Crunk v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.

719 P.2d 1338, 106 Wash. 2d 23, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1283, 1986 Wash. LEXIS 1197
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedJune 5, 1986
Docket51053-9
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 719 P.2d 1338 (Crunk v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crunk v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 719 P.2d 1338, 106 Wash. 2d 23, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1283, 1986 Wash. LEXIS 1197 (Wash. 1986).

Opinions

Callow, J.

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company petitions for review of the holding of the Court of Appeals reported as Crunk v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 38 Wn. App. 501, 686 P.2d 1132 (1984). The insurer asserts that the homeowner's policy involved was unambiguous and that a cashier's check constitutes "money" within the terms of a special limit of liability provision in the policy.

Fredrick and Alice Crunk were insured under a homeowner's policy issued by State Farm. They entered into a contract with George K. Wright, d/b/a G & G Construction Company, for a $37,769.62 remodeling job on their home. The Crunks secured a cashier's check for $18,884.91 from a bank, endorsed it and gave it to the contractor on July 8, 1981, as the initial payment on the home improvements the contractor was to make under the contract. The contractor cashed the check and departed for sunny climes. He was arrested later in Florida and returned to King County for trial where in December 1981 he pleaded guilty to the first degree theft of the cashier's check stating that:

from November 1980 and July 1981, I was working as a building contractor. I had several jobs: Fellhauer, Crunk, Pearsons and Persons. I got behind in the Fellhauer job and then everything snowballed. I tried to catch up and I couldn't. I used the money from one job for another job in hopes of catching up. I used money advanced to me by the Crunks and Persons for purposes other than the work I was hired to do and never started their work.

The insured presented a claim to the insurer under coverage B of the homeowner's policy. Coverage was provided under the provisions of the policy which read in pertinent part:

[25]*25Coverage B — Unscheduled Personal Property.
This policy covers unscheduled personal property usual or incidental to the occupancy of the premises as a dwelling and owned or used by an Insured, while on the described premises and, at the option of the Named Insured, owned by others while on the portion of the premises occupied exclusively by the Insured.
This coverage also includes such unscheduled personal property while elsewhere than on the described premises, anywhere in the world:
(1) owned or used by an Insured; or
(2) at the option of the Named Insured;
(a) owned by a guest while in a residence occupied by an Insured; or
(b) owned by a residence employee while actually engaged in the service of an Insured and while such property is in the physical custody of such residence employee or in a residence occupied by an Insured;
(3) but the limit of this Company's liability for the unscheduled personal property away from the premises shall be an additional amount of insurance equal to 10% of the amount specified for Coverage B, but in no event less than $1000.

Perils Insured Against

Coverage B — Unscheduled personal property against direct loss to the property covered by the following perils as defined and limited, except as otherwise excluded:

10. Theft, meaning any act of stealing or attempt thereat, including loss of property from a known place under circumstances when a probability of theft exists.

Special Limits of Liability

b. Under Coverage B, this company shall not be liable for loss in any one occurrence with respect to the following property for more than:

(1) $100 in the aggregate on money, bullion, numismatic property and bank notes;
(2) $500 in the aggregate on securities, accounts, bills, deeds, evidences of debt, letters of credit, notes other than bank notes, passports, railroad [26]*26and other tickets or stamps, including philatelic property;

The following issues are before us: (1) whether the acts of the contractor constitute theft as defined in the policy, and (2) whether a cashier's check is money, a bank note or an evidence of debt under the special limits of liability clause contained in the policy.

An ordinary check is a bill of exchange drawn by an individual on a bank, payable on demand. It is an order upon a bank purporting to be drawn upon a deposit of funds for the payment of a sum certain to a person named or to order or bearer on demand. The drawer of the ordinary check has the power of countermanding his order for payment at any time before the bank has paid it or committed itself to pay it. A cashier's check differs in that it is a bill of exchange drawn by the bank upon itself and is accepted by the act of issuance. A cashier's check is the primary obligation of the remitting bank. See RCW 62A.4-211(l)(b). The right to countermand as applied to ordinary checks does not exist as to cashier's checks. Drinkall v. Movius State Bank, 11 N.D. 10, 88 N.W. 724 (1901). An ordinary check is considered as merely a promise to pay, but a cashier's check is regarded substantially as money, which it represents. The gift of such a check is completed upon delivery of the check. Pikeville Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Shirley, 281 Ky. 150, 135 S.W.2d 426, 126 A.L.R. 919 (1939). See also Scott v. Seaboard Sec. Co., 143 Wash. 514, 255 P. 660 (1927), which quoted with approval extensively from Drinkall, and then quoted from Hathaway v. Delaware Cy., 185 N.Y. 368, 78 N.E. 153 (1906) as follows:

"That by reason of the peculiar character of cashiers' checks and their general use in the commercial world they were to be regarded substantially as the money which they represented,"

(Italics ours.) Scott, at 518. See also Duke v. Johnson, 127 Wash. 601, 221 P. 321 (1923); Bunge Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 65 Misc. 2d 829, 318 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1971); Foreman v. Martin, 6 Ill. App. 3d 599, 286 N.E.2d 80 (1972). As stated in 10 Am. Jur. 2d Banks § 544, at 518-[27]*2719 (1963):

Issuance and nature of cashiers' checks.
A cashier's check is a bill of exchange, drawn by the bank upon itself, and is accepted by the act of issuance. While the only apparent basic or factual difference between a cashier's check and the ordinary check is that the ordinary check is drawn on one other than the drawer, while in a cashier's check both the drawer and the drawee are the same, there are certain differences, some radical, in the incidents and consequences of the two types of checks. A cashier's check is a primary obligation of the bank, rather than the depositor, as in the case of an ordinary check, and a promise to pay which ordinarily cannot be countermanded. It is issued by the authorized officer of a bank, directed to another person, evidencing the fact that the payee is authorized to demand and receive from the bank, upon presentation, the amount of money represented by the check.

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Crunk v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.
719 P.2d 1338 (Washington Supreme Court, 1986)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
719 P.2d 1338, 106 Wash. 2d 23, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1283, 1986 Wash. LEXIS 1197, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crunk-v-state-farm-fire-and-casualty-co-wash-1986.