Curtis Anthony Moody v. Joshua Blankely, et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. Ohio
• Decided: November 17, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-00289
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

CURTIS ANTHONY MOODY,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 3:25-cv-289 Judge Thomas M. Rose Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura JOSHUA BLANKELY, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff, Curtis Moody, an Ohio inmate who is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, sues several Dayton, Ohio police officers in connection with the death of Plaintiff’s son, Brian Moody. Plaintiff has submitted a request to file a civil action in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. All judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). This matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1-1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)1 to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for the

1 Although Plaintiff was a prisoner at the time this action was commenced, the Court screens his Complaint only under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and not 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A or § 1997e due to the nature of his claims. reasons below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s federal claims under § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and that those

claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to re-filing in state court. I. BACKGROUND On June 29, 2024, officers of the Dayton Police Department shot and killed Brian Moody, a 16-year-old boy. Plaintiff, Brian Moody’s father, alleges that police officers falsely asserted that Brian was observed with a gun, when, in fact, Brian was observably unarmed as demonstrated by body camera footage. Plaintiff advances claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and failure to intervene against the individual officers involved. Plaintiff also sues the City of Dayton under § 1983 for municipal liability for the actions of those officers. The Complaint also contains claims purportedly under § 1983 for pain and suffering from deprivation of life, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, and loss of parental consortium. Finally, Plaintiff also advances a claim for wrongful death and a survival action

under the Ohio Revised Code. As relief, Plaintiff seeks $3 million in compensatory and punitive damages. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e): (2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that— * * * (B) the action or appeal— (i) is frivolous or malicious; [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . . 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013). Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up). Instead, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial

plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612, 614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)). III. ANALYSIS All of Plaintiff’s federal claims must be dismissed. Plaintiff advances claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force, failure to intervene, municipal liability, deprivation of life, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and assault and battery to redress violations of his son’s constitutional rights. But a “plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Warth

v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). Plaintiff therefore lacks standing to bring claims to redress violations of his son’s constitutional rights. See Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[A] section 1983 cause of action is entirely personal to the direct victim of the alleged constitutional tort.). Moreover, there is no indication that Plaintiff is the representative of Brian’s estate (which would have standing to assert claims for violations of Brian’s constitutional rights). And a pro se litigant may not appear on behalf of a decedent’s estate, unless he or she is the sole beneficiary of an estate without any creditors. Bass v. Leatherwood, 788 F.3d 228, 230 (6th Cir. 2015). But Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel reflects the existence of other potential beneficiaries, including Brian’s mother and brother. (See Pl.’s Mot. to Appoint Counsel, ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff therefore cannot maintain claims for violations of Brian’s constitutional rights. Further, to the extent Plaintiff seeks redress for his own pain and suffering or loss of consortium as a result of his son’s death under § 1983, those claims also fail. “[N]o cause of

action may lie under section 1983 for emotional distress, loss of a loved one, or any other consequent collateral injuries allegedly suffered personally by the victim’s family members.” Claybrook, 199 F.3d at 357. Finally, the undersigned recommends that the Court decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims for wrongful death and survivorship action under the Ohio Revised Code. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when the Court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that “[i]f the federal claims are dismissed before trial, the state claims generally should be dismissed as well.” Brooks v. Rothe, 577 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s claims under the Ohio

Revised Code fail to provide a basis for a claim over which this Court has original jurisdiction. “The basic statutory grants of federal court subject-matter jurisdiction are contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for federal-question jurisdiction, and § 1332, which provides for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501 (2006) (cleaned up). Federal-question jurisdiction is implicated when a plaintiff pleads a claim “arising under” the federal laws or the United States Constitution. Id. (citation omitted). For a federal court to have diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a), there must be complete diversity, meaning that each plaintiff must be a citizen of a different state than each defendant, and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). Plaintiff’s claims under the Ohio Revised Code pertain squarely to state law and do not arise under federal laws or the United States Constitution. Nor has Plaintiff alleged that he and Defendants are citizens of different states. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege facts on which the Court could rely to conclude that this Court has original subject-matter jurisdiction

over his state-law claims. Because the undersigned is recommending dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s federal claims, it is further recommended that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state-law claims and that it dismiss any such claims without prejudice to filing in state court. IV. DISPOSITION For these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED. The undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s federal claims be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, and that Plaintiff’s Ohio claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to re-filing in state court.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura CHELSEY M. VASCURA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE