Crowder v. LinkedIn Corporation

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: March 21, 2024
• Docket: 4:22-cv-00237
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 TODD CROWDER, et al., Case No. 22-cv-00237-HSG

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS AND GRANTING IN PART 9 v. AND DENYING IN PART MOTIONS TO SEAL 10 LINKEDIN CORPORATION, Re: Dkt. Nos. 73, 84, 85, 91 11 Defendant.

12 13 Before the Court are Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the parties’ administrative motions to 14 seal, and a non-party’s motion to seal. Dkt. Nos. 73, 84, 85, 91. The Court held a hearing on the 15 motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 77. The Court DENIES the motion to dismiss and GRANTS IN 16 PART AND DENIES IN PART the motions to seal. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiffs filed the first amended complaint (“FAC”) after the Court granted Defendant’s 19 motion to dismiss their initial complaint. See Dkt. No. 65. 20 This is an antitrust proposed class action against LinkedIn, an online social network that 21 focuses on professional connections. See FAC ¶¶ 1, 30. Plaintiffs subscribe to LinkedIn Premium 22 Career, which provides paying users with additional features. Id. ¶¶ 21–23. Plaintiffs assert that 23 LinkedIn has a monopoly in the professional social networking market, allowing it to overcharge 24 Premium subscribers. Id. ¶¶ 20, 421, 446–456. Plaintiffs allege that LinkedIn’s monopoly is 25 protected by a powerful barrier to market entry comprising LinkedIn’s “data centralization, 26 machine learning models, and resulting trove of inferred data.” Id. ¶¶ 182. This barrier allegedly 27 prevents would-be rivals from entering the market, because “[w]ithout these three components, a 1 this barrier and maintains its monopoly through two categories of anticompetitive conduct. Id. ¶ 2 232–33. First, Defendant sells private user data through application programming interfaces 3 (“API”) to exclusive third parties called “partners.” Id. ¶¶ 234–78. Second, Defendant integrated 4 its user data with Microsoft’s Azure cloud computing system. Id. ¶¶ 279–325. Plaintiffs bring 5 claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act for monopolization and attempted monopolization. 15 6 U.S.C. § 2; FAC ¶¶ 438–57. 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain 9 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A 10 defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be 11 granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is 12 appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support 13 a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th 14 Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a 15 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 16 A claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw 17 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 18 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 19 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the 20 complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 21 Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, 22 courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 23 fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 24 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)). 25 If the court concludes that a 12(b)(6) motion should be granted, the “court should grant 26 leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the 27 pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d III. DISCUSSION 1 A. Section 2 Liability for Monopolization 2 Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, it is unlawful to “monopolize, or attempt to 3 monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 2. 4 To establish Section 2 liability, a plaintiff must show: (1) possession of monopoly power in the 5 relevant market; (2) willful acquisition or maintenance of that power; and (3) causal antitrust 6 injury. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974, 990 (9th Cir. 2020). 7 i. Anticompetitive Conduct 8 Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ FAC should be dismissed because they have not 9 adequately alleged that LinkedIn engaged in “anticompetitive” conduct. Anticompetitive conduct 10 is “the use of monopoly power to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to 11 destroy a competitor.” Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th 12 Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted). Put another way, anticompetitive conduct is “behavior that tends 13 to impair the opportunities of rivals and either does not further competition on the merits or does 14 so in an unnecessarily restrictive way.” Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 894 15 (9th Cir. 2008). “[B]ehavior that might otherwise not be of concern to the antitrust laws—or that 16 might even be viewed as procompetitive—can take on exclusionary connotations when practiced 17 by a monopolist.” Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 125 F.3d at 1217 (quotation omitted). 18 a. API Agreements 19 The first category of alleged anticompetitive conduct is that Defendant provided access to 20 its private user data to “hand-selected partners” only after the partners “promise[d] not to compete 21 with LinkedIn.” Opp at 12; FAC ¶¶ 234–52. The FAC describes APIs as interfaces that allow 22 developers to request and receive information from LinkedIn, and as a way “for developers to 23 build apps that could interact with LinkedIn’s network of professionals.” FAC ¶¶ 166–73. 24 Plaintiffs allege that in 2015, LinkedIn stopped offering general access to its APIs and began 25 requiring developers to apply and register to become API “partners.” Id. ¶¶ 173–80. Plaintiffs 26 assert that Defendant leveraged those Private APIs to prevent potential competitors from entering 27 the market. Id. ¶ 180. According to Plaintiffs, Defendant did this “through anticompetitive 1 agreements with hand-selected ‘partners,’ requiring that each partner agree not to compete with 2 LinkedIn in exchange for access to LinkedIn user data through LinkedIn’s Private APIs.” Id. 3 Defendant contends that these allegations are fatally speculative because “Plaintiffs have 4 no plausible factual support for their non-compete arguments.” Mot. at 8. Defendant argues that 5 Plaintiffs’ theory relies solely on “on an irrelevant, unverified, vague, and speculative 2019 blog 6 post.” Id. That blog post states: LinkedIn has a number of APIs, there’s the Profile-API for getting 7 users profiles and there’s the Profile-Edit-API which can be used to send a patch of the user’s profile to update the content. In order to use 8 the Profile-Edit-API you need to have the w_compliance permission associated with your app. The w_compliance permission is gained via 9 LinkedIn’s partner program where an app that promises not to compete with LinkedIn or abuse the API can gain access to more data. 10 FAC ¶ 241. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ reliance solely on this “unverified source” makes 11 their API non-compete claim implausibly pled. Mot. at 9. 12 The Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have found competitors’ agreements not to compete 13 with one another in a market to be anticompetitive. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. U.S., 410 U.S. 14 366, 377 (1973) (“Use of monopoly power ‘to destroy threatened competition’ is a violation of the 15 ‘attempt to monopolize’ clause of [§]2 of the Sherman Act,” as are “agreements not to compete, 16 with the aim of preserving or extending a monopoly”); Optronic Techs., Inc. v. Ningbo Sunny Elec 17 Co., 20 F.4th 466, 481 (9th Cir. 2021) (describing agreement between horizontal competitors 18 either not to compete in a market or to divide customers or potential customers between them as 19 “illegal market allocation, which is a per se Section 1 violation”) (citing Palmer v. BRG Georgia, 20 Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990)). To sustain a Section 2 claim, a plaintiff must also adequately allege 21 that a defendant’s conduct harmed competition. Dreamstime.com, LLC v. Google LLC, 54 F.4th 22 1130, 1143 (9th Cir. 2022) (affirming dismissal of Section 2 claim for failure to adequately plead 23 harm to competition); see also Kentmaster Mfg. Co. v. Jarvis Products Corp., 146 F.3d 691, 695 24 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding failure to allege harm to competition to be fatal to Section 2 claims). 25 Plaintiffs have adequately alleged anticompetitive conduct. The FAC alleges that “[t]he 26 Private APIs require that selected API Partners agree not to compete with LinkedIn, including by 27 creating a rival product. Upon agreement, a LinkedIn partner obtains access to programmatic 1 permissions to access private LinkedIn user data.” FAC ¶ 240. Plaintiffs plead that “an app that 2 promises not to compete with LinkedIn . . . can gain access to more data.” Id. ¶ 241. According 3 to Plaintiffs, Defendant selects API partners that pose a significant threat to its business as a means 4 to foreclose entry by actual or potential rivals. Id. ¶ 238. Plaintiffs identify some of Defendant’s 5 API partners and allege that these companies, but for signing API agreements, would be well 6 positioned to compete with Defendant. These facts adequately allege that Defendant entered into 7 non-compete agreements which work to “impair the opportunities of rivals and [] do not further 8 competition.”1 Cascade Health Sols., 515 F.3d at 894. 9 Defendant’s fact-based arguments regarding the credibility of the blog post do not change 10 the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged anticompetitive conduct. 11 Defendant argues that “(1) a blog post (2) by a non-rival (3) stating that the API agreement he 12 never saw (4) contained an undefined non-compete provision is nothing but unfounded, irrelevant 13 speculation insufficient to support Plaintiffs’ API claim.” Mot. at 10. But this argument invites 14 the Court to construe the allegations in the complaint in Defendant’s favor. Plaintiffs have pled 15 facts supporting a cognizable legal theory: Defendant requires would-be competitors to agree not 16 to compete with it in the professional social networking market, and these potential competitors 17 receive valuable data in exchange for this commitment. Whether this theory bears out factually is 18 for a later stage, but Plaintiffs have adequately alleged it.2 19 1 At the Court’s direction, Defendant produced certain private API agreements to Plaintiffs. See 20 Dkt. No. 78. In connection with their supplemental briefs, the parties submitted these agreements. See Dkt. Nos 85, 86, 88. As explained at the end of this order, the Court finds that the agreements 21 cannot change the outcome of the pending motion to dismiss given the allegations in the FAC. That said, once the Court can consider the substance of the agreements, such as on a motion for 22 summary judgment, it seems plain that at least the agreements proffered so far simply do not contain the sort of outright agreement not to compete that is alleged in the FAC. Given this 23 seeming mismatch, the Court will consider whether an early summary judgment motion on this point may be warranted. 24

2 According to the FAC, API partners are both Defendant’s potential competitors (in that they are 25 primed to enter the professional social networking market) and customers (in that they purchase data from Defendant). As such, there is some ambiguity as to whether the API agreements are 26 vertical or horizontal restraints. See Dkt. No. 81 (“Hrg. Tr.”) at 27:1–11. But at this stage it is enough that Plaintiffs have alleged that the API partners are viable potential competitors, and 27 Defendant entered into agreements with them for the purpose of restraining competition and 1 Plaintiffs have also adequately alleged harm to competition. The harm to competition 2 analysis “need not always be extensive or highly technical.” Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 67 3 F.4th 946, 983 (9th Cir. 2023); see also Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 4 919, 924 (9th Cir. 1980) (“There is no special rule requiring more factual specificity in antitrust 5 pleadings.”). Instead, a plaintiff may allege that defendant “increases barriers to entry or reduces 6 consumer choice by excluding would-be competitors that would offer differentiated products.” 7 Epic Games, 67 F.4th at 983–84. 8 Here, Plaintiffs allege that absent the non-compete agreements, “competitors would enter 9 LinkedIn’s market and erode its profits and market share with price competition.” FAC ¶ 3. 10 According to Plaintiffs, because of the exclusionary APIs, Defendant has no competitors, and 11 premium subscribers “cannot obtain any of the additional services” because “no comparable 12 products” exist. Id. ¶ 375. Plaintiffs claim that but for the non-compete agreements, there would 13 be greater price competition in the premium product market that Defendant currently monopolizes. 14 The FAC pleads that Defendant “charges premium subscription prices that range from $29.99 to 15 $99.95,” and that “[n]o general social networks provide comparable subscription products that 16 enhance a user’s ability to access information about others on the social network.” Id. ¶ 376. 17 According to Plaintiffs, Defendant enjoys “unheard of” price stability because they have “no 18 competitive check.” Id. ¶ 379. Together, these allegations adequately plead harm to competition. 3 19 In sum, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendant’s entry into the API agreements 20 customer and a potential competitor of Gatan, it is not clear at this stage whether the Agreement 21 should be considered a vertical or horizontal restraint. But the court need not decide whether the rule of reason applies to the Agreement, or weigh its pro- and anti-competitive effects, at the 22 pleading stage. It is enough that Nion plausibly alleges that the Agreement restrains trade, and a potential competitor’s promise not to make a competing product limits competition.”) (citations 23 omitted).

24 3 Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs are asserting an exclusive dealing claim, which necessitates pleading substantial foreclosure. Reply at 5. At the hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel directly confirmed 25 that they are not pursuing an exclusive dealing theory. Hrg. Tr. 18:21-23 (answering “That’s absolutely correct, Your Honor” when asked “I assume that your position is that you’re not 26 bringing any sort of tying or exclusive-dealing claim here[?]”). Given this concession, the Court agrees that a claim of market foreclosure is not necessary to adequately allege anticompetitive 27 conduct. See Bay Area Surgical Management LLC v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 166 F.Supp.3d 1 constitutes anticompetitive conduct and have pled an associated harm to competition. Plaintiffs 2 thus adequately plead a Section 2 monopolization claim, and Defendant’s motion to dismiss this 3 claim is DENIED.4 4 ii. Attempted Monopolization 5 Defendant argues that even if Plaintiffs’ monopolization claim survives, their attempted 6 monopolization claim should be dismissed because “it does not allege that LinkedIn possessed a 7 ‘specific intent to control prices or destroy competition.’” Mot. at 18. Plaintiffs do not argue that 8 they directly plead specific intent, but instead contend that “[i]ntent can be inferred where, as here, 9 anticompetitive conduct ‘form[s] the basis for a substantial claim of restraint of trade’ or is 10 ‘clearly threatening to competition or clearly exclusionary.’” Opp. at 24. 11 A Section 2 attempted monopolization claim requires proof of three elements: “(1) specific 12 intent to monopolize a relevant market; (2) predatory or anticompetitive conduct; and (3) a 13 dangerous probability of success.” Optronic Techs., 20 F.4th at 481–82. All three elements may 14 be proved with evidence of either: (1) conduct forming the basis for a substantial claim of restraint 15 of trade, or (2) conduct that is clearly threatening to competition or clearly exclusionary. Twin 16 City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O Finley & Co., Inc., 676 F.2d 1291, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982). 17 “[W]hile the three elements are discrete, they are often interdependent; i.e., proof of one of the 18 three elements may provide circumstantial evidence or permissible inferences of the other 19 elements.” Id. at 1308. An attempted monopoly violation can be found based on evidence of 20 conduct alone. Id at 1309. 21 Plaintiffs’ attempted monopolization claim is predicated on the same alleged 22

23 4 Given the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs’ API theory adequately alleges anticompetitive conduct and harm to competition to support the Section 2 monopolization claim, the Court need 24 not address the alternative Azure integration and “monopoly broth” theories of liability. See Aya HealthCare Servs., Inc. v. AMN Healthcare, Inc., No. 17-cv-205-MMA (MDD), 2018 WL 25 3032552 *at 8 & n.7 (S.D. Cal. June 19, 2018) (“In light of the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged antitrust injury, the Court need not address Plaintiffs’ third theory of 26 antitrust injury mentioned in Plaintiffs’ opposition to the instant motion.”). The Court can address what the import of these additional theories might be on summary judgment or at trial. See Opp. 27 at 23 (“Finally, whether the Azure integration can stand alone under Section 2 or not, LinkedIn’s 1 anticompetitive conduct as their monopolization claim, and is sufficiently pled for the same 2 reasons. See LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., 304 F. App’x 554, 557 (9th Cir. 2008) 3 (explaining that attempted monopolization requires pleading the same elements as a 4 monopolization claim).5 Plaintiffs have adequately pled that Defendant’s API agreements 5 excluded would-be competitors from the market. This allegedly allowed Defendant to enjoy 6 “unheard of” levels of pricing with “no competitive check.” At this stage, Defendant’s alleged 7 exclusion of competitors sufficiently pleads anticompetitive conduct supporting an inference of 8 specific intent to destroy competition. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 9 attempted monopolization claim is DENIED. 10 IV. JUDICIAL NOTICE 11 A. Legal Standard 12 In Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, the Ninth Circuit addressed the judicial notice rule and 13 incorporation by reference doctrine. See 899 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2018). Under Federal Rule of 14 Evidence 201, a court may take judicial notice of a fact “not subject to reasonable dispute because 15 it … can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 16 questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Accordingly, a court may take “judicial notice of matters of 17 public record,” but “cannot take judicial notice of disputed facts contained in such public records.” 18 Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999 (citation and quotations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has clarified that if a 19 court takes judicial notice of a document, it must specify what facts it judicially noticed from the 20 document. Id. at 999. Further, “[j]ust because the document itself is susceptible to judicial notice 21 does not mean that every assertion of fact within that document is judicially noticeable for its 22 truth.” Id. As an example, the Ninth Circuit held that for a transcript of a conference call, the 23 court may take judicial notice of the fact that there was a conference call on the specified date, but 24 may not take judicial notice of a fact mentioned in the transcript, because the substance “is subject 25 to varying interpretations, and there is a reasonable dispute as to what the [document] establishes.” 26 Id. at 999–1000. 27 1 Separately, the incorporation by reference doctrine is a judicially-created doctrine that 2 allows a court to consider certain documents as though they were part of the complaint itself. Id. 3 at 1002. This is to prevent plaintiffs from cherry-picking certain portions of documents that 4 support their claims, while omitting portions that weaken their claims. Id. Incorporation by 5 reference is appropriate “if the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or the document forms 6 the basis of plaintiff’s claim.” Khoja, 899 F.3d at 1002. However, “the mere mention of the 7 existence of a document is insufficient to incorporate the contents” of a document. Id. at 1002. 8 And while a court “may assume [an incorporated document’s] contents are true for purposes of a 9 motion to dismiss … it is improper to assume the truth of an incorporated document if such 10 assumptions only serve to dispute facts stated in a well-pleaded complaint.” Id. 11 B. Defendant’s Request 12 As part of its motion to dismiss, Defendant requests that the court take judicial notice of 13 the following documents: 14 1. A copy of the API related blog post that Plaintiffs quote in their complaint, at 15 https://medium.com/swlh/the-frustrations-of-dealing-with-the-linkedin-api- 16 747147c95eac, Dkt. No. 73-2, Ex. A. 17 2. A copy of a publicly accessible website discussing API agreements that Plaintiffs 18 quote in their complaint, Dkt. No. 73-3, Ex. B. 19 Websites and their contents may be proper subjects for judicial notice. See Threshold 20 Enterprises Ltd. v. Pressed Juicery, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 3d 139, 146 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (collecting 21 cases); Wible v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp. 2d 956, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (recognizing that 22 “websites and their contents may be proper subjects for judicial notice” where party “supplied the 23 court with hard copies of the actual web pages of which they sought to have the court take judicial 24 notice”). 25 Further, under the doctrine of incorporation by reference, the Court may consider 26 documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint, provided the complaint “necessarily 27 relies” on the documents, the document’s authenticity is uncontested, and the document’s 1 United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Even if a document is not attached to 2 a complaint, it may be incorporated by reference into a complaint if the plaintiff refers extensively 3 to the document or the document forms the basis of the plaintiff's claim.”). “The defendant may 4 offer such a document, and the district court may treat such a document as part of the complaint, 5 and thus may assume that its contents are true for purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 6 12(b)(6).” Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908. 7 Here, Exhibits A and B are copies of web pages, and Plaintiffs expressly cite to them at 8 length in the FAC. See FAC ¶¶ 241, 246. In their opposition, Plaintiffs do not object to 9 Defendant’s request for judicial notice and rely on the blog post website themselves in that brief. 10 See Dkt. No. 74 at 6–7. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s request for judicial notice of 11 Exhibits A and B. 12 As discussed above in footnote 1, the parties also submitted the private API agreements 13 that Defendant produced in discovery. See Dkt. Nos 85, 86, 88. The Court directed counsel to 14 indicate whether they agreed that the Court may take judicial notice of those agreements in 15 deciding the motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 92. Defendant argues that because the API agreements 16 were referenced in the FAC and form the basis of Plaintiffs’ claims, they should be considered 17 incorporated by reference. Dkt. Nos. 85, 93. Plaintiffs argue that the Court may take judicial 18 notice of only the undisputed facts related to the API agreements (for example, that 18 agreements 19 were submitted and “that they contain the words they contain”). Dkt. No. 94. Plaintiffs’ position 20 is that the Court may not take judicial notice of the agreements to determine what they 21 characterize as disputed facts (such as the overall content and effect of the agreements). Id. 22 The key question is what use the Court can properly make of these documents at the 23 motion to dismiss stage. The FAC indisputably refers repeatedly to, and characterizes, “Private 24 API Agreements.” See, e.g., FAC ¶ 234-252. And the parties agree that the documents they have 25 submitted are at least some of the agreements that are at issue in the case. See Dkt. No. 94 at 2 26 (Plaintiffs’ acknowledgment that “there appears to be no dispute between the parties that the 27 documents attached to Dkt. No. 85 are what they purport to be—eighteen LinkedIn private API 1 these particular agreements, Plaintiffs agree that “the Court may look at the terms of these 2 documents to evaluate Plaintiffs’ claims in adjudicating LinkedIn’s motion to dismiss.” Id. 3 But even assuming the Court finds these documents to be incorporated by reference or 4 judicially noticeable, it agrees with Plaintiffs that it cannot rely on them to contradict the 5 allegations in the FAC. See Khoja, 899 F.3d at 1002 (explaining that “it is improper to assume the 6 truth of an incorporated document if such assumptions only serve to dispute facts stated in a well- 7 pleaded complaint”); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that 8 district court erred in taking judicial notice of disputed matters contained in public documents). It 9 is undisputed that additional relevant API agreements have not yet been produced (which is 10 understandable given the limited scope of the Court’s order directing targeted disclosure of certain 11 agreements). Dkt. No. 78. And one of the central issues in dispute in this case is the meaning of 12 the clauses describing the conditions to which API partners agreed in receiving LinkedIn’s data. 13 The Court cannot resolve these interpretation disputes in Defendant’s favor at this stage. See In re 14 Juul Labs, Inc., Antitrust Litigation, 555 F.Supp.3d 932, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (finding segments 15 of alleged agreement incorporated by reference based on repeated citation to them in the 16 complaint, but finding that the court “cannot and do[es] not resolve the parties’ disputes over what 17 certain provisions in those documents mean,” given that “the parties argue[d] the provisions mean 18 different things on their face or in the context of the other written and unwritten agreements and 19 communications between [them]”). Accordingly, while it acknowledges the existence and content 20 of the agreements, the Court finds that they do not change its analysis above finding that Plaintiffs 21 have adequately pled a Section 2 and attempted monopolization claims sufficient to survive a 22 motion to dismiss. 23 V. MOTIONS TO SEAL 24 A. Legal Standard 25 Courts generally apply a “compelling reasons” standard when considering motions to seal 26 documents related to the merits of a case. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th 27 Cir. 2010) (quoting Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)). 1 documents, including judicial records and documents.’” Id. (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 2 1178). “[A] strong presumption in favor of access is the starting point.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 3 1178 (quotations omitted). To overcome this strong presumption, the party seeking to seal a 4 judicial record attached to a dispositive motion must “articulate compelling reasons supported by 5 specific factual findings that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies 6 favoring disclosure, such as the public interest in understanding the judicial process” and 7 “significant public events.” Id. at 1178–79 (quotations omitted). “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ 8 sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in disclosure and justify sealing court records exist 9 when such ‘court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of 10 records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release 11 trade secrets.” Id. at 1179 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). 12 “The mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, 13 incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its 14 records.” Id. 15 The Court must “balance[ ] the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks 16 to keep certain judicial records secret. After considering these interests, if the court decides to seal 17 certain judicial records, it must base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual 18 basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Id. Civil Local Rule 79-5 19 supplements the compelling reasons standard set forth in Kamakana: the party seeking to file a 20 document or portions of it under seal must “establish[ ] that the document, or portions thereof, are 21 privileged, protectable as a trade secret or otherwise entitled to protection under the law,” and 22 “[t]he request must be narrowly tailored to seek sealing only of sealable material.” Civil L.R. 79- 23 5(b). 24 B. Parties’ Motions Regarding Sealing 25 The parties’ sealing motions concern the API agreements themselves as well as references 26 to them in some of the briefs. Because the documents attached to the motion to dismiss are more 27 than tangentially related to the merits of the case, the Court applies the compelling reasons 1 “[Defendant] is not itself moving to seal these documents based on LinkedIn’s own 2 confidential business information.” Dkt. No. 85 at 1. Instead, Defendant filed its motion “solely 3 to accommodate third parties—the API Partners—with the opportunity to evaluate whether 4 anything in these agreements should remain sealed.” Id. Defendant accordingly framed its 5 request as a motion to consider whether these non-parties’ material should be sealed. 6 Only non-party Hootsuite, Inc. filed a statement in response to the motion, seeking to 7 maintain under seal portions of the information identified by Defendant. See Dkt. No. 91. 8 Hootsuite “only seeks to seal limited portions of these exhibits . . . that relate[] to terms that 9 describe the technology behind Hootsuite’s product and its product structure, which could 10 disadvantage it with its competitors.” Id. The Court finds this targeted request appropriate and 11 GRANTS the motions with respect to Hootsuite’s documents and references to them because the 12 proposed redactions seek to seal only sensitive confidential business information. See Baird v. 13 BlackRock Institutional Tr., N.A., 403 F.Supp.3d 765, 792 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“[C]onfidential 14 business information in the form of license agreements, financial terms, details of confidential 15 licensing negotiations, and business strategies satisfies the compelling reasons standard.”) 16 (internal quotations omitted). 17 The motions are otherwise DENIED with respect to all other third-party agreements given 18 that no party or nonparty has presented a basis for sealing them (or references to them). See Civil 19 L.R. 79-5(f). 20 VI. CONCLUSION 21 The Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss. See Dkt. No. 73. Accordingly, the 22 Court also LIFTS the discovery stay. See Dkt. No. 64. 23 The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the parties’ requests to determine 24 whether another party’s material should be sealed. See Dkt. Nos. 84, 85. Sealing is GRANTED 25 as to the materials specified by non-party Hootsuite in Dkt. No. 91-1 and DENIED otherwise. 26 The Court DIRECTS the parties to file public versions of all documents for which the 27 proposed sealing has been denied within ten days from the date of this order. Only the specific 1 conforming versions of any document that it originally filed unless the parties mutually agree on a 2 || different allocation of this work. 3 The Court further SETS a telephonic case management conference for April 9, 2024 at 4 || 2:00pm. The Court further DIRECTS the parties to submit a joint case management statement by 5 April 2, 2024. All counsel shall use the following dial-in information to access the call: 6 Dial-in: 888-808-6929 7 Passcode: 6064255 8 For call clarity, parties shall NOT use speaker phone or earpieces for these calls, and where 9 at all possible, parties shall use landlines. All attorneys appearing for a telephonic case 10 || management conference are required to dial in at least 15 minutes before the hearing to check in 11 with the CRD. The parties should be prepared to discuss how to move this case forward 12 || efficiently. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. || Dated: 3/21/2024 AMasprerd 8 hdl) HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. = 16 United States District Judge

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