HECHT, Justice.
The plaintiff sued a bar for injuries sustained when he was assaulted in the bar’s parking lot. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the bar. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s ruling, concluding questions of fact precluded summary judgment. On further review, we affirm the court of appeals decision and reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
The summary judgment record taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff-appellant Hoyt supports the following factual findings. Defendant-appellee Gutterz Bowl & Lounge (Gutterz) is a bowling alley and tavern located in Guthrie Center, Iowa. On March 20, 2009, Curtis Hoyt and several members of his construction crew finished work and went to Gutterz for refreshments. Curtis Knapp was also a customer at Gutterz that afternoon. Hoyt soon came to believe that Knapp was scowling at him. Hoyt and Knapp had formerly been friendly, but tension had arisen between them as a result of Hoyt’s alleged mistreatment of the sister of Knapp’s friend. The record reveals no evidence tending to prove the staff of Gut-terz had any knowledge of this history between Hoyt and Knapp.
After consuming a few beers, Hoyt and coworker Chris Brittain approached and verbally confronted Knapp. Knapp did not respond and continued to scowl at Hoyt. The waitress serving Hoyt and Brit-tain observed their behavior with concern and threatened to discontinue serving them unless they calmed down. Hoyt and Brittain ignored the waitress’s warning and thus she requested and secured permission from Gutterz’s owner, Rodney Atkinson, to discontinue serving them. Atkinson, who had been preparing food in the kitchen, went to the bar area to assess the situation. Hoyt and Brittain complained to Atkinson that they were no longer being served and continued to taunt Knapp.
Shortly thereafter, Atkinson grew concerned that ah altercation might occur. He requested that Hoyt and Brittain leave.1 Hoyt finished his beer and exited the tavern. As Hoyt walked through the parking lot toward his vehicle, somebody approached him from behind and struck him in the back of the head, knocking him unconscious. Hoyt suffered several injuries including a compound fracture of his ankle. Knapp admitted to police who later arrived on the scene that he had struck Hoyt, but claimed he had done so in self-defense.2
On September 25, 2009, Hoyt filed this action alleging that Knapp and Gutterz were liable for the injuries he sustained when Knapp assaulted him. Gutterz moved for summary judgment, alleging [774]*774Gutterz owed Hoyt no duty of reasonable care, there was no evidence of a breach of any duty, and the assault by Knapp and Hoyt’s injury were not foreseeable. The district court granted Gutterz’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Gutterz from the lawsuit. The district court found as a matter of law that the assault in the parking lot and Hoyt’s resulting injury were not foreseeable to Gutterz. Having found Hoyt’s injury was not foreseeable to Gutterz, the district court further found
insufficient evidence to generate a genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether Gutterz employees failed to exercise reasonable care to discover the likelihood of harm or failed to provide an adequate warning after discovering a potential danger to Hoyt.3
We granted Hoyt’s application for interlocutory appeal, and we transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s summary judgment ruling. In reversing, the court of appeals cited our opinion in Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 2009). In Thompson, we adopted the general duty formulation set forth in section 7 the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm and explained that “the assessment of the foreseeability of a risk” is no longer part of the duty analysis in evaluating a tort claim, and instead is to be considered when the fact finder decides whether a defendant has failed to exercise reasonable care. Id. at 835. Consistent with its understanding that foreseeability is no longer part of the duty determination, the court of appeals applied section 40 of the Restatement (Third), entitled “Duty Based on Special Relationship With Another,” in analyzing Hoyt’s claim. Concluding Gutterz owed Hoyt a duty under section 40 and finding Hoyt had raised fact questions as to foreseeability related to the issues of breach of duty and scope of liability, the court of appeals reversed the summary judgment ruling. We granted Gutterz’s application for further review.
II. Scope of Review.
The district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is reviewed for correction of errors of law. Id. at 832. A party is entitled to summary judgment when the record shows no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must: “(1) view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and (2) consider on behalf of the nonmoving party every legitimate inference reasonably deduced from the record.” Van Fossen v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 777 N.W.2d 689, 692 (Iowa 2009).
III. Discussion.
Hoyt contends the district court erred in concluding as a matter of law that Gutterz did not breach a duty of reasonable care under these circumstances. Further, Hoyt contends, the district court erred in its consideration of foreseeability of injury to Hoyt in making its summary judgment ruling. Gutterz urges that the summary judgment ruling should be affirmed because: (1) the district court correctly analyzed the question of duty, (2) even if a duty existed, Gutterz acted reasonably as a matter of law, and (3) Hoyt’s injuries here were, as a matter of law, outside the scope of harms typically resulting from the risks associated with Gutterz’s conduct.
[775]*775A. Duty. Before examining the record for a factual question regarding whether Gutterz breached a duty to Hoyt, we must consider whether Gutterz owed Hoyt a duty of care, and if so, the nature of that duty under these circumstances. While summary adjudication is rarely appropriate in negligence cases, the determination of whether a duty is owed under particular circumstances is a matter of law for the court’s determination. Thompson, 774 N.W.2d at 834; Sankey v. Richenberger, 456 N.W.2d 206, 207 (Iowa 1990). Traditionally, Iowa courts examining whether a landowner has a duty to protect visitors from the conduct of third parties relied upon section 344, comment f, of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to conclude that a property owner “is ordinarily under no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know that the acts of the third person are occurring, or are about to occur.” Galloway v. Bankers Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 437, 438 (Iowa 1988); Martinko v. H-N-W Assocs., 393 N.W.2d 320, 322-23 (1986); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 cmt. f, at 225 (1965) [hereinafter Restatement (Second) ]. That general proposition was subject to the caveat that a duty would be imposed in scenarios where the property owner knew or had reason to know of a likelihood of third party conduct that could endanger visitors or where the place or character of the business was such that the property owner should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct by third parties. Galloway, 420 N.W.2d at 439-40; Martinko, 393 N.W.2d at 322-23; Restatement (Second) § 344 cmt. f at 225-26.
Recently, in Thompson, we examined not a landowner-visitor scenario, but a scenario in which the trampoline of a landowner had been blown by high winds into a nearby roadway, obstructing the travel of and causing injury to a driver. 774 N.W.2d at 831-32. We questioned and then rejected an assessment of foreseeability of risk in determining whether the landowner owed the driver a duty. We adopted the general duty formulation of section 7 of the Restatement (Third) and explained:
An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm. Thus, in most cases involving physical harm, courts need not concern themselves with the existence or content of this ordinary duty, but instead may proceed directly to the elements of liability set forth in section 6 [of the Restatement (Third) ]. The general duty of reasonable care will apply in most cases, and thus courts can rely directly on section 6 and need not refer to duty on a case-by-case basis.
Id. at 834-35 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We joined the drafters of the Restatement (Third) in explicitly disapproving of the use of foreseeability, or lack thereof, in making no-duty determinations. Id. at 835. Instead, we explained, no-duty rulings should be limited to exceptional cases in which “ ‘an articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting liability in a particular class of cases.’ ” Id. (quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical & Emotional Harm § 7(b), at 77 (2010) [hereinafter Restatement (Third) ]). Such reasons of principle or policy justifying departure from a general duty to exercise reasonable care would not depend on the foreseeability of harm in any given case. Id. Instead, assessment of foreseeability should be allocated to the fact finder, as part of its determination of whether appropriate care has been exercised in any given scenario. Id.
Section 40 of the Restatement (Third) describes duty principles, some of which overlap with section 7’s general duty, more [776]*776specifically for special relationships such as landowner-visitor or business-patron relationships, as follows:
(a) An actor in a special relationship with another owes the other a duty of reasonable care with regard to risks that arise within the scope of the relationship.
(b) Special relationships giving rise to the duty provided in Subsection (a) include:
(1) a common carrier with its passengers,
(2) an innkeeper with its guests,
(3) a business or other possessor of land that holds its premises open to the public with those who are lawfully on the premises,
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Restatement (Third) § 40, at 39 (2012). Comment g explains that section 40’s contemplated duties apply even in cases involving harm caused by a third party:
The duty described in this Section applies regardless of the source of the risk. Thus, it applies to risks created by the individual at risk as well as those created by a third party’s conduct, whether innocent, negligent, or intentional.
Id. § 40 cmt. g, at 42. Therefore, comment j explains, “[b]usinesses ... who hold their land open to the public owe a duty of reasonable care to persons lawfully on their land who become ill or endangered by risks created by third parties.” Id. § 40 cmt. j, at 43-44. Section 40 thus modifies the general proposition of section 37 that actors typically owe no duty to protect victims from the conduct of third parties,4 and clarifies that a duty of reasonable care applies as a result of these special relationships.
For the same reasons we found the Restatement (Third) compelling in Thompson, we find it compelling in the tavern owner-patron context. Recognizing that a duty exists whenever an actor has created a risk of harm and that risks arise out of the special relationships contemplated by section 40 encourages simplicity and predictability. Limiting no-duty rulings to exceptional problems of policy or principle promotes judicial transparency, encouraging judges to justify in explicit terms any reasons for declining to impose a duty in a given scenario. Thompson, 774 N.W.2d at 835 (citing Restatement (Third) § 7 cmt. j, at 82). Further, foreseeability is central to the fact finder’s inquiries regarding breach and the range of harms for which an actor may be liable. Any overlap in the duty inquiry is likely to be redundant and confusing, and may well frustrate longstanding rationales for specific allocations of decision-making power between the judge and jury. Id. at 835 (removing foreseeability from the duty analysis “ ‘protects] the traditional function of the jury as fact finder’ ” (quoting Restatement (Third) § 7(b) cmt. j, at 98-99)); 1 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 159, at 503-04 (2d ed. 2011) (“Foreseeability [of harm] is seldom if ever a pure fact ... [and] is normally a jury question.”). The redundancy also gives rise to the possibility that judge and jury may reach inconsistent results regarding foreseeability, at odds with goals of procedural fairness, predictability, and treating like cases alike. For these reasons, we emphasize again our adoption [777]*777of the duty analysis of the Restatement (Third).
The district court clearly considered the foreseeability of the assault and Hoyt’s resulting injury in granting summary judgment for Gutterz, but whether the judgment was based on a no-duty determination or a reasonable care determination is less clear.5 Removing foreseeability from the duty analysis, we must consider whether some principle or strong policy consideration justifies exempting Gutterz, or the class of tavern owners in general, from the duty to exercise reasonable care. The parties have not advanced, and we cannot discern, any such considerations compelling exemption of tavern owners from the duty. Tavern owners fit squarely within the class of business owners contemplated by section 40(b)(3). Section 40 enumerates several justifications for requiring business owners to exercise due care:
[T]he relationship identifies a specific person to be protected and thus provides a more limited and justified incursion on autonomy, especially when the relationship is entered into voluntarily. In addition, some relationships necessarily compromise a person’s ability to self-protect, while leaving the actor in a superior position to protect that person. Many of the relationships also benefit the actor.
Restatement (Third) § 40 cmt. ⅛, at 43. We are convinced these justifications are applicable to tavern owners and decline to exempt them from the duty to exercise reasonable care. Accordingly, we conclude Gutterz owed Hoyt a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances presented here. We now turn to the question of whether Hoyt raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding the alleged breach of this duty.
B. Reasonable Care. Hoyt contends the district court erred in concluding Gutterz had not, as a matter of law, failed to exercise reasonable care. Gutterz counters that it acted reasonably.
While taverns are not insurers of patrons’ safety against third-person criminal attacks, various jurisdictions have explained taverns must make reasonable efforts to maintain order and supervise and control patrons. See, e.g., Gunter v. Vill. Pub, 606 N.E.2d 1310, 1312 (Ind.Ct.App.1993); Sweenor v. 162 State St., Inc., 361 Mass. 524, 281 N.E.2d 280, 281-82 (1972); Mettling v. Mulligan, 303 Minn. 8, 225 N.W.2d 825, 827-28 (1975); Flynn v. Audra’s Corp., 332 Wis.2d 253, 796 N.W.2d 230, 232-33 (Ct.App.2011); see also Restatement (Second) § 344 cmt. f, at 225-26. The Restatement (Third) adds that in situations involving section 40 affirmative duties, section 3’s reasonable care analysis may be applied in determining whether a particular failure to act is unreasonable. Restatement (Third) § 3 cmt. c, at 30. Section 3 explains that a person
acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances. Primary factors to con[778]*778sider in ascertaining whether the person’s conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person’s conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.
Id. § 3, at 29.
In addition, section 19’s specific application of the section 3 principles explains that “[t]he conduct of a defendant can lack reasonable care insofar as it foreseeably combines with or permits the improper conduct of the plaintiff or a third party.” Id. § 19, at 215. Section 19 sets forth the following examples of situations where the defendant may create or increase the likelihood of injury by a third person:
For example, the defendant’s conduct may make available to the third party the instrument eventually used by the third party in inflicting harm; or that conduct may bring the plaintiff to a location where the plaintiff is exposed to third-party misconduct; or that conduct may bring the third party to a location that enables the third party to inflict harm on the plaintiff; or the defendant’s business operations may create a physical environment where instances of misconduct are likely to take place; or the defendant’s conduct may inadvertently give the third party a motive to act improperly.
Restatement (Third) § 19 cmt. e, at 218.6
That a tavern may create a physical environment where instances of misconduct are likely to take place raises converging questions of reasonable care and the appropriate scope of liability for the defendant. Restatement (Third) § 19 cmt. c, at 216-17. In a tavern, for example, the environment may foreseeably bring about the misconduct of a third party, resulting in injury to a plaintiff. While the foreseeability of misconduct raises an issue of the appropriate level of care, it also raises the issue of whether the harm suffered by the plaintiff is within the range of risks that may make the defendant’s conduct negligent in failing to exercise that care. Id. In considering this overlap, we have previously observed that where liability is based on the intentional acts of a third party, we must take care to avoid requiring excessive precaution relating to these acts, even when the improper conduct may be regarded as foreseeable in the abstract. Brokaw v. Winfield-Mt. Union Cmty. Sch. Dist., 788 N.W.2d 386, 392 (Iowa 2010).
In Brokaw, for example, we adjudicated a claim that a school district had failed to control the conduct of one of its students. Id. at 388. The plaintiff, a high-school basketball player who alleged he was injured by an opposing player during a game, appealed a decision in favor of the defendant school district after a bench trial. Id. The plaintiff argued the alleged assault by the defendant district’s student athlete was foreseeable because the student athlete had taken a swing during the game at another player within view of his [779]*779coaches and had committed an egregious foul. Id. at 394. We observed, however, that there was no evidence in the record that the opposing player had a history of physically dangerous conduct. Id. We therefore concluded there was substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s view that the assault was unforeseeable and affirmed its ruling that the school district had not failed to exercise reasonable care. Id.
By contrast, section 19 of the Restatement (Third) illustrates scenarios where an actor’s knowledge of the risk of negligent or intentional third-party conduct may provide a basis for liability as follows:
[A]n actor engaging in certain conduct can foresee a considerable risk, either on account of the general prospect of other persons’ negligence during the relevant frame of time and place, or because the actor has knowledge of the propensities of the particular person or persons who are in a position to act negligently.
Restatement (Third) § 19 cmt. f at 219.
Here, the district court found that Gut-terz exercised reasonable care as a matter of law, based largely on the notion that the information available to Gutterz at the time failed to suggest any possibility of harm to Hoyt. Hoyt and Brittain initiated the verbal conflict with Knapp, reasoned the court, and thus, Gutterz could expect harm to Knapp but had no reason to expect harm to Hoyt. Mindful of section 19’s instructions that foreseeability should be evaluated in the relevant frame of time and place, and that foreseeability may arise in environments where instances of physical misconduct are likely to take place, we disagree that the record established as a matter of law that an injury to Hoyt was unforeseeable. Gutterz’s duty of reasonable care applied “regardless of the source of risk.” Id. § 40 cmt. g, at 42. The duty applied to risks arising from Hoyt’s conduct, as well as those created by a third party’s conduct, whether innocent, negligent, or intentional. Id. Indeed, section 19 confirms that the risk rendering a defendant’s conduct negligent may be the “risk that potential victims will act in ways that unreasonably imperil their own safety.” Id. § 19 cmt. b, at 216.
Gutterz personnel had observed the conflict developing between Hoyt, Brittain, and Knapp, and had observed all three consuming alcohol in the bar that afternoon. Hostilities escalated such that the waitress felt compelled to seek and obtain Atkinson’s permission to discontinue alcohol service to Hoyt and Brittain. Atkinson ordered Hoyt out of the bar as a result of his concern that a physical altercation between Hoyt and Knapp might occur. Moreover, bars are business venues in which alcohol-fueled disturbances causing injury and even death are known to occur. See Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, 36 Cal.4th 224, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 113 P.3d 1159, 1169 (2005) (proprietor who serves intoxicating drinks must exercise reasonable care to protect patrons from injury at hands of fellow guests); Carey v. New Yorker of Worcester, Inc., 355 Mass. 450, 245 N.E.2d 420, 422 (1969) (“commotion and boisterous behavior and continued drinking” may be “warnings of trouble”); Priewe v. Bartz, 249 Minn. 488, 83 N.W.2d 116, 120 (1957) (presence of an intoxicated person upon the premises “immediately exposes the proprietor to the hazards of liability resulting from the unpredictable conduct of such person”); Peck v. Gerber, 154 Or. 126, 59 P.2d 675, 678 (1936) (“any place selling intoxicants for immediate consumption is potentially a disorderly place unless properly policed and patrolled”). Under these facts, and given the relevant context of a bar and the conduct known to occur there, we cannot conclude that the risk of harm to Hoyt was unforeseeable as [780]*780a matter of law as contemplated by sections 3, 19, and 40. Small changes in the facts may make dramatic changes in how much risk is foreseeable, and thus we leave the breach question’s foreseeability determination to juries unless no reasonable person could differ on the matter. Thompson, 774 N.W.2d at 836. Given the ruling of our court of appeals, the general tenor of bar behavior, and Atkinson’s own testimony regarding concern about a physical altercation, we conclude that a reasonable person might find the risk of harm to Hoyt foreseeable. Accordingly, that Hoyt may have initiated the conflict cannot serve as the basis for summary judgment that Gutterz acted reasonably under the circumstances.
Although the district court did not clearly address whether the record established reasonable care by Gutterz, Hoyt contends that Gutterz could have exercised reasonable care by any of the following: (1) calling the police when the conflict developed, (2) escorting Hoyt to his vehicle in the parking lot, or (3) verifying that Knapp was not lying in wait in the parking lot. Gutterz contends that it did escort Hoyt to his vehicle, and that its precautions here were reasonable as a matter of law. While resolution of the factual dispute is best left to the fact finder, we observe that the resolution may have significant bearing on the reasonable care determination. We emphasize that our recognition of a duty in this case does not give rise to strict or absolute liability on the part of Gutterz. Instead, to fulfill its duty in this context, Gutterz was merely required to employ reasonable safety precautions. It may be that quick intervention was all that was necessary under the circumstances. See, e.g., Collins v. Shepherd, 212 Ga.App. 54, 441 S.E.2d 458, 459 (1994). Alternatively, a call to the police may have been warranted. See, e.g., Getson v. Edifice Lounge, Inc., 117 Ill.App.3d 707, 72 Ill.Dec. 826, 453 N.E.2d 131, 135 (1983); Regan v. Denbar, Inc., 514 N.W.2d 751, 753 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994). Regardless, the question of what reasonable care required under these circumstances is for the jury; it is only in exceptional cases that such questions may be decided as matters of law. Iowa R.App. P. 6.904(3)() )• Given the factual dispute here, and our preference for the jury’s assessment of reasonable care, we cannot conclude that the record established Gutterz’s conduct constituted reasonable care as a matter of law.
C. Scope of Liability. Although the district court’s ruling did not address the issue of Gutterz’s scope of liability, Gutterz relies on it on appeal as an alternative ground for affirming the ruling. See Pitts v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 818 N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa 2012) (noting we may affirm on an alternative ground raised in the district court even if it was not one on which the court based its ruling). Gutterz contends that because the risk of Knapp assaulting Hoyt was unforeseeable as a matter of law, the harm here fell outside Gutterz’s scope of liability. A finding to the contrary, Gutterz argues, would result in an overbroad and unjust scope of liability for a tavern. Hoyt does not address this particular argument directly on appeal, but contends generally that because a reasonable person could find the harm to Hoyt was foreseeable, the district court erred in resolving the issue as a matter of law.
Although we have concluded Gutterz owed Hoyt a duty of reasonable care here, we have previously noted that tort law will not always impose liability on an actor for all harm factually caused by an actor’s conduct. Thompson, 774 N.W.2d at 837. Instead, an actor’s liability is limited to those physical harms that result from the risks that make an actor’s conduct tor-tious. Id. at 838; see also Royal Indem. [781]*781Co. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 786 N.W.2d 839, 852 (Iowa 2010) (‘“[A]n act which merely places persons in the position where they sustain injury from an unrelated event is not for that reason a legal cause of the injury.’ ” (quoting Hansen v. Anderson, Wilmarth & Van Der Maaten, 657 N.W.2d 711, 715 (Iowa 2003))). This limiting principle aims to avoid unjustified liability and to confine liability in a way consistent with the reasons for holding an actor liable in the first place. Application of the principle is fact-intensive, requiring consideration of the risks that make an actor’s conduct tortious and a determination of whether the harm at issue is a result of any of those risks. Thompson, 774 N.W.2d at 838. Section 29 of the Restatement (Third) further explains these considerations, noting that tortious conduct may be wrongful because of various risks to various classes of persons. Restatement (Third) § 29 cmt. d, at 496. Some risks may be more far prominent than others, but all are relevant in determining whether harm is within the appropriate scope of liability for the actor’s conduct. Id.
Further, in special relationship cases, an actor’s scope of liability may include harms that are different from the harms risked by the actor’s failure to exercise reasonable care to ameliorate or eliminate risks that the special relationship requires the actor to attend to. Restatement (Third) § 29 cmt. r, at 511. In other words, as a result of the bar-patron relationship, a range of risks may arise for which the bar has a duty of reasonable care, and in addition, a separate range of risks may arise to the extent the bar’s conduct foreseeably combines with or permits the improper conduct of a third party. Id. Thus, as noted in our reasonable care analysis, foreseeability is relevant in the scope determination, and we have observed that the fact finder, in determining the appropriate scope of liability, must determine whether the type of harm that occurs is among those reasonably foreseeable potential harms that make an actor’s conduct negligent. Thompson, 774 N.W.2d at 839 (citing Restatement (Third) § 29 cmt. j, at 594). When courts consider the scope-of-liability question on summary judgment, we have explained that they
“must initially consider all of the range of harms risked by the defendant’s conduct that the jury could find as the basis for determining [the defendant’s] conduct tortious. Then, the court can compare the plaintiffs harm with the range of harms risked by the defendant to determine whether a reasonable jury might find the former among the latter.”
Id. at 838 (quoting Restatement (Third) § 29 cmt. d, at 496). No straightforward rule can be provided to determine the appropriate level of generality or specificity to employ in characterizing the harms. Restatement (Third) § 29 cmt. i, at 504. Where there are contending plausible characterizations of the range of reasonably foreseeable harms arising from the defendant’s conduct leading to different outcomes and requiring the drawing of an arbitrary line, the case should be left to the judgment and common sense of the fact finder. Id.
At first blush, the relevant inquiry here given the parties’ contentions might appear to be the appropriate level of generality with which to characterize the harm that occurred. According to Gutterz, the relevant range of risks did not include the risk that a verbally aggressive patron in a bar might suffer retaliatory harm from a patron who showed no signs of physical aggression inside the bar. Hoyt, on the other hand, characterizes the relevant range of risks more generally and contends the risk of a physical altercation between bar patrons who had engaged in [782]*782verbal conflict on the premises is well within the range. Regardless which of these characterizations of the range of risks is adopted, however, we cannot conclude Hoyt’s harm fell outside Gutterz’s scope of liability as a matter of law. For the same reasons discussed above in-our reasonable care analysis, we think it plausible that a reasonable jury could find either characterization of the risk of harm to Hoyt as falling within the range of risks arising from Gutterz’s conduct. Accordingly, the claim must survive summary judgment on the scope-of-liability issue.
Finally, we think it prudent to observe that the scope-of-liability standard is flexible enough to accommodate fairness concerns raised by the specific facts of a case. Thompson, 774 N.W.2d at 888. Whether an individual instigating a bar fight should have a viable negligence claim when the fight materializes clearly implicates questions of fairness. Those questions, however, are better left to fact finders applying (1) the relevant breach and scope-of-liability analyses, and (2) comparative fault law, than to a court applying summary judgment rules. See Iowa Code § 668.8(1) (a) (plaintiff cannot recover damages if he or she is more than fifty percent at fault); see also Mulhern v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 799 N.W.2d 104, 121 (Iowa 2011); Restatement (Third) § 29 cmt. s, at 511.
IV. Conclusion.
The district court erred in concluding that Gutterz, as a matter of law, could not have breached its duty of reasonable care. In addition, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Hoyt’s harm was within the appropriate scope of liability for Gutterz. Genuine issues of material fact remain regarding each element of Hoyt’s negligence claim and summary judgment was therefore inappropriate. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of this claim and remand this case for trial.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.
All justices concur except WATERMAN, J., CADY, C.J., and MANSFIELD, J., who dissent.