Cummins v. Department of Transportation

877 A.2d 550, 2005 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 325
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJune 20, 2005
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 877 A.2d 550 (Cummins v. Department of Transportation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cummins v. Department of Transportation, 877 A.2d 550, 2005 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 325 (Pa. Ct. App. 2005).

Opinion

OPINION BY Judge LEADBETTER.

Robert J. Cummins, d/b/a Bob Cummins Construction Co., appeals from the determination of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation, denying his bid protest on the basis that it was untimely. 1 Section 1711.1(b) of the Procurement Code (Code), 62 Pa.C.S. § 1711.1(b), requires a bidder or prospective contractor on a Department project to file his protest “within seven days after the aggrieved bidder or ... prospective contractor knew or should have known of the facts giving rise to the protest....” On appeal, we are asked to determine when, as a matter of law, Cum-mins should have known of the facts giving rise to his protest. After a review of the statutory scheme, we conclude that at the latest, Cummins should have known of all pertinent facts giving rise to his protest on the date that his bid was filed. Therefore, since Cummins’ protest was filed more than seven days after he filed his bid, his protest was untimely. Accordingly, we affirm.

In early September 2004, the Department published its proposal for the award of a contract for improvements to a certain street in McKean County. It is not disputed that the proposal contained a description of each work item involved as well as its corresponding classification code. 2 Pursuant to Section 457.5(d) of the *552 Department’s regulations, 67 Pa.Code § 457.5(d), each prequalified contractor is eligible to bid on projects in which “the types of work for which he is classified constitute at least 50% of the project.” The bid opening was scheduled for November 4, 2004. 3 Cummins submitted his bid on November 4, and, on November 17, learned via the Department’s website that his bid, which appears to have been the lowest, was rejected because of “classification requirements.” Apparently, Cum-mins’ bid encompassed work items that he felt that he was qualified to perform but which bore a classification code not included in his prequalification certificate. 4 Of particular importance here, Cummins’ bid encompassed a work item described as “trench” and assigned a classification code of “P8”; there is no dispute that Cummins is not classified to perform work classified as “P8.” See Cummins’ Prequalification Certificate, Petitioner’s Reproduced Record at 39a.

Thereafter, by letter dated November 23, 2004, 5 Cummins filed a written protest pursuant to Section 1711.1 of the Code. According to Cummins’ protest, his bid met the fifty percent threshold requirement. Cummins asserted that while two particular work items, specifically line numbers 0017 and 0023, had been classified with the work codes “P” and “P8,” which he was not classified to perform, 6 the skills/work actually involved in those work items required a significant amount of excavation work (properly classified as “C” and “Cl”), Which Cummins was classified to perform. Cummins specifically noted that line item number 0023 bore the description “trench,” which is defined in an applicable Departmental publication as including, among other things, excavation and back-filling, both of which Cummins is classified to perform. 7 . According to Cum-mins, line items 0017 and 0023 should have been given multiple work code classifications to more accurately reflect the nature of the work involved. 8 Since Cummins believed those particular line numbers should have been deemed to include “C” and “Cl” codes, he was, in fact, classified and competent to perform the majority of the work required by those line numbers and, when those two lines were included in his bid, his bid met the fifty percent threshold. Since the Department awarded the project to the next lowest bidder, Cummins also requested a stay of the award of the project contract.

The Department denied the protest on the grounds that it was not only untimely, but also clearly without merit. With respect to the timeliness of the protest, the Department concluded that Cummins needed to file his protest, at the latest, within seven days of November 4, 2004, the date that Cummins submitted his bid (which was also the date of bid-letting). The Department noted that at the time Cummins submitted his bid, he knew which classification codes he was prequali-fied to bid on as well as the codes that the Department had assigned to the work *553 items involved in the project. The Department further noted that, had Cummins simply evaluated his bid to determine whether he met the fifty percent threshold, he would have realized at that time that the work items (as coded by the Department) that he was classified to bid on did not meet the fifty percent threshold. According to the Department, at least by that time, Cummins should have had the requisite knowledge to submit a bid protest premised on any belief that certain work items had been miscoded based on the work involved. Consequently, the Department determined that Cummins’ protest was untimely. 9 The present appeal followed. 10

On appeal, Cummins contends that his protest was timely because it was filed within seven days of when he learned that his bid had been rejected. This argument is without merit. Cummins’ protest was based upon the assertion that two project items were assigned the wrong classification codes, and had the item been properly classified, Cummins would have met the prequalification requirements. Thus, the salient facts giving rise to his protest were the codes assigned to the two work items and the codes for which Cummins has been prequalified, and the relevant inquiry is when Cummins knew or should have known these facts. As noted above, the description of each work item and its corresponding code was included in the proposal for bids published in early September 2004, and Cummins does not claim that he was unaware of the classifications in which he is prequalified.

Cummins appears to base his claim on the argument that since work item 0023 was described as a “trench,” he had no duty to determine what specific classification code had been assigned. He states:

It is true that [Cummins] could have learned (ie. “could have” known) of the inaccurate classifications by making further inquiry. This does not mean that he “should have” done so. There was nothing in the use of the [Department’s] defined term “trench” that should have put [Cummins] on notice that something other than (not merely in addition to) excavation was involved in the performance of Project Item No. 0023. [Cum-mins] did not need to make any further inquiry to learn if he could dig the trench....

Petitioner’s brief at 13-14 (emphasis in original).

However, as the Department points out, the regulations governing prequalification of bidders detail the types of work that contractors may be prequalified to perform along with the corresponding *554

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877 A.2d 550, 2005 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 325, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cummins-v-department-of-transportation-pacommwct-2005.