Cruz Jesus Alba Olvera v. North Lake Processing Center et al.

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

CRUZ JESUS ALBA OLVERA,

Petitioner, Case No. 1:26-cv-2371

v. Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou

NORTH LAKE PROCESSING CENTER et al.,

Respondents. ____________________________/ OPINION Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee, initiated this action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice. Discussion I. Procedural History In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court to, inter alia, accept jurisdiction over this action and issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.13, 16.) In an order entered on August 24, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 4.) Respondents filed their response on August 27, 2026, (ECF No. 5), and Petitioner filed his reply on August 31, 2026, (ECF No. 7). II. Relevant Factual Background Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6; Patillo Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.115.) Petitioner entered the United States in 2021 at the Gateway International Bridge in Brownsville, Texas. (Patillo Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.115.) The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging

Petitioner with inadmissibility under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)” and released Petitioner into the United States. (Id. ¶¶ 5–6, PageID.115–116.) On September 19, 2022, an Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner removed to Mexico. (Id. ¶ 6, PageID.116.) Petitioner did not appeal the order of removal, making Petitioner’s order of removal administratively final on October 19, 2022.1 On June 5, 2024, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen his immigration case, which was denied on June 20, 2024. (Id. ¶¶ 7–8.) On July 5, 2026, ICE agents took custody of Petitioner following his release from local law enforcement custody. (Id. ¶ 10.) Petitioner is currently detained pending removal to Mexico. (Id. ¶ 18, PageID.117.) Removal operations to Mexico are routine, occurring multiple times per week. (Id.) ICE expects to remove Petitioner within three weeks. (Id.)

III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

1 For the purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), a removal order “shall become final upon the earlier of (i) a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming such an order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B). Petitioner had 30 days from which to file an appeal. 8 CFR § 1003.38. the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration- related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025). IV. Merits Discussion Because Petitioner has a final order of removal, Petitioner’s present detention is governed

by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. However, Petitioner contends that his detention is unlawful and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In response, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s continued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) remains lawful and does not implicate the constitutional concerns identified in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). Section 1231 provides that “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). “During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.” Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). Here, as noted above, Petitioner’s order of removal became final in 2022. Therefore, the 90-day removal period following the order expired well before Petitioner filed the present action. See id. § 1231(a)(1) (“The [90-day] removal period

begins on . . . [t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.”). In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that after expiration of the 90-day removal period, the Government may continue to detain the noncitizen for a “presumptively reasonable period” of time, which the Supreme Court concluded equaled six months. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Following that six-month period, “once [a noncitizen] provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. Id.2 “[O]nce [a noncitizen’s]

2 The Court notes that the Supreme Court has held that § 1231(a)(6) does not require the “Government to offer detained noncitizens bond hearings after six months of detention in which removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699. Petitioner has been detained for less than six months. “Although the Supreme Court established a six-month period of presumptively reasonable detention,” courts have found that Zadvydas does “not preclude a detainee from challenging the reasonableness of his detention

before such time.” See, e.g., Munoz-Saucedo v. Pittman, 789 F. Supp. 3d 387, 395–96 (D.N.J. 2025) (citing, inter alia, Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699–701; Ali v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 451 F. Supp. 3d 703, 706–07 (S.D. Tex. 2020); Hoang Trinh v. Homan, 333 F. Supp. 3d 984, 994 (C.D. Cal. 2018)); Ali v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 451 F. Supp. 3d 703, 707 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (“This six- month presumption is not a bright line, however, and Zadvydas did not automatically authorize all detention until it reaches constitutional limits.” (citations omitted)). That is, during the six-month period of detention, “[t]he presumption of reasonableness is the default,” and “the government bears no burden to justify detention,” “but if a person ‘can prove’ that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable, then he can overcome that presumption.” Id. at 397 (citations omitted).

In this case, Petitioner has not proven that “there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Indeed, ICE expects to remove Petitioner to Mexico within three weeks. (Patillo Decl. ¶ 18, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.117.) Accordingly, the Court will deny Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.

the Government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen poses a flight risk or a danger to the community.” See Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 576 (2022). The Court, however, did not reach Arteaga-Martinez’s constitutional or Zadvydas claims, concluding that such claims were not properly before the Court. See id. at 583–84. V. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief Because the Court will deny Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein, the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment denying Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.

Dated: September 1, 2026 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou HALA Y. JARBOU CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE