Dale v. Young

2015 SD 96, 873 N.W.2d 72, 2015 S.D. LEXIS 173, 2015 WL 9258603
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 16, 2015
Docket27338
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 2015 SD 96 (Dale v. Young) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering South Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dale v. Young, 2015 SD 96, 873 N.W.2d 72, 2015 S.D. LEXIS 173, 2015 WL 9258603 (S.D. 2015).

Opinion

SEVERSON, Justice.

[¶ 1.] James Dale filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his penitentiary sentences were miscalculated. The habeas court denied Dale’s application. We affirm.

Background

[¶2.] In 2001, Dale pleaded guilty to third-degree burglary and possession of burglary tools for his role in burglarizing the Watertown Municipal Golf . Course. The circuit court sentenced Dale to two consecutive terms of incarceration: 10 years for burglary and 5 years for possession of burglary tools. The court entered separate judgments of conviction for each count. Dale was granted parole in- 2007. 1

[¶ 3,] After his release, Dale committed another burglary in Minnesota. He was convicted of second-degree burglary and possession of burglary tools. On May 31, 2012, the South Dakota Board of Pardons and Paroles (parole board) generated a parole violation report regarding the Minnesota burglary convictions. Consequently, Dale was re-incarcerated in South Dakota for violating his parole.

[¶ 4.] -. Dale filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus. He maintained that, under SDCL 24-15A-19, his separate judgments of conviction resulted, in separate sentences. Had his sentences been calculated separately, Dale claimed he would have been “paroled to” his 5-year consecutive sentence after reaching his initial parole date on his 10-year sentence. Using his method of calculation, 2 Dale determined that he served the entirety of his consecutive sentences on September 2, 2011, and was no longer on parole when the parole board generated his violation report on May 31, 2012. The circuit court denied Dale’s application for a writ of ha-beas corpus but granted a certificate of probable cause to appeal.

Standard of Review

[¶ 5.] “Questions of law concerning statutory construction are reviewed de novo.” In re W. River Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 2004 S.D. 11, ¶ 14, 675 N.W.2d 222, 226 (citing Goetz v. State, 2001 S.D. 138, ¶ 8, 636 N.W.2d 675, 678). No defer *74 ence is given to the legal conclusions of the parole board or the circuit court. See id. (quoting In re Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 1997 S.D. 35, ¶ 13, 560 N.W.2d 925, 927).

Analysis ''

[¶ 6.] “Statutory construction is an exercise to determine legislative intent.” W. River Elec., 2004 S.D. 11, ¶ 15, 675 N.W.2d at 226. “[T]he language expressed in the statute is the paramount consideration” and “if the words and phrases in the statute have plain meaning and effect, we should simply declare their meaning and not resort to statutory construction.” Id. (quoting Goetz, 2001 S.D. 138, ¶ 8, 636 N.W.2d at 678). When statutory construction is required “statutes must be construed according to their intent, [and] the intent" must be determined from the statute as a whole, as well as enactments relating to the same subject.” Martinmaas v. Engelmann, 2000 S.D. 85, ¶ 49, 612 N.W.2d 600, 611 (quoting Moss v. Guttormson, 1996 S.D. 76, ¶ 10, 551 N.W.2d 14, 17). “[I]n construing statutes together it is presumed that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.” Id.

[¶ 7.J The statute in question, SDCL 24-15A-Í9, provides in relevant part:

In the determination of an inmate’s initial parole date, two or more convictions arising from the .same transaction, for which the sentences are made to run consecutively, shall be considered, as one conviction. Two or more sentences arising from different transactions for which the sentences are made to run consecutively shall be considered as separate convictions. For a person receiving two or more sentences which are made to run consecutively, time to serve to initial parole shall be calculated individually for each sentence then added to determine actual first parole date.

[¶ 8.] In support of his position, Dale points to the distinction in SDCL 24-15A-19 between “convictions arising from the same transaction” and separate convictions “arising from different transactions.” Dale argues that in order to give effect to this distinction, separate judgments of conviction that arise from different transactions must result in separate sentences. The State, on the other hand, argues that the distinction in SDCL 24-15A-19 is given effect when SDCL 24-15A-19 is read together with SDCL 24-15A-32. According to the State, the distinction provides a method for determining whether consecutive sentences should be treated as one or more convictions when applying the initial parole grid contained in SDCL 24-15A-32.

[¶ 9.] We agree with the State. SDCL 24-15A-19 and 24-15A-32 “are in the same chapter, they relate to the same thing, and they have the same purpose or .object.”, See Lewis & Clark Rural Water Sys., Inc. v. Seeba, 2006 S.D. 7, ¶ 16, 709 N.W.2d 824, 831. Both statutes were enacted at the same time,, in the same bill entitled, “An Act to eliminate good time and establish a new parole system for inmates of the adult prison system.” 1996 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 158, §§ 18, 31. The statutes were later amended at the same time, in the same "bill entitled, “An Act to revise certain provisions ofpárole eligibility.” 2007 S.D. Sess. Lawsch. 153, §§ 1,2.

[¶ 10.] In State v. Sieler, this Court construed the predecessor statutes to SDCL 24-15A-19 and. 24-15A-32, under the “old system” of parole, 3 in the same *75 way. 1996 S.D. 114, ¶ 9, 554 N.W.2d 477, 480. Calculating the time Sieler had to serve until he was eligible for parole, the Court read SDCL 24-15-7 together with SDCL 24r-15-5. Id.. SDCL ¡24-15-7 provides:

In the determination of an inmate’s eligibility for consideration for parole, two or more convictions arising from the same transaction, for which the sentences are made to run consecutively, shall be considered as one conviction.

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Bluebook (online)
2015 SD 96, 873 N.W.2d 72, 2015 S.D. LEXIS 173, 2015 WL 9258603, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dale-v-young-sd-2015.