Cruz v. San Diego County CWS

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedAugust 24, 2023
Docket3:23-cv-00957
StatusUnknown

This text of Cruz v. San Diego County CWS (Cruz v. San Diego County CWS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cruz v. San Diego County CWS, (S.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Leila Cruz, Case No.: 3:23-CV-0957-GPC-KSC

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION TO 14 San Diego County CWS, Lynette Miller, PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, Christopher Hines, 15 [ECF No. 2]; Defendants. (2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING 16 PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT FOR 17 FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM; (3) DENYING MOTION TO 18 APPOINT COUNSEL, [ECF NO. 6]; 19 AND (4) DENYING “MOTION TO ADD 20 CLAIMS FOR RELIEF”, [ECF NO. 7] 21 22 Plaintiff Leila Cruz (“Plaintiff” or “Cruz”), proceeding pro se, filed a complaint 23 against Defendants San Diego County CWS, Lynette Miller, and Christopher Hines in the 24 United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on May 4, 2023. (ECF 25 No. 1, Compl.) On May 24, 2023, the District Court in the Eastern District of Missouri 26 27 1 1 transferred the action to this Court to cure the defect in venue. (ECF No. 3 at 7–8.1) Cruz 2 also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), (ECF No. 2), which was 3 provisionally granted by the Eastern District of Missouri and subject to modification by 4 this Court. (ECF No. 3 at 8.) 5 For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in 6 forma pauperis; sua sponte DISMISSES the action for failure to state a claim with leave to 7 amend; DENIES the motion to appoint counsel; and DENIES the “motion to add claims 8 for relief.” 9 A. Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis 10 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a United States 11 District Court must pay a $402 filing fee.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may 12 proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if she is granted leave to 13 proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (“§ 1915(a)”). See Andrews v. 14 Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 15 (9th Cir. 1999). An affidavit in support of an IFP application is “sufficient” if it alleges 16 the plaintiff “cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo 17 v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (IFP 18 applicant must “submit[] an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such 19 [applicant] possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees . . . .”). Although there is 20 no established formula to determine IFP status provided by statute, regulation or caselaw, 21 a plaintiff must allege poverty “with some particularity, definiteness and certainty.” 22

23 1 Page numbers are based on the CM/ECF pagination. 24 2 Effective December 1, 2020, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $52, in 25 addition to the $350 filing fee set by statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2020)). The $52 administrative fee does not 26 apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id. 27 2 1 Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234-35. The district court has discretion in determining whether 2 the plaintiff has satisfied the statute’s IFP requirements. Cal. Men’s Colony, Unit II 3 Men’s Advisory Council v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991), reversed on 4 other grounds by 506 U.S. 194 (1993); see also United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 5 940 (9th Cir. 1981) (“It [is] within the court's discretion to make a factual inquiry and to 6 deny the motion when [plaintiffs are] unable, or unwilling, to verify their poverty.”) 7 (internal citations omitted). 8 Here, Cruz’s IFP form indicates that (1) she has $520.00 in her bank account, (2) 9 her only form of income is a monthly disability payment of $712, and (3) her monthly 10 expenses total $1,089. (ECF No. 2 at 2, 4, 5.). The IFP form also indicates Cruz is a 11 blind mother with three dependent children, including a disabled son. (Id. at 3, 5.) 12 Given that Cruz’s expenses exceed her income by more than $300, the Court 13 agrees with the Eastern District of Missouri’s assessment and finds Plaintiff has 14 demonstrated that “because of poverty” she cannot “meet court costs and still provide 15 [herself] . . . with the necessities of life.” See Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1235. Therefore, the 16 Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP. 17 B. Sua Sponte Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 18 1. Legal Standard 19 Courts must engage in a sua sponte review of any complaints filed by any person 20 proceeding IFP pursuant to § 1915(a), and courts should dismiss claims that are 21 “frivolous or malicious; fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seek[] 22 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915 23 (e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“It is also 24 clear that section 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in 25 forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”). 26 27 3 1 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 8, a complaint must contain “a short 2 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. 3 P. 8(a)(2). While a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff must 4 plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell 5 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, legal conclusions are “not 6 entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). A claim 7 is facially plausible when the factual allegations permit “the court to draw the reasonable 8 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. A complaint 9 should disclose “who is being sued, for what relief and on what theory, with enough detail 10 to guide discovery.” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996). Allegations 11 that do not “identify[] the transaction or occurrence giving rise to the claim and the 12 elements of the prima facie case” fail to satisfy Rule 8. Bautista v. Los Angeles Cty, 216 13 F.3d 837, 840 (9th. Cir. 2000). 14 Courts “liberally construe[]” pro se claims, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 15 (1976), holding them to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 16 lawyers.” Id. (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).

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Bluebook (online)
Cruz v. San Diego County CWS, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cruz-v-san-diego-county-cws-casd-2023.