Cruz v. Mount Sinai Hosp.

2024 NY Slip Op 34557(U)
CourtNew York Supreme Court, New York County
DecidedDecember 24, 2024
DocketIndex No. 805307/2023
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2024 NY Slip Op 34557(U) (Cruz v. Mount Sinai Hosp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court, New York County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cruz v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 2024 NY Slip Op 34557(U) (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2024).

Opinion

Cruz v Mount Sinai Hosp. 2024 NY Slip Op 34557(U) December 24, 2024 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 805307/2023 Judge: John J. Kelley Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York State and local government sources, including the New York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. INDEX NO. 805307/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 23 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/24/2024

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK NEW YORK COUNTY PRESENT: HON. JOHN J. KELLEY PART IAS MOTION 56EFM Justice --------------------------------------------------------------------------------X INDEX NO. 805307/2023 HAZEL CRUZ as Proposed Administrator of the Estate of HECTOR CRUZ, Deceased, MOTION DATE 08/15/2024

Plaintiff, MOTION SEQ. NO. 001

-v- MOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL, DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION Defendant.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22

were read on this motion to/for DISMISS/LACK OF CAPACITY .

In this action to recover damages for medical malpractice based on alleged departures

from good and accepted medical practice, wrongful death, and negligent hiring, training,

supervision, and retention, the defendant moves pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3) to dismiss the

complaint based on the plaintiff’s lack of capacity. The plaintiff opposes the motion. The

defendant’s motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed, albeit without prejudice to the

commencement of a new action by the plaintiff Hazel Cruz in accordance with CPLR 205(a)

after she is appointed as the administrator of the estate of her decedent, Hector Cruz.

The plaintiff commenced this action on June 28, 2023. In the summons and complaint,

the plaintiff characterized herself as the “proposed administratrix” of the decedent’s estate.

Although the plaintiff executed a petition for letters of administration of the decedent’s estate on

December 20, 2022, and filed that petition and supporting papers with the Surrogate’s Court,

New York County, on January 30, 2023, as of the date that she commenced this action, the

Surrogate’s Court had yet to appoint her as the administrator of that estate.

INDEX NO. 805307/2023 CRUZ, HAZEL, as Proposed Administrator v MOUNT SINAL HOSPITAL Page 1 of 4 SEQ 001

1 of 4 [* 1] INDEX NO. 805307/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 23 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/24/2024

“A personal representative who has received letters of administration of a decedent’s estate [or letters testamentary] is the only party who is authorized to commence a survival action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the decedent or a wrongful death action to recover damages sustained by the decedent’s distributees on account of his or her death”

(Shelley v South Shore Healthcare, 123 AD3d 797, 797 [2d Dept 2014]; see Gulledge v

Jefferson County, 172 AD3d 1666, 1667 [3d Dept 2019]; Jordan v Metropolitan Jewish Hospice,

122 AD3d 682, 683 [2d Dept 2014]; Mingone v State of New York, 100 AD2d 897, 899 [2d Dept

1984]; EPTL 1-2.13, 5-4.1 [1]; 11-3.2 [b]). Consequently, a “proposed administrator” lacks

capacity to prosecute either a personal injury “survival” action or a wrongful death action on

behalf of the estate of a decedent (see Rodriguez v River Val. Care Ctr., Inc., 175 AD3d 432,

433 [1st Dept 2019]; Richards v Lourdes Hosp., 58 AD3d 927, 927-928 [3d Dept 2009]; Mendez

v Kyung Yoo, 23 AD3d 354, 355 [2d Dept 2005]; Duran v Isabella Geriatric Ctr., Inc., 2023 NY

Slip Op 30500[U], *9, 2023 NY Misc LEXIS 669, *12-13 [Sup Ct, N.Y. County, Feb. 15, 2023]

[Kelley, J.]; Castro v Fraser, 2022 NY Slip Op 30903[U], *5, 2022 NY Misc LEXIS 1368, *7 [Sup

Ct, N.Y. County, Mar. 15, 2022] [Kelley, J.]; Stroble v Townhouse Operating Co., 2019 NY Misc

LEXIS 18865 [Sup Ct, Nassau County, Dec. 16, 2019]; Fleisher v Ballon Stoll Bader & Nadler,

P.C., 2015 NY Slip Op 31855[U], *5, 2015 NY Misc LEXIS 3625, *6 [Sup Ct, N.Y. County, Oct.

5, 2015]).

The burden is on the defendant to establish that the plaintiff lacked capacity to

commence this action (see Bartel v Farrell Lines, 215 AD3d 517, 526 [1st Dept 2023]). The

defendant here has established that the plaintiff lacked capacity to commence the action on the

date that she filed the summons and complaint by noting that she was only a “proposed

administrator” at the time that she commenced the action. Contrary to the plaintiff’s suggestion,

where a plaintiff lacks capacity to prosecute an action, and a defendant timely moves to dismiss

the complaint on that ground, the complaint must be dismissed, and is not subject to an

amendment to substitute either a proper plaintiff or an existing plaintiff who secured

appointment as a proper administrator or executor of a decedent’s estate during the pendency

INDEX NO. 805307/2023 CRUZ, HAZEL, as Proposed Administrator v MOUNT SINAL HOSPITAL Page 2 of 4 SEQ 001

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of the action. This is so because it is a “fatal defect” for a person who lacks capacity to

commence an action, inasmuch as the defect constitutes a “failure to comply with a condition

precedent” (Morris Investors, Inc. v Commissioner of Finance, 121 AD2d 221, 224 [1st Dept

1986]). Nonetheless, although the plaintiff lacked capacity to prosecute this action at the time

that she commenced it, her lack of capacity did not technically render the action a “nullity,” and,

hence, while the action remains “subject to grounds for dismissal,” it nonetheless is “within the

ambit of CPLR 205(a)” (Sokoloff v Schor, 176 AD3d 120, 124, 135-136 [2d Dept 2019])

As such, the dismissal here is without prejudice to the commencement of a new action

against the defendant for the same relief, under a new index number, in accordance with CPLR

205(a), provided that the new action is commenced within six months of the termination of this

action against it. As relevant here, CPLR 205(a) provides that:

“[i]f an action is timely commenced and is terminated in any other manner than by a voluntary discontinuance, a failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant, a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action, or a final judgment upon the merits, the plaintiff . . . may commence a new action upon the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences within six months after the termination provided that the new action would have been timely commenced at the time of commencement of the prior action and that service upon defendant is effected within such six-month period.”

A “disposition based solely upon the absence of a duly appointed administrator does not

preclude reprosecution of the underlying claim through the mechanism of CPLR 205 (subd [a])

once a qualified administrator has been appointed” (Carrick v Central Gen. Hosp., 51 NY2d 242,

252 [1980]; see Rodriguez v River Val. Care Ctr., Inc., 175 AD3d at 433; Snodgrass v

Professional Radiology, 50 AD3d 883, 884-885 [2d Dept 2008]; Mendez v Kyung Yoo, 23 AD3d

at 355; Bernardez v City of New York, 100 AD2d 798, 799-800 [1st Dept 1984]).

Accordingly, it is,

ORDERED that the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint is granted, and the

complaint is dismissed, without prejudice, in accordance with CPLR 205(a), to the

INDEX NO.

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Related

Jordan v. Metropolitan Jewish Hospice
122 A.D.3d 682 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2014)
Shelley v. South Shore Healthcare
123 A.D.3d 797 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2014)
Carrick v. Central General Hospital
414 N.E.2d 632 (New York Court of Appeals, 1980)
Mendez v. Kyung Yoo
23 A.D.3d 354 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2005)
Snodgrass v. Professional Radiology
50 A.D.3d 883 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2008)
Richards v. Lourdes Hospital
58 A.D.3d 927 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2009)
Bernardez v. City of New York
100 A.D.2d 798 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1984)
Mingone v. State
100 A.D.2d 897 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1984)
Morris Investors, Inc. v. Commissioner of Finance
121 A.D.2d 221 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1986)

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Bluebook (online)
2024 NY Slip Op 34557(U), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cruz-v-mount-sinai-hosp-nysupctnewyork-2024.