matter possessed was contraband. Walker

v. State, 77 Ark. App. 122, 72 S.W.3d 517 (2002). Although constructive possession can be

inferred when the drugs are in the joint control of the accused and another, joint occupancy

of a vehicle, standing alone, is not sufficient to establish possession or joint possession.

Dodson v. State, 341 Ark. 41, 14 S.W.3d 489 (2000). There must be other factors linking the

accused to the drugs:

Other factors to be considered in cases involving automobiles occupied by more than one person are (1) whether the contraband is in plain view; (2) whether the contraband is found with the accused’s personal effects; (3) whether it is found on the same side of the car seat as the accused was sitting or in near proximity to it; (4) whether the accused is the owner of the automobile, or exercises dominion or control over it; and (5) whether the accused acted suspiciously before or during the arrest.

Mings v. State, 318 Ark. 201, 207, 884 S.W.2d 596, 600 (1994) (citation omitted).

While the Mings factors offer guidance for our court in analyzing constructive-

possession cases, the mere presence of some of these enumerated factors does not relieve our

obligation to determine whether a nexus between the accused and the contraband has been

established. The link between the accused and the drugs must be sufficient to raise a

reasonable inference of knowledge of the contraband. Walker, 77 Ark. App. 122, 72 S.W.3d

517. In Boston v. State, 69 Ark. App. 155, 12 S.W.3d 245 (2000), we reversed a conviction

where the contraband was found in a suitcase in the trunk of appellant’s car where it could

not be shown that he had knowledge of the contents of the suitcase. Similarly, in Miller v.

6 State, 68 Ark. App. 322, 6 S.W.3d 812 (1999), we affirmed a conviction where (although

none of the five Mings factors were apparent) the strong odor of burning marijuana was

sufficient to establish that the appellant had knowledge of the drug and concluded that it is

the knowledge of the existence of the contraband that provides substantial evidence of

constructive possession. Id.

The contraband underlying Ford’s convictions are (1) a 9mm handgun found in a

black bag outside the blue vehicle; (2) a syringe containing a yellow substances and a set of

digital scales found in the same bag; and (3) a plastic bag of methamphetamine on the ground

underneath the front bumper of the white car where Ford bent down instead of complying

with Officer Murray’s commands. As discussed previously, Ford was the driver of the vehicle.

In Thomas v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 159, 686 S.W.3d 576, this court held that proof the

defendant is the driver of the vehicle is evidence that he exercised dominion and control

over the vehicle. See also McCastle v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 162, 392 S.W.3d 369. Perhaps

more pertinent, Ford admitted he owned the black bag containing the 9mm handgun and

drug paraphernalia, and the contraband was found alongside Ford’s wallet and driver’s

license.

Furthermore, Officer Murray testified to initiating the traffic stop where he saw the

black bag containing the contraband fall from the vehicle as the unidentified passenger fled.

Ford, rather than complying with Officer Murray’s command to sit on the ground, walked

to the front bumper of the white vehicle and bent down. Officer Murray later located the

plastic bag of methamphetamine underneath the front bumper of the white vehicle. This

7 court has found that a police officer’s observation of an object thrown from a window and

that police officer’s discovery of contraband in the location where the object was thrown are

sufficient to infer a defendant’s constructive possession due to the defendant’s proximity to

the contraband. See McNeely v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 483, at 3–5, 530 S.W.3d 876, 878–79.

Like McNeely, supra, the present case involves an officer who saw the defendant

discard an object in the vicinity where the contraband was found, which was held to be

substantial evidence of constructive possession. Officer Murray witnessed Ford bend over

in front of the front bumper of the white vehicle where the methamphetamine was

discovered. Furthermore, Officer Murray stated that the appearance of the contraband was

consistent with having just been placed on the ground. Officer Murray’s testimony indicated

it was highly likely Ford placed the methamphetamine in the area where it was located and

that the methamphetamine was not in the area for a long period of time.

Although Ford argues that the State relied on, and the circuit court erred in

considering, evidence that was not substantial enough to show Ford constructively possessed

the contraband, we hold that Ford’s constructive possession is supported by substantial

circumstantial evidence. At the outset, this court has made clear that “there is no

requirement that all or even a majority of the linking factors be present to constitute

constructive possession.” McCastle, 2012 Ark. App. 162, at 4–5, 392 S.W.3d at 372.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude there was

sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that Ford constructively possessed the

contraband. We affirm.

8 Affirmed.

GLADWIN and BROWN, JJ., agree.

Ben Motal, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Brooke Jackson Gasaway, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.