Crull v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance

153 N.W.2d 591, 36 Wis. 2d 464, 1967 Wisc. LEXIS 1031
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 31, 1967
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 153 N.W.2d 591 (Crull v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crull v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance, 153 N.W.2d 591, 36 Wis. 2d 464, 1967 Wisc. LEXIS 1031 (Wis. 1967).

Opinions

Hansen, J.

The trial court concluded that the photographs and negatives were part of the work product of the attorney and therefore not available to appellant under the provisions of sec. 269.57 (1), Stats.1

[467]*467We point out that the decision of this court in State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court (1967), 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 N. W. 2d 387, in which Mr. Justice BeilfüSS thoroughly analyzes the relationship between attorney’s work product privilege and discovery and inspective procedures, was not available to the trial judge and counsel at the time this matter was heard and that had the Dudek, supra, decision been available at that time a different result would probably have been reached.

This court in Dudek, supra (p. 589), citing the landmark case of Hickman v. Taylor (1947), 329 U. S. 495, 67 Sup. Ct. 385, 91 L. Ed. 451, concluded that:

“. . . a lawyer’s work product consists of the information he has assembled and the mental impressions, the legal theories and strategies that he has pursued or adopted as derived from interviews, statements, memo-randa, correspondence, briefs, legal and factual research, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and other tangible or intangible means.
“This broad definition of lawyer’s work product requires that most materials, information, mental impressions and strategies collected and adopted by a lawyer after retainer in preparation of litigation and relevant to the possible issues be initially classified as work product of the lawyer and not subject to inspection or discovery unless good cause for discovery is shown.”

It follows that from the particular fact situation in the instant case, the photographs and negatives in question, initially would properly be considered as a lawyer’s work product as defined in Dudek, supra, as they constitute information relevant to possible issues, assembled by the attorney after retainer and in preparation of litigation.

Essentially, Dudek, supra, is founded upon Hickman v. Taylor, supra, and in discussing the privileged pro[468]*468tection of the attorney’s work product, this court stated (p. 591):

“For these reasons we hold that the work product of the lawyer usually is privileged and not subject to discovery except where the objectives of pretrial discovery are unnecessarily frustrated and where good cause is shown to make exception to the rule.
“Keeping in mind the reasons for the privilege, good cause sufficient to warrant an exception must be based upon necessity, prejudice, injustice or hardship. This means that once a matter is classified as work product the court will require the party moving for discovery to make an adequate showing that the information contained in the work product is unavailable from other sources and, that a denial of discovery would prejudice the movant’s preparation for trial. What showing of unavailability or prejudice the court will require depends upon the particular facts and issues of the case, as well as what is deemed to be basis for classifying the particular item as work product.” (Emphasis added.)

This court further stated (p. 576) :

“The basic objective of our trial system, then, is the ascertainment of the truth, whether by court or jury, on the basis of those factors legal and factual, best calculated to effect a decision which comports with reality.”

The accident occurred January 19, 1963. Several months thereafter the topography of the intersection was changed. Suit was commenced in late December of 1965, and in January of 1966 defendant-appellant retained counsel for defense of the action. In the preparation of the defense, counsel learned that the topography had been changed and the instant proceeding is the result thereof.

On the basis of the record before us, the photographs of the intersection now in possession of plaintiffs’ attorney, which depict the topography of the intersection at the time of the accident and prior to the alterations [469]*469made by the county highway department, are material and relevant to the issue involved, and it does not appear there was any lack of diligence on the part of defendant-appellant. The information contained in the attorney’s work product is unavailable from any other source and denial of discovery would prejudice appellant’s preparation for trial and impede the basic objective of our trial system, which is the ascertainment of the truth. The photographs should have been made available through discovery proceedings.

By the Court. — Order reversed.

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Related

Ranft v. Lyons
471 N.W.2d 254 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 1991)
State Ex Rel. Shelby Mutual Insurance v. County Court
227 N.W.2d 161 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1975)
Blakely v. Waukesha Foundry Co.
222 N.W.2d 920 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1974)
Crull v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance
153 N.W.2d 591 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1967)

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Bluebook (online)
153 N.W.2d 591, 36 Wis. 2d 464, 1967 Wisc. LEXIS 1031, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crull-v-preferred-risk-mutual-insurance-wis-1967.