RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2764-16T2
C.Y.R., f/k/a C.Y.S. and C.S.,1
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
C.M.,
Defendant-Respondent. _____________________________
Argued April 12, 2018 – Decided June 13, 2018
Before Judges Simonelli, Rothstadt and Gooden Brown.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, Docket No. FD-12-1805-15.
Jennifer E. Presti and Lynne Strober argued the cause for appellants (Mandelbaum Salsburg, PC, attorneys; Jennifer E. Presti, on the briefs).
Joy A. Anderson argued the cause for respondent (Law Office of Joy Anderson, LLC, attorneys; Joy A. Anderson, on the brief; Jeff Thakker, of counsel and on the brief).
1 We use initials and fictitious names to identify the participants in this matter pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(d). PER CURIAM
This matter involves a third-party custody dispute over
three-year-old E.M. (Edward) between his biological father,
defendant C.M. (Conrad), and the child's maternal aunt and uncle,
plaintiffs C.Y.R. (Catherine) and C.S. (Charles) (collectively,
plaintiffs). Following a ten-day custody trial, the court held
plaintiffs failed to rebut the presumption of custody in favor of
Conrad by clear and convincing evidence of exceptional
circumstance based on psychological parentage. We agree and
affirm.
I.
Background Facts
Edward was born in October 2014. C.M.S. (Carol) is Edward's
biological mother. Carol and Conrad were not married, but they
lived together and jointly raised Edward until Carol's death.
In November 2014, the family became involved with the New
Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) when
Conrad was arrested for simple assault following a domestic
violence incident with Carol. The charges were later dismissed
when Carol declined to pursue the matter or seek a restraining
order. The Division found that abuse and neglect of Edward was
"not established" against either parent, but provided them
2 A-2764-16T2 domestic violence counseling. The Division closed the file after
the couple completed counseling.
On April 21, 2015, Carol died of a stab wound. According to
Conrad, he and Carol were arguing over her text messaging another
person, a physical altercation ensued, Carol retrieved a knife,
they struggled over the knife, and Carol accidentally stabbed
herself in the chest. Following an investigation, the Middlesex
County Prosecutor's Office did not charge Conrad in connection
with Carol's death.
Edward was in the apartment at the time of the altercation.
The police notified the Division and asked Conrad's sister to take
custody of Edward, which the Division approved. The Division
initiated an investigation, but did not seek emergent removal of
Edward from Conrad because they found he was safe with his father.
However, on the day Carol died, plaintiffs filed an emergent order
to show cause (OTSC), seeking temporary custody of Edward.
Catherine certified that defendant was "suspected of murdering
[her] sister[,]" she feared for Edward's life, Edward would not
be cared for, and Carol designated them in her Last Will and
Testament to be the child's guardians.
On April 21, 2015, the court entered an ex parte OTSC granting
plaintiffs temporary legal and residential custody of Edward
"pending the completion of the investigation against . . . [Conrad]
3 A-2764-16T2 and pending further [o]rder of the [c]ourt[.]"2 The court set May
27, 2015 as the return date for the OTSC.
On April 27, 2015, Conrad filed a pro se motion for an order
granting him sole legal and physical custody of Edward, and
subsequently retained an attorney to represent him. On April 29,
2015, Conrad visited the Division's office and discussed his plan
for Edward's return to his custody. He reported that Carol's
family was calling him a murderer and expressed his concern that
his son would be alienated from him while in their care. He also
reported he was diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
resulting from witnessing Carol's death, and was actively engaged
in therapeutic services. He expressed his willingness to comply
with whatever the Division requested of him and agreed to undergo
a psychological evaluation and sign release forms in connection
with his mental health care.
On May 13, 2015, Conrad underwent a psychological evaluation
with Carolina Mendez, Ph.D. to assess his parenting ability, mental
status, and treatment needs. Mendez recommended that he undergo
a more comprehensive, in-depth evaluation of his risk of engaging
2 It is unclear from the record whether the court was referring to the Prosecutor's investigation, the Division's investigation, or both.
4 A-2764-16T2 in domestic violence in the future, as well as individual therapy
that incorporated domestic violence counseling.
Mendez testified at the custody hearing, but not as an expert
witness. She testified consistent with her report and reiterated
her concern about Conrad's history of domestic violence and
criminal activity.3 She re-emphasized the need for defendant to
undergo a more in-depth evaluation and recommended his parenting
time be supervised time until then.
In a May 27, 2015 order, the court continued plaintiffs'
temporary legal and physical custody of Edward, granted Conrad
supervised parenting time every Saturday for two hours, and ordered
Conrad to continue individual therapeutic services the Division
offered and cooperate with Mendez's recommendation that he undergo
a more in-depth evaluation. Catherine's husband, J.R. (John), a
law enforcement officer, supervised Conrad's parenting time.
On June 12, 2015, the Division completed its investigation
and found "[t]he allegations of neglect, substantial risk of
physical injury/environment injurious to health and welfare . . .
to [Edward] . . . [were] not established." However, the Division
3 Defendant apparently has convictions for eluding law enforcement and resisting arrest, playing of loud radio, phonograph or musical instrument, obstructing the administration of law or governmental function, and noncompliance with posted restrictions at a State park. There are no judgments of conviction in the appellate record.
5 A-2764-16T2 asked the court to order Conrad to comply with updated
recommendations Mendez made after she reviewed additional records,
specifically, that he complete anger management, undergo a
substance abuse evaluation, and participate in a parenting skills
program.
On June 19, 2015, Conrad visited the Division's office and
inquired about parenting skills classes. He expressed his
continued willingness to comply with the Division's
recommendations, as well as his concern that he was not receiving
the full amount of supervised parenting time the court granted
him.
In a July 2, 2015 order, the court ordered Conrad to comply
with Mendez's updated recommendations and continued his supervised
parenting time. In a September 17, 2015 case management order,
the court set discovery deadlines and continued plaintiffs'
temporary legal and physical custody of Edward and Conrad's
supervised parenting time.
On September 30, 2015, Conrad completed a parenting skills
program. On October 26, 2015, the Division advised the court that
Conrad was participating in counseling through the Fatherhood
Training Program and an anger management program.
In a November 2, 2015 order, the court increased Conrad's
supervised parenting time to four hours every Saturday and granted
6 A-2764-16T2 him additional supervised parenting time on Wednesday evenings,
to be supervised by his parents, rather than John. On November
16, 2015, Conrad completed the Fatherhood Training Program and
also completed an anger management program.
On February 19, 2016, the Division advised the court that
Conrad completed parenting skills and anger management programs,
but had not engaged in domestic violence counseling. The Division
also advised that Conrad declined to complete a substance abuse
evaluation and home inspection on the advice of his attorney. The
court subsequently directed Conrad to complete a substance abuse
evaluation, participate in domestic violence counseling, and
submit to a home inspection.
On March 10, 2016, Conrad completed a substance evaluation.
He did not test positive for any illicit substances and there was
no recommendation for substance abuse treatment. On March 14,
2016, the Division advised the court that it had referred Conrad
to domestic violence counseling, but the provider would not accept
him due to the pending criminal investigation of Carol's death.
On March 24, 2016, the Division completed an inspection of Conrad's
home and found no safety issues. Thereafter, at the conclusion of
the first day of the custody hearing on June 8, 2016, the court
granted Conrad unsupervised overnight parenting time on
alternating weekends and Wednesday.
7 A-2764-16T2 The Parties' Experts
Plaintiffs' expert, Diane Travers, a licensed social worker,
conducted a bonding evaluation between Edward and Catherine. The
evaluation included three home visits and collateral interviews
with Catherine and John, their children, Catherine's parents, and
Carol's friend, T.V. A significant portion of the evaluation
involved completion of the Groves Bonding Checklist, which rates
preschoolers to assess their attachment to adults.
Travers noted in her report there was a secure attachment and
bond between Edward and Catherine, which they formed prior to
Carol's death. Travers concluded there would be a negative impact
on Edward, both physically and mentally, if the bond were broken
through removal from Catherine's custody. She testified at the
custody hearing consistent with her report and opined there was a
"psychological parent bond" between Catherine and Edward.
Plaintiffs presented no evidence that Charles had formed a
psychological parent bond with Edward.
Conrad's expert, Andrew Brown, Ph.D., a psychologist,
conducted a bonding evaluation between Conrad and Edward that
included Conrad's other children. Brown stated in his report that
he observed Conrad engaging positively with Edward, and concluded
Edward was "genuinely enjoying the company of his natural father"
8 A-2764-16T2 and "display[ed] comfort, security and confidence" with him.
Brown found Edward "relat[ed] to [his father] in a natural and
relaxed manner[,]" there were "no episodes of hesitance or
reluctance to be in close proximity to [his father,]" and the
"[a]ffection [was] reciprocated, eye contact [was] mutual and
interactions [were] intimate." Brown concluded "[t]hese were all
sign of a child who has formed a deep attachment." Brown also
noted that Edward "demonstrate[d] that he is attached to his half
siblings."
Brown determined there was a secure attachment between Conrad
and Edward and "a potential that any arrangement leading to the
forced severance of this attachment will result in irreparable
psychological harm and trauma to [Edward]." He opined "[w]ithin
a reasonable degree of psychological certainty," that Edward "is
attached to his natural father" and the attachment should not be
severed. He recommended "that the goal of family reunification
be vigorously pursued and executed as soon as possible."
Brown also conducted a psychological evaluation of Conrad.
He noted in his report that Personality Assessment Inventory
revealed that Conrad did "not present with evidence for the
presence of psychopathology or aberrant personality
functioning[.]" The Culture-Free Self-Esteem Inventory, which
measured Conrad's perception of self, resulted in scores in the
9 A-2764-16T2 "high" range. The Beck Depression Inventory revealed that Conrad
was not clinically depressed. The Child Abuse Potential Inventory
revealed that Conrad had no indications toward the potential for
physical child abuse. The Parenting Stress Index did not reveal
any high parenting stress or defensiveness in Conrad. Finally,
Brown found that Conrad's IQ was in the average range, and he "did
not display any behavior symptomatic of thought disorder or
psychosis." Brown concluded that Conrad's "[p]rognosis for
parenting [was] good."
Brown testified at the hearing consistent with his two
reports. He also testified that Conrad was friendly, loving,
caring, and considerate, did "not pose as a threat to harm his
. . . son" and "ha[d] the cognitive template required for
parenting." Brown opined that Conrad did "not currently
demonstrate any emotional or behavioral issues that would prevent
him from executing parenting" and "demonstrat[ed] the capacity to
mitigate separation [from plaintiffs]." Brown reiterated that
Edward had a "deep emotional attachment to his father" and would
suffer "problems, in terms of his development[,]" if their
relationship was severed.
The Division's Caseworkers
Division caseworkers confirmed that: the Division never
sought to remove Edward from Conrad; it had no safety concerns for
10 A-2764-16T2 the child when with his father; Conrad completed the requisite
services; and the Division's recommended provider for domestic
violence counseling rejected him because of the pending criminal
investigation. A caseworker verified that Conrad was cooperative
throughout the Division's investigation and had visited the
Division's office to complain that the Division had not come to
inspect his home despite his numerous calls to the Division.
Another caseworker verified that Conrad called her "all the time"
and visited her office several times to discuss the case with her
and her supervisor.
The Trial Court's Decision
On March 7, 2017, the trial judge issued a comprehensive oral
opinion, holding that plaintiffs failed to rebut the presumption
of custody in favor of Conrad by clear and convincing evidence of
exceptional circumstances based on psychological parentage. The
judge conducted the two-step analysis for third-party custody
disputes set forth in Watkins v. Nelson, 163 N.J. 235 (2000),
which first required plaintiffs to rebut the presumption by clear
and convincing evidence of parental unfitness, abandonment, gross
misconduct, or existence of exceptional circumstances affecting
the welfare of the child. The judge found plaintiffs did not
11 A-2764-16T2 establish unfitness, abandonment, gross misconduct, or any
wrongdoing by Conrad.4
The judge acknowledged that proof of psychological parentage
could constitute exceptional circumstances. However, the judge
determined plaintiffs did not prove exceptional circumstances
because they did not establish prong one of the psychological
parentage test set forth in V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200, 223
(2000), which required clear and convincing proof that Conrad
consented to and fostered the parental relationship between
plaintiffs.
The judge found plaintiffs failed to show Conrad was
physically or emotionally absent, unable, or incapable of
performing his parental duties. The judge also found that
plaintiffs had not formed a psychological parentage bond with
Edward and even if they did, Conrad did not consent to or foster
it. The judge granted Conrad legal and physical custody of Edward,
and ordered him to foster plaintiffs' relationship with the child,
cooperate with visits with plaintiffs, and have Edward attend
therapy to assist in his development.
4 Plaintiffs do not challenge these findings.
12 A-2764-16T2 II.
On appeal, plaintiffs contend Catherine is entitled to
custody of Edward because they presented proof that she is his
psychological parent under the exceptional circumstances standard
set forth in Watkins and V.C. Plaintiffs concede that Conrad did
not consent to Catherine's formation and establishment of a parent-
like relationship with Edward, but argue he impliedly consented
and acquiesced to Catherine becoming Edward's psychological parent
by his delay for over two years in completing evaluations and
services the Division recommended, which caused Edward to remain
in Catherine's custody. In the alternative, plaintiffs argue that
Conrad's actual consent was not necessary because, by his delay,
he yielded authority for Catherine to become Edward's
psychological parent.5
Our review of a trial judge's factual findings, following a
non-jury trial, is limited. Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424,
433 (App. Div. 2015). "Generally, 'findings by the trial court
are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial,
credible evidence.'" Ibid. (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J.
5 Plaintiffs cite to unpublished opinions to support their arguments. However, unpublished opinions do not constitute precedent or bind us. Trinity Cemetery Ass'n v. Twp. of Wall, 170 N.J. 39, 48 (2001); R. 1:36-3.
13 A-2764-16T2 394, 411-12 (1998)). In Family Part matters, this "[d]eference
is especially appropriate when the evidence is largely testimonial
and involves questions of credibility." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412
(citation omitted). "Reversal is warranted only when a mistake
must have been made because the trial court's factual findings are
'so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent,
relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the
interests of justice[.]'" Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. at 433 (quoting
Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474,
484 (1974)). "Consequently, when a reviewing court concludes
there is satisfactory evidentiary support for the trial court's
findings, 'its task is complete and it should not disturb the
result[.]'" Ibid. (quoting Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 496 (1981)).
"Deference is appropriately accorded to factfinding; however, the
trial judge's legal conclusions, and the application of those
conclusions to the facts, are subject to our plenary review."
Ibid. (quoting Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div.
2013)). "Finally, legal conclusions are always reviewed de novo."
Id. at 433-34 (citation omitted). Applying the above standards,
we discern no reason to reverse.
As a threshold matter, we note plaintiffs did not cite to any
statute in their complaint supporting the court's jurisdiction
over this matter. Throughout the proceeding, the parties and the
14 A-2764-16T2 judge referenced N.J.S.A. 9:2-4, N.J.S.A. 9:2-5, and N.J.S.A. 9:2-
9, without specifically setting forth which one supported
jurisdiction.
However, N.J.S.A. 9:2-4, the best interests of the child
standard, "refers only to parents and does not refer to third
parties[,]" Watkins, 163 N.J. at 244, and N.J.S.A. 9:2-56 does not
apply because Carol was not Edward's sole custodian at the time
of her death. We conclude that jurisdiction fell under N.J.S.A.
9:2-9, which provides as follows:
When the parents of any minor child or the parent or other person having the actual care and custody of any minor child are grossly immoral or unfit to be intrusted with the care and education of such child, or shall neglect to provide the child with proper protection, maintenance and education, or are of such vicious, careless or dissolute habits as to endanger the welfare of the child or make the child a public charge, or likely to become a public charge; or when the parents of any minor child are dead or cannot be found, and there is no other person, legal guardian or
6 N.J.S.A. 9:2-5 provides as follows, in pertinent part:
In case of the death of the parent to whom the care and custody of the minor children shall have been awarded by the Superior Court, or in the case of the death of the parent in whose custody the children actually are, when the parents have been living separate and no award as to the custody of such children has been made, the care and custody of such minor children shall not revert to the surviving parent without an order or judgment of the Superior Court to that effect.
15 A-2764-16T2 agency exercising custody over such child; it shall be lawful for any person interested in the welfare of such child to institute an action in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part, in the county where such minor child is residing, for the purpose of having the child brought before the court, and for the further relief provided by this chapter.
[(Emphasis added).]
"N.J.S.A. 9:2-10 then allows a court, in an action brought by a
third party pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:2-9, to award custody of the
child to that third party." Watkins, 163 N.J. at 244.
When read together, N.J.S.A. 9:2-4, N.J.S.A. 9:2-9, and
N.J.S.A. 9:2-10:
indicate that in a custody dispute between a parent and a third party, the public policy of this State is that a presumption exists in favor of the parent. A third party can overcome that presumption by satisfying the standard required for termination of the rights of a non-consenting parent: unfitness, abandonment, gross misconduct, or "exceptional circumstances."
[Watkins, 163 N.J. at 244-45 (emphasis added).]
The court must conduct a two-step analysis when a third party
seeks custody of a child over the child's natural parent. First,
a third party can overcome the presumption in favor of the natural
parent by presenting clear and convincing evidence of parental
unfitness, abandonment, gross misconduct, or the existence of
16 A-2764-16T2 exceptional circumstances affecting the welfare of the child.
Watkins, 163 N.J. at 253-55.
Second, once the first prong is met, the court can then
consider the best interests of the child test articulated in
N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c). Id. at 254. "[I]n custody determinations
between a fit parent and a third party, as opposed to claims made
between two fit parents, the child's best interests become a factor
only after the parental termination standard has been met, rather
than the determinative standard itself." Id. at 253 (emphasis
added). "[T]he best interest of the child cannot validly ground
an award of custody to a third party over the objection of a fit
parent without an initial court finding that the standard for
termination of the rights of a non-consenting parent or the
'exceptional circumstances' prong has been satisfied." Id. at
255.
This case only involves exceptional circumstances. The
exceptional circumstances doctrine is grounded in the court's
power of parens patriae to protect minor children from serious
physical or psychological harm. Id. at 246-47. This standard
"always requires proof of serious physical or psychological harm
or a substantial likelihood of such harm" and is to be determined
on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 248. Proof that a third party
has become a child's psychological parent by assuming the role of
17 A-2764-16T2 his or her legal parent who has been unable or unwilling to
undertake the obligations of parenthood will suffice to establish
exceptional circumstances. Id. at 254; V.C., 163 N.J. at 219.
Such proof will place the third party "in parity" with the legal
parent. V.C., 163 N.J. at 227-28, 230.
To demonstrate the existence of a psychological parentage,
the third party must prove four elements:
[1] the legal parent must [have] consent[ed] to and foster[ed] the relationship between the third party and the child; [2] the third party must have lived with the child; [3] the third party must [have] perform[ed] parental functions for the child to a significant degree; and most important, [4] a parent-child bond must [have] be[en] forged.
[Id. at 223.]
As to element one, the legal parent must have been a "participant
in the creation of the psychological parent's relationship with
the child" by
ced[ing] over to the third party a measure of parental authority and autonomy and grant[ing] to that third party rights and duties vis-à- vis the child that the third party's status would not otherwise warrant[, thereby creating the likelihood that the third party would develop a profound bond with the child.]
[Id. at 224.]
"[T]he focus is on [the legal parent's] intent during the formation
and pendency of the parent-child relationship." Ibid. Absent
18 A-2764-16T2 consent, the legal parent "has the absolute ability to maintain a
zone of autonomous privacy for [himself] and [the] child." Ibid.
The record confirms that Conrad did not consent to plaintiffs'
custody of Edward or to the formation and establishment of a
parentage relationship between Catherine and the child. The record
also confirms that Conrad did not impliedly consent or acquiesce
to the creation of a psychological parent relationship or yield
authority for Catherine to become Edward's psychological parent.
Rather, the record shows that Conrad's separation from Edward was
entirely involuntary, he contested plaintiffs' custody from the
very outset of this litigation and took immediate steps to regain
custody, and he actively sought out and cooperated with the
Division in order to be reunified with his son. Any delay in
completing the Division's services was not attributable to
Conrad's affirmative or unjustifiable actions.
Further, Conrad was never absent physically or mentally from
Edward or found to be unable or incapable of performing his
parental duties. He remained in his son's life throughout this
protracted litigation, maintained a deep and secure bond with his
son, took active steps to regain custody, and the Division found
him to be a capable parent who posed no risk of harm to the child.
We are satisfied the judge correctly found that plaintiffs failed
to rebut the presumption of custody in favor of Conrad by clear
19 A-2764-16T2 and convincing evidence of exceptional circumstances based on
psychological parentage.
III.
Plaintiffs argue the court erred by transferring custody to
Conrad without taking his testimony and making findings of fact
or conclusions of law as to his credibility, character, or ability
to care for Edward under the best interests of the child standard
articulated in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c). Plaintiffs also argue the court
failed to apply an adverse inference against Conrad after he
asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
These arguments lack merit.
Watkins made clear that, if the third party seeking custody
over a natural parent fails to satisfy the first prong of the
Watkins test, the inquiry ends and the court need not consider the
best interests of the child second prong. 163 N.J. at 253. Because
the judge properly found plaintiffs failed to satisfy the first
prong of the Watkins test, he was not required to consider the
best interests of the child articulated in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c).
Accordingly, there was no need for Conrad's testimony to determine
Edward's best interests.
Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we address
plaintiffs' argument that the court must always base its custody
decision on all factors relevant to the child's best interests.
20 A-2764-16T2 Plaintiffs cite to In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 456 (1988) to
support this argument. There, a biological father entered into a
surrogacy contract with a surrogate mother, who refused to
relinquish custody. Id. at 412. The court invalidated the
surrogacy contract as being against public policy, but nonetheless
found that the biological father was entitled to custody based on
the best interests of the child after considering various factors,
including each parent's stability, finances, and employment, among
other factors. Id. at 457-60. This case is distinguishable
because Conrad was entitled to a presumption of custody in his
favor and the judge did not need to consider the best interests
of the child because plaintiffs failed to rebut that presumption.
Watkins, 163 N.J. at 253.
Plaintiffs cite to D.A. v. R.C., 438 N.J. Super. 431, 454
(App. Div. 2014), to argue that, despite the testimony of mental
health practitioners, it is the court's ultimate responsibility
to determine what custody arrangement is in the best interests of
the child. In D.A., where a parent sought to change the child's
custody arrangement, the trial court failed to consider the
relevant statutory framework. Id. at 433. We remanded the matter
with instructions to do so. Id. at 461. In contrast here, the
judge made repeated reference to the requisite authority and
properly applied it. Thus, D.A. does not apply.
21 A-2764-16T2 Plaintiffs also cite to Terry v. Terry, 270 N.J. Super. 105,
118 (App. Div. 1994), a child custody case which required trial
courts to set forth the statutory criteria for any custody
analysis. The judge here amply satisfied Terry through his repeated
reference to the Watkins standard.
Lastly, plaintiffs allege the judge abdicated his parens
patriae role when he rendered a decision without hearing Conrad's
testimony, contending that such failure "created a substantial
potential for irreparable physical and psychological harm."
However, the record does not support plaintiffs' bare allegations,
and it is clear the judge was not required to hear Conrad's
testimony because plaintiffs failed to overcome their burden under
the first prong of the Watkins test. Moreover, there was ample
evidence that a return of custody to Conrad was in Edward's best
interests, including expert testimony. Accordingly, the judge did
not err in rendering a custody decision without having heard
Conrad's testimony.
In addition, the judge did not err in failing to draw an
adverse inference from Conrad's refusal to testify after asserting
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Courts may
draw an adverse inference where a party refuses to testify in a
civil matter. See State, Dep't of Law & Public Safety, Div. of
Gaming Enf't v. Merlino, 216 N.J. Super. 579, 587 (App. Div. 1987).
22 A-2764-16T2 The inference may be "drawn only if there is other evidence
supporting an adverse finding; it must not alone constitute the
evidence of guilt." Ibid. (citation omitted). An adverse
inference is a discretionary evidential ruling by the trial court.
See Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 424 N.J.
Super. 448, 474 (App. Div. 2012).
While the adverse inference is discretionary, trial courts
have alternative remedies, such as barring that party from offering
any testimony, including testimony which inures to their benefit.
Attor v. Attor, 384 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 2006). Such
alternatives are consistent with the ruling in Mahne v. Mahne, 66
N.J. 53, 61 (1974), a divorce case in which the husband invoked
the Fifth Amendment as to allegations of adultery and the Supreme
Court allowed trial courts "broad choices of sanctions when dealing
with good faith exercises of the privilege[.]" Further, in Attor,
a matrimonial matter cited by plaintiffs, the wife invoked the
Fifth Amendment as to separate immigration proceedings, fearing
that she could be implicated for providing false testimony to
immigration officials. Attor, 384 N.J. Super. at 161. Although
the court found her invocation was improper because she was not
really at risk of criminal charges, we determined that, had her
invocation been proper, the trial court "should then either have
drawn an adverse inference against defendant or struck her
23 A-2764-16T2 testimony[.]" Id. at 170. Here, the judge followed Attor and
Mahne by barring Conrad's testimony on his behalf.
Next, plaintiffs cite In re Guardianship of D.J.M., 325 N.J.
Super. 150, 155-56 (Ch. Div. 1999), to illustrate an example
wherein a biological mother was compelled to testify despite
invoking the Fifth Amendment as to charges that she sexually
assaulted the minor child. However, trial court opinions do not
constitute precedent and are not binding on us. S & R Assocs. v.
Lynn Realty Corp., 338 N.J. Super. 350, 355 (App. Div. 2001). In
any event, the case does not apply. There, the biological mother
requested a stay of the Division's guardianship action pending
resolution of criminal charges, citing the Fifth Amendment. Id.
at 152-53. The court denied a stay, explaining that the delay
necessitated by a stay was contrary to the child's best interests
and need for permanency. Id. at 161-62. The court also explained
that the biological mother "may testify and invoke the Fifth
Amendment in response to particular inquiries." Ibid. Because
the judge here was not required to reach the best interests of the
child test articulated in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4, Conrad's testimony,
including particular inquiries outside the criminal investigation
and Carol's death, was not necessary and there was no need to
compel his testimony or draw an adverse inference.
24 A-2764-16T2 Plaintiffs also cite New Jersey Division of Youth & Family
Services v. S.S., 275 N.J. Super. 173 (App. Div. 1994) to argue
in favor of an adverse inference. However, that case concerned a
parent who refused to testify after the Division had successfully
shifted the burden for her to prove non-culpability, and her "oral
testimony was simply one means of several available to her to
demonstrate her non-culpability." Id. at 181. Here, Conrad had
no burden of proof and no reason to testify. Thus, there was no
need for an adverse inference.
We are satisfied the judge committed no error by transferring
custody to Conrad without taking his testimony or in failing to
apply an adverse inference after invocation of the Fifth Amendment.
Affirmed.
25 A-2764-16T2