[Cite as Cuyahoga Cty. Treasurer v. LaRossa Property Affiliates, Ltd., 2025-Ohio-2768.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
TREASURER OF CUYAHOGA : COUNTY, OHIO : Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 114183 v. : LAROSSA PROPERTY AFFILIATES, LTD, ET AL., :
Defendants-Appellants. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 7, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-22-965553
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Adam Jutte, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Law Offices of Bruce M. Broyles and Bruce M. Broyles, for appellants.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
Appellants LaRossa Property Affiliates, Ltd. and Liberty Holdings
Group, LLC (collectively, “appellants”) appeal the judgment of the trial court overruling appellants’ objections to the magistrate’s decision and adopting the
magistrate’s decision. After a thorough review of the facts and law, this court
affirms.
I. Factual and Procedural History
On June 30, 2022, the treasurer of Cuyahoga County, Ohio
(“treasurer”) filed a complaint, delinquent land certificate, and preliminary judicial
report against appellants for collection of delinquent taxes, assessments, penalties
and interest, and foreclosure and equitable relief associated with permanent parcel
No. 003-12-013, located at 4204 Detroit Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio.
In December 2022, appellants answered. Thereafter, the matter was
set for a tax hearing for February 2023, and the treasurer filed a City of Cleveland
land affidavit and a final judicial report. The journal entry following the hearing
indicated that “the parties are attempting to settle and [appellants] are trying to
complete a sale on the property,” and thus the trial court continued the hearing. In
April 2023, the trial court’s journal entry provided that the “parties are finalizing
settlement.”
The parties never reached a settlement, and in June 2023, the
magistrate’s issued a decision in favor of treasurer. Appellants filed a motion to set
aside the magistrate’s decision and objections to the magistrate’s decision. Relevant
to this case, the court’s ruling on these motions provided that there was not a
recording of the tax hearing for the court to reference in ruling on the objections,
and as such, the court set a new tax hearing. The second tax hearing was held telephonically on January 18, 2024,
before the magistrate, after which the magistrate again issued a decision finding in
favor of the treasurer. Appellants again filed a motion to set aside the magistrate’s
decision and objections. The court held a hearing on the objections and the resulting
journal entry provided, “Case called for a hearing on 07/01/2024. All parties
appeared through counsel. Parties spoke with the judge. Hearing did not go
forward. Objections to magistrate’s decision dated January 18, 2024, filed
01/31/2024, are overruled.” A journal entry adopting the magistrate’s decision
followed.
Appellants filed the instant appeal on July 21, 2024; after a
bankruptcy stay and attempts at mediation, we now consider the appeal, which
assigns the following errors for our review:
I. The trial court abused its discretion in adopting the magistrate’s decision dated January 18, 2024.
II. The trial court erred in overruling appellants’ objections to the magistrate’s decision dated January 18, 2024, and adopting the magistrate’s decision dated January 18, 2024.
II. Law and Analysis
Appellants’ first assignment of error challenges the trial court’s
alleged failure to perform an independent review of the appellants’ objections to the
magistrate’s decision, arguing that the journal entry does not explicitly state that the
trial court undertook an independent review of the magistrate’s objections. Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) requires that the court “undertake an independent
review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly
determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law.” “‘A failure of the
trial court to conduct an independent review of the magistrate’s recommendations
as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) is an abuse of discretion.’” Walpole v. Walpole,
2013-Ohio-3529, ¶ 47 (8th Dist.), quoting Barrientos v. Barrientos, 2011-Ohio-
5734, ¶ 5 (3d Dist.). On appeal, we “presume that the trial court conducted an
independent review of the magistrate’s decision unless the appellant affirmatively
shows that the trial court failed to conduct such an independent analysis.” Rokakis
v. W. Res. Leasing Co., 2011-Ohio-1926, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), citing McCarty v. Hayner,
2009-Ohio-4540, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.). An affirmative duty requires more than an
inference, and an appellant must provide the court with facts to rebut this general
presumption. Scalise v. Johnston Invests., LLC, 2021-Ohio-2916, ¶ 20 (9th Dist.).
Here, appellants rely entirely on the journal entry, which lacks an
affirmative statement indicating that the trial court performed an independent
review. However, appellants do not point to any authority requiring that the trial
court address this in the entry, nor do appellants point to any affirmative evidence
in the record indicating that this independent review did not occur. In fact, the
record indicates that (1) the trial court refrained from ruling on the first set of
objections due to the absence of a hearing transcript and (2) the trial court set a
hearing on the objections to the magistrate’s decision, resulting in the journal entry
indicating that the parties instead “spoke with the judge.” Both of these are indicative that the trial did review the objections; a hearing on the objections was
set and a previous magistrate’s decision was not considered because without a
transcript, the court could not independently review the decision. Accordingly,
appellants’ have not met their burden to affirmatively demonstrate that the trial
court failed to conduct the independent review required by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) and
we overrule appellants’ first assignment of error.
In appellants’ second assignment of error, appellants advance several
arguments relating to the procedure and evidence received during the tax-hearing
process.
Appellants first argue that a tax hearing may not be held
telephonically, “let alone . . . in place of a trial or motion for summary judgment.”
This error is twofold and presents two issues: (1) whether a tax hearing may not be
held telephonically and (2) whether a tax hearing can replace a trial or motion for
summary judgment.
We first address appellants’ contention that a tax hearing cannot be
held telephonically. Appellants point to a myriad of reasons that this hearing was
improper, but we are more persuaded by the treasurer’s citation to our existing case
law, relying on the inherent authority of courts to promulgate local rules that “are
created with the purpose of promoting the fair administration of justice and
eliminating undue delay.” Cavalry Invests. v. Dzilinski, 2007-Ohio-3767, ¶ 16 (8th
Dist.). Under the common pleas court’s local rules, Cuyahoga C.P., Gen. Div., Loc.R.
24 affords judges discretion to set case-management orders and rules of procedure in foreclosure cases. Further, the General Assembly has instructed that in civil
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[Cite as Cuyahoga Cty. Treasurer v. LaRossa Property Affiliates, Ltd., 2025-Ohio-2768.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
TREASURER OF CUYAHOGA : COUNTY, OHIO : Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 114183 v. : LAROSSA PROPERTY AFFILIATES, LTD, ET AL., :
Defendants-Appellants. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 7, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-22-965553
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Adam Jutte, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Law Offices of Bruce M. Broyles and Bruce M. Broyles, for appellants.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
Appellants LaRossa Property Affiliates, Ltd. and Liberty Holdings
Group, LLC (collectively, “appellants”) appeal the judgment of the trial court overruling appellants’ objections to the magistrate’s decision and adopting the
magistrate’s decision. After a thorough review of the facts and law, this court
affirms.
I. Factual and Procedural History
On June 30, 2022, the treasurer of Cuyahoga County, Ohio
(“treasurer”) filed a complaint, delinquent land certificate, and preliminary judicial
report against appellants for collection of delinquent taxes, assessments, penalties
and interest, and foreclosure and equitable relief associated with permanent parcel
No. 003-12-013, located at 4204 Detroit Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio.
In December 2022, appellants answered. Thereafter, the matter was
set for a tax hearing for February 2023, and the treasurer filed a City of Cleveland
land affidavit and a final judicial report. The journal entry following the hearing
indicated that “the parties are attempting to settle and [appellants] are trying to
complete a sale on the property,” and thus the trial court continued the hearing. In
April 2023, the trial court’s journal entry provided that the “parties are finalizing
settlement.”
The parties never reached a settlement, and in June 2023, the
magistrate’s issued a decision in favor of treasurer. Appellants filed a motion to set
aside the magistrate’s decision and objections to the magistrate’s decision. Relevant
to this case, the court’s ruling on these motions provided that there was not a
recording of the tax hearing for the court to reference in ruling on the objections,
and as such, the court set a new tax hearing. The second tax hearing was held telephonically on January 18, 2024,
before the magistrate, after which the magistrate again issued a decision finding in
favor of the treasurer. Appellants again filed a motion to set aside the magistrate’s
decision and objections. The court held a hearing on the objections and the resulting
journal entry provided, “Case called for a hearing on 07/01/2024. All parties
appeared through counsel. Parties spoke with the judge. Hearing did not go
forward. Objections to magistrate’s decision dated January 18, 2024, filed
01/31/2024, are overruled.” A journal entry adopting the magistrate’s decision
followed.
Appellants filed the instant appeal on July 21, 2024; after a
bankruptcy stay and attempts at mediation, we now consider the appeal, which
assigns the following errors for our review:
I. The trial court abused its discretion in adopting the magistrate’s decision dated January 18, 2024.
II. The trial court erred in overruling appellants’ objections to the magistrate’s decision dated January 18, 2024, and adopting the magistrate’s decision dated January 18, 2024.
II. Law and Analysis
Appellants’ first assignment of error challenges the trial court’s
alleged failure to perform an independent review of the appellants’ objections to the
magistrate’s decision, arguing that the journal entry does not explicitly state that the
trial court undertook an independent review of the magistrate’s objections. Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) requires that the court “undertake an independent
review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly
determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law.” “‘A failure of the
trial court to conduct an independent review of the magistrate’s recommendations
as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) is an abuse of discretion.’” Walpole v. Walpole,
2013-Ohio-3529, ¶ 47 (8th Dist.), quoting Barrientos v. Barrientos, 2011-Ohio-
5734, ¶ 5 (3d Dist.). On appeal, we “presume that the trial court conducted an
independent review of the magistrate’s decision unless the appellant affirmatively
shows that the trial court failed to conduct such an independent analysis.” Rokakis
v. W. Res. Leasing Co., 2011-Ohio-1926, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), citing McCarty v. Hayner,
2009-Ohio-4540, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.). An affirmative duty requires more than an
inference, and an appellant must provide the court with facts to rebut this general
presumption. Scalise v. Johnston Invests., LLC, 2021-Ohio-2916, ¶ 20 (9th Dist.).
Here, appellants rely entirely on the journal entry, which lacks an
affirmative statement indicating that the trial court performed an independent
review. However, appellants do not point to any authority requiring that the trial
court address this in the entry, nor do appellants point to any affirmative evidence
in the record indicating that this independent review did not occur. In fact, the
record indicates that (1) the trial court refrained from ruling on the first set of
objections due to the absence of a hearing transcript and (2) the trial court set a
hearing on the objections to the magistrate’s decision, resulting in the journal entry
indicating that the parties instead “spoke with the judge.” Both of these are indicative that the trial did review the objections; a hearing on the objections was
set and a previous magistrate’s decision was not considered because without a
transcript, the court could not independently review the decision. Accordingly,
appellants’ have not met their burden to affirmatively demonstrate that the trial
court failed to conduct the independent review required by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) and
we overrule appellants’ first assignment of error.
In appellants’ second assignment of error, appellants advance several
arguments relating to the procedure and evidence received during the tax-hearing
process.
Appellants first argue that a tax hearing may not be held
telephonically, “let alone . . . in place of a trial or motion for summary judgment.”
This error is twofold and presents two issues: (1) whether a tax hearing may not be
held telephonically and (2) whether a tax hearing can replace a trial or motion for
summary judgment.
We first address appellants’ contention that a tax hearing cannot be
held telephonically. Appellants point to a myriad of reasons that this hearing was
improper, but we are more persuaded by the treasurer’s citation to our existing case
law, relying on the inherent authority of courts to promulgate local rules that “are
created with the purpose of promoting the fair administration of justice and
eliminating undue delay.” Cavalry Invests. v. Dzilinski, 2007-Ohio-3767, ¶ 16 (8th
Dist.). Under the common pleas court’s local rules, Cuyahoga C.P., Gen. Div., Loc.R.
24 affords judges discretion to set case-management orders and rules of procedure in foreclosure cases. Further, the General Assembly has instructed that in civil
actions for enforcing tax liens, “the court shall advance such cause on the docket, so
that it may be first heard.” R.C. 323.25(F). Given the expedited nature of and
evidence required for tax-foreclosure proceedings, we cannot say that the trial
court’s decision to hold this matter by telephone was improper.
In Rokakis, 2011-Ohio-1926 (8th Dist.), this court previously
addressed appellants’ second issue pertaining to the authority of the court to hold a
“tax hearing” in lieu of a hearing on a motion for summary judgment or trial. The
Rokakis appellant challenged tax hearings as violative of due process because “there
was no evidence offered, either through a trial or summary judgment exercise, to
support the final judgment.” Id. at ¶ 11. This court disagreed, finding that R.C.
323.25 and Cuyahoga C.P., Gen. Div., Loc.R. 24 afford discretion to the trial court to
hold a tax hearing. Id. at ¶ 15. Here, appellants similarly argue that the hearing was
improper because the court did not receive any evidence or swear in witnesses and
that there is no basis in law for the tax hearing. We maintain our position on this
issue as set forth in Rokakis, finding no merit to appellants’ arguments and further
add that R.C. 323.25(F), requiring courts to advance tax-foreclosure cases on the
docket, supports the concept of the tax hearing and the administration of such
hearing by a magistrate.
Addressing appellants’ argument disputing the “lack of evidence” and
improper admission of evidence at the hearing and the documents attached to the
complaint, we similarly overrule these concerns. The process of tax foreclosure has been promulgated by the General Assembly. R.C. 323.25. Under R.C. 323.26, “it
shall be sufficient for the county treasurer to allege in the treasurer’s petition that
the taxes are charged on the tax duplicate[,] . . . the amount of the taxes, and that
the taxes are unpaid, and the treasurer shall not be required to set forth in the
petition any other or further special matter relating to such taxes.” And, “[a]
certified copy of the entry on the tax duplicate shall be prima-facie evidence of such
allegations and the validity of the taxes.” Id.; see also R.C. 5721.18(A) (“[t]he
certificate or master list . . . is prima-facie evidence at the trial of the foreclosure
action of the amount and validity of the taxes, assessments, charges, penalties, and
interest appearing due and unpaid and of their nonpayment”); see also Treasurer
of Cuyahoga Cty. v. Durham Constr. Trade Inst., 2021-Ohio-1960, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.).
To the extent that appellants argue that the delinquent land certificate
was not “certified,” this is an incorrect assertion based on the statutory requirements
directed towards the county auditor in certifying delinquent properties. It is
apparent from the relevant statutes that “certified” in the context of tax foreclosures
differs from “certified” as it relates to other evidence and documentation. R.C.
5721.13(A), governing delinquent land tax certificates specifically provides that “the
county auditor shall make in duplicate a certificate, to be known as a delinquent land
tax certificate, of each delinquent tract of land . . . upon which the taxes . . . have not
been paid . . . and stating that the amount has been certified to the county
prosecuting attorney as delinquent.” The certificate must be signed by the auditor
or his deputy, and the original is filed with the prosecuting attorney. Id. R.C. 5721.18(A); see also Durham Constr. Trade Inst., 2021-Ohio-1960, at ¶ 26 (8th
Dist.). Accordingly, pursuant to statute, the delinquent land certificate attached to
the complaint constitutes a properly certified document that serves as prima-facie
evidence of the debts at the tax hearing. Thus, the trial court did not err in relying
on prima-facie evidence in the case herein.
Appellants’ second assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellants costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, P.J., and ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR