Culver v. 3m Company

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 14, 2025
• Docket: 24-3846
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 14 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAKEH PAUL CULVER, No. 24-3846 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:24-cv-05119-DGE v. MEMORANDUM* 3M COMPANY,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 9, 2025 Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS, GRABER, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff Jakeh Paul Culver appeals from the dismissal of his suit in favor of

Defendant 3M Company. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review

de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d

338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010), and for abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of

leave to amend, Chappel v. Lab’y Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725 (9th Cir. 2000).

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. We affirm.

1. The district court did not err in concluding that Plaintiff failed to claim that

3M enforced or explicitly leveraged the non-compete agreement. Under

Washington law, “[a] cause of action may not be brought regarding a

noncompetition covenant signed prior to January 1, 2020, if the noncompetition

covenant is not being enforced or explicitly leveraged.” 1 RCW 49.62.080(4).

Washington courts have not specified what it means to “enforce[]” or “explicitly

leverage[]” a non-compete agreement, but under the plain meaning of those terms,

3M did not “enforce[]” or “explicitly leverage[]” the non-compete agreement See

Enforce, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “enforce” to mean “[t]o

give force or effect to (a law, etc.); to compel obedience to”); Leverage, Merriam-

Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/leverage (last

visited May 28, 2025) (defining “leverage” to mean “to use for gain: exploit”).

Plaintiff reached out to 3M for relief under the Employee Agreement, and 3M

requested information to provide him with relief. Under these facts, 3M’s request

for information did not rise to “enforc[ing]” or “explicitly leverag[ing]” the non-

compete agreement. Once Plaintiff provided the requested information, 3M gave

him a limited waiver to pursue the employment opportunity. 3M’s waiver did not

1 We assume without deciding that the 2024 amendments to Washington’s non-compete statute apply to Plaintiff’s claims. See Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 36 § 5.

2 24-3846 “enforce[]” or “explicitly leverage[]” the non-compete agreement.

2. The district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s claim that 3M violated

Washington’s Consumer Protection Act. First, even assuming that a violation of

Washington’s non-compete laws constitutes a per se violation of Washington’s

Consumer Protection Act, Plaintiff failed to allege 3M violated Washington’s non-

compete statute. Second, Plaintiff failed to plead 3M’s actions were unfair or

deceptive. See Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins., 719 P.2d

531, 533 (Wash. 1986). Plaintiff did not allege that the terms of the non-compete

agreement were abusive or that 3M engaged in deception to get him to sign the

agreement. Plaintiff fails to show that 3M acted unfairly or that his claims have a

public interest impact. See id. at 538 (“Ordinarily, a breach of a private contract

affecting no one but the parties to the contract is not an act or practice affecting the

public interest.”).

3. The district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s tortious interference

with contract claim. Under Washington law, a plaintiff must allege:

(1) [T]he existence of a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy; (2) that defendants had knowledge of that relationship; (3) an intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy; (4) that defendants interfered for an improper purpose or used improper means; and (5) resultant damage. Pac. Nw. Shooting Park Ass’n v. City of Sequim, 144 P.3d 276, 280 (Wash. 2006)

(quoting Leingang v. Pierce Cnty. Med. Bureau, Inc., 930 P.2d 288, 300 (Wash.

3 24-3846 1997)). Plaintiff failed to plead that 3M interfered causing a breach or termination

of a relationship or expectancy. 3M requested information about Plaintiff’s job

opportunity and then granted Plaintiff a release to accept the job. Plaintiff alleged

that he then “turn[ed] down” the job.

4. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff leave to

amend. No additional facts could be pled that would allow Plaintiff to state a

plausible claim for relief. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d

1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff argues that he will provide additional

explanation if permitted leave to amend, but he already included these additional

allegations in his Amended Complaint.

AFFIRMED.

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