ALARCÓN, Senior Circuit Judge.
We must decide in this matter the novel question whether a Washington state prisoner may challenge the'validity of his sentence retroactively on the ground that the trial .court based its sentencing decision on facts that were not found to be true by a jury in -violation of the constitutional principle subsequently announced by the United States Supreme Court in
Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct, 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). We conclude that
Blakely
does not apply retroactively to convictions that became final prior to its publication. We also hold that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he was ineffectively represented by his trial counsel.
I
Mr. Schardt was charged,with one count of rape of a child in the first degree,
a class A felony under Washington law. The accusatory pleading alleges' that Mr. Schardt had sexual intercourse with a child who was less than twelve years old from
April 1, 1996 to April 22, 1997, a period of more than a year.
At trial, B.E. (“the victim”) testified that Mr. Schardt committed numerous acts upon her person that come within Washington’s definition of the term “sexual intercourse.”
She stated that this conduct began sometime after she and her mother moved in with Mr. Schardt in early 1996. The victim testified that Mr. Schardt engaged in sexual intercourse with her several times a month. She described the various places in the residence where these acts occurred and the ways in which Mr. Schardt would position their bodies in order to engage in sexual intercourse. She testified that Mr. Schardt committed the last act of sexual intercourse on the morning of April 22,1997.
The victim testified that on April 22, 1997, she was in bed when Mr. Schardt-entered her room. He told her that she “owed” him. He took off her clothes, and placed Vaseline on his penis and attempted to insert it in her vagina. Mr. Schardt also touched her vagina with his mouth and fingers.
The victim’s mother, testified that she lived with Mr. Schardt from March 1996 until the end of April 1997. The victim’s mother stated that she took the victim to a hospital for a medical examination a day or so after the April 22,1997 incident.
A nurse practitioner testified that she examined the victim on April 25, 1997 and found “a notch” on her hymen which was “indicative of penetrating trauma, or attempted penetrating trauma” and consistent with sexual abuse.
In his defense, Mr.'Schardt testified that as a result of an on-the-job injury to his back, he began taking muscle relaxants that impaired his ability to have an erection. He stated that this problem began to occur around January 1997. Mr. Schardt’s counsel did not introduce any medical records into evidence regarding Mr. Schardt’s complaint of erectile dysfunction.
The judge’s admonition to the jury contained the following instruction:
There are allegations that the defendant committed acts of rape of a child in the first degree on multiple occasions. To convict the defendant, one or more particular acts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and you must unani
mously agree as to which act or acts have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. You need not unanimously agree that all the acts have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thus, the jury was not required to make a finding regarding whether Mr. Schardt had repeatedly committed rape of a child during the one-year period. Based on this instruction, the members of the jury could have convicted Mr. Schardt if they agreed that only one act of rape had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury found Mr. Schardt guilty as charged.
The court determined that Mr. Schardt had a standard sentence range of 78 to 102 months under Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act.
Under that statute, a court can increase the standard sentence if it finds that there are aggravating factors.
The judge must determine the existence of any aggravating factors “by a preponderance of the evidence.” Wash. Rev.Code § 9.94A.530(2). These factors include:
The defendant knew or should have known that the victim of the current offense was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to extreme youth, advanced age, disability, or ill health....
The current offense involved multiple victims or multiple incidents per victim.
Wash. Rev.Code § 9.94A.535 (2004). The state trial court sentenced Mr. Schardt to serve 204 months in prison based on its findings of fact that:
1. The defendant was victim B.E.’s surrogate stepfather and/or father-figure and was one of two primary custodial parents during the entire span of time the offenses were committed.
2. The offenses were committed against B.E. over an approximately one year period'when B.E. was between the ages of 10 years and 11 years old.
In its conclusions of law, the trial court stated:
1. In committing these offenses the defendant abused his position of trust and confidence as a surrogate stepfather and custodial parent.
2. The victim was, at the time of the offenses, particularly vulnerable and incapable of resistance due to her extreme youth.
3. The offenses committed were part of an ongoing pattern of sexual abuse of the same victim and involved multiple incidents over a prolonged period of time.
The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Schardt’s conviction in an unpublished opinion. Mr. Schardt did not petition the Washington Supreme Court for direct review. Mr. Schardt’s personal restraint petition was dismissed by the Washington Court of Appeals. The Washington Supreme Court denied Mr. Schardt’s motion for discretionary review of the personal restraint petition.
In his state prisoner petition for habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
Mr. Schardt raised three arguments: (1) his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as construed by
Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); (2) more than a preponderance of the evidence was required to enhance his sentence, and (3) his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to discover and submit reports made by Mr. Schardt’s treating physicians showing that he had complained of erectile dysfunction at the time of the alleged rapes. The district court denied the petition. The district court had jurisdiction over this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254. We have jurisdiction to review Mr. Schardt’s timely appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II
Mr. Schardt contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase of his trial. We review de novo a district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief.
Clark v. Murphy,
331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir.2003). In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Schardt “must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”
Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 688; 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Second, he must show “that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”
Id.
at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Mr. Schardt correctly notes that to show prejudice under
Strickland,
he need only demonstrate “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Wade v. Calderon,
29 F.3d 1312, 1323 (9th Cir.1994) (citing
Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052),
overruled on other grounds by Ro-han ex rel. Gates v. Woodford,
334 F.3d 803, 815 (9th Cir.2003). He argues that counsel’s failure to introduce medical records reflecting his complaint of erectile dysfunction prejudiced him because such evidence would have corroborated his testimony, and impeached the victim’s testimony regarding penile penetration. He asserts that the doctor’s records would be particularly persuasive, because “the reports were made before any allegations or charges of child rape or anything like it were ever brought forward. They were made at a time when there was no suspicion being cast upon Mr. Schardt.”
In response, the State first points out that the medical reports did not show that Mr. Schardt’s physician diagnosed him as suffering from erectile dysfunction. The medical reports merely record that Mr. Schardt had made “unproven, undiagnosed, and self-serving statements [to his treating physician] who did not have the expertise to diagnose or treat such a dysfunction.” The State also notes that the victim described numerous ways in which Mr. Schardt had engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim as defined under Washington law that can be effected without an erection. Furthermore, Mr. Schardt did not complain of erectile dysfunction until after an accident in October 1996, but he was charged with committing rape during a period that began in April 1996.
The record shows that at the time Mr. Schardt complained to his physician regarding erectile dysfunction, he had not been criminally charged. He asserts that it would be difficult for a jury to believe that he would he to his physician about erectile dysfunction in a private setting before he was criminally charged with rape of a child, in an effort to protect himself against possible charges in the future. He also maintains that, while he
complained of erectile dysfunction only midway through the period for which he was charged, and although some of the acts described by thp victim could have been performed without erection, “witness credibility is so critical that it is outcome-determinative. It was in this context that [the victim] described Mr. Schardt attaining an erection and attempting penile-vaginal intercourse. If this were a medical impossibility for Mr. Schardt, it would cast doubt on all of the girl’s allegations.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 44.
Evidence that Mr. Schardt complained to his treating physicians that he suffered from erectile dysfunction would not have corroborated his denial of his criminal conduct that did not require penile penetration. The victim testified that Mr. Schardt molested her seven to ten times per month but that he attempted penile penetration only a few times. Admitting medical evidence that he complained of erectile dysfunction might well have been harmful to Mr. Schardt’s defense because it would have supported the victim’s testimony that Mr. Schardt rarely attempted penile penetration.
Mr. Schardt has the burden of showing that there is a reasonable probability that his lawyer’s failure to enter the doctor’s note into evidence deprived him of a fair trial. He has failed to do so.
Ill
Mr. Schardt also contends that the trial judge’s decision to increase his sentence based on facts not found by the jury violated his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury under
Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) and
Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004).
A
Before we reach Mr. Schardt’s contention about the application of
Apprendi
and
Blakely
to this case, we must' first determine whether this issue is properly before us’. After denying Mr. Schardt’s petition for habeas corpus relief, the' dis-' trict court granted a certificate of appeala-bility (“COA”). Its order states:
The Court finds that petitioner is entitled to a certificate of appealability on the issues of (1) whether the petitioner adequately presented his claim that the federal due process clause requires a heightened standard of proof when a sentencing' factor results in an exceptional sentence, and (2) whether the petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to discover and use exculpatory evidence.
The State contends that Mr. Schardt is precluded from raising the question whether the district court judge violated
Apprendi
.by enhancing Mr. Schardt’s sen-, tence based solely on the trial court’s findings because this issue is not clearly .identified in the COA.
We disagree with the State. Under Circuit Rule 22-l(d), as it existed when Mr. Schardt filed his appeal in this case, Mr. Schardt had thirty-five days from the district court’s entry of its order denying a COA to seek a broader COA from this court.
Mr. Schardt did not file a motion
requesting certification of additional issues on appeal within the specified thirty-five-day period. However, effective January 1, 2004, we amended Circuit Rule 22-1 to allow additional methods of seeking an expanded COA. Of particular importance to this case is new Circuit Rule 22-l(e), which allows a petitioner to brief uncerti-fied issues in his or her brief to us, using separate headings in the brief for “certified issues” and “uncertified issues.” Under this rule, we construe such briefing as a request for an expanded COA.
We construe Circuit Rule 22 — 1(e) to apply to merits briefs filed in this court after the effective date of the rule. Mr. Schardt filed his supplemental brief addressed to the
Blakely
issue on August 2, 2004, seven months after its[the] effective date [of the rule]. The State, however, points out that Schardt has not set off its discussion of the
Blakely
issue under a separate heading of “uncertified issues,” as required by Circuit Rule 22-l(e). While we agree with the State that Schardt should have complied with this aspect of Circuit Rule 22-1 (e), his noncompliance does not deprive us of jurisdiction to rule on his request for a COA. Indeed, in the circumstances of this case, Mr. Schardt’s failure to provide a separate designation of his
Blakely
discussion as an “uncertified issue” could hardly have caused the confusion that this aspect of the rule is designed to prevent, ■ for Mr. Schardt’s supplemental brief is directed solely to the
Blakely
issue.
B
The validity of the sentencing issue presented in Mr. Schardt’s case is virtually indistinguishable from the question reviewed by the Supreme Court in
Blakely.
In both cases, the judge imposed a sentence greater than the standard range specified in Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act based on findings made by the judge, rather than the jury.
In
Blakely,
the defendant pled guilty to kidnaping his estranged wife, a class B felony, which carried a maximum sentence of ten years. 124 S.Ct. at 2534.
Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act specified a standard range of forty-nine to fifty-three months.
Id.
A Washington trial court enhanced Mr. Blakely’s sentence based on its finding that he acted with “deliberate cruelty.”
Id.
at 2534. Before the Supreme Court, Mr. Blakely argued “that this sentencing procedure 'deprived him of his federal constitutional right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt all facts legally essential to his sentence.”
Id.
at 2536. The Supreme Court agreed and held that Mr. Blakely’s sentence was invalid.
Id.
at 2538. The Supreme Court instructed:
Our precedents make clear ... that the “statutory maximum” for
Apprendi
purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose
solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.
In other words, the relevant “statutory maximum” is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose
without
any additional findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts “which the law makes essential to the punishment,” and the judge exceeds his proper authority.
Id.
at 2537 (citations omitted) (emphasis in the original).
Under Washington law the maximum sentence for a class A felony, such as the
rape of a child, is life imprisonment.
Under Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act, however, the standard sentence Mr. Schardt would have received for a conviction for a single count of rape of a child is 102 months.
In this matter the trial court doubled this sentence to 204 months based on its own independent findings of fact. Clearly, under
-Blakely,
the state court erred in sentencing Mr. Schardt on the. basis of facts not found to be true by a jury-
The critical distinction between this case and
Blakely
is that
Blakely
was decided by-the Supreme Court on a writ of
certiorari
from the defendant’s direct appeal of his conviction.
Id.
at 2536. Mr. Schardt’s case comes before us as a collateral attack on his sentence. If Mr. Schardt’s case were still pending on direct appeal when
Blakely
was decided, we would be compelled to hold that
Blakely
was applicable.
See Griffith v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314, 322, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (“[FJailure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic-norms 'of constitutional adjudication.”).
A state prisoner whose conviction is final may not automatically have the rule from a subsequently decided ease applied in a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to § 2254.
Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288, 310, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). Congress has mandated that “[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under [28 USCS § 2254] that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless ... the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was’ previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). We held in
Cook v. United States,
386 F.3d 949 (9th Cir.2004) that the Supreme Court has not made
Blakely
retroactive to cases on collateral review.
Id.
at 950.
Cook
does not control our decision here, however,.because this is Mr. Schardt’s initial petition, not a second or successive petition, In
Teague v. Lane,
the Court addressed the issue of whether a decision announced after a state prisoner’s conviction becomes final can be applied retroactively.
Teague
lays out a three-part test for the retroactive application of a Supreme Court decision.
Teague,
489 .U.S. at 299-310, 109 S.Ct. 1060. This process was reiterated in
Beard v. Banks,
542 U.S. 406, 124 S.Ct. 2504, 159 L.Ed.2d 494 (2004) as follows:
First, the court must determine when the defendant’s conviction became final. Second, it must ascertain the legal landscape as it then existed and ask whether the Constitution, as interpreted by the precedent then existing, compels the rule. That is, the court must decide whether the rule is actually “new.” Finally, if the rule is new, the court must consider whether it falls within either of the two exceptions to non-retroactivity.
Id.
at 2510 (citations and quotations omitted). The Court further explained that the two types of rules that are the exceptions to nonretroactivity are (1) “rules for
bidding punishment of certain primary-conduct or to rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense”; and (2) “watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”
Id.
at 2513(eitations, quotations and alterations omitted).
Before addressing each of these factors, we note that the Tenth Circuit has held that
Blakely
does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral appeal.
See United States v. Price,
400 F.3d 844, 849 (10th Cir.2005)
(Blakely
does not apply retroactively to petitions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255);
Young v. Neet,
130 Fed.Appx. 211, 214 (10th Cir.2005)
(Blakely
does not apply retroactively to petitions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254). Several other circuits have held that
United States v. Booker,
— U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), which extends the reasoning of
Blakely
to the federal sentencing guidelines, is not retroactive.
See Varela v. United States,
400 F.3d 864, 868 (11th Cir.2005)
(Booker
does not apply retroactively to petitions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255);
Humphress v. United States,
398 F.3d 855, 860-63 (6th Cir.2005) (same);
McReynolds v. United States,
397 F.3d 479, 480-81 (7th Cir.2005) (same);
Guzman v. United States,
404 F.3d 139, 144 (2d Cir.2005).
We address each of the
Teague
factors in turn.
1. When did Mr. Schardt’s conviction become final?
Mr. Schardt’s conviction became final on December 22, 2000, after
Apprendi
was decided on June 26, 2000, but well before
Blakely
was announced on June 24, 2004.
2. Did
Blakely
announce a new rule?
We have previously held that
Apprendi
announced a new rule.
Jones v. Smith,
231 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir.2000). Mr. Schardt may have the benefit of the new rule announced in
Apprendi
because his case was not final when
Apprendi
was decided.
See Griffith,
479 U.S. at 328, 107 S.Ct. 708(when a Supreme Court decision results in a new rule, that rule applies to cases still pending on direct appeal). If
Blakely
created a new rule, however, Mr. Schardt cannot have the benefit of that rule because his conviction was final when
Blakely
was announced, unless his claim fits within the
Teague
exceptions. We therefore must determine whether
Blakely
created a new rule.
In
Teague,
the Supreme Court instructed as follows:
It is admittedly often difficult to determine when a case announces a new rule, and we do not attempt to define the spectrum of what may or may not constitute a new rule for retroactivity purposes. In general, however, a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal- Government.
Teague,
489 U.S. at 301, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (citations omitted).
Mr. Schardt contends that
Blakely
did not announce a new rule. Instead, he argues that in
Blakely,
the Court simply applied the rule set forth in
Apprendi.
In support of this argument, he quotes the following language from
Blakely:
This case requires us to apply the rule we expressed in
Apprendi
....
... In
Ring v. Arizona
[536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002)] ... we applied
Apprendi
to an Arizona law that authorized the death penalty if the judge found one of ten aggravating factors ....
... Opr commitment to
Apprendi
in this context reflects not just respect for longstanding precedent, but the need to
give intelligible content to the right of jury trial....
... Those who would rejeét
Apprendi
are resigned to one of two alternatives.
Blakely,
124 S.Ct. at 2536-39.
The State argues that the Court created a new rule in
Blakely.
In support of this argument, the State points to
Simpson v. United States,
376 F.3d 679 (7th Cir.2004) in which the Seventh Circuit held that
Blakely
did more than just apply
Appren-di;■
it created a new rule that was not compelled by
Apprendi
or its progeny.
Id.
at 681.
In
Beard,
the Supreme Court recently revisited the question whether a case creates a new rule. The Court instructed: “We must ... ask ‘whether the rule later announced ... was
dictated
by then-existing precedent-whether, that is, the unlawfulness of [the] conviction was apparent to all reasonable jurists.’ ” 124 S.Ct. at 2511(quoting
Lambrix v. Singletary,
520 U.S. 518, 527-28, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997)) (emphasis in the original).
Every circuit court of appeals that addressed the question presented in
Blakely
reached the opposite conclusion from the rule subsequently announced by the Supreme Court.
See, e.g., United States v. Hughes,
369 F.3d 941, 946-47(6th Cir.2004) (once the jury has determined guilt, the judge may give the defendant a sentence of up to the statutory maximum based on findings made by the judge by a preponderance of the evidence);
United States v. Francis,
367 F.3d 805, 820 (8th Cir.2004) (same);
United States v. Jar-dine,
364 F.3d 1200, 1209 (10th Cir.2004);
United States v. Alvarez,
358 F.3d 1194, 1211-12 (9th Cir.2004) (same);
United States v. Phillips,
349 F.3d 138, 143 (3rd Cir.2003) (same);
United States v. Patterson,
348 F.3d 218, 228-29 (7th Cir.2003) (same);
United States v. Randle,
304 F.3d 373, 378 (5th Cir.2002) (same);
United States v. Sanchez,
269 F.3d 1250, 1267-69 (11th Cir.2001) (same);
United States v. Webb,
255 F.3d 890, 898 (D.C.Cir.2001) (same);
United States v. Angle,
254 F.3d 514, 518 (4th Cir.2001) (same);
United States v. Cabo,
241 F.3d 98, 101 (1st Cir.2001) (same);
United States v. Garcia,
240 F.3d 180, 183-84 (2nd Cir.2001) (same). Thus, the rule announced in
Blakely
was clearly not apparent to all reasonable jurists, nor was it dictated by precedent.
3. Did
Blakely
create a new substantive rule?
In its
amicus
brief, the NACDL argues that the rule in
Blakely
is a new substantive rule, rather than a procedural rule.
New
substantive
rules generally apply retroactively. This includes decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms, as well as constitutional determinations that place particular conduct or persons covered by the statute beyond the State’s power to punish. Such rules apply retroactively
because they necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.
Schriro v. Summerlin,
542 U.S. 348, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 2522-23, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) (citations, quotations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis in the original).
The
amicus
brief maintains that the principle announced in
Blakely
is a substantive rule because it holds that the jury must make findings that enhance a sentencing decision. We disagree. The Supreme Court has instructed that “[rjules that allocate decisionmaking authority in this fashion are prototypical procedural rules.... ”
Schriro,
124 S.Ct. at 2523.
Blakely
allocated some of the decision-making authority previously held by judges to juries.
Blakely,
124 S.Ct. at 2537. It is therefore a procedural rule.
4. Did
Blakely
announce a watershed procedural rule?
New procedural rules generally do not apply retroactively, unless they amount to “ ‘watershed rules of criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”
Saffle v. Parks,
494 U.S. 484, 495, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990) (quoting
Teague,
489 U.S. at 311, 109 S.Ct. 1060). To fit within this exception, the rule must be one “without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.”
Teague,
489 U.S. at 313, 109 5.Ct. 1060.
Blakely
did not announce a watershed rule of criminal procedure. The Tenth Circuit has recently explained:
First,
Blakely
does not affect the determination of a defendant’s guilt or innocence. Rather, it addresses only how a court imposes a sentence, once a defendant has been convicted.
Further, the Supreme Court has previously determined that a change in the law requiring that juries, rather than judges, make the factual findings on which a sentence is based did not announce a watershed rule of criminal procedure.
See Summerlin,
124 S.Ct. at 2524-26. Similarly, we have previously held that a change in the law requiring juries to find these sentencing facts beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by a preponderance of the evidence, also does not announce a watershed rule of criminal procedure.
See United States v. Mora,
293 F.3d 1213, 1219 [10th Cir.2002](holding
Apprendi,
including its quantum of proof requirement, did not announce watershed rule);
see also Sepulveda v. United States,
330 F.3d 55, 61 (1st Cir.2003) (holding, in addressing
Apprendi’s
retroactivity, that “ ‘a decision ... by a judge (on a preponderance standard) rather than a jury (on the reasonable-doubt standard) is not the sort of error that necessarily undermines the fairness ... of judicial proceedings,’ ” quoting
Curtis v. United States,
294 F.3d 841, 843 (7th Cir.2002));
Coleman v. United States,
329 F.3d 77, 88-90 (2d Cir.2003) (rejecting argument that
Apprendi’s
requiring Government to prove sentencing factors beyond a reasonable doubt was watershed rule of criminal procedure).
Price,
400 F.3d at 848-49 (footnotes omitted). We agree with this analysis. We hold that
Blakely
did not announce a watershed rule of criminal procedure.
C
Mr. Schardt also contends that he is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Under this statute, a state prisoner is entitled to relief if his case “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” The rule established in
Blakely
— that the statutory maximum is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant, rather than facts found by the judge — was not clearly established by a Supreme Court decision at the time Mr. Schardt’s case became final on direct appeal. It was a new rule, as explained above. We have held that if a case creates a new rule under'
Teague,
then it is not a clearly established rule under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
See Himes v. Thompson,
336 F.3d 848, 855 n. 4 (9th Cir.2003) (explaining that because a defendant’s case was adjudicated prior to a decision that announced a rule he wanted applied in his case, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) would bar the application of that rule if that case established a new rule of constitutional law ac-' cording to the principles of
Teague v. Lane), see also Vasquez v. Strack,
228 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir.2000) (noting that if a rule is a new rule under
Teague,
it is not clearly established federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). Thus, Mr. Schardt’s argument under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) also fails.'
D
Mr. Schardt further asserts that “[f|ed-eral due process law should also compel the conclusion that
Blakely
must, apply' retroactively to this case.... [I]t is impermissible for'the state courts to deny a criminal defendant a forum in which to raise the fact that he was convicted without the state proving all of the pre-existing elements beyond a reasonable doubt — and aggravating sentencing factors are akin to pre — existing elements.” In support of this argument, Mr. Schardt relies on
Fiore v. White,
531 U.S. 225, 121 S.Ct. 712, 148 L.Ed.2d 629 (2001), and
Bunkley v. Florida,
538 U.S. 835, 123 S.Ct. 2020, 155 L.Ed.2d 1046 (2003). These cases are readily distinguishable. In
Fiore,
the defendant was convicted of operating a hazardous waste facility without a permit pursuant to Title 35 § 6018.401(a) of the Pennsylvania code. 531 U.S. at 226-27, 121 S.Ct. 712. In fact, he had a permit, but he operated the dump in a way that violated its terms.
Id.
at 227, 121 S.Ct. 712. After his conviction became final, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted the relevant statute in such a way that it became clear that Mr. Fiore should not have been convicted as charged. His' conduct1 was not proscribed by the statute, because it applied solely to. persons operating a hazardous waste facility without a permit.
Id.
at 226-27, 121 S.Ct. 712. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court further held that this rule was not new, but had always been the correct interpretation of the law.
Id.
at 228, 121 S.Ct. 712. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the defendant’s conviction holding that “[w]e have held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a State to convict a person of a crime without proving the elements of that crime beyond a' reasonable doubt.”
Id.
at 228-29, 121 S.Ct. 712 (citation omitted).
In
Bunkley,
the defendant was convicted of first degree burglary. 538 U.S. at 837, 123 S.Ct. 2020. His charge was based in part on the fact that he had a pocket knife with a blade 2-1/2 to.3 inches long, which the trial court considered a “dangerous weapon.”
Id.
at 836-37, 123 S.Ct. 2020. After he was convicted, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of “dangerous weapon” in
L.B. v. State,
700 So.2d 370 (Fla.1997) (per curiam). It held that a knife with a blade of 3-3/4 inches did not constitute a dangerous weapon within the meaning of the statute.
Bunkley,
538 U.S. at 837, 123 S.Ct. 2020. The defendant in
Bunkley
filed a motion for postconviction -relief, based on the court’s holding in
L.B.
The Florida Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that its decision did not apply retroactively.
Id.
at
838, 123 S.Ct. 2020. It held, instead, that the decision in
L.B.
(holding that a knife of 3-3/4 inches was not a dangerous weapon) was “a change in the law which culminated the century-long evolutionary process.”
Id.
at 841, 123 S.Ct. 2020 (citations and alterations omitted). Applying the rule announced in
Fiore,
the United States Supreme Court vacated the state court judgment. The Court explained its reasoning as follows:
For the first time, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted the common pocketknife exception, and its interpretation covered the weapon Bunkley possessed at the time of his offense. In the face of such doubt,
Fiore
entitles Bunkley to a determination as to whether
L.B.
correctly stated the common pocketknife exception at the time he was convicted.
Id.
Mr. Schardt contends that, after
Ap-prendi,
exceptional sentencing factors are facts akin to elements that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, he argues the trial court’s finding was unconstitutional in 1999. This argument is unpersuasive. No court has ruled that Mr. Sehardt’s
conduct
was beyond the power of the criminal law to punish. Unlike the circumstances in
Bunkley,
it is clear that the trial judge’s sentencing decision in this matter did not violate any constitutional principle announced by the United States Supreme Court before his sentence became final. The Supreme Court announced a new rule in
Blakely
— one that worked a significant change in the law as it was understood up to that point.
Conclusion
We conclude that Mr. Schardt failed to demonstrate that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We also hold that the Supreme Court announced a new rule in
Blakely v. Washington
that does not apply retroactively to a conviction that was final before that decision was announced. Therefore, the state court’s sentencing decision cannot be challenged in a petition for habeas corpus.
AFFIRMED.