Cuara R. v. Utah Division of Real Estate

CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedAugust 29, 2023
Docket2:23-cv-00564
StatusUnknown

This text of Cuara R. v. Utah Division of Real Estate (Cuara R. v. Utah Division of Real Estate) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cuara R. v. Utah Division of Real Estate, (D. Utah 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH CENTRAL DIVISION

CONSTANTINO CUARA RODRIGUEZ, MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER PERMITTING PLAINTIFF Plaintiff, TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT

v.

UTAH DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE, Case No. 2:23-cv-00564 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION Magistrate Judge Daphne A. Oberg OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS, and REAL ESTATE COMMISSION,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Constantino Cuara Rodriguez, proceeding in forma pauperis (without paying the filing fee) and without an attorney, filed this action against the Utah Division of Real Estate, National Association of Realtors, National Association of Real Estate Brokers, and Real Estate Commission.1 Because the complaint is deficient as set forth below, the court permits Mr. Cuara Rodriguez to file an amended complaint to correct these deficiencies by September 20, 2023. LEGAL STANDARDS Whenever a court authorizes a party to proceed in forma pauperis, the court must dismiss the case if it determines the complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”2 In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim for relief, the court employs the

1 (See Compl., Doc. No. 5.) 2 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). standard for analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”4 The court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and views the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.5 But the court need not accept the plaintiff’s conclusory allegations as true.6 “[A] plaintiff must offer specific factual allegations to support each claim.”7 Because Mr. Cuara Rodriguez proceeds pro se (without an attorney), his filings are liberally construed and held “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”8 Still, pro se plaintiffs must “follow the same rules of procedure that govern other

litigants.”9 For instance, a pro se plaintiff “still has the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.”10 While the court must make some allowances for a pro se plaintiff’s “failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal

3 Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). 4 Hogan v. Winder, 762 F.3d 1096, 1104 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). 5 Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847, 852 (10th Cir. 2013). 6 Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). 7 Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011). 8 Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. 9 Garrett v. Selby, Connor, Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). 10 Jenkins v. Currier, 514 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements,”11 the court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.”12 ANALYSIS Mr. Cuara Rodriguez’s complaint lacks coherent factual allegations and fails to state a plausible claim for relief. The complaint alleges Mr. Cuara Rodriguez is “the owner of all trademarks of United States and global network, federal and state[] entities, under sha [sic] 256 fingerprint hereditary blood, malicious, and misco[]nduct.” 13 These allegations are unintelligible and fail to support any cognizable claim. The complaint contains no other factual allegations, and it fails to allege any actions or omissions by the named defendants. Mr. Cuara

Rodriguez attached what appears to be an investment account statement as an exhibit to his complaint,14 but this fails to elucidate his claims; it is unclear what claims or allegations this document relates to. Mr. Cuara Rodriguez checked boxes on the pro se complaint form indicating he is bringing the case under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985,15 but his incoherent allegations fail to state a claim under either statute. He fails to allege a “deprivation of a federal right by . . . a person

11 Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. 12 Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 13 (Compl., Doc. No. 5 at 3.) 14 (Ex. 1 to Compl., Doc. No. 5-1.) 15 (Compl., Doc. No. 5 at 1.) acting under color of state law” as required to state a claim under section 1983.16 And he fails to

allege any conspiracy to interfere with civil rights under section 1985.17 The complaint references the “Hatch Act 5 U.S.C. 7323 [] and 7324.”18 The Hatch Act prohibits civil-service employees in the executive branch of the federal government from engaging in certain forms of political activity.19 The Hatch Act does not authorize private civil actions but, instead, authorizes “any person or entity” to file “an administrative complaint alleging that a federal employee has engaged in prohibited political activity” with the Office of Special Counsel.20 The complaint also makes conclusory references to various criminal statutes, including 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (computer fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1031 (fraud against the United States), 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (securities and commodities fraud), and 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (treason).21 While

sections 1030 and 1031 authorize private civil actions in certain circumstances,22 Mr. Cuara

16 Watson v. Kan. City, 857 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir. 1988). 17 See 42 U.S.C. § 1985; Archuleta v. City of Roswell, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1247 (D.N.M. 2012). 18 (Compl., Doc. No. 5 at 3.) The complaint also references the “KKK Act.” (Id.) The court assumes Mr. Cuara Rodriguez refers to the Klu Klux Klan Act, “a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1871” codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 460 F. Supp. 399, 402 (W.D. Okla. 1978); see also David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, Nos.

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer
425 F.3d 836 (Tenth Circuit, 2005)
Kay v. Bemis
500 F.3d 1214 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Jenkins v. Currier
514 F.3d 1030 (Tenth Circuit, 2008)
Smith v. United States
561 F.3d 1090 (Tenth Circuit, 2009)
Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins
656 F.3d 1210 (Tenth Circuit, 2011)
Wilson v. Montano
715 F.3d 847 (Tenth Circuit, 2013)
Silkwood Ex Rel. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.
460 F. Supp. 399 (W.D. Oklahoma, 1978)
Hogan v. Winder
762 F.3d 1096 (Tenth Circuit, 2014)
Archuleta v. City of Roswell
898 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (D. New Mexico, 2012)
Hall v. Bellmon
935 F.2d 1106 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)
Miller v. Glanz
948 F.2d 1562 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)

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Cuara R. v. Utah Division of Real Estate, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cuara-r-v-utah-division-of-real-estate-utd-2023.