Cruz 164127 v. Thornell

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: July 31, 2025
• Docket: 4:25-cv-00002
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Ralph David Cruz, Jr., No. CV-25-00002-TUC-JGZ (LCK)

10 Petitioner, ORDER

11 v.

12 Ryan Thornell et al.,

13 Respondents.

14 Petitioner Ralph David Cruz Jr., presently incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison 15 Complex-Lewis, Buckley Unit in Buckeye, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 16 Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2254. (Doc. 1.) In his Petition, Cruz presents one ground 17 for relief: his life sentence without the possibility of parole violates the Eighth 18 Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because he was sixteen 19 years old when he committed the crimes at issue and he is not “permanently incorrigible.” 20 (Id. at 6.) The Petition is fully briefed. (See Docs. 1 & 14.) For the reasons that follow, the 21 Court will deny the Petition. 22 I. Factual and Procedural Background1 23 In August 2000, then-sixteen-year-old Cruz shot and killed a mother and her two 24 children during a robbery. (Doc. 14-1 ¶ 2, Ex. A.) Cruz pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea 25 agreement, in Pima County Superior Court, to one count of armed robbery and three counts 26 27 1 The facts are taken from the Arizona Appellate Court’s decision. (Doc. 14-1, Ex. A.) The 28 Appellate Court’s stated facts are entitled to a presumption of correctness. 25 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 1 of first-degree murder. (Id.)2 The plea agreement specified that Cruz would be sentenced 2 to natural life or life with the possibility of release after twenty-five years for the first 3 murder count or release after thirty-five years for the second and third murder counts. (Id.) 4 The plea agreement also required Cruz’s prison terms to run consecutively. (Id.) The court 5 sentenced Cruz to life imprisonment with the possibility of release after twenty-five years 6 for the first murder, to be followed by consecutive terms of natural life for the children’s 7 murders. (Id.) The court imposed a consecutive 10.5-year prison term for the armed 8 robbery. (Id.) 9 In 2013, Cruz sought post-conviction relief in the Pima County Superior Court. 10 (Doc. 14-1 ¶ 3, Ex. A.) Cruz argued that Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), required 11 that he be sentenced to life with the possibility of parole, and asserted the sentencing court 12 gave insufficient weight to his age as a mitigating factor. (Id.) In Miller, the Supreme Court 13 held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of mandatory life-without-parole 14 sentences for juveniles. 567 U.S. at 480. The court, however, did not categorically prohibit 15 such sentences. It held that sentencers must “take into account how children are different, 16 and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in 17 prison.” Id. The state court denied Cruz relief, and later the court of appeals denied relief, 18 observing that “even under Miller’s heightened standard, the sentencing court adequately 19 considered Cruz's youth in deciding whether to impose a natural life sentence.” (Doc. 14- 20 1 ¶ 3, Ex. A.) 21 In 2016, Cruz again sought post-conviction relief. (Id. ¶ 4.) Citing State v. Valencia 22 (Valencia I), 239 Ariz. 255, 259 (Ct. App. 2016), Cruz asserted he was entitled to a 23 resentencing to consider whether his crimes reflected permanent incorrigibility, such that 24 a natural life sentence could be imposed. (Id.) While the matter was pending, the Arizona 25 Supreme Court issued a decision vacating Valencia I, and holding that juvenile defendants 26 2 Defendant pled guilty in a “wrap plea” to all charges in the indictment as well as the 27 charge of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon from a home invasion, which the State charged in a separate cause number, CR-20002954. The trial court imposed a sentence of 28 ten years for aggravated assault in CR-20002954, consecutive to all other sentences. (See Doc. 14-2 at 193, Ex. OO.) 1 sentenced to life imprisonment were entitled to “have an opportunity to establish, by a 2 preponderance of the evidence, that their crimes did not reflect irreparable corruption but 3 instead transient immaturity.” State v. Valencia (Valencia II), 241 Ariz. 206 (2016). 4 Thereafter, the trial court set a hearing to allow Cruz to present evidence as to his “transient 5 immaturity.” (Doc. 14-1 ¶ 4, Ex. A.) The hearing was continued in anticipation of rulings 6 by the United States Supreme Court related to juvenile sentencing. (Id.) After the 7 evidentiary hearing was completed in March 2023, the state trial court denied relief. (Id. 8 ¶¶ 4–5.) Noting that the sentencing court had been “required, and did, consider [Cruz]’s 9 youth before imposing the sentences,” the court concluded “the constitutional requirements 10 of the Miller decision were satisfied.” (Id. ¶ 5) The court also “revisited” the sentencing 11 court’s decision “in light of subsequent rulings on the subject by both the United States 12 Supreme Court and the Arizona Supreme Court,” and concluded that Cruz had failed to 13 show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that ‘his actions . . . were the result of transient 14 immaturity and instead were the result of permanent incorrigibility/irreparable corruption.” 15 (Id.) “The court therefore affirmed Cruz’s natural life prison terms.” (Id.) 16 In 2024, Cruz appealed the trial court’s determination to the state court of appeals, 17 which granted review but denied relief. (Doc. 14-1 ¶ 10, Ex. A.) Cruz argued that he 18 “‘overwhelmingly proved he is not permanently incorrigible,’ the trial court erred by 19 rejecting expert testimony ‘based on preconceived notions and lay assumptions,’ and the 20 trial court ‘cherry-picked certain testimony.’” (Id. ¶ 6.) The appeals court declined to 21 address Cruz’s arguments. The court explained that, in State ex rel. Mitchell v. Cooper, 22 256 Ariz. 1 (2023), the Arizona Supreme Court overruled Valencia II in light of the U.S. 23 Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98 (2021), thereby eliminating 24 Valencia II’s requirement that juvenile defendants subject to natural life sentences receive 25 an evidentiary hearing to demonstrate that their crimes did not reflect irreparable corruption 26 but instead transient immaturity. (Doc. 14-1 ¶¶ 1, 7, Ex. A (quoting Valencia II, 241 Ariz. 27 at 209–10, ¶¶ 15, 18).) The appeals court reiterated that, under Jones, a natural life sentence 28 is constitutional if the sentencing court considered the “juvenile offender’s ‘youth and 1 attendant characteristics.’” (Id. ¶ 7 (quoting Jones, 593 U.S. at 106).) The court further 2 noted that, in Jones, the Supreme Court clarified that “sentencing courts need not provide 3 an ‘on-the-record sentencing explanation with an implicit finding of permanent 4 incorrigibility.’” (Id. (quoting Jones, 593 U.S. at 115).) Applying these principles, the 5 appeals court concluded the trial court could not have “erred by denying Cruz relief after 6 an evidentiary hearing held to address a question . . . the trial court was not required to 7 address.” (Id. ¶ 8.) The court further found that no constitutional infirmity was apparent 8 from the record because the sentencing court found Cruz’s age to be a mitigating factor. 9 (Id. ¶ 9.) 10 On December 18, 2024, Cruz deposited the instant petition in the mail. In the 11 Petition, Cruz challenges the constitutionality of his state sentences. (Doc. 1 at 6.) 12 II. Legal Standard 13 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) created a 14 “‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,’ . . . demand[ing] that state 15 court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 16 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997)). Under 17 AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim “adjudicated on the 18 merits” by the state court unless that adjudication: 19 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 20 determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 21 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 22 State court proceeding. 23 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). When a state court has adjudicated a claim on the merits, AEDPA 24 requires the court to defer to the last reasoned state court decision on the constitutional 25 issue. Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2014). Here, the last reasoned state 26 decision is the appellate court’s second Post Conviction Relief (PCR) review of Cruz’s 27 sentence. 28 1 To assess a claim under subsection (d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly 2 established Federal law,” if any, that governs the sufficiency of the claims on habeas 3 review. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Clearly established federal law 4 consists of the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner’s state court 5 conviction became final. Id. at 379–80; see Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006). 6 “The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply a rule of 7 law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became final.” 8 Williams, 529 U.S. at 390. 9 The court next determines whether the state court decision is “contrary to” clearly 10 established precedent. The Supreme Court has identified two situations where a state court 11 decision is contrary to established precedent. 12 First, a state-court decision is contrary to this Court's precedent if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a 13 question of law. Second, a state-court decision is also contrary to this Court's precedent if the state court confronts facts that are materially 14 indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to ours. 15 Id. at 405–06. 16 Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal district court 17 may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the 18 Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case” 19 or “unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new 20 context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new 21 context where it should apply.” Id. at 407. For a federal court to find a state court's 22 application of Supreme Court precedent unreasonable, the petitioner must show that the 23 state court’s decision was not merely incorrect or erroneous, but objectively unreasonable. 24 Id. at 409; Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). “A state court’s determination 25 that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fair-minded jurists could 26 disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 27 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 28 1 III. Discussion 2 The Arizona court’s sentence is not contrary to clearly established precedent. Cruz 3 asserts: “The Arizona courts violated the Eighth Amendment by sentencing [him] to 4 mandatory life-without-parole sentences without evidence that [he] was one of the rare 5 offenders who is permanently incorrigible.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) But Cruz’s natural life sentences 6 were not mandatory and the sentences were imposed in accordance with Supreme Court 7 precedent. 8 A. Cruz’s sentence was not mandatory 9 Cruz’s plea agreement gave the sentencing court discretion to impose a sentence 10 less than a life sentence. (Doc. 14-1 at 10, Ex. B.) The agreement specified that Cruz would 11 be sentenced to natural life or life with the possibility of release after twenty-five years for 12 the first murder count or release after thirty-five years for the second and third murder 13 counts. (Id.) The agreement required the prison terms for all counts to run consecutive. (Id. 14 at 10–11, Ex. B.) At the change of plea hearing, the state court explained to Cruz that the 15 court had the discretion to impose a sentence less than natural life for the murder counts. 16 (Id. at 19–21, Ex. C.) 17 B. Cruz’s sentence was consistent with Supreme Court law 18 Cruz’s sentence was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly 19 established federal law. In Miller, the Supreme Court held that sentencing schemes 20 mandating life imprisonment without the possibility of release for juvenile homicide 21 offenders violate the Eighth Amendment, but the court allowed for discretionary life- 22 without-parole sentences for those offenders where “a judge or jury [has] the opportunity 23 to consider mitigating circumstances . . . .” 567 U.S. at 465, 479, 489. The court held that 24 a trial court must consider “an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics” before 25 sentencing a juvenile to life without the possibility of parole. Id. at 483.3 26 In its review of Cruz’s sentencing during the second PCR proceeding, the Arizona 27 court of appeals correctly identified and applied controlling Supreme Court law. The court

28 3 In Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 206 (2016), the Supreme Court held Miller is to be applied retroactively on collateral review. 1 cited Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 118 (2021), as relevant law. In Jones, the Supreme 2 Court reiterated Miller’s holding that a natural life sentence is constitutional only if the 3 sentencing court considered the juvenile offender’s youth and attendant characteristics. 593 4 U.S. at 106. The Jones court also rejected the arguments that a sentencer is required to 5 make a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility, or to make an on-the-record 6 sentencing explanation with an implicit finding of permanent incorrigibility, before 7 sentencing a murderer under 18 to life without parole. Id. at 113–14 (“[T]he Court has 8 unequivocally stated that a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility is not 9 required before a sentencer imposes a life-without-parole sentence on a murderer under 10 18.”). 11 The Arizona Court of Appeals applied the relevant Supreme Court law in rejecting 12 Cruz’s claim. Consistent with Supreme Court precedent, the appellate court concluded 13 Cruz’s sentences did not violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual 14 punishment because Cruz’s natural life sentences were not mandatory and the sentencing 15 court had considered Cruz’s youth in determining the appropriate sentence to impose. The 16 court of appeals wrote: 17 As we noted above, the [sentencing] court found Cruz’s age to be a mitigating factor. The Supreme Court clarified in Jones that neither the Constitution nor 18 “historical or contemporary sentencing practice” require “an on-the-record explanation of the mitigating circumstance of youth by the sentencer.” 593 19 U.S. at 116-17 . . . . And the [sentencing] court had the discretion to impose a sentence other than natural life. 20 (Doc. 14-1 ¶ 9, Ex. A.) The court specifically rejected Cruz’s argument, also raised in his 21 pending Petition, that the second sentencing court’s determination was based on an 22 unreasonable determination of the facts presented at the evidentiary hearing, explaining: 23

Although Cruz acknowledges Cooper, he argues that we “should reach the 24 merits of [his] claim” because “a Valencia hearing occurred.” He does not cite any authority, however, nor otherwise explain how this court could 25 conclude the trial court erred by denying Cruz relief after an evidentiary hearing held to address a question our supreme court has since clarified the 26 trial court was not required to address. 27 (Id. ¶ 8.)4 This Court concludes that the court of appeals’ determination is consistent with 28 4 The appellate court also noted that Cruz was found permanently incorrigible at both || and reasonable application of controlling Supreme Court precedent. IV. Certificate of Appealability 3 Before Petitioner can appeal this Court’s judgment, a certificate of appealability (“COA”) must issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1); Rule 11(a) of the || Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. A COA may issue only when the petitioner “has || made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The court must indicate which specific issues satisfy this showing. See id. § 2253(c)(3). 8 || With respect to claims rejected on the merits, a petitioner “must demonstrate that 9|| reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims || debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 11 In this case, Cruz has not made a substantial showing of a denial of his Eighth 12 || Amendment rights or that reasonable jurists would find the Court’s assessment of his claim 13 || debatable or wrong. Accordingly, the Court will deny a certificate of appealability. V. Conclusion 15 Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief on his Eighth 16 || Amendment claim. Accordingly, 17 IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is denied. 18 || The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment and close its file in this action. 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the issuance of a Certificate of || Appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 21 Dated this 30th day of July, 2025. 22 Lernnf DLE 24 Jennifer G. Zh ps 25 Chief United States District Judge 26 27 28 sentencing hearings, the second of which included an extensive evidentiary hearing.

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