Curtis v. Harmon Electronic, Inc.

552 P.2d 117, 1976 Utah LEXIS 884

• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Decided: July 9, 1976
• Docket: 14354
• Status: Published

Opinions

HENRIOD, Chief Justice:

Appeal from a dismissal of an action against DeWayne,¹ employer of Curtis,² by the Railroad,³ on a joint tort-feasor contribution theory. Affirmed with costs to DeWayne.

Curtis, in the course of his employment by DeWayne, was injured while riding in a vehicle as a passenger with a co-worker, who drove broadside into one of the Railroad’s freight cars. Curtis sued Harmon Electronic, Inc., and the Railroad (not DeWayne), on theories of defective product (signals) liability and negligent train operation liability respectively. The latter was allowed to join DeWayne as third-party defendant, apparently on a theory claiming a right of contribution based on joint negligence under the joint tort-feasor act (see below).

The only question here is whether the Workmen’s Compensation Act,⁴ under which Curtis has been paid, preempts any other recovery by anyone else against his employer, based on a theory that such employer, as respondeat superior and the Railroad may have been joint tort-feasors and beneficiaries or losers under the provisions of Title 78-27-39, et seq., U.C.A.1953, as amended (see Vol. 9, 1975 Pocket Supp., pp. 59 and 60).

The Railroad concedes that there are no Utah cases on the subject, and candidly volunteers that “courts of other jurisdictions” ⁵ might agree with DeWayne that the Workmen’s Compensation Act⁶ insulates against the claim of the Railroad.

Under the act, the employer has no defense he can assert, and any tort liability or complete freedom therefrom on the part of an employer is not issuable or asserta-ble, which is the reason, no doubt, why DeWayne was not named as a defendant. Besides,' he cannot be a joint tort-feasor because his liability is quite different than that of a third party.⁷

The act, under 35-1-60, paraphrased, says that “the right to recover compensation . . . for injuries sustained . . . shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer . . . and the liabilities of the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, . . . and no action at law may be maintained against an employer . based upon any . . . injury . of an employee.”

In view of this clear interdiction, and in light of the letter and spirit,⁸ magnitude and almost all-encompassing declaration of rights and remedies under the act, it would seem that no good purpose would be served in reporting the provisions of the tort-fea-sor contribution provisions of 78-27-39, et seq., (supra), urged by the Railroad, save to refer to them, and to say that we cannot accept the gratuitous suggestion of the Railroad that there may be significance in the dates of passage of the two acts, with a hint that one impliedly may have repealed the other.

■CROCKETT and TUCKETT, JJ., concur.

1 . Third-party defendant.

2 . Plaintiff.

3 . Defendant.

4 . Title 35-1, U.C.A.1953.

5 . Employers Mutual v. Griffin Const., 280 S.W.2d 179, 53 A.L.R.2d 967 (Ky.1955) ; Larson, Law of Workmen’s Compensation, Sec. 76-21 (1970).

⁶

7 . Footnote 5, supra.

8 . Cook v. Peter Kiewit, 15 Utah 2d 20, 386 P.2d 616 (1963).