USCA11 Case: 24-10392 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/12/2025 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-10392 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
CYNTHIA FLETCHER, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus JM SMUCKER COMPANY, THE, BIG HEART PET BRANDS INC,
Defendants-Appellees. ____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cv-01411-AMM ____________________ USCA11 Case: 24-10392 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/12/2025 Page: 2 of 8
2 Opinion of the Court 24-10392
Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and WILSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Cynthia Fletcher sued the J.M. Smucker Company and Big Heart Pet Brands (“the Manufacturers”) for racial discrimination, gender discrimination, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), 3(a), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Manufacturers filed a motion for summary judgment on these claims, which the district court granted. We affirm. 1 I The facts of this case are known to the parties, and we repeat them here only as necessary to decide the case. Fletcher was a tech- nician at the Manufacturers’ facility in Decatur, Alabama. During her time as a technician, Fletcher violated several of the Manufac- turers’ policies. First, she violated the Manufacturers’ safety proto- col, resulting in a verbal warning. Second, she violated the attend- ance policy, resulting in a written warning. Third, she violated the COVID-19 policy and the cell-phone policy, resulting in another written warning. After her third violation, Fletcher complained to her supervisor that, although black employees were disciplined for
1 “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
the same legal standards applied by the district court.” Valley Drug Co. v. Ge- neva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1303 (11th Cir. 2003). USCA11 Case: 24-10392 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/12/2025 Page: 3 of 8
24-10392 Opinion of the Court 3
such violations, white employees were not. Finally, Fletcher failed to appear for a scheduled overtime shift, resulting in her termina- tion. The Manufacturers maintain that they terminated Fletcher because, pursuant to their disciplinary policy, she had accrued enough points for termination. Fletcher argues that this proffered reason is pretextual. First, she argues that she was fired because of her race and gender. Second, she argues that she was fired as retal- iation for engaging in statutorily-protected activity—namely, for complaining that the Manufacturers disciplined black employees, but not white employees, who violated COVID-19 safety proto- cols. Neither of Fletcher’s claims has merit. II We begin by addressing Fletcher’s claims of racial and gen- der discrimination. The district court, applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, ruled that, although Fletcher did establish a prima facie case of discrimination, she failed to show that the Manufacturers’ nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Fletcher—i.e., Fletcher’s violations of safety protocol, the attend- ance policy, the cell-phone policy, and the COVID-19 policy—were pretextual. Further, the district court ruled that Fletcher’s claims failed under both the convincing-mosaic and mixed-motive theo- ries of liability. On appeal, to demonstrate pretext, Fletcher argues that she was treated differently from similarly situated USCA11 Case: 24-10392 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/12/2025 Page: 4 of 8
4 Opinion of the Court 24-10392
individuals—i.e., her comparators—and that the Manufacturers miscalculated her disciplinary points. Additionally, Fletcher con- tends that she has presented enough evidence to create a triable issue of fact under either a convincing-mosaic or mixed-motive the- ory of liability. We address each argument in turn. First, the comparators. 2 Fletcher has presented five male comparators whom, she argues, the Manufacturers treated better than her, despite the fact, she says, that they engaged in misconduct similar to her own. But these comparators cannot demonstrate pretext, because they are insufficiently similar to her. Three of them did not have the same supervisor as Fletcher. See Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1227–28 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (holding that, ordinarily, a similarly situated comparator must “have been under the jurisdiction of the same supervisor as the plaintiff”). And the other two comparators differed substantially from Fletcher in their disciplinary histories. Whereas these com- parators had violated only the attendance policy, Fletcher’s disci- plinary history reflected safety-protocol, attendance-policy, cell-
2 In Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia, we held “that a meaningful comparator
analysis must be conducted at the prima facie stage of McDonnell Douglas’s bur- den-shifting framework.” 918 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc). But, we explained, a plaintiff may also conduct a comparator analysis at the pretext stage. Id. at 1223 n.9 (“Evidence necessary and proper to support a plaintiff’s prima facie case may of course be used, later as it were, to demonstrate that the defendant’s explanation for its conduct was pretextual.”). USCA11 Case: 24-10392 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/12/2025 Page: 5 of 8
24-10392 Opinion of the Court 5
phone-policy, and COVID-19-policy violations. See id. at 1228 (holding that, ordinarily, a similarly situated comparator “will share the plaintiff’s employment or disciplinary history”). Because her comparators are insufficiently similar to her, Fletcher cannot point to their differential treatment as evidence of pretext. Similarly ineffective is Fletcher’s argument that, because the Manufacturers miscalculated how many disciplinary points she had accrued, their reasons for termination were pretextual. Even if we assume that the Manufacturers did miscalculate her disciplinary points, Fletcher has not shown that they did so for a discriminatory reason. “An employer ‘may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason.’” Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1363 n.3 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 151 F.3d 1321, 1324 n. 16 (11th Cir. 1998)) (emphasis in original). Fletcher separately contends that, under either a convincing- mosaic 3 or mixed-motive 4 theory of liability, she has presented
3 Under the convincing-mosaic theory, “an employee may prove retaliation
with any circumstantial evidence that creates a reasonable inference of retali- atory intent.” Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300, 1310 (11th Cir. 2023). 4 “[T]o survive a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff assert-
ing a mixed-motive claim need only produce evidence sufficient to convince a jury that: (1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the USCA11 Case: 24-10392 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/12/2025 Page: 6 of 8
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USCA11 Case: 24-10392 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/12/2025 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-10392 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
CYNTHIA FLETCHER, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus JM SMUCKER COMPANY, THE, BIG HEART PET BRANDS INC,
Defendants-Appellees. ____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cv-01411-AMM ____________________ USCA11 Case: 24-10392 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/12/2025 Page: 2 of 8
2 Opinion of the Court 24-10392
Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and WILSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Cynthia Fletcher sued the J.M. Smucker Company and Big Heart Pet Brands (“the Manufacturers”) for racial discrimination, gender discrimination, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), 3(a), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Manufacturers filed a motion for summary judgment on these claims, which the district court granted. We affirm. 1 I The facts of this case are known to the parties, and we repeat them here only as necessary to decide the case. Fletcher was a tech- nician at the Manufacturers’ facility in Decatur, Alabama. During her time as a technician, Fletcher violated several of the Manufac- turers’ policies. First, she violated the Manufacturers’ safety proto- col, resulting in a verbal warning. Second, she violated the attend- ance policy, resulting in a written warning. Third, she violated the COVID-19 policy and the cell-phone policy, resulting in another written warning. After her third violation, Fletcher complained to her supervisor that, although black employees were disciplined for
1 “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
the same legal standards applied by the district court.” Valley Drug Co. v. Ge- neva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1303 (11th Cir. 2003). USCA11 Case: 24-10392 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/12/2025 Page: 3 of 8
24-10392 Opinion of the Court 3
such violations, white employees were not. Finally, Fletcher failed to appear for a scheduled overtime shift, resulting in her termina- tion. The Manufacturers maintain that they terminated Fletcher because, pursuant to their disciplinary policy, she had accrued enough points for termination. Fletcher argues that this proffered reason is pretextual. First, she argues that she was fired because of her race and gender. Second, she argues that she was fired as retal- iation for engaging in statutorily-protected activity—namely, for complaining that the Manufacturers disciplined black employees, but not white employees, who violated COVID-19 safety proto- cols. Neither of Fletcher’s claims has merit. II We begin by addressing Fletcher’s claims of racial and gen- der discrimination. The district court, applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, ruled that, although Fletcher did establish a prima facie case of discrimination, she failed to show that the Manufacturers’ nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Fletcher—i.e., Fletcher’s violations of safety protocol, the attend- ance policy, the cell-phone policy, and the COVID-19 policy—were pretextual. Further, the district court ruled that Fletcher’s claims failed under both the convincing-mosaic and mixed-motive theo- ries of liability. On appeal, to demonstrate pretext, Fletcher argues that she was treated differently from similarly situated USCA11 Case: 24-10392 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/12/2025 Page: 4 of 8
4 Opinion of the Court 24-10392
individuals—i.e., her comparators—and that the Manufacturers miscalculated her disciplinary points. Additionally, Fletcher con- tends that she has presented enough evidence to create a triable issue of fact under either a convincing-mosaic or mixed-motive the- ory of liability. We address each argument in turn. First, the comparators. 2 Fletcher has presented five male comparators whom, she argues, the Manufacturers treated better than her, despite the fact, she says, that they engaged in misconduct similar to her own. But these comparators cannot demonstrate pretext, because they are insufficiently similar to her. Three of them did not have the same supervisor as Fletcher. See Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1227–28 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (holding that, ordinarily, a similarly situated comparator must “have been under the jurisdiction of the same supervisor as the plaintiff”). And the other two comparators differed substantially from Fletcher in their disciplinary histories. Whereas these com- parators had violated only the attendance policy, Fletcher’s disci- plinary history reflected safety-protocol, attendance-policy, cell-
2 In Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia, we held “that a meaningful comparator
analysis must be conducted at the prima facie stage of McDonnell Douglas’s bur- den-shifting framework.” 918 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc). But, we explained, a plaintiff may also conduct a comparator analysis at the pretext stage. Id. at 1223 n.9 (“Evidence necessary and proper to support a plaintiff’s prima facie case may of course be used, later as it were, to demonstrate that the defendant’s explanation for its conduct was pretextual.”). USCA11 Case: 24-10392 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/12/2025 Page: 5 of 8
24-10392 Opinion of the Court 5
phone-policy, and COVID-19-policy violations. See id. at 1228 (holding that, ordinarily, a similarly situated comparator “will share the plaintiff’s employment or disciplinary history”). Because her comparators are insufficiently similar to her, Fletcher cannot point to their differential treatment as evidence of pretext. Similarly ineffective is Fletcher’s argument that, because the Manufacturers miscalculated how many disciplinary points she had accrued, their reasons for termination were pretextual. Even if we assume that the Manufacturers did miscalculate her disciplinary points, Fletcher has not shown that they did so for a discriminatory reason. “An employer ‘may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason.’” Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1363 n.3 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 151 F.3d 1321, 1324 n. 16 (11th Cir. 1998)) (emphasis in original). Fletcher separately contends that, under either a convincing- mosaic 3 or mixed-motive 4 theory of liability, she has presented
3 Under the convincing-mosaic theory, “an employee may prove retaliation
with any circumstantial evidence that creates a reasonable inference of retali- atory intent.” Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300, 1310 (11th Cir. 2023). 4 “[T]o survive a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff assert-
ing a mixed-motive claim need only produce evidence sufficient to convince a jury that: (1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the USCA11 Case: 24-10392 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/12/2025 Page: 6 of 8
6 Opinion of the Court 24-10392
enough evidence to create a triable issue of fact. But Fletcher’s claims fail under these theories for the same reason that they fail under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework: She has not shown that discrimination played any part in her termination. To advance her convincing-mosaic and mixed-motive theories of liabilities, Fletcher relies, again, on her comparators. But, as just explained, these comparators were not similarly situated to her. Fletcher’s only other “evidence” is an email detailing her allegation that the Manufacturers racially discriminated in their enforcement of COVID-19 safety protocols. But this email in no way confirms the veracity of Fletcher’s complaint—it only describes the com- plaint. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the Manufacturers on Fletcher’s discrimination claims. III Next, retaliation. “To establish a prima facie case of retalia- tion under Title VII, the plaintiff must show (1) that she engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that there is some causal relation be- tween the two events.” Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d
plaintiff; and (2) a protected characteristic was a motivating factor for the de- fendant’s adverse employment action.” Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 2016) (alterations accepted) (citation and quota- tion marks omitted). USCA11 Case: 24-10392 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/12/2025 Page: 7 of 8
24-10392 Opinion of the Court 7
1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The district court ruled that, although Fletcher established the first and second elements of a prima facie retaliation claim, she failed to establish the third element: causation. Fletcher argues that the dis- trict court erred in so ruling. Specifically, Fletcher contends that the temporal proximity of her statutorily protected activity—i.e., complaining that the Manufacturers disciplined black employees, but not white employees, who violated COVID-19 safety proto- cols—and the adverse employment action—i.e., termination—is sufficient to survive summary judgment on her retaliation claim. But, as the district court correctly ruled, in Fletcher’s case, temporal proximity is insufficient to show causation. For, although Fletcher was terminated seven days after filing her complaint, her intervening violation of the attendance policy—which occurred af- ter other safety-protocol, attendance-policy, cell-phone-policy, and COVID-19-policy violations—severed the causal inference created by temporal proximity. See Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he intervening discovery of employee misconduct can sever the causal inference created by close temporal proximity.”). Nor can Fletcher succeed under the convincing-mosaic the- ory. The only evidence that Fletcher has presented in support of this theory is the temporal proximity of her complaint and her ter- mination. And, as explained above, this evidence alone cannot demonstrate causation. Id. at 1310–11. USCA11 Case: 24-10392 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/12/2025 Page: 8 of 8
8 Opinion of the Court 24-10392
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the Manufacturers on Fletcher’s retaliation claim. *** Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.