In The
Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont _________________ NO. 09-14-00196-CR _________________
CURTIS NATHANIEL BULLMAN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee ________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 128th District Court Orange County, Texas Trial Cause No. A-130,595-R ________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In four issues, appellant, Curtis Nathaniel Bullman, challenges his
conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a young child. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§ 21.02 (West Supp. 2015). 1 Bullman contends the trial court abused its discretion
in admitting the following: (1) the testimony of an outcry witness; (2) evidence of
1 Although the Legislature amended section 21.02 of the Texas Penal Code after the commission of the alleged offense, we cite to the current version of the statute because the subsequent amendments do not affect the outcome of this appeal.
1 Bullman’s extraneous offenses; (3) Facebook records; and (4) telephone recordings
and transcripts. Because we overrule all of Bullman’s issues on appeal, we affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
I. Background
The State indicted Bullman for continuous sexual abuse of a child. The State
alleged that “from on or about June 3, 2011 through March 5, 2012” Bullman
committed two or more acts of sexual abuse against E.D. 2, a child younger than
fourteen years of age. The State specifically alleged that Bullman committed
aggravated sexual assault against E.D. on or about June 3, 2011, November 1,
2011, and March 5, 2012.
Bullman pled not guilty to the charges against him and elected a trial by
jury. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Bullman guilty of continuous
sexual abuse of a young child and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Bullman
filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. Outcry Testimony
In his first issue, Bullman contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by admitting testimony from E.D.’s mother (the “Mother”) regarding E.D.’s outcry
statement under article 38.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See 2 To protect the victim’s identity, we use an alias. See McClendon v. State, 643 S.W.2d 936, 936 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982). 2 generally Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.072 (West Supp. 2015).3 The trial
court has broad discretion to determine whether a child’s hearsay statement is
admissible under article 38.072. Reed v. State, 974 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1998, pet. ref’d). We will not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless the
record shows a clear abuse of discretion. Id.
A. Untimely Notice
Bullman first argues that the Mother’s outcry statement testimony was
inadmissible because the State did not provide fourteen days’ notice as required by
section 2(b)(1) of article 38.072. See generally Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
38.072 § 2(b)(1).
Hearsay statements are not admissible unless otherwise provided by the
rules of evidence or by statute. Tex. R. Evid. 802. Article 38.072 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure creates a statutory exception to the rule against
hearsay for statements of child-abuse victims when certain conditions are met. See
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.072. The exception provides that in sexual
offense cases committed against a child, a statement that was made by the child to
3 The Legislature amended article 38.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure after the commission of the alleged offense; however, we cite to the current version of the statute because the subsequent amendments do not affect the outcome of this appeal.
3 the first adult about the offense will not be inadmissible because of the hearsay
rule. Id. art. 38.072, § 2(a), (b). However, for this hearsay exception to apply, the
State must notify the defendant of its intention to offer such statement on or before
the fourteenth day before trial begins. Id. art. 38.072, § 2(b)(1)(A). “The purpose of
the notice requirement is to prevent the defendant from being surprised by the
introduction of the outcry-hearsay testimony.” Gay v. State, 981 S.W.2d 864, 866
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d); see also Fetterolf v. State, 782
S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, pet. ref’d).
Bullman contends—and the State concedes—that the State did not provide
fourteen days’ written notice of its intent to call an outcry witness. The State filed
its notice of intent to introduce the hearsay statement of a child abuse victim on
March 27, 2014, the eleventh day before trial began. Bullman argues that the
State’s noncompliance with the notice provision should have prevented the State
from using the article 38.072 hearsay exception. However, when notice is
untimely, the admission of outcry testimony is harmless error if the defendant had
actual notice of the identity of the outcry witness, the complainant testified and
was subject to cross-examination, and the defendant did not show that the untimely
notice impeded his defense. See Fetterolf, 782 S.W.2d at 930; see also Upton v.
State, 894 S.W.2d 426, 429 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, pet. ref’d) (holding
4 untimely notice was harmless error when appellant admitted he reviewed the
State’s file and learned the identity of two potential outcry witnesses, when
appellant did not establish how his defense was impeded by the untimely notice,
and when the complainant appeared as a witness, provided comparable testimony
to the outcry witness, and was subjected to cross-examination).
During the article 38.072 hearing, the State argued it had an open file policy
and that defense counsel had had an opportunity to review everything in the State’s
file, including the Mother’s statement. Additionally, the prosecutor for the State
informed the trial court that sometime before he filed the written notice, he had
spoken with defense counsel and verbally informed her that the State was going to
call the Mother as an outcry witness.
Bullman does not contest these facts, and defense counsel admitted at the
hearing that she had reviewed the State’s file. Moreover, fourteen days before trial,
defense counsel filed a motion wherein she stated that she had reason to believe
that the State planned to present the testimony of an outcry witness at trial. Twelve
days before trial, during the pretrial motions hearing, defense counsel stated on the
record that the State’s intention to call an outcry witness to introduce E.D.’s outcry
statement “should not be an issue[.]” After defense counsel made the statement, the
trial court noted that it did not have the State’s notice in the file. The State
5 responded that it thought it had already given notice but would file its notice that
day.
At the article 38.072 hearing, the trial court asked defense counsel if she was
surprised that the outcry witness was going to testify. Defense counsel responded
that she was not surprised by the content of the outcry witness’s statement, but she
was surprised that the State actually planned to call the witness to testify because
she had not received formal notice of the State’s intent to call the witness. When
asked if she would have changed her trial strategy had she received the notice a
few days before, defense counsel responded that she “may” have changed her trial
strategy.
Here, Bullman has failed to show that the State’s untimely notice caused him
harm. While Bullman contends he was surprised by the State’s notice of intent to
call an outcry witness, Bullman cannot reasonably argue he was actually surprised
by the outcry evidence. As indicated above, defense counsel reviewed the State’s
file long before trial and within that file was the Mother’s statement, which
detailed E.D.’s outcry of sexual abuse. Additionally, the State responded that it had
previously informed counsel of its intent to call an outcry witness. Defense counsel
argued that she might have changed her defensive strategy if she had received
proper notice, but she does not show how the lack of timely notice impeded
6 Bullman’s defense. Also, E.D. testified and was subject to cross-examination
regarding the statements she made to her mother. See Hanson v. State, 180 S.W.3d
726, 729-30 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.).
Additionally, even if Bullman had shown surprise and prejudice in the
admission of the Mother’s testimony, any error would not be reversible error when
the same evidence was subsequently admitted without objection. See Leday v.
State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). E.D. testified about
Bullman’s sexual abuse. She testified as to each incident of abuse identified by the
Mother, and did so in greater detail. Under these facts, we conclude that harm has
not been shown. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b).
B. Improper Scope of Testimony
Bullman also contends that the trial court was lenient in what it allowed to
come in as part of the Mother’s outcry statement testimony and, thus, the testimony
was not proper. Bullman argues that the trial court should not have allowed the
Mother to testify about incidents of sexual abuse that occurred prior to June 3,
2011, and about an incident of forced sexual intercourse that occurred on an
unspecified date. Bullman’s counsel objected during the article 38.072 hearing, but
the trial court did not rule on Bullman’s objection, and instead, instructed
Bullman’s counsel to present the objections during trial. Thus, Bullman failed to
7 obtain a definitive adverse ruling on this objection during the article 38.072
hearing. Furthermore, Bullman did not object to the Mother’s testimony on this
basis when the State sought to enter her testimony during trial. We conclude that
Bullman failed to preserve his complaint for review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
We overrule Bullman’s first issue.
III. Extraneous Offense Testimony
In his second issue, Bullman contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing E.D. to testify regarding “events or alleged instances of
abuse” that occurred outside of the time specified in the indictment. According to
Bullman, the State offered the testimony only for the purpose of proving Bullman’s
character so as to show that he acted in conformity with that character, and he
contends that none of the exceptions listed in Rule 404(b) of the Texas Rules of
Evidence support the admissibility of the evidence.4
4 For sexual-abuse cases involving children, article 38.37 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that notwithstanding Rule of Evidence 404, “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by the defendant against the child who is the victim of the alleged offense shall be admitted for its bearing on relevant matters, including: (1) the state of mind of the defendant and the child; and (2) the previous and subsequent relationship between the defendant and the child.” Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.37, § 1(b) (West Supp. 2015). However, before this type of evidence may be admitted under article 38.37, the statute provides that “[t]he state shall give the defendant notice of the state’s intent to introduce” the evidence in its case in chief “not later than the 30th day before the date of the defendant’s trial. Id. art. 38.37, § 3. Article 38.37 further provides 8 As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record
must show that the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely objection
stating the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial
court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint,
unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context, and that the trial court
ruled on the objection. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. During a bench conference, Bullman
objected “to any other extraneous offenses other than those stated in the
Indictment[.]” Bullman expressly based his objection on Texas Rule of Evidence
403. He argued that although relevant, the extraneous offense evidence may still be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice or confusion of the issues. The trial court overruled Bullman’s objection.
Because Bullman failed to object to the evidence based on Rule 404, we conclude
he has failed to preserve his complaint under Rule 404(b). See Tex. R. App. P.
33.1; see also Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (To
that the trial court must “conduct a hearing out of the presence of the jury” to determine whether “the evidence likely to be admitted at trial will be adequate to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the separate offense beyond a reasonable doubt[.]” Id. art. 38.37, § 2-a. In this case, the record does not show that the State provided the requisite notice that it intended to introduce the evidence at issue under article 38.37 or that the trial court held a hearing before the evidence was admitted. For these reasons, we do not discuss the admissibility of the evidence under article 38.37. 9 preserve error for appellate review, “the point of error on appeal must comport
with the objection made at trial.”). 5
Bullman did raise a Rule 403 objection, which we now consider. On appeal,
Bullman specifically complains about the admissibility of the following testimony
by E.D.: (1) Bullman began having vaginal intercourse with E.D. when she was
nine years old; (2) Bullman continued having regular intercourse with E.D. until
February 2013, eleven months after the last date alleged in the indictment; and (3)
Bullman forced E.D. to have intercourse with him on an unspecified date,
potentially outside the indictment period. Bullman contends the trial court should
have excluded this evidence under Texas Rule of Evidence 403. He argues that the
trial court failed to conduct a proper balancing test under Rule 403. The trial court
is presumed to engage in the required balancing test under Rule 403 once a party
objects on the ground of Rule 403 and the trial court rules on the objection, unless
the record indicates otherwise. See Rojas v. State, 986 S.W.2d 241, 250 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1998); Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 173 (Tex. Crim. App.
5 To the extent that Bullman’s argument during the article 38.072 hearing could be construed as a Rule 404 objection to the admissibility of extraneous offense evidence offered during E.D.’s testimony, we reiterate that Bullman failed to obtain a ruling on his complaint, and, as such, failed to preserve error on that basis. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
10 1997). The trial court is not required to sua sponte place the results of its balancing
test on the record. Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
The record before us does not affirmatively show the trial court refused to conduct
the Rule 403 balancing test, it simply overruled Bullman’s Rule 403 objection. We
presume the trial court did engage in a balancing test before the court ruled on the
objection.
Even if we assume that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the
extraneous offense testimony, we will not reverse the judgment if the error was
harmless. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2. We review error in admitting extraneous
offense evidence as non-constitutional error. See Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870,
884-85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We will disregard non-constitutional error that
does not affect a criminal defendant’s substantial rights. See Tex. R. App. P.
44.2(b). “A substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Schmutz v. State,
440 S.W.3d 29, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). In our determination of whether error
adversely affected the jury’s decision, we consider everything in the record,
including testimony, physical evidence, jury instructions, the State’s theories and
any defensive theories, closing arguments, and voir dire. Id.
11 Regarding E.D.’s testimony that Bullman forced her to have sex, we note
that E.D.’s mother testified as to the same occurrence without a Rule 403
objection. Additionally, Facebook records containing a conversation between E.D.
and Bullman, wherein Bullman admits to the forced occurrence, were entered into
the record without a Rule 403 objection. Both E.D. and her mother testified that
Bullman sexually molested E.D. when she was eight years old without objection.
Also, the recording and transcription of three telephone conversations between
Bullman and E.D. were admitted without a Rule 403 objection. During one of the
telephone conversations, evidence was presented to the jury that Bullman was
having sex with E.D. when she was eight and nine years old. Thus, E.D.’s
testimony was merely cumulative of other evidence admitted without a proper Rule
403 objection. See Leday, 983 S.W.2d at 718; Duncan v. State, 95 S.W.3d 669, 672
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d); see also Wilson, 71 S.W.3d at
349. Accordingly, because evidence regarding these two extraneous offenses was
admitted through other sources without a proper objection, we conclude any error
potentially stemming from the admission of the evidence was harmless. See Tex.
R. App. P. 44.2(b).
Concerning E.D.’s testimony that the abuse continued after the indictment
period, we conclude that error, if any, did not have a substantial and injurious
12 effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. E.D.’s testimony regarding the
sexual abuse occurring after March 2013, was very general in nature and not as
detailed or extensive as her testimony regarding the sexual abuse offenses covered
in the indictment. Additionally, the State did not emphasize this evidence during
the trial. The jury heard substantial evidence and argument concerning Bullman’s
sexual abuse of E.D. starting from age eight and continuing until she turned
fourteen years old. We believe there is little risk that the jury would have convicted
Bullman based on the evidence that he continued to sexually abuse E.D. after she
turned fourteen, rather than the detailed and extensive evidence that was the basis
of the State’s indictment. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). Therefore, we hold that the
error in admitting this evidence, if any, did not affect a substantial right of Bullman
and must be disregarded.
We overrule Bullman’s second issue.
IV. Admissibility of Facebook Records
In his third issue, Bullman contends the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting into evidence Facebook records from Bullman’s Facebook account,
which included various dialogues between Bullman and E.D. Bullman argues the
Facebook records were not properly authenticated and contained inadmissible
hearsay.
13 Like other types of evidence, electronically stored evidence must be properly
authenticated. See Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638-39 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012). Rule of Evidence 901(a) states that for the proponent of evidence to satisfy
the authentication requirement, he must “produce evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Tex. R. Evid. 901(a). In a
jury trial, after the trial court makes this threshold decision, the jury then has the
role to ultimately determine whether an item of evidence is indeed what its
proponent claims. Butler v. State, 459 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
We review the trial court’s determination of the threshold requirement for an abuse
of discretion and will not reverse its decision if it is within the zone of reasonable
disagreement. Id.
“Evidence may be authenticated in a number of ways, including by direct
testimony from a witness with personal knowledge, by comparison with other
authenticated evidence, or by circumstantial evidence.” Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638.
In Tienda, the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the authentication of printouts
from a social-networking website, namely MySpace. Id. at 638-47. Acknowledging
that computers can be hacked, passwords compromised, and mobile phones stolen,
the Court explained that evidence that “an email on its face purports to come from
a certain person’s email address, that the respondent in an internet chat room
14 dialogue purports to identify himself, or that a text message emanates from a cell
phone number assigned to the purported author” is alone insufficient to support a
finding of authenticity. Id. 641-42. However, after reviewing the content of the
MySpace postings, the Court concluded there was sufficient circumstantial
evidence to establish a prima facie case such that a reasonable juror could have
found that the MySpace accounts were created and maintained by the defendant.
Id. at 642. Later, in Butler, the Court explained that the trial court may consider the
message’s “‘appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive
characteristics,’ which considered in conjunction with other circumstances” to
support a conclusion that a message emanated from the purported author. 459
S.W.3d at 602 (quoting Tex. R. Evid. 901(b)(4)).
The Austin Court of Appeals identified the two major authentication
concerns specific to Facebook:
First, because anyone can establish a fictitious profile under any name, the person viewing the profile has no way of knowing whether the profile is legitimate. Second, because a person may gain access to another person’s account by obtaining the user’s name and password, the person viewing communications on or from an account profile cannot be certain that the author is in fact the profile owner.
Campbell v. State, 382 S.W.3d 545, 550 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.)
(internal citations omitted). In Campbell, the defendant acknowledged having a
Facebook account but denied sending the victim the Facebook messages at issue. 15 Id. at 551. And, the defendant argued that only he and the victim had access to his
Facebook account. Id. The victim in the case identified the printouts as messages
she received from the defendant, and she specifically denied that she sent the
messages to herself through the defendant’s account. Id. The victim also denied
having the defendant’s current Facebook password the day the messages were sent.
Id. The court considered the content of the Facebook messages and found internal
characteristics that linked the messages to the defendant as the author. Id. at 551-
52. The court concluded that the State was not required to conclusively establish
that the defendant authored the messages; rather, the State only had to present
prima facie evidence such that a reasonable jury could have found that the
Facebook messages were created by the defendant. Id. at 552-53. The court
concluded such evidence was presented in Campbell, and determined the trial court
did not err in overruling the defendant’s authentication objection. Id. at 553.
In reviewing whether the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s
ruling, we note initially that the messages, on their face, purport to be messages
sent from a Facebook account bearing the name “Curtis N Bullman” to an account
bearing E.D.’s name.6 While this fact, without more, is not sufficient to
6 In his brief, Bullman notes that the trial court also admitted records from a Facebook account bearing the name “Stanley.doritos[.]” Bullman does not identify any content from this account that he alleges caused him harm. See Tex. R. App. P. 16 authenticate Bullman as the author of the messages, “when combined with other
circumstantial evidence, the record may support a finding by a rational jury that the
messages were authored and sent by” Bullman. Id. at 551. Therefore, we examine
whether other evidence in the record supports the trial court’s ruling as to the
authenticity of the Facebook records.
E.D. testified that she communicated with Bullman through Facebook and
that the messages she received during those communications stemmed from a
Facebook account bearing the name, “Curtis N. Bullman[.]” E.D. recalled that
Bullman sent her a friend request from this account in May 2013 after he left
Texas. E.D. explained that she knew she was communicating with Bullman
because of “the way he said things” and because he communicated things through
Facebook that only she and Bullman would know. For example, E.D. testified that
Bullman created a code and required E.D. to use the code during Facebook
conversations to verify he was communicating with her. E.D. testified that
38.1(i). Our review of the record indicates that there are no Facebook messages between Bullman and E.D. from this account. Moreover, the only testimony in the record regarding this account is that there were no conversations between Bullman and E.D. from this Facebook account. To the extent Bullman’s brief challenges the trial court’s admission of these records, we conclude any error potentially stemming from the admission of the records from the “Stanley.doritos” Facebook account would be harmless. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). 17 Bullman used the code during the Facebook conversations at issue in this case, and
as a result, she was certain she was communicating with Bullman.
A forensics investigator with the sheriff’s office testified that he obtained the
records from Facebook pursuant to a probable cause search warrant. The
investigator identified the evidence he received from Facebook in its response to
the search warrant. The investigator testified that the Facebook records reflect that
Bullman’s account was logged into in South Carolina and in Tennessee, but not in
Orange County. There is evidence in the record that after leaving Texas, Bullman
went to South Carolina and Tennessee. The investigator also testified that
Facebook verified this was Bullman’s account through his email address and phone
number. An Orange County detective testified that they obtained the phone number
for Bullman from which he had previously contacted E.D., that they used that
phone number to contact Bullman, and that this number was the same phone
number that Facebook indicated it used to verify the owner of the Facebook
account.
During Bullman’s testimony, he admitted that he started a Facebook account
in May 2013. Bullman further admitted that he had had conversations with E.D.
through Facebook two or three times. According to Bullman, he was drunk and
high during these conversations, so he could not recall the content of the
18 conversations in full. Notably, Bullman did not deny having the Facebook
conversations with E.D. as portrayed in the Facebook records. Bullman also
admitted he had a code he used with E.D., and he asked E.D. for the code during
the Facebook conversations to confirm he was communicating with E.D. In
reviewing the content of the Facebook messages, we note that the messages are
consistent with E.D. and Bullman’s testimony that Bullman requested E.D. to
provide him with a secret code, which E.D. was able to do.
Based on all of the circumstances reviewed above, we conclude that there
was sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could have found that the
Facebook messages at issue in this case were created by Bullman. Therefore, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Bullman’s authentication
objection and admitting the Facebook records into evidence for the jury to
determine the ultimate question of authenticity.
With regard to Bullman’s hearsay objection, Texas Rule of Evidence
801(e)(2)(A) “plainly and unequivocally states that a criminal defendant’s own
statements, when being offered against him, are not hearsay.” Trevino v. State, 991
S.W.2d 849, 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also Williams v. State, 402 S.W.3d
425, 438 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d). “A party’s own
statements are not hearsay and they are admissible on the logic that a party is
19 estopped from challenging the fundamental reliability or trustworthiness of his
own statements.” Trevino, 991 S.W.2d at 853. Because the Facebook messages
were posted by Bullman, the trial court properly overruled his hearsay objection as
to his statements on Facebook.
Regarding Bullman’s contention that E.D.’s statements were inadmissible
hearsay, we disagree. E.D.’s statements were offered not for the truth of the
matters asserted, but to give context to Bullman’s statements and are thus not
hearsay. See McNeil v. State, 452 S.W.3d 408, 419 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d); see also Gardner v. State, No. 05-14-01063-CR, 2015 WL
6784270, at * 2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 6, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); Hernandez v. State, No. 01-08-00306-CR, 2009 WL
1331649, at *6-7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 14, 2009, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication).
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling
Bullman’s hearsay objection. We overrule Bullman’s third issue.
V. Admissibility of Telephone Recordings
In his fourth issue, Bullman contends the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting the recording and transcription of three telephone conversations between
20 Bullman and E.D. Bullman contends that the recording and transcripts containing
the telephone conversations were replete with inadmissible hearsay.
As noted above, a party’s own statements are not hearsay when offered
against that party. Tex. R. Evid. 801(e)(2)(A). Bullman’s statements on the
recording and in the transcripts were his own statements that the State used against
him; therefore, Bullman’s statements are not hearsay and were admissible. See
Trevino, 991 S.W.2d at 853; Tex. R. Evid. 801(e)(2)(A). And, contrary to
Bullman’s contention, E.D.’s statements were offered not for the truth of the
matters asserted therein, but to give context to Bullman’s statements and are thus
not hearsay. See McNeil, 452 S.W.3d at 419. We overrule Bullman’s fourth issue.
Having overruled all of Bullman’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
______________________________ CHARLES KREGER Justice
Submitted on June 29, 2015 Opinion Delivered April 13, 2016 Do not publish
Before Kreger, Horton, and Johnson, JJ. 21