GUITTARD, Chief Justice.
This suit for unemployment compensation was filed by appellant Carolyn G. Crosland nine days after the Texas Employment Commission mailed to her its decision overruling her motion for rehearing of its decision denying her claim. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the filing was premature under Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5221b — 4(h) and (i) (Vernon 1971). That article reads:
(h) Appeal to Courts: Any decision of the Commission shall become final ten (10) days after the date of mailing thereof, unless, within such ten (10) days, the appeal is reopened by Commission order or a party to the appeal files a written motion for rehearing, and judicial review of any final decision of the Commission shall be permitted only after any party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has exhausted his remedies (not including a motion for rehearing) before the Commission as provided by this Act.
(i) Court Review: Within ten (10) days after the decision of the Commission has become final, and not before, any party aggrieved thereby may secure a judicial review thereof by commencing an action . [emphasis added].
We conclude that premature filing of the action did not deprive the court of jurisdiction under the circumstances shown in this record.
As we interpret the statute, judicial review is permitted only after the decision of the Commission has become final, and the decision does not become final until ten days after the date of mailing. Within that ten days the Commission itself may reopen its order, or any party may file a motion for rehearing. When a motion for rehearing has been filed within the ten-day period allowed, the Commission’s order overruling the motion for rehearing does not become final until ten days after mailing that order.
The difficulty arises from the provision of subdivision (i) that permits judicial review by commencing an action “[wjithin ten (10) days after the decision of the Commission has become final, and not before.” What is the effect of filing the petition for judicial review before the time permitted by this subdivision? The statute does not specify. It does not, by its terms, provide that the court can never obtain jurisdiction of an action prematurely filed, even if the petition is on file with the clerk within the ten days permitted for commencing the action. Therefore, we must construe the statute, and we are reluctant to construe it as a strict jurisdictional requirement that the same suit be filed again.
Crosland relies on Texas Employment Commission v. Stewart Oil Co., 153 Tex. 247, 267 S.W.2d 137 (1954), which held that such a premature filing was not fatal under the statute as it stood before it was amended in 1955. In that case, the supreme court said that since the petition was in the possession of the clerk at the end of the ten days, to insist upon the subsequent filing of a duplicate set of papers and obtaining a new filing stamp would be a “retreat into formalism,” and consequently, premature delivery of the petition to the clerk did not prevent it from taking effect when the Commission’s ruling became final.
The Stewart Oil case would control here but for the 1955 amendment, which added [317]*317the words “and not before.” The Commission insists that this amendment shows the intent of the legislature to change the law as declared in Stewart Oil and, therefore, to deny jurisdiction of an action prematurely commenced, even though the effect of this construction is to require the filing of another petition identical to the one already in the official custody of the clerk.
We are not convinced that the legislature intended to require this meaningless formality. A statute will not be interpreted so as to lead to a foolish or absurd result unless there is no alternative interpretation. McKinney v. Blankenship, 154 Tex. 632, 282 S.W.2d 691, 698 (1955); Trimmier v. Carlton, 116 Tex. 572, 296 S.W. 1070, 1074 (1927); Petroleum Casualty Co. v. Williams, 15 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tex.Com.App.1929, jdgmt adopted). Neither will a statute be construed to require a useless or idle thing if it is susceptible to any other construction. Connally v. Continental Southland Savings & Loan Ass’n, 121 Tex. 565, 51 S.W.2d 293, 298 (Tex.1932); Dovalina v. Albert, 409 S.W.2d 616, 621 (Tex.Civ. App.—Amarillo 1966, writ ref’d n. r. e.). A construction leading to a harsh or unjust result should be avoided, even when the literal text of the statute seems to require it. State Highway Dept. v. Gorham, 139 Tex. 361, 162 S.W.2d 934, 936 (1942); Anderson v. Penix, 138 Tex. 596, 161 S.W.2d 455, 459 (1942); Austin v. Strong, 117 Tex. 263,1 S.W .2d 872, 876 (1928). If adherence to the strict letter of the statute would lead to injustice of absurdity, the court’s duty is to seek the true meaning of the legislation. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 125 Tex. 430, 83 S.W.2d 929, 934 (1935). These principles of construction are applied even when the question is whether the legislature has granted permission to sue the State. State v. Hale, 136 Tex. 29, 146 S.W.2d 731, 735 (1941); Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance, 429 S.W .2d 930, 934 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1968, no writ).
We recognize that the legislature múst be presumed to have intended to change the statute by amending subdivision (i) in 1955. American Surety Co. v. Axtell Co., 120 Tex. 166, 36 S.W.2d 715, 719 (1931). Accordingly, we must construe the amendment so as to give it some effect. In this connection we must determine what the legislature intended to accomplish by the amendment and whether the legislative intent can be given that effect without requiring, as a jurisdictional prerequisite, the second filing of a petition already on file. We believe that the evident legislative intent can be given effect without such a harsh and absurd result. It is reasonable to conclude that after the opinion in Stewart Oil, the legislature was concerned that the filing of a suit before the decision of the Commission became final might be held to pre-empt the jurisdiction of the Commission, and thus to prevent the Commission from reopening its order, and that such premature filing might also prevent other parties from invoking further administrative action by filing a motion for rehearing as authorized by subdivision (h). Whether the Stewart Oil decision would have had that result is beside the point. The legislature was evidently concerned that no doubt be left as to whether the jurisdiction of the Commission might be pre-empted by filing of an action in court before expiration of the full ten days after the date of mailing. Thus, it amended subdivision (i) to provide that an action may be commenced “[w]ithin ten (10) days after the decision of the Commission has become final, and not before.”
Effect may be given to this evident legislative intent without requiring a second action to be filed when the first is filed prematurely.
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GUITTARD, Chief Justice.
This suit for unemployment compensation was filed by appellant Carolyn G. Crosland nine days after the Texas Employment Commission mailed to her its decision overruling her motion for rehearing of its decision denying her claim. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the filing was premature under Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5221b — 4(h) and (i) (Vernon 1971). That article reads:
(h) Appeal to Courts: Any decision of the Commission shall become final ten (10) days after the date of mailing thereof, unless, within such ten (10) days, the appeal is reopened by Commission order or a party to the appeal files a written motion for rehearing, and judicial review of any final decision of the Commission shall be permitted only after any party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has exhausted his remedies (not including a motion for rehearing) before the Commission as provided by this Act.
(i) Court Review: Within ten (10) days after the decision of the Commission has become final, and not before, any party aggrieved thereby may secure a judicial review thereof by commencing an action . [emphasis added].
We conclude that premature filing of the action did not deprive the court of jurisdiction under the circumstances shown in this record.
As we interpret the statute, judicial review is permitted only after the decision of the Commission has become final, and the decision does not become final until ten days after the date of mailing. Within that ten days the Commission itself may reopen its order, or any party may file a motion for rehearing. When a motion for rehearing has been filed within the ten-day period allowed, the Commission’s order overruling the motion for rehearing does not become final until ten days after mailing that order.
The difficulty arises from the provision of subdivision (i) that permits judicial review by commencing an action “[wjithin ten (10) days after the decision of the Commission has become final, and not before.” What is the effect of filing the petition for judicial review before the time permitted by this subdivision? The statute does not specify. It does not, by its terms, provide that the court can never obtain jurisdiction of an action prematurely filed, even if the petition is on file with the clerk within the ten days permitted for commencing the action. Therefore, we must construe the statute, and we are reluctant to construe it as a strict jurisdictional requirement that the same suit be filed again.
Crosland relies on Texas Employment Commission v. Stewart Oil Co., 153 Tex. 247, 267 S.W.2d 137 (1954), which held that such a premature filing was not fatal under the statute as it stood before it was amended in 1955. In that case, the supreme court said that since the petition was in the possession of the clerk at the end of the ten days, to insist upon the subsequent filing of a duplicate set of papers and obtaining a new filing stamp would be a “retreat into formalism,” and consequently, premature delivery of the petition to the clerk did not prevent it from taking effect when the Commission’s ruling became final.
The Stewart Oil case would control here but for the 1955 amendment, which added [317]*317the words “and not before.” The Commission insists that this amendment shows the intent of the legislature to change the law as declared in Stewart Oil and, therefore, to deny jurisdiction of an action prematurely commenced, even though the effect of this construction is to require the filing of another petition identical to the one already in the official custody of the clerk.
We are not convinced that the legislature intended to require this meaningless formality. A statute will not be interpreted so as to lead to a foolish or absurd result unless there is no alternative interpretation. McKinney v. Blankenship, 154 Tex. 632, 282 S.W.2d 691, 698 (1955); Trimmier v. Carlton, 116 Tex. 572, 296 S.W. 1070, 1074 (1927); Petroleum Casualty Co. v. Williams, 15 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tex.Com.App.1929, jdgmt adopted). Neither will a statute be construed to require a useless or idle thing if it is susceptible to any other construction. Connally v. Continental Southland Savings & Loan Ass’n, 121 Tex. 565, 51 S.W.2d 293, 298 (Tex.1932); Dovalina v. Albert, 409 S.W.2d 616, 621 (Tex.Civ. App.—Amarillo 1966, writ ref’d n. r. e.). A construction leading to a harsh or unjust result should be avoided, even when the literal text of the statute seems to require it. State Highway Dept. v. Gorham, 139 Tex. 361, 162 S.W.2d 934, 936 (1942); Anderson v. Penix, 138 Tex. 596, 161 S.W.2d 455, 459 (1942); Austin v. Strong, 117 Tex. 263,1 S.W .2d 872, 876 (1928). If adherence to the strict letter of the statute would lead to injustice of absurdity, the court’s duty is to seek the true meaning of the legislation. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 125 Tex. 430, 83 S.W.2d 929, 934 (1935). These principles of construction are applied even when the question is whether the legislature has granted permission to sue the State. State v. Hale, 136 Tex. 29, 146 S.W.2d 731, 735 (1941); Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance, 429 S.W .2d 930, 934 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1968, no writ).
We recognize that the legislature múst be presumed to have intended to change the statute by amending subdivision (i) in 1955. American Surety Co. v. Axtell Co., 120 Tex. 166, 36 S.W.2d 715, 719 (1931). Accordingly, we must construe the amendment so as to give it some effect. In this connection we must determine what the legislature intended to accomplish by the amendment and whether the legislative intent can be given that effect without requiring, as a jurisdictional prerequisite, the second filing of a petition already on file. We believe that the evident legislative intent can be given effect without such a harsh and absurd result. It is reasonable to conclude that after the opinion in Stewart Oil, the legislature was concerned that the filing of a suit before the decision of the Commission became final might be held to pre-empt the jurisdiction of the Commission, and thus to prevent the Commission from reopening its order, and that such premature filing might also prevent other parties from invoking further administrative action by filing a motion for rehearing as authorized by subdivision (h). Whether the Stewart Oil decision would have had that result is beside the point. The legislature was evidently concerned that no doubt be left as to whether the jurisdiction of the Commission might be pre-empted by filing of an action in court before expiration of the full ten days after the date of mailing. Thus, it amended subdivision (i) to provide that an action may be commenced “[w]ithin ten (10) days after the decision of the Commission has become final, and not before.”
Effect may be given to this evident legislative intent without requiring a second action to be filed when the first is filed prematurely. Full effect can be given to that intent by holding that when a suit is prematurely filed, it can have no effect on the jurisdiction of the Commission and is a nullity until the Commission’s decision becomes final. If the Commission’s decision is not final, the Commission may reopen its order or any party may file a motion for rehearing, notwithstanding the premature filing of the suit. In that event the Commission will retain jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the matter. Meanwhile, the petition on file in court has no effect on the [318]*318administrative process, and the court has no power to proceed until that process is complete. When the Commission’s order becomes final, however, if a proper petition is on file with the clerk, or if such a petition is filed within the ten-day period allowed by subdivision (i), the court then has jurisdiction and may proceed.
Moreover, subdivision (i) does not expressly provide that the petition shall not be filed before the Commission’s decision becomes final. It provides, rather, that the aggrieved party may not commence an action to secure judicial review before that time. An action is not necessarily commenced when the petition is filed. In cases determining when an action has been commenced within the statutes of limitation, commencement is held to require also diligence in service of process. Rigo Mfg. Co. v. Thomas, 458 S.W.2d 180, 182 (Tex.1970). Under this rule the statutory prohibition of commencing the action before the Commission’s decision becomes final can be given full effect by holding, as we do, that the action is not commenced by premature filing of the petition and cannot be considered commenced until the Commission’s decision becomes final. Then a petition already filed with the clerk will constitute commencement of the action within subdivision (i) if plaintiff ,is diligent thereafter to obtain service of process. Service before the Commission’s decision becomes final would be no more effective than service before the petition is filed. Premature service might have a tendency to discourage other parties from seeking further administrative relief and, therefore, would be within the prohibition of the amended statute. Filing the petition, however, would not, in itself, be likely to have that result. In this case no question of premature service is presented because the record shows that process was not served until after the Commission’s decision became final.
The rule concerning avoidance of absurdity and injustice in the construction of statutes is particularly applicable in this case because of the crucial practical problem facing counsel for Crosland when the petition was filed. He had already filed a motion for rehearing and the Commission had overruled it. Did the Commission’s decision become final when the motion was overruled, or did it become final ten days after the order overruling the motion was mailed? A lawyer accustomed to the procedure for obtaining review of decisions of trial courts and courts of civil appeals under Tex.R. Civ.P. 356 and 468 might have cause for uncertainty as to whether the ten days for commencing the action began when the motion was overruled or ten days later. Counsel might have taken the safe course by filing one action, as he did, within ten days after the motion was overruled, and then filing another more than ten days after the date of mailing the order. In our view it would be unjust and absurd to expect him to file two such identical suits, particularly in such a small matter as a claim for unemployment compensation. To affirm the trial court’s dismissal for want of jurisdiction, we would have to hold that by interpreting the statute as requiring the filing of the petition within ten days after mailing of the Commission’s order, counsel made a fatally erroneous interpretation of the statute. It would be unjust, unreasonable, and absurd to hold that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because counsel did not file the same petition again on the next business day. Consequently, under the authorities cited, we cannot attribute to the legislature an intention to require such a result.
Since the record fails to show that any further administrative proceedings were undertaken that would prevent the decision of the Commission from becoming final within ten days after it was mailed, we hold that the petition in the possession of the clerk after the Commission’s order became final, and before the expiration of the ten-day period allowed by subdivision (i), vested jurisdiction in the court to proceed with the action. Consequently, the court erred in dismissing the action for lack of jurisdiction.
Reversed and remanded.