Curtis Packaging Corp. v. Kpmg, No. X06-Cv-99-0156558-S (Jul. 31, 2002)

2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 9777
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedJuly 31, 2002
DocketNo. X06-CV-99-0156558-S
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 9777 (Curtis Packaging Corp. v. Kpmg, No. X06-Cv-99-0156558-S (Jul. 31, 2002)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Curtis Packaging Corp. v. Kpmg, No. X06-Cv-99-0156558-S (Jul. 31, 2002), 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 9777 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
The plaintiff Curtis Packaging Corporation (Curtis) is a manufacturer of folding packaging material, such as golf ball sleeves. The defendant KPMG, LLP, formerly, KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP (KPMG), is a major public accounting firm employed as Curtis' auditor from the 1950's until the relationship was terminated in 1999. This action claiming tort and contract damages by Curtis against KPMG was filed in 1999. Curtis claims that KPMG was negligent in the performance of its professional duties owed to Curtis, and breached its contractual obligations to Curtis by failing to detect an ongoing scheme whereby Payroll Express, as Curtis' outsourced payroll service, stole approximately $2.5 million during the 1990's from Curtis' payroll account.

The case was tried to the court from December 4, 2001 through December 14, 2001. The parties also filed post-trial and reply memoranda of law. Curtis prevails on the basis of the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Sometime in the late 1980's, Payroll Express had performed services for Curtis, including preparation of its W-2 forms for Internal Revenue Services (IRS) purposes. Commencing in April of 1991, Payroll Express assumed Curtis' payroll function. Payroll Express wrote and signed payroll checks on behalf of Curtis by using checks bearing authorized facsimile signatures supplied by Curtis. Payroll Express used these same presigned checks for payment of taxes to federal and state authorities on behalf of Curtis, delivered such checks to the appropriate authorities, and produced check registers. Payroll Express prepared quarterly reports and filed them on behalf of Curtis as its payroll administrator.

Curtis' payroll account was with Union Trust Bank, which maintained account balances and statements. Payroll Express routinely notified Curtis of the funds necessary to meet its payroll, including tax obligations, and Curtis then deposited the appropriate funds into the payroll account.

Payroll Express' thievery involved payments of withholding taxes to the IRS. Payroll Express had responsibility for preparing Curtis' tax withholding forms, IRS form 941. The

principal of Payroll Express, David Kast, routinely prepared two different 941 forms, one being the correct form, which was provided to Curtis, and a second set of forms that reported a lower total wage and withholding amount. This second set of forms was sent at the appropriate CT Page 9779 time to the IRS, without a copy to Curtis. Kast would pay the reduced amount of withholding taxes, or none at all, and would pay the balance of funds to Payroll Express.

To facilitate this fraud, Kast intentionally changed the address on the company's tax form so that any IRS notice of underpayment would be sent to Payroll Express, not to Curtis. Using the signature authority on the payroll account, Payroll Express was able to write checks directly to itself, rather than to the IRS depository.

Curtis first discovered the theft on August 6, 1998, as a result of an IRS investigation and Payroll Express bankruptcy. Potentially liable for the full $2.5 million which should have been paid to IRS, Curtis was able to negotiate a compromise with the IRS on or about October 29, 1998. The compromise agreement required Curtis to pay to the IRS $300,000, forego recognizing a $404,000 net operating loss, and pay to the IRS a portion of its insurance claim against The Hartford Insurance Group. The insurance claim eventually resulted in an additional payment of $146,865.57 to the IRS.

The relationship between Curtis and KPMG was contractual in nature, by means of an engagement letter which was entered into annually over the relevant period. The agreement retained KPMG to conduct a yearly audit of Curtis' financial statements in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). Those standards required KPMG to state with "reasonable assurance" that the financial statements prepared by Curtis were free from material misstatements.

The professional negligence claim is based on KPMG's status as a professional accounting firm. The plaintiff in a professional negligence or malpractice action must demonstrate "(1) the relevant standard of care in the circumstances; and (2) that the defendant deviated from the standard of care and that the deviation caused harm to the plaintiff."Pisel v. Stamford Hospital, 180 Conn. 314, 334-42, 430 A.2d 1 (1980). There was substantial expert evidence to establish the standard of care in this case. The standard of care for the accounting profession is GAAS, which is a product of the U.S. Auditing Standards Board and American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Also see Vosgerichianv. Commodore Int'l, 862 F. Sup. 1371, 1373 (E.D. Pa. 1994) and FDIC v.Schoenberger, 781 F. Sup. 1155, 1157 (E.D. La. 1992).

GAAS contains ten generally accepted auditing standards: three general standards, three standards of fieldwork, and four reporting standards. The three general standards are focused on auditor qualifications and address training and proficiency, independence and professional due care. The three fieldwork standards govern the performance of GAAS audits CT Page 9780 and include: (4) audit planning and supervision; (5) understanding and evaluation of internal controls; and (6) obtaining sufficient evidential matter necessary to support the auditor's opinion. The four reporting standards are: (7) adherence to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP); (8) obligation to report on the consistent application of generally accepted accounting principles from year to year; (9) adequate disclosure in financial statements; and (10) requirement of the expression of an opinion, or the reasons why one cannot be expressed.

The plaintiff's expert, Conrad Kappel, testified as an expert witness that GAAS and statements of auditing standards (SAS) delineated the standard of care for accountants performing audits such as those performed by KPMG on Curtis' financial statements. Kappel was of the opinion that KPMG violated the general standard of due care, all three standards of fieldwork, and the standard (10) requiring an opinion or the reasons why one cannot be expressed.

Whether KPMG met the GAAS obligations is dispositive of the case. The engagement letters only obligated KPMG to perform a GAAS audit. This fact was conceded by the Curtis' principal and owner, Donald Droppo.1 Both the breach of contract and negligence claims are based on proof of deviations from the GAAS standard of care.

It is not the auditor's responsibility under GAAS to detect thefts. A GAAS audit "in most cases is not to disclose defalcations but to render an opinion on the financial statements as audited by the accountant through following accepted accounting procedures." Cereal Byprods. Co.v. Hall, 8 Ill. App.2d 331, 334, 138 N.E.2d 27 (1956). "Auditors are not required to be detectives hired to ferret out fraud." Cenco Inc. v.Seidman Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 454 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied459 U.S.

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Bluebook (online)
2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 9777, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/curtis-packaging-corp-v-kpmg-no-x06-cv-99-0156558-s-jul-31-2002-connsuperct-2002.