Cudlassi v. MacFarland

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Cudlassi v. MacFarland

24 N.E.2d 512, 304 Mass. 612, 1939 Mass. LEXIS 1132

CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

DecidedDecember 29, 1939

StatusPublished

Cited by16 cases

This text of 24 N.E.2d 512 (Cudlassi v. MacFarland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Cudlassi v. MacFarland, 24 N.E.2d 512, 304 Mass. 612, 1939 Mass. LEXIS 1132 (Mass. 1939).

Pincite

Opinion

Lummus, J.

On September 10, 1933, the plaintiff was injured by the attack of a dog owned and kept by the defendant. At that time the measure of the statutory liability of the defendant was “double the amount of damages sustained.” G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 140, § 155. But by St. 1934, c. 320, § 18, which took effect on January 1, 1935, after the present action had been brought, certain changes in the conditions of liability were made and the measure of liability was made the “damage,” instead of “double the amount of damages sustained,” The judge ruled that the [613]*613plaintiff could recover damages, but not double damages. The plaintiff alleged exceptions.

The statute in question did not, as did that in Pittsley v. David, 298 Mass. 552, provide for civil liability as a concomitant of criminal liability, not for the purpose of creating a vested right to damages but rather as an additional discouragement of violations of the statutory prohibition. On the contrary, liability under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 140, § 155, involved no violation of law. That statute did “not declare the owning or keeping of a dog to be unlawful, but that if the dog injures another person, the owner or keeper shall be liable, without regard to the question whether he had or had not a license to keep the dog. The wrong done to the person injured consists not in the act of the master in owning or keeping, or neglecting to restrain, the dog, but in the act of the dog for which the master is responsible.” Le Forest v. Tolman, 117 Mass. 109, 110. See also Munn v. Reed, 4 Allen, 431, 433; Somers v. Broderick, 281 Mass. 550; Canavan v. George, 292 Mass. 245; Leone v. Falco, 292 Mass. 299.

We think that at the time of the injury in this case a vested right to double remedial damages arose. This right was not affected by the changes in the statute, which were not intended, so far as appears, to have any retroactive effect. Wild v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 171 Mass. 245, 248. Hennessey v. Moynihan, 272 Mass. 165, 169. Engel v. Checker Taxi Co. 275 Mass. 471, 476. Hill v. Duncan, 110 Mass. 238. Pittsley v. David, 298 Mass. 552, 554-555.

Exceptions sustained.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Lummus, J.

On September 10, 1933, the plaintiff was injured by the attack of a dog owned and kept by the defendant. At that time the measure of the statutory liability of the defendant was “double the amount of damages sustained.” G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 140, § 155. But by St. 1934, c. 320, § 18, which took effect on January 1, 1935, after the present action had been brought, certain changes in the conditions of liability were made and the measure of liability was made the “damage,” instead of “double the amount of damages sustained,” The judge ruled that the [613]*613plaintiff could recover damages, but not double damages. The plaintiff alleged exceptions.

The statute in question did not, as did that in Pittsley v. David, 298 Mass. 552, provide for civil liability as a concomitant of criminal liability, not for the purpose of creating a vested right to damages but rather as an additional discouragement of violations of the statutory prohibition. On the contrary, liability under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 140, § 155, involved no violation of law. That statute did “not declare the owning or keeping of a dog to be unlawful, but that if the dog injures another person, the owner or keeper shall be liable, without regard to the question whether he had or had not a license to keep the dog. The wrong done to the person injured consists not in the act of the master in owning or keeping, or neglecting to restrain, the dog, but in the act of the dog for which the master is responsible.” Le Forest v. Tolman, 117 Mass. 109, 110. See also Munn v. Reed, 4 Allen, 431, 433; Somers v. Broderick, 281 Mass. 550; Canavan v. George, 292 Mass. 245; Leone v. Falco, 292 Mass. 299.

We think that at the time of the injury in this case a vested right to double remedial damages arose. This right was not affected by the changes in the statute, which were not intended, so far as appears, to have any retroactive effect. Wild v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 171 Mass. 245, 248. Hennessey v. Moynihan, 272 Mass. 165, 169. Engel v. Checker Taxi Co. 275 Mass. 471, 476. Hill v. Duncan, 110 Mass. 238. Pittsley v. David, 298 Mass. 552, 554-555.

Exceptions sustained.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

24 N.E.2d 512, 304 Mass. 612, 1939 Mass. LEXIS 1132, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cudlassi-v-macfarland-mass-1939.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack