Dali v. Walter Reed National Military Medical Center
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Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SVETLANA DALI,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 24-cv-3313 (CRC)
WALTER REED NATIONAL MILITARY MEDICAL CENTER, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Svetlana Dali, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), has filed a
complaint purporting to assert causes of action against Walter Reed National Military Medical
Center and several other defendants. Because her complaint does not comply with Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), the Court will dismiss the complaint sua sponte.
In September 2024, Dali filed a Complaint in the Superior Court for the District of
Columbia against the Court Services & Offender Supervision Agency (“CSOSA”) and Walter
Reed Medical Center (“Walter Reed”), which is located in Bethesda, Maryland. See Compl,
ECF No. 1-1, at 1, 9 (page numbers designated by CM/ECF). 1 Three days later, Dali filed an
Amended Complaint, adding five new defendants: Holy Cross Health Center (located in Silver
Spring, Maryland), Suburban Hospital (located in Bethesda, Maryland), the D.C. Inspector
General, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and a defendant referred to only as
“FOIA.” See Am. Compl at 1.
1 Dali appears to be a resident of Philadelphia, see Compl. at 1, but also provides a District of Columbia address, see Am. Compl., ECF No. 1-2, at 1. On November 21, 2024, Defendants Walter Reed, DOJ, and CSOSA removed the case to
this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. There is no
indication that Defendants were served prior to removal. See Dkt.; Defs.’ Status Report, ECF
No. 3, at 1. Upon review, and for the reasons discussed below, this matter is dismissed without
prejudice—the usual remedy for noncompliance with Rule 8(a)(2). Brown v. Califano, 75
F.R.D. 497, 499 (D.D.C. 1977).
Even pro se litigants like Ms. Dali must comply with the applicable Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Relevant here, Federal
Rule 8(a) requires complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the
court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009);
Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668–71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8(a) standard ensures that
defendants receive fair notice of the claims asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer
and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown, 75
F.R.D. at 498.
Courts have “unhesitatingly dismissed actions where the complaint” fails to comply with
Rule 8(a), including complaints that are “confusing, ambiguous, redundant, vague and, in some
respects, unintelligible.” Brown, 75 F.R.D. at 499 (collecting cases). Such dismissals may be
ordered on motion or sua sponte by the court. Hamrick v. United States, No. 08-1698, 2009 WL
8747880, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2009) (citing Resource N.E. of Long Island, Inc. v. Babylon, 28
F. Supp. 2d 786, 794 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)).
Neither the Complaint nor Amended Complaint complies with the requirements of Rule
8(a)(2). The Amended Complaint is mostly devoid of factual allegations, essentially functioning
2 as a stand-alone list of the five new defendants. See Am. Compl. Dali’s sole allegation is a
vague contention that she filed “police reports” from 2017 to date, including a “statement” with
the DOJ in 2018, but law enforcement has declined to investigate her claims. Id. at 1. She
claims this purported inaction violates her “civil rights.” Id. Applicable here, “[t]he general rule
is that an amended complaint supersedes and replaces an original complaint unless the
amendment specifically refers to or adopts an earlier pleading.” Simms v. D.C. Gov’t, 646 F.
Supp. 2d 36, 37–38 (D.D.C. 2009). That leaves Dali with an operative pleading that is formless
and meager at best.
But even generously construing the Amended Complaint as a supplement to its precursor,
the original Complaint fares no better. There, Dali alleges that in 2023, she was poisoned and
“abused by drugs” in Germany by “warfare chemical agents.” See Compl. at 1. Then, in 2024,
she claims she was once again “poisoned in Washington D.C.” Id. Sometime later, in order to
file a report with law enforcement, she purportedly went to the hospital to be tested for exposure
to these “military poisons.” Id. at 1. She was informed, however, that a “civil hospital” lacks the
capabilities to test for “heavy metal nuclear chemical agents.” Id. at 1, 27. According to Dali,
Walter Reed has agreed to develop a specific blood test for her, but first requires her to provide a
verified email address. See id. at 2. Dali therefore asks the Court to “obligate” Walter Reed “to
make [her] [a] spectral blood test (Massenspectrometrie/Toxicology/Diagnostic/Full
Screen/WCA, NuclearCA, Drugs [that] include) for chemical substantion [sic] that are not in
civil use.” Id. at 1.
As here, “[a] confused and rambling narrative of charges and conclusions . . . does not
comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 3d 163,
169 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Both the Complaint and the
3 Amended Complaint are extremely difficult to decipher, containing mainly conclusory statements
“present[ing] the type of fantastic or delusional scenarios found to justify immediate dismissal of
a complaint as frivolous in the related context of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).” Hamrick, 2009 WL
8747880, at *1 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989)). Due to the ambiguous
nature of Dali’s assertions, which relate to incomprehensible conspiracies by unidentified bad
actors, neither the Court nor Defendants can make heads or tails of her intended claims or
determine whether she is entitled to any relief. In fact, the alleged involvement of most
Defendants, if any, is unclear.
Compounding these problems, Dali has entirely failed to establish why Walter Reed would
be obligated to provide her with a bespoke blood test. Nor can the Court independently discern
such an obligation. And insofar as Dali seeks to compel a criminal investigation by federal law
enforcement, she may not do so. “This court has no authority to compel the government to initiate
a criminal investigation or to prosecute a criminal case.” Wagner v. U.S. Solic. Gen., No. 22-
3671, 2023 WL 122272, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2023) (Cooper, J.). Nor may a plaintiff compel a
criminal investigation by filing a civil complaint. See Otero v. U.S. Attorney General, 832 F.2d
141, 141–42 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); see also Jafree v.
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