Opinion,
Mr. Chief Justice Paxson:
The defendant, Philip H. Somerset, entered into a contract [77]*77with the Sea Isle City Hotel Company, for the erection of a hotel building, at Sea Isle City, according to certain plans and specifications. The building was completed, and accepted by the hotel company in the presence of their architect and the chairman of the building committee. Subsequently, at an entertainment given at the hotel by the proprietor or lessee, a crowd of persons, some twenty or more, having collected on the porch, a girder, which in part supported it, gave way, the porch fell, and by reason thereof the plaintiff was injured. He brought this suit in the court below against the contractor, to recover damages for the injury he thus sustained, with the result of a verdict in his favor for $4,000.
Upon the trial, the defendant asked the court below to instruct the jury that “ if Somerset, the defendant, was the contractor for the erection of the hotel in question, for the Sea Isle City Hotel Company, the owner, and after completion delivered possession of it to the said Sea Isle City Hotel Company on June 30, 1888, which company accepted it, and if the accident in question happened after June 30, 1888, and while said owner or his lessee was in possession, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover against the defendant.” See first assignment. This point was refused, and it fairly presents the important question in the case.
The contention of the plaintiff is that the accident was caused by the defective construction of the porch; that it was not according to the plans and specifications called for by the contract; that timbers inferior in size and quality to those called for by the plans were used; that these defects were not observable after the building was completed, and, in point of fact, were unknown to the company when it accepted the building from the contractor.
We must assume these allegations as substantially found by the jury, and the question arises, what is the responsibility of the contractor under such circumstances ? That he would be responsible to the company for any loss sustained by it in consequence of his failure to erect the building in conformity to the plans and specifications, may be conceded. There was a contractual relation between them, and for breach of a contract, not known to and approved by the company, he would be liable. Is he also liable for an injury to a third person not a party to [78]*78the contract, sustained by reason of defective construction? It is very clear that he was not responsible by force of any contractual relation, for, as before observed, there was no contract between these parties, and hence there could have been no breach. If liable at all, it can only be for a violation of some duty. It may be stated, as a general proposition, that a man is not responsible for a breach of duty where he owes no duty. What duty did the defendant owe to the plaintiff ? The latter was not upon the porch by the invitation of the defendant. The proprietor of the hotel, or whoever invited or procured the presence of the plaintiff there, may be said to have owed him a duty, — the duty of ascertaining that the porch was of sufficient strength to safely hold the guests whom he had invited. The plaintiff contended, however, that as the hotel company was not responsible, the contractor must necessarily be so. This, however, is moving in a circle. It by no means follows that, because A is not responsible for an accident, B or some other person must be.
Authorities are not abundant upon this point, for the reason that it is comparatively new. I do not know of any direct ruling upon it in this state. The true rule, which we think applicable to it, may be found in Wharton on Negligence, 2d ed., § 488. It is as follows:
“ There must he causal connection between the negligence and the hurt; and such causal connection is interrupted by the interposition between the negligence and the hurt of any independent human agency.....Thus, a contractor is employed by a city to build a bridge in a workmanlike manner, and, after he has finished his work and it has been accepted by the city, a traveler is hurt when passing over it by a defect caused by the contractor’s negligence. Now, the contractor may he liable on his contract to the city for his negligence, but he is not liable to the traveler in an action on the case for damages. The reason sometimes given to sustain such a conclusion is that otherwise there would be no end to suits. But a better ground is that there is no causal connection between the traveler’s hurt and the contractor’s negligence. The traveler reposed no confidence in the contractor, nor did the contractor accept any confidence from the traveler. The traveler, no doubt, reposed confidence in the city that it would have its [79]*79bridges and highways in good order; but between the contractor and the traveler intervened the city, an independent, responsible agent, breaking the causal connection.”
In § 438, the same learned author refers to the casé of a contract with the postmaster general to furnish certain roadworthy carriages; and after the delivery of the carriages the plaintiff is injured in using one of them, by reason of the carriage having been defectively built. “No doubt,” says Mr. Wharton, “had the carriage been built for the plaintiff, he could have recovered from the contractor. But there is no confidence exchanged between him and the contractor; and between them, breaking the causal connection, is the postmaster general, acting independently, forming a distinct legal centre of responsibilities and duties.” This rule is distinctly recognized in Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 115. There, one Atkinson contracted with the postmaster general to provide a mail coach to carry the mail-bags over a certain route. The driver was injured while in this service, from a hidden defect in the coach. In a suit by him against Atkinson, it was held that he could not recover, Alderson, J., saying : “ The contract in this case was made with the postmaster general; and the case is just the same as if he had come to the defendant and ordered a carriage, and had handed it at once over to Atkinson. The only safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those who enter into the contract; if we go one step beyond that, there is no reason why we should not go fifty.”
Francis v. Cockrell, L. R. 5 Q. B. 501; Heanen v. Pender, 11 Q. B. 503; Collis v. Selden, L. R. 3 C. P. 495; and other English cases, recognize the doctrine that in such instances there is no duty owing from the contractor to the public. As was said by Martin, B., in Francis v. Cockrell, supra: “ The law of England looks at proximate liabilities as far as possible, and endeavors to confine liabilities to the persons immediately concerned.” In Losee v. Clute, 51 N. Y. 494, it was held that the manufacturer and vendor of a steam-boiler is only liable to the purchaser for defective materials, or for any want of care and skill in its construction; and if, after delivery to and acceptance by the purchaser, and while in use by him, an explosion occurs in consequence of such defective construction, [80]*80to the injury of a third person, the latter has no cause of action, because of such injury, against the manufacturer.
We do not find that any of the cases cited on behalf of the plaintiff conflict with the above views. In Godley v. Hagerty, 20 Pa. 387, the builder was the owner, and he was properly held responsible for an inherent weakness in the building by which an accident occurred.
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Opinion,
Mr. Chief Justice Paxson:
The defendant, Philip H. Somerset, entered into a contract [77]*77with the Sea Isle City Hotel Company, for the erection of a hotel building, at Sea Isle City, according to certain plans and specifications. The building was completed, and accepted by the hotel company in the presence of their architect and the chairman of the building committee. Subsequently, at an entertainment given at the hotel by the proprietor or lessee, a crowd of persons, some twenty or more, having collected on the porch, a girder, which in part supported it, gave way, the porch fell, and by reason thereof the plaintiff was injured. He brought this suit in the court below against the contractor, to recover damages for the injury he thus sustained, with the result of a verdict in his favor for $4,000.
Upon the trial, the defendant asked the court below to instruct the jury that “ if Somerset, the defendant, was the contractor for the erection of the hotel in question, for the Sea Isle City Hotel Company, the owner, and after completion delivered possession of it to the said Sea Isle City Hotel Company on June 30, 1888, which company accepted it, and if the accident in question happened after June 30, 1888, and while said owner or his lessee was in possession, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover against the defendant.” See first assignment. This point was refused, and it fairly presents the important question in the case.
The contention of the plaintiff is that the accident was caused by the defective construction of the porch; that it was not according to the plans and specifications called for by the contract; that timbers inferior in size and quality to those called for by the plans were used; that these defects were not observable after the building was completed, and, in point of fact, were unknown to the company when it accepted the building from the contractor.
We must assume these allegations as substantially found by the jury, and the question arises, what is the responsibility of the contractor under such circumstances ? That he would be responsible to the company for any loss sustained by it in consequence of his failure to erect the building in conformity to the plans and specifications, may be conceded. There was a contractual relation between them, and for breach of a contract, not known to and approved by the company, he would be liable. Is he also liable for an injury to a third person not a party to [78]*78the contract, sustained by reason of defective construction? It is very clear that he was not responsible by force of any contractual relation, for, as before observed, there was no contract between these parties, and hence there could have been no breach. If liable at all, it can only be for a violation of some duty. It may be stated, as a general proposition, that a man is not responsible for a breach of duty where he owes no duty. What duty did the defendant owe to the plaintiff ? The latter was not upon the porch by the invitation of the defendant. The proprietor of the hotel, or whoever invited or procured the presence of the plaintiff there, may be said to have owed him a duty, — the duty of ascertaining that the porch was of sufficient strength to safely hold the guests whom he had invited. The plaintiff contended, however, that as the hotel company was not responsible, the contractor must necessarily be so. This, however, is moving in a circle. It by no means follows that, because A is not responsible for an accident, B or some other person must be.
Authorities are not abundant upon this point, for the reason that it is comparatively new. I do not know of any direct ruling upon it in this state. The true rule, which we think applicable to it, may be found in Wharton on Negligence, 2d ed., § 488. It is as follows:
“ There must he causal connection between the negligence and the hurt; and such causal connection is interrupted by the interposition between the negligence and the hurt of any independent human agency.....Thus, a contractor is employed by a city to build a bridge in a workmanlike manner, and, after he has finished his work and it has been accepted by the city, a traveler is hurt when passing over it by a defect caused by the contractor’s negligence. Now, the contractor may he liable on his contract to the city for his negligence, but he is not liable to the traveler in an action on the case for damages. The reason sometimes given to sustain such a conclusion is that otherwise there would be no end to suits. But a better ground is that there is no causal connection between the traveler’s hurt and the contractor’s negligence. The traveler reposed no confidence in the contractor, nor did the contractor accept any confidence from the traveler. The traveler, no doubt, reposed confidence in the city that it would have its [79]*79bridges and highways in good order; but between the contractor and the traveler intervened the city, an independent, responsible agent, breaking the causal connection.”
In § 438, the same learned author refers to the casé of a contract with the postmaster general to furnish certain roadworthy carriages; and after the delivery of the carriages the plaintiff is injured in using one of them, by reason of the carriage having been defectively built. “No doubt,” says Mr. Wharton, “had the carriage been built for the plaintiff, he could have recovered from the contractor. But there is no confidence exchanged between him and the contractor; and between them, breaking the causal connection, is the postmaster general, acting independently, forming a distinct legal centre of responsibilities and duties.” This rule is distinctly recognized in Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 115. There, one Atkinson contracted with the postmaster general to provide a mail coach to carry the mail-bags over a certain route. The driver was injured while in this service, from a hidden defect in the coach. In a suit by him against Atkinson, it was held that he could not recover, Alderson, J., saying : “ The contract in this case was made with the postmaster general; and the case is just the same as if he had come to the defendant and ordered a carriage, and had handed it at once over to Atkinson. The only safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those who enter into the contract; if we go one step beyond that, there is no reason why we should not go fifty.”
Francis v. Cockrell, L. R. 5 Q. B. 501; Heanen v. Pender, 11 Q. B. 503; Collis v. Selden, L. R. 3 C. P. 495; and other English cases, recognize the doctrine that in such instances there is no duty owing from the contractor to the public. As was said by Martin, B., in Francis v. Cockrell, supra: “ The law of England looks at proximate liabilities as far as possible, and endeavors to confine liabilities to the persons immediately concerned.” In Losee v. Clute, 51 N. Y. 494, it was held that the manufacturer and vendor of a steam-boiler is only liable to the purchaser for defective materials, or for any want of care and skill in its construction; and if, after delivery to and acceptance by the purchaser, and while in use by him, an explosion occurs in consequence of such defective construction, [80]*80to the injury of a third person, the latter has no cause of action, because of such injury, against the manufacturer.
We do not find that any of the cases cited on behalf of the plaintiff conflict with the above views. In Godley v. Hagerty, 20 Pa. 387, the builder was the owner, and he was properly held responsible for an inherent weakness in the building by which an accident occurred. In Carson v. Godley, 26 Pa. 111, the warehouse was erected under the personal superintendence of the owner, and having leased it to the government, he was held liable to a person whose goods were destroyed by the fall of the building, in consequence of its insufficiency for the purpose for which it was erected and leased. In Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397, the court held a dealer in drugs and medicines, who carelessly labels a deadly poison as a harmless medicine, and sends it so labeled into market, to be liable to all persons who, without fault on their parts, are injured by using it. We think this case was correctly decided, but it has no application. The druggist owed a duty to every person to whom he sold a deadly poison, to have it properly labeled to avoid accidents. Just here the analogy between this case and the one in hand ceases. The defendant owed no duty to the public, as before stated; his duty was to his employer.
We need not pursue the subject further. We regard the weight of authority as with the views above indicated. Moreover, they are sustained by the better reason. The consequences of holding the opposite doctrine would be far reaching. If a contractor who erects a house, who builds a bridge, or performs any other work; a manufacturer who constructs a boiler, piece of machinery, or a steamship, owes a duty to the whole world, that his work or his machine or his steamship shall contain no hidden defect, it is difficult to measure the extent of his responsibility, and no prudent man would engage in such occupations upon such conditions./ It is safer and wiser to confine such liabilities to the parties immediately concerned. We are of opinion that the defendant’s first point should have been affirmed. So, also, his second point, which asked for a binding instruction in his favor.
This disposes of the case, and we would stop here, were it not that we do not wish any conclusion to be deduced from our silence in regard to the portions of the charge referred to [81]*81in the fourth and fifth assignments. In these portions of the charge, the learned judge used very strong expressions in regard to the alleged departure of the contractor from his plans .and specifications. When the court characterizes such departure as “gross and almost criminal negligence,” and as ■“glaringly and knowingly” done, “for which he could have no excuse, except the desire to increase his profits,” the defendant has not much chance with the jury. Such intense expressions are ill-suited to a judicial charge, and may seriously interfere with a calm and impartial consideration of the facts by the jury. More than this, it was assuming the province of the jury, for the facts are for them. Were there nothing else in the case, we would reverse upon these assignments alone. We prefer, however, to place our decision upon a ground which ■controls the case.
Judgment reversed.