GLASSMAN, Justice.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) appeals from the decision of the Appellate Division of the Workers’ Compensation Commission, affirming the decision of the Commissioner that the failure of Omer Daigle (Daigle), a self-employed claimant, to notify his insurer, Liberty Mutual, within thirty days of a work-related injury did not bar Daigle’s claim for compensation. We find no error in the ruling of the Appellate Division and deny the appeal.
I.
By stipulation of the parties, the sole issue presented to the Commissioner was whether, since Daigle was self-employed, he was required to give notice of his work-related injury to Liberty Mutual within thirty days, pursuant to 39 M.R.S.A. § 63 (1978). The Commissioner held that notice to Liberty Mutual was not required under section 63 and awarded compensation to Daigle. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Commissioner, and Liberty Mutual appeals.
II.
This case raises the novel question whether the injured self-employed claimant must give notice of the work-related injury to the insurance carrier within thirty days under the notice provision in 39 M.R.S.A. [779]*779§ 63 (1978).1 Section 63 provides that no proceeding for compensation shall be maintained under the Workers’ Compensation Act (hereinafter the Act) unless notice of the injury is given to the employer within thirty days of the date of injury. The Act defines “employer,” if insured, to include the insurer “unless the contrary intent is apparent from the context or [it] is inconsistent with the purposes of this Act.” 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(1) (1978). Liberty Mutual asserts that it is consistent with the purposes of section 63 and of the Act in general to bar Daigle’s claim absent notice to Liberty Mutual within thirty days. We disagree.
We recognize the two policies competing for application here. See Clark v. DeCoster Egg Farms, 421 A.2d 939, 942 (Me.1980). First, the purpose of the notice provision is to permit the employer to determine whether the injury is work-related, to take steps to assure prompt medical attention, and to conduct early investigation of the circumstances of the injury. Id.; see also Dun-ton v. Eastern Fine Paper Co., 423 A.2d 512 (Me.1980). The early notice requirement also affords protection against false or mistaken claims and contentions. Clark v. DeCoster Egg Farms, 421 A.2d at 942. Contrary to Liberty Mutual’s contention, the purpose of the notice provision is realized on the facts of this case because the parties have stipulated that the injury was work-related and the injured employee has received medical treatment. There is no need for investigation into the circumstances of the injury for the purpose of determining coverage under the Act. This case is therefore distinguishable from Murray v. T.W. Dick Co., 398 A.2d 390 (Me.1979), where the employee’s claim was barred because the absentee owner-employer lacked notice that the employee’s claim was work-related. Furthermore, we note that as in Murray, no question of fraudulent conduct on the part of the claimant has arisen here.
Competing with the employer’s interest in timely notice is the basic purpose of the Act. As recognized by the Appellate Division, the basic purpose of the Act is to provide compensation for the loss of earning capacity arising from work-related injuries. See Levesque v. Shorey, 286 A.2d 606, 609 (Me.1972). We have consistently held that the Act is remedial in nature and “is to be so construed to accomplish its beneficent purpose and avoid incongruous or harsh results.” Clark v. DeCoster Egg Farms, 421 A.2d at 942; see 39 M.R.S.A. § 94-A(3) (1984);2 Canning v. State, 444 A.2d 387, 390 (Me.1982); Levesque v. Levesque, 363 A.2d 951, 954 (Me.1976). We conclude that to bar Daigle’s claim, when the injury was clearly work-related and the employer had knowledge of the nature of the injury, would not only be inconsistent with the purpose of the Act but would also lead to an unduly harsh result.
Our conclusion draws additional support by reading the notice requirements of sec[780]*780tion 63 in context with the actual knowledge requirements of section 64. Section 64 provides, inter alia, that want of notice to the employer “shall not be a bar to proceedings under this Act if it can be shown that the employer or his agent had knowledge of the injury.” To construe “employer” here to include insurer is contrary to the intent apparent from the context, since the insurer would rarely have occasion to acquire actual knowledge of the injury. Accordingly, in construing this provision, we have not required such knowledge on the part of the insurer and have focused exclusively on the employer’s knowledge to determine whether notice is excused. See, e.g., Murray v. T.W. Dick Co., 398 A.2d at 390; Ross v. Oxford Paper Co., 363 A.2d 712 (Me.1976). There is no question in this ease where the identity between the employee and employer is complete, that the employer had actual knowledge of the injury thereby satisfying section 64. Want of notice to the insurer should not, therefore, bar the employee from proceeding under the Act.
Liberty Mutual further urges us to examine the legislative history of the Act. It asserts that the legislature, by its failure to amend section 63 to cover the self employment situation, must have intended to require that the self-employed claimant notify the insurer.3 We have previously noted, in Wentzell v. Timberlands, Inc., 412 A.2d 1213, 1215 (1980), that unlike other fields “in which the law has generally developed through judicial decision, the law of workers’ compensation is uniquely statutory.” See also American Mutual Insurance Companies v. Murray, 420 A.2d 251, 252 (Me.1980). When the legislative record is silent as to the legislature’s intent in failing to harmonize the notice provision and the amended definition of employee, we decline to read an additional notice requirement into section 63. To engraft such a requirement upon the statutory scheme would be to establish policy in a legislatively created field of law, a function we refused to undertake in American Mutual Insurance Companies v. Murray, 420 A.2d at 252.
Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly refused to require the self-employed injured person to report his injury to an additional party within a specific time when the notice provision in the workers’ compensation law does not expressly so provide. Dick's Delicatessen of Paoli, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, 82 Pa. Commonw. 444, 475 A.2d 1345 (Pa.1984); Travelers Insurance Co. v.
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GLASSMAN, Justice.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) appeals from the decision of the Appellate Division of the Workers’ Compensation Commission, affirming the decision of the Commissioner that the failure of Omer Daigle (Daigle), a self-employed claimant, to notify his insurer, Liberty Mutual, within thirty days of a work-related injury did not bar Daigle’s claim for compensation. We find no error in the ruling of the Appellate Division and deny the appeal.
I.
By stipulation of the parties, the sole issue presented to the Commissioner was whether, since Daigle was self-employed, he was required to give notice of his work-related injury to Liberty Mutual within thirty days, pursuant to 39 M.R.S.A. § 63 (1978). The Commissioner held that notice to Liberty Mutual was not required under section 63 and awarded compensation to Daigle. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Commissioner, and Liberty Mutual appeals.
II.
This case raises the novel question whether the injured self-employed claimant must give notice of the work-related injury to the insurance carrier within thirty days under the notice provision in 39 M.R.S.A. [779]*779§ 63 (1978).1 Section 63 provides that no proceeding for compensation shall be maintained under the Workers’ Compensation Act (hereinafter the Act) unless notice of the injury is given to the employer within thirty days of the date of injury. The Act defines “employer,” if insured, to include the insurer “unless the contrary intent is apparent from the context or [it] is inconsistent with the purposes of this Act.” 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(1) (1978). Liberty Mutual asserts that it is consistent with the purposes of section 63 and of the Act in general to bar Daigle’s claim absent notice to Liberty Mutual within thirty days. We disagree.
We recognize the two policies competing for application here. See Clark v. DeCoster Egg Farms, 421 A.2d 939, 942 (Me.1980). First, the purpose of the notice provision is to permit the employer to determine whether the injury is work-related, to take steps to assure prompt medical attention, and to conduct early investigation of the circumstances of the injury. Id.; see also Dun-ton v. Eastern Fine Paper Co., 423 A.2d 512 (Me.1980). The early notice requirement also affords protection against false or mistaken claims and contentions. Clark v. DeCoster Egg Farms, 421 A.2d at 942. Contrary to Liberty Mutual’s contention, the purpose of the notice provision is realized on the facts of this case because the parties have stipulated that the injury was work-related and the injured employee has received medical treatment. There is no need for investigation into the circumstances of the injury for the purpose of determining coverage under the Act. This case is therefore distinguishable from Murray v. T.W. Dick Co., 398 A.2d 390 (Me.1979), where the employee’s claim was barred because the absentee owner-employer lacked notice that the employee’s claim was work-related. Furthermore, we note that as in Murray, no question of fraudulent conduct on the part of the claimant has arisen here.
Competing with the employer’s interest in timely notice is the basic purpose of the Act. As recognized by the Appellate Division, the basic purpose of the Act is to provide compensation for the loss of earning capacity arising from work-related injuries. See Levesque v. Shorey, 286 A.2d 606, 609 (Me.1972). We have consistently held that the Act is remedial in nature and “is to be so construed to accomplish its beneficent purpose and avoid incongruous or harsh results.” Clark v. DeCoster Egg Farms, 421 A.2d at 942; see 39 M.R.S.A. § 94-A(3) (1984);2 Canning v. State, 444 A.2d 387, 390 (Me.1982); Levesque v. Levesque, 363 A.2d 951, 954 (Me.1976). We conclude that to bar Daigle’s claim, when the injury was clearly work-related and the employer had knowledge of the nature of the injury, would not only be inconsistent with the purpose of the Act but would also lead to an unduly harsh result.
Our conclusion draws additional support by reading the notice requirements of sec[780]*780tion 63 in context with the actual knowledge requirements of section 64. Section 64 provides, inter alia, that want of notice to the employer “shall not be a bar to proceedings under this Act if it can be shown that the employer or his agent had knowledge of the injury.” To construe “employer” here to include insurer is contrary to the intent apparent from the context, since the insurer would rarely have occasion to acquire actual knowledge of the injury. Accordingly, in construing this provision, we have not required such knowledge on the part of the insurer and have focused exclusively on the employer’s knowledge to determine whether notice is excused. See, e.g., Murray v. T.W. Dick Co., 398 A.2d at 390; Ross v. Oxford Paper Co., 363 A.2d 712 (Me.1976). There is no question in this ease where the identity between the employee and employer is complete, that the employer had actual knowledge of the injury thereby satisfying section 64. Want of notice to the insurer should not, therefore, bar the employee from proceeding under the Act.
Liberty Mutual further urges us to examine the legislative history of the Act. It asserts that the legislature, by its failure to amend section 63 to cover the self employment situation, must have intended to require that the self-employed claimant notify the insurer.3 We have previously noted, in Wentzell v. Timberlands, Inc., 412 A.2d 1213, 1215 (1980), that unlike other fields “in which the law has generally developed through judicial decision, the law of workers’ compensation is uniquely statutory.” See also American Mutual Insurance Companies v. Murray, 420 A.2d 251, 252 (Me.1980). When the legislative record is silent as to the legislature’s intent in failing to harmonize the notice provision and the amended definition of employee, we decline to read an additional notice requirement into section 63. To engraft such a requirement upon the statutory scheme would be to establish policy in a legislatively created field of law, a function we refused to undertake in American Mutual Insurance Companies v. Murray, 420 A.2d at 252.
Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly refused to require the self-employed injured person to report his injury to an additional party within a specific time when the notice provision in the workers’ compensation law does not expressly so provide. Dick's Delicatessen of Paoli, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, 82 Pa. Commonw. 444, 475 A.2d 1345 (Pa.1984); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, 68 Pa. Commonw. 24, 447 A.2d 1116 (Pa.1982); see, e.g., State Insurance Fund v. Perkes, 672 P.2d 101 (Utah 1983).4 The Utah court found that such a requirement should be imposed by the legislature and not by the court. See State Insurance Fund v. Perkes, 672 P.2d at 102. The Pennsylvania court characterized the duty to notify the insurance carrier as a contract matter to be expressly agreed upon and set forth in the insurance contract. Dick’s Delicatessen of Paoli, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, 82 Pa. Commonw. at 451, 475 A.2d at 1349. We agree that such an additional duty is not for the court to impose. Accordingly, we find no error in the Commissioner’s decision finding the claimant entitled to compensation under the Act.
[781]*781The entry is:
Decision of the Appellate Division affirmed.
It is further ordered that the employer pay to the employee an allowance for counsel fees in the amount of $550, together with his reasonable out-of-pocket expenses for this appeal.
NICHOLS, ROBERTS and WATHEN, JJ., concurring.