Daalling v. Daalling

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedSeptember 5, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-05426
StatusUnknown

This text of Daalling v. Daalling (Daalling v. Daalling) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Daalling v. Daalling, (E.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ---------------------------------------------------------x MATTHEW DAALLING,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 23-CV-05426 (OEM) -against-

GIOVANNI DAALLING; AMBER; AL DAEMO; MICHELLE RIVERA,

Defendants. -----------------------------------------------------------x ORELIA E. MERCHANT, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Matthew Daalling (“Plaintiff” or “Daalling”) filed the instant pro se action alleging jurisdiction under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. However, for the reasons discussed below, the complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and for failure to conform with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff is granted thirty (30) days from the date of this memorandum and order to file an amended complaint. BACKGROUND On July 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed this action and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF 1, (“Compl.”) at 2. Plaintiff has used a standard form complaint. Plaintiff indicates that he is bringing this action against federal officials and that “they have been attacking [him] over and over and I don’t know how to get it to stop.” Id. at 4. As the facts underlying his claims, Plaintiff simply lists the words “surveillance abuse,” “abuse of power,” “attempted murder,” and “murder.” Compl. at 5. Plaintiff asserts that the events giving rise to his claim occurred in Brooklyn, New York, “for the past ten years.” Id. For relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and “for elevation from this auditory and visual assaults.” Id. at 6. STANDARD OF REVIEW 28 U.S.C. § 1915 allows a litigant to pursue a claim in federal court “without prepayment

of fees or security” so long as they “submit[] an affidavit” that establishes “that the person is unable to pay such fees.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).1 However, in exchange for the privilege of maintaining an action without payment – i.e., proceeding in forma pauperis – and to avoid abuse of the judicial system, § 1915(e) provides a mechanism for the Court to initially review the complaint prior to the issuance of summons and the commencement of the adversarial process. See Potnick v. E. State Hosp., 701 F.2d 243, 244 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (“[W]e are not unmindful of the mounting concern over the ever-increasing caseload burdening the federal courts, and the growing view that judges must be alert to prevent the dissipation of limited judicial resources on claims that are frivolous or are brought in bad faith.”). Thus, the Court’s duty at this stage involves two “distinct” tasks: (1) reviewing the

plaintiff’s affidavit and assessing their inability to pay the filing fee,2 and (2) reviewing the complaint on the merits. See id. (“The statutory scheme recognizes, however, that whether a plaintiff qualifies for in forma pauperis status and whether his claims have merit present two distinct issues.”). As to whether the plaintiff qualifies for in forma pauperis status, that “decision . . . is left to the District Court’s discretion[.]” Fridman v. City of New York, 195 F. Supp. 2d 534, 536

1 28 U.S.C. § 1915 also contains additional requirements and provisions for incarcerated litigants seeking in forma pauperis status which do not apply here. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(2), (b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A 2 As of the date of this order, the current filing fee for civil cases in this district is $402.00 See Court Fees, Eastern District of New York, available at Court Fees | Eastern District of New York | United States District Court (uscourts.gov) (S.D.N.Y. 2002). “The Supreme Court has long held that ‘an affidavit is sufficient which states that one cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for the costs [inherent in litigation] and still be able to provide himself and dependents with the necessities of life.’” Brooks v. Aiden 0821 Cap. LLC, No. 19-CV-6823 (GRB) (AYS), 2020 WL 4614323, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2020)

(quoting Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339(1948)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Section 1915(a) does not require a litigant to demonstrate absolute destitution; no party must be made to choose between abandoning a potentially meritorious claim or foregoing the necessities of life.” Potnick, 701 F.2d at 244. At the initial review of the complaint, a district court “shall” dismiss an in forma pauperis action when the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In practice, “[t]he standard for dismissal of an action or appeal taken in forma pauperis is identical to the standard for dismissal on a motion made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Fridman, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 538. That is, the complaint must survive the Iqbal-

Twombly pleading standard and “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). An action is “frivolous” when either: (1) “the ‘factual contentions are clearly baseless,’ such as when allegations are the product of delusion or fantasy”; or (2) “the claim is ‘based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.’” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted). “It is well established that the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted ‘to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (cleaned up) (alteration omitted). See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (A “pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyer.”).

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Related

Adkins v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.
335 U.S. 331 (Supreme Court, 1948)
Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Ricciuti v. Transit Authority
941 F.2d 119 (Second Circuit, 1991)
Fridman v. City of New York
195 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D. New York, 2002)
Harnage v. Lightner
916 F.3d 138 (Second Circuit, 2019)
Ally v. Sukkar
128 F. App'x 194 (Second Circuit, 2005)

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Bluebook (online)
Daalling v. Daalling, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/daalling-v-daalling-nyed-2023.