D. R. Johnson Lumber Co. v. Department of Revenue

866 P.2d 1227, 318 Or. 330, 1994 Ore. LEXIS 11
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 10, 1994
DocketOTC 3237; SC S40298
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 866 P.2d 1227 (D. R. Johnson Lumber Co. v. Department of Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
D. R. Johnson Lumber Co. v. Department of Revenue, 866 P.2d 1227, 318 Or. 330, 1994 Ore. LEXIS 11 (Or. 1994).

Opinion

*332 VAN HOOMISSEN, J.

Taxpayers (“D. R. Johnson Lumber Company”) 1 appeal from a decision of the Tax Court that their two steam powered electric generating facilities (the facilities) are assessed properly under ORS 308.505 et seq. D. R. Johnson Lumber Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 12 OTR 429 (1993). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the Tax Court’s judgment.

Taxpayers own two steam powered electric generating facilities (“Co-Gen” and “Co-Gen II”) that use wood waste to generate steam. Most of the wood waste is a byproduct from D. R. Johnson Lumber Company’s adjacent lumber mills, but Co-Gen and Co-Gen II also purchase wood waste from other lumber mills owned by unrelated parties. Although 25 to 30 percent of the steam generated by the facilities is used in the kilns at the adjacent lumber mills, more than half of the steam is used to generate electricity that, except for a portion used to operate the generating facilities, is sold to power companies. Electricity required by the lumber mills is purchased separately from the power companies.

In 1988, D. R. Johnson Lumber Company filed an election with the Department of Revenue (department) to have Co-Gen and Co-Gen II’s facilities valued under ORS 308.411 2 for tax purposes. 3 The department denied the election and assessed Co-Gen and Co-Gen II under ORS 308.505 *333 et seq, the statutory scheme for assessing utility companies, 4 on the ground that the facilities were not industrial plants within the meaning of ORS 308.411.

On taxpayers’ appeal, the Oregon Tax Court affirmed the department’s decision, holding that Co-Gen and Co-Gen II are not an integrated part of taxpayers’ larger industrial plants. D. R. Johnson Lumber Co. v. Dept. of Rev., supra, 12 OTR at 432. The Tax Court held that Co-Gen and Co-Gen II facilities were properly designated by the department for central assessment as utilities under ORS 308.505 and concluded that they are not industrial plants that taxpayers may elect to have taxed under ORS 308.411 and *334 withhold income information. Id. at 435. Taxpayers appealed. This court reviews de novo. ORS 305.445.

The parties do not dispute any material fact. This case presents an issue of statutory construction.

Taxpayers concede that Co-Gen and Co-Gen II are subject to central assessment under ORS 308.505 et seq. They argue, however, that the election provisions of ORS 308.411 for industrial plants also apply to the electric generation facilities, and that the owners of those facilities are entitled to elect to withhold income and expense information from the department under ORS 308.411(2).

The department responds that the election provisions of ORS 308.411 do not apply to facilities that are centrally assessed utilities under ORS 308.505 et seq. The department argues that, to hold otherwise would create an exception to ORS 308.525, which requires centrally assessed utilities to provide statements of gross receipts and net earnings to the department, because ORS 308.411(8) provides that owners who elect under ORS 308.411 may not be required to provide “any itemization of income and expense of the industrial plant for use in an income approach to valuation * *

In construing statutes, our duty is to discern the intent of the legislature. ORS 174.020. To discern legislative intent, we first look to the text and context of the statute at issue. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). In reviewing text and context, the court takes into consideration the rules of statutory construction that bear directly on the reading of the text and context. Id. at 611. If, after that inquiry, the legislative intent remains unclear, the court then looks to the legislative history of the statute at issue. Id. at 611-12. Only if the legislative intent remains unclear does the court turn to general maxims of statutory construction. Id. at 612.

ORS 174.010 provides:

“In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where there *335 are several provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.”

Our goal, then, in examining the text and context of ORS 308.411 and 308.505 et seq, is to determine the legislature’s intent and, if possible, to adopt a construction that will give effect to all the relevant statutes. With that template in mind, we proceed to consider the statutes at issue here.

Taxpayers argue that, although the electric generation facilities maybe centrally assessed as utilities under ORS 308.505 et seq,

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cerney v. Dept. of Rev.
Oregon Tax Court, 2022
Rivera v. Dept. of Rev.
Oregon Tax Court, 2020
Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. Department of Revenue
226 P.3d 28 (Oregon Supreme Court, 2010)
Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. Dept. of Rev.
19 Or. Tax 481 (Oregon Tax Court, 2008)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
866 P.2d 1227, 318 Or. 330, 1994 Ore. LEXIS 11, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/d-r-johnson-lumber-co-v-department-of-revenue-or-1994.