Dallas v. Inman

93 S.E. 8, 107 S.C. 402, 1917 S.C. LEXIS 148
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedJuly 6, 1917
Docket9731
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 93 S.E. 8 (Dallas v. Inman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dallas v. Inman, 93 S.E. 8, 107 S.C. 402, 1917 S.C. LEXIS 148 (S.C. 1917).

Opinion

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Watts.

This is an action for injunction. A temporary restraining order was issued by his Honor, Judge Mauldin, and a rule to show cause as issued by him returnable at his chambers at Eancaster, S. C. The defendants demurred to the complaint. The matter was heard by his Honor at chambers, who filed an order sustaining the demurrer refusing the tern *404 porary order of injunction and dismissing the complaint. All of this was done by his Honor at chambers. • From this order plaintiffs appeal.

Exceptions raise the point, among others, that the Court had no jurisdiction at chambers to dismiss the complaint. The only matter properly before his Honor for a determination at chambers was the question of granting a temporary restraining order in the cause until the cause could be heard on its merits. This his Honor could do or refuse to do in the exercise of the discretion vested in him by law.

In the hearing of this question of granting or refusing the temporary order of injunction the Judge can inquire into the merits of the cause sufficiently to say what his discretion should be whether to refuse or grant the motion before him. He cannot try the case on its merits and dismiss the complaint at chambers. The only matter that his Honor should have heard and determined in the matter • before him was whether he would grant or refuse the application for the temporary injunction. He had no right at chambers to sustain the demurrer and dismiss the complaint. This would be a final order given at chambers, and a judgment in the case which cannot be done at chambers. The exceptions raising this question are sustained. The others are not considered.

Order appealed from reversed.

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155 S.E. 228 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1930)
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129 S.E. 207 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1925)
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
93 S.E. 8, 107 S.C. 402, 1917 S.C. LEXIS 148, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dallas-v-inman-sc-1917.