IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED JULY SESSION, 1999 October 29, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk CYRUS DEVILLE WILSON, ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9811-CR-00448 ) Appe llant, ) ) DAVIDSON COUNTY V. ) ) ) HON. SETH NORMAN, JUDGE STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) Appellee. ) (POST-CONVICTION)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
WILLIAM A. LANE PAUL G. SUMMERS 3236 Dilton Mankin Road Attorney General & Reporter Murfreesboro, TN 37127 ELIZABETH B. MARNEY Assistant Attorney General 2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243
VICTO R S. JO HNS ON, III District Attorney General
KIMB ERLY HAAS Assistant District Attorney General Washington Square, Suite 500 222 2nd Avenue North Nashville, TN 37201-1649
OPINION FILED ________________________
VACATED AND REMANDED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE OPINION Petitioner Cyrus D eville W ilson app eals as o f right from th e denia l of his post-
conviction petition by the Davidson County Criminal Court. Petitioner was convicted
by a jury of first degree m urder, and seeks post-conviction relief on a number of
grounds. Because the trial court’s order denying post-conviction relief is incomplete,
we vacate the judgment entered by the trial court and remand the case for the entry
of a new order consistent with this opinion.
I. Procedural History
A review of this Court’s opinion on Petitioner’s direct appeal reveals that
Petitioner was c onvicte d of first d egree murd er by a D avidso n Cou nty jury in
February of 1994 , and Pe titioner was senten ced to life im prisonm ent. See State v.
Cyrus Deville W ilson, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9408-CR-00266, 1995 WL 676398 at *2,
*5 (Davidson County) (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Nov. 17, 1995) perm. to appeal
denied (Tenn. 1996). The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Crim inal Ap peals
in December of 1995. Id. at *1. Permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme
Court w as den ied on M arch 25 , 1996. Id.
Petitioner, acting pro se, filed his initial post-conviction petition on August 15,
1996. Petitioner alleged that (1) trial counsel wa s ineffective because counsel was
undergoing psychological or substance abuse evaluation during his representation
of Petitioner; (2) the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction on reasonable doubt
that did not meet constitutional standards; (3) trial counsel was ineffective because
counsel failed to object to this instruction; (4) the state failed to disclose an oral
statement mad e by P etitione r, desp ite the fa ct that it w as listed in Petitio ner’s
discovery request, and the state intended to use the statement at trial; (5) the state
violated Petitioner’s due process rights because the state called a material witness,
whose eviden ce wa s part o f the sta te’s proof-in-chief, as a rebuttal witness; and (6)
-2- the state violated Petitioner’s due process rights because the state failed to identify
witnesse s in the ind ictmen t whose testimon y was pa rt of the state ’s proof-in-c hief.
Post-conviction counsel was appointed for Petitioner, and an amended post-
conviction petition was filed on June 6, 1998. In the amended petition Petitioner
alleged that his trial coun sel was ineffective be cause of co unsel’s failure to locate,
interview, and present alibi witnesses th at were available and willing to testify on
behalf of Petitioner.
II. Facts
In this Co urt’s opinion addressing Petitioner’s direct appeal we summarized
the facts of Petitioner’s case:
On September 15, 1992, Metro Davidson police officers found the body of Christopher Luckett partly lodged underneath a chain link fence in East Nashville. The victim had sustained a fatal gunshot wound to the head. The officers also found empty shotgun shells, shotgun "wadding," and a blue duffel bag at the crime scene. On February 2, 1993, the Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the appellant for the v ictim's murd er. Th e cas e proc eede d to trial on January 31, 1994.
At trial, the state first called Chiquita Lee, the victim's sister, in order to establish the victim's age and health. Ms. Lee testified that the victim was nineteen years old at the time of his murder and that he had a deform ity in his right arm that preve nted its full use. Defense counsel objected on the gr ound th at the state had not given prior notice of their intent to call Ms. Lee as a witness. The trial court overruled the objection.
The state next presented evidence to establish a motive for the murder. Officer Phillip Wright testified that during routine patrol on or about July 20, 1992, he was stopped by the appellant who reported that the victim, Luckett, had s tolen his car. Officer W right further testified that, when aske d if he wanted to swear out a warrant against the victim, the appellan t replied "no t right now." D efense couns el objecte d to this testimony on the ground that the appellant's statement to Officer Wright had not been disclosed prior to trial. Again, the trial court overruled the objection.
Next, the state called two e yewitnesses to the murde r. The first, Rodriguez Lee, testified that the appellant had a twelve-gauge shotgun which came from Mr. Lee's house. Lee added that he saw the appellant remove the gun from a blue duffel bag. Lee stated that he saw the appellant chasing the victim on the night of the murder. He further testified that the victim got stuck underneath a patio fence. Lee
-3- then stated that he heard the victim plea d "[p]lease don't kill me ." According to Lee, the appellant paid no heed to the victim's pleas for mercy. Instead, he fired point-blank into the victim 's face . Marq uis Harris, another witness for the prosecution, also testified that he saw the appellant shoot the victim in the face.
Other witnesses co rroborated this tes timony. Steve Crawley testified that he saw the appellant three weeks prior to the murder carrying a shotgun. Craw ley also testified that he witnessed the appe llant on the night of the murder "acting shaky and nervous." Another witness, Frederick Davis, testified that he overheard the appellant state that "he was going to get" the victim for stealing the appellant's car.
The appellant testified as a witness on his o wn beh alf. The appellant denied any involvement in the murder, contending that he was at home with his girlfriend at the time of the shooting. The appellant did admit that, after the victim stole his car, he threatened to "get" the victim. On cross- examination, the state asked the appellant if, on the night of the shooting, he was in possession of a shotgun. The appellant responded that he wa s not. T he sta te then inquire d if all the other witnesses who testified that the appellant did have a shotgun around the time of the shooting were "lying ." The appellant responded affirmatively.
At the close of the defens e's case in chief, the s tate called Detective Bill Pridem ore as a rebuttal witn ess. Prior to trial, Pridemore had made a summary of statements given to him by Rodriguez Lee during questioning. The statemen ts corroborated Lee's trial testimony. On direct exam ination , the sta te ask ed Pr idem ore to re coun t his summ ary of thes e state men ts. Defe nse c ouns el obje cted on the ground that Pridemore was a material witness, and thus, should not be permitted to testify as a rebuttal witness. The state argued that the appellant had "opened the door" when he testified on cross-examination that anyone who said he possessed a shotgun on the night o f the m urder was "lyin g." The trial judge overruled defense counsel's objection.
Wilson, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9408-CR-00266, 1995 WL 676398 at *1-2.
III. Post-Conviction Hearings
Two post conviction hearings were held. At the initial post-conviction hearing
Petitioner presented two witnesses, Dawone Matthews and Brandi Chriswe ll. Both
witnesses testified that they were in the general vicinity of the murder on September
15, 1992, and that they saw Petitioner somewhere other than the murder scene at
the time th e murd er was c omm itted.
-4- Matthews testified that he knew Petitioner because he was dating Petition er’s
sister around the time of the murder. Chriswell, who was 12 years of age at the time
of the mu rder, testified that she knew Petitioner’s face and name. Both Matthews
and Chris well tes tified that on the da te of the murd er they were in an are a in
Nash ville called “the villag e.” At th at time both were con grega ting with their
friends–Matthews was on a basketball court, and Chriswell was out on the porch of
an apartm ent adjac ent to the b asketb all court. Both testified that Petitioner was also
on the b asketb all court.
When gun shots rang out, Matthews stated that he ran with his girlfriend
(Petitioner’s sister) to the home of Petitioner’s mother. Matthews testified that
Petitioner ran in the house right after Matthews. On cross examination, Matthews
testified that Pe titioner w as run ning w ith him imme diately after th e shots were fired,
and that the place where the victim was killed was approximately 30 yards away
from the basketball court. Chriswell testified that when shots were fired, she saw
Petitione r on the b asketb all court, and that the gunshots came from an area to the
right of her-- away from the cour t.
Both Matthews and Chriswell testified that they were not contacted by any
attorneys for Petitioner until they were approached by pos t-conv iction co unse l, but
that they would have testified at Petitioner’s trial had they been asked. On cross
examination both acknowledged that they did not know the date of Petition er’s trial.
Matthews stated that he did not come forward with his information because the idea
“never ca me to m y mind.”
The State ca lled Petition er’s mo ther, Valerie W ilson Ehinlaiye. Ehinlaiye
testified that Petitioner entered her home five to ten minutes after the shooting, and
that he entered with a woman named Sonya, not with Matthews. Ehinlaiye also
testified that sh e was not ca lled as a witne ss at P etitione r’s trial.
-5- The hearing was then continued until October 14, 1998, at which time
Petitioner called Pe titioner’s trial cou nsel to the stand, an d Petitione r also cho se to
testify. Trial co unse l testified that he did undergo psychological and drug
dependency evaluations, but tha t these occurre d after his representation of
Petitioner, and that his license was in good standing during Pe titioner’s
representation. Trial counsel also testified that he did no t recall th e reas onab le
doubt instruction that was given to the jury. Post-conviction counsel for Petitioner
attempted to question trial counsel regarding the non disclosure of Petitioner’s oral
statement by the State, as well as the State’s use of a material witness in rebu ttal,
but the post-conviction court ruled that both issues were predetermined.
As to alibi witnes ses, tria l coun sel tes tified tha t Petition er gav e him the “street”
names of three ind ividuals wh o could p rovide alibis for Petitione r: “Jabbe r,”
“Rodn ey,” and “Ice.” Petitioner did not provide formal names or addresses for these
individuals, but told counsel that they could be located in a particular area of the
Edge Hill housin g projects . Trial counsel said that he canvassed this area four times
looking for these person s, twice by himself, twice with an assistant, but was
unsuccessful each time. Counsel stated that he did not recognize the names of
Dawone Matthews or Brandi Chriswell. Trial counsel testified that Petition er’s
mothe r was no t called as a n alibi witnes s beca use sh e could n ot provide an alibi.
Petitioner testified that he gave trial counsel the names of several alibi
witnesses: Craig Johnson (“Ice”), “Snake,” “Jab ber,” Dewa n (sic), Rodne y, Randy,
and Brandy (sic). Petitioner stated that he did not provide trial counsel with the given
names of all the p ossib le alibi w itness es be caus e he w as no t familia r with the ir
names, but that the street na mes “are the names that they go by eve ry day.” He
also testified that he did not provide formal addresses because he did not know
them, but that these individuals we re in Petitioner’s neighb orhood eve ry day.
Petitioner testified that he had no personal knowledge of any efforts trial counsel
may or may no t have m ade to loc ate the w itnesses .
-6- Following the hearing the post-conviction court orally dismissed the petition:
The Court: The allega tion is ine ffective a ssista nce a nd co unse l in the matter and un der the law , it is the petitioner’s burden to carry the proof. I have Mr. Wilson saying he gave the names to Mr. Blair and Mr. Blair didn’t do anything. M r. Blair tells me he we nt and looked for the witnesses. The re’s no proof here that the ou tcom e of the trial wou ld be any different or that Mr. Blair was outside of the requirem ents as far as counselor is concerned in a case in this community (sic). The petition is dismissed.
The trial court issu ed a writte n order dismissing the petition, but did not set
forth any findings of fact or conclusions of law in the order or in a sep arate
memorandum.
IV. Analysis
Petition er’s request for post-conviction relief is governed by the Post
Conviction Procedure Act of 1995. See Tenn . Code Ann. § 40-30 -201, C omp iler’s
Notes (1997). As a threshold matter we must decide if the post-convictio n cou rt’s
failure to issue written findings of fact and conclusions of law precludes us from
addressing Petition er’s appe al. Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-30-211(b) requires
a post-con viction trial cou rt to enter a written order or memorandum upon final
disposition of a petition, wh ich “sh all set fo rth . . . all gro unds prese nted, a nd sh all
state the findings of fact and conclusions of law with regards to each s uch gro und.”
(1997). See also Tenn . Sup. C t. R. 28, § 9 (A).
Here, we have no such findings o f fact and conclusions of law. Th e post-
conviction court disposed of Wilson’s petition orally following the conclusion of the
second evidentiary hearing. The written order entered thereafter does not co ntain
any findings of fact and conclusions of law. Nor is there a separate memorandum.
Section 40-30-211(b) is identical to its pred ecesso r, § 40-30 -118(b). Comp are
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-2 11(b) (1997 ) with Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-118(b)
-7- (1990). This Court interpreted the provisions of § 40-30-118(b) as creating
manda tory obligations that a trial court must follow in a post-conviction proceeding.
See State v. Swanson, 680 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984) (citing Brown
v. State, 445 S.W.2d 669 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969)). Because the purpose of the
section was to ensure m eaningful app ellate review, a trial court’s failure to com ply
with the section did no t constitute a cons titutional abridgem ent nor did it render a
petition er’s convic tion or s enten ce void or voidab le. Id. (citing Georg e v. State , 533
S.W.2d 322 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975)). The remedy for a trial court’s failure to
com ply with § 40-30-118 was assessed on a case-by-case basis: “Non-compliance
by the post-conviction court does not warrant a reversal if the record is s ufficient to
effectuate a mea ningful ap pellate revie w . . . . ‘Where the record of the proceedings
contains the reasons of the trial judge for dismissing th e petitio n, the re cord is
sufficient to effectua te mean ingful app ellate review.’” Rickm an v. State , 972 S.W.2d
687, 692 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Brown v. State, C.C.A. No. 03C01-9107-
CR-00233, 1992 WL 143878 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, June 26, 1992); quoting
Watkins v. State, C.C.A. No. 1121, 1989 WL 106974 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville,
Sept. 18, 198 9)).
Given that the language of § 40-30-211(b) is identical to that in § 40-30-
118(b), we see no reas on to depart from the above reas oning, and a dopt the abo ve
as the correct ap proach to interpretin g violations of § 40-3 0-211(b ). Accordingly, we
turn to the petition and rec ord befo re us to se e if mean ingful app ellate review may
be provided.
W e are of the opinion that Petition er’s cla ims m ay not b e me aning fully
reviewed. Because the trial court did not address all of the petitioner’s grounds, and
because we canno t deduce from the record the trial cou rt’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law, we must remand the case to the trial court for a complete written
order.
-8- To begin , Petition er raise d a tota l of seven issues in his post-conviction
petitions. The trial jud ge ruled two of thos e issues to be pre determ ined. Thus five
issues remain ed: (1) whether trial counsel was ineffective because counsel was
undergoing psychological or substance abuse evaluation during his representation
of Petitioner; (2) whether the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction on
reasonable doub t that did not m eet co nstitutio nal sta ndard s; (3) wh ether tr ial counsel
was ineffective because counsel failed to object to this instruction; (4) whether the
state violated Petitioner’s du e proce ss rights w hen the state failed to identify
witnesses in the indictment whose testimony was pa rt of the state ’s proof-in-c hief;
and (5) wheth er trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to locate,
interview, and p resen t alibi witn esse s that w ere av ailable and willing to testify on
The oral disposition of the p etition, however, addresse s one claim– ineffective
assistance of counsel as regards to alibi witnesse s. Because there are no findings
of fact and conclusions of law as regards the four missing issues, we are u nable to
provide any review of the trial court’s determinations on these claims.
Nor are we a ble to me aningfu lly review the o ne issue that the trial court did
address in disposing of the petition. Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of
counsel as to procurement of alibi witnesses. There is, however, conflicting
testimony, and the trial court did n ot state wh ose testim ony it credite d. W e have
noted th is before:
[w]e cannot discern whether the trial court accredited the testimony of the petitioner or his trial attorney. Although it may be possible to infer that the trial court accredited the attorney’s testimony, one of the main purposes behind requiring an order with findings of fact and conclusions of law is to prevent this very type of speculation on appea l.” Steve E. Tod d v. State , C.C.A. No. 01C01-9612-CR-00503 , 1999 W L 30678 at *4
(Davidson County) (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Jan. 16, 1999) (no Rule 11
applicatio n filed).
-9- W e would like to emphasize that the Post Conviction Procedure Act is very
clear as to wha t must be done b y a trial court o n the final d isposition o f a petition:
“the court shall enter a final orde r . . . [and] shall set forth in the order or a written
memorandum of the case all grounds presented, and shall state the findings of fact
and conclusions of law with regard to each such ground.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-
211(b) (1 997) (em phasis a dded); see also Tenn . Sup. C t. R. 28, § 9 (A).
V. Conclusion
In summ ary, the trial co urt’s dispo sition of the post-c onviction petition is not
adequate. The oral disposition from the bench and the written judgment do not
address all of Petitioner’s claims, and do not contain sufficient findings of fact and
conclusions of law that provide the grounds for the denial of Petitioner’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim as to alibi witnesses. As a result, we cannot provide
meaningful appellate review. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand
this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. After the trial court has made
its complete findings of fact and conclusions of law as to each ground, it should enter
another order either granting relief or denying the petition. The appeal process can
then be followed if the aggrieved party so desires.
____________________________________ THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
CONCUR:
___________________________________ JERRY L. SMITH, Judge
___________________________________ NORMA McG EE OGLE, Judge
-10-