Crow v. State

325 S.W.2d 419, 1959 Tex. App. LEXIS 2496
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMay 6, 1959
DocketNo. 10653
StatusPublished

This text of 325 S.W.2d 419 (Crow v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crow v. State, 325 S.W.2d 419, 1959 Tex. App. LEXIS 2496 (Tex. Ct. App. 1959).

Opinions

PER CURIAM.

This is a suit brought by appellant, Joe Crow, against appellees, the State, the State Highway Department, its individual members and the Highway Engineer, to recover compensation for the taking of or damage to property under Texas Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 17, Vernon’s Ann.St. The Legislature granted appellant permission to bring the suit on April 5, 1954, by House Concurrent Resolution No. 30.

In 1951 appellant purchased a tract of land in Travis County containing 61 acres, more or less. The trace is bounded on the east by Burnet Road which was formerly designated as U. S. Highway 183 and pri- or to that as State Highway 29. During the period from February, 1947 to March, 1948 the Highway Department, caused improvements, additions and alterations to be constructed on the above highway adjacent to the property purchased by appellant.

Prior to this construction and in 1941 a deed from Chas. J. Anderson and wife, the then owners of the above land and appellant’s grantors, was secured. This deed recited a consideration of $13 and conveyed a tract of land 60 feet by 192 feet described as “lying within the limits of the right of way of relocated State Plighway 29” and containing .046 acres. This tract was out of the southeast portion of the Anderson land. This deed also provided that:

“The undersigned grantor herein for the same consideration hereby specially agree that the consideration above recited includes adequate and complete compensation for any and all damages, present or future, that may be done to the remainder of the tract above referred to and in consideration of the premises and the [420]*420■ payment to us of the sum of money • above acknowledged, we hereby release the State of Texas from any and all damages, if any, present or future, that may be lawfully done to the remainder of our said tract of land by virtue of the construction and maintenance of the new proposed Highway No. 29, or by virtue of any lawful drainage in connection therewith or by virtue of any lawful operations of any nature in connection with said road and its appurtenances.”

As material here the improvements and alterations consisted of the removal of two metal culverts running- from east to west under then Highway 29 and adjacent to the Anderson property. These metal culverts were 24 inches in diameter and in their place a concrete culvert was constructed which consisted of two channels each being five feet wide and three feet high. At this time there was an earthen dike along the east boundary of the Anderson land it having been placed there by Anderson’s grantor.

It was alleged that no damage had resulted to the land from water draining onto it until after appellant acquired it and further that water from the northeast and east was diverted through the concrete culvert onto appellant’s land causing the damage here sued for.

A jury trial was had and 14 special issues were submitted. However due to .findings and instructions only six were answered. The jury answered: (1) that prior to appellant’s purchase of the land there had not been any substantial injury to it; (2) that drainage from the highway did not do substantial injury to appellant’s land after he purchased it; (8) that the parties to the right of way deed intended to release damages caused by an unnatural diversion of water onto the land; (9) that at the time the Andersons signed the right of way deed and at the time the State accepted it the parties reasonably foresaw the diversion of water from the highway onto the land; (10) that prior to his purchase appellant was not aware of potential damage to the land from overflow by water, and (11) that prior to the construction of Highway 29 the natural drainage of water was down the barrow ditches on the east side of the land. On these findings of the jury a judgment that appellant take nothing was rendered.

Appellant here presents two points to the effect that the jury’s answers to issues two, eight and nine are contrary to the great weight of the evidence if not to the uncontradicted and undisputed evidence and are not supported by evidence having probative value for which reasons the trial court erred in overruling his motion for judgment non obstante veredicto and in overruling his motion for a new trial. By one counterpoint appellees join issue with appellant on his two points supra.

There is no controversy as to the jury’s answers to issues one, ten and eleven. Also we note that issues two and nine inquire respectively as to drainage and diversion of water from the highway and issue eight inquires as to the unnatural diversion of water onto the land. The parties here treat the jury’s findings as relating to the drainage of water from the areas to the east and northeast of appellant’s land. In our consideration of the evidence we will do the same as there is no dispute that water from the areas to the northeast and east drained to the east side of the highway. The dispute is as to the discharge of this water onto appellant’s land through the concrete culvert and resulting damage.

The evidence shows without dispute that, the highway not considered, the natural drainage of surface water is from the northeast and east to the southwest and west across appellant’s property. Also that there is drainage of surface water from an area of from 300 to 356 acres of land to the east side of the highway. Prior to the construction of old Highway 29 there was a county road along its route. The evidence also shows that prior to the alleged damage [421]*421in question there was no overflow of the dike along the east boundary of the land.

Mr. Fincher, the engineer in charge of the engineering work at the time the culvert in question was constructed, testified that he never saw water from the culvert go over the earthen dike along the boundary of the Anderson property; that looking southwest from the culvert there was a slight drain or swale across the land which was pasture and sodded and said:

“I don’t recall any defined ditch in it, but there was a low where water before that had drained that way. * * *
“Q. Did you in your function as Highway Engineer for the Highway Department direct that an easement be obtained from the Andersons from the culvert across the property on that diagonal? A. My memory is that I sent my assistant to see Mr. Anderson to see if we could get an easement across his property, and we were unable to get that easement to take that water down that drain.
“Q. Did you want to get an easement so that you could let water come out of the culvert and across Mr. Crow’s property in that little swale that you are talking about? A. That was Mr. Anderson’s then.
“Q. You wanted the easement, but you were not able to get it. A. That’s right.”

He located the concrete culvert in question as being at the northeast quarter of the Joe Crow property and said that he left the Highway Department in 1954.

Chas. J. Anderson testified that he owned the land from 1910 until he sold it to appellant in 1951; that during all of that time there was an earthen dike along the east boundary and that water never overflowed it and that at the time he sold the land to appellant there was no wash across it but that there is one now. Mrs. Anderson gave testimony which was substantially the same as that given by Mr. Anderson.

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Bluebook (online)
325 S.W.2d 419, 1959 Tex. App. LEXIS 2496, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crow-v-state-texapp-1959.