Crooker v. Metallo
This text of Crooker v. Metallo (Crooker v. Metallo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Bluebook
Crooker v. Metallo, (1st Cir. 1993).
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
___________________
No. 93-1370
STEPHEN S. CROOKER AND PAMELA A. CROOKER,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
PAUL METALLO, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellants.
__________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Frank H. Freedman, U.S. District Judge]
___________________
___________________
Before
Breyer, Chief Judge,
___________
Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
______________
___________________
Stephen S. Crooker and Pamela A. Crooker on brief pro se.
__________________ _________________
Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, and William J. Meade,
_________________ _________________
Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellants.
__________________
September 29, 1993
__________________
SELYA, Circuit Judge. The issue presented in this
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
______________
appeal is whether the defendants, parole officers, violated a
clearly established constitutional right of which a
reasonable person would have known when, in August 1989, they
arrested plaintiff Stephen S. Crooker at his home for sundry
parole violations. The officers conducted a protective sweep
incident to the arrest. Stephen Crooker and his wife,
Pamela, brought suit, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging
that the search violated their Fourth Amendment rights.
Particularly, they allege that, during the sweep, an officer
lifted their mattress from its box spring and looked between
the two.1 The district court denied the defendants' claim
of qualified immunity. The defendants appeal. We reverse.
When defendants executed the arrest warrant for Stephen
Crooker, they "possesse[d] a reasonable belief based on
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant[ed]
the officer[s] in believing," that the Crookers' home
harbored an individual, one Vincent Tondryk, who "pos[ed] a
danger to the officer[s] or others." Maryland v. Buie, 494
________ ____
U.S. 325, 327 (1990) (citations omitted); see also Michigan
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1. The defendants deny that, in fact, the mattress was
lifted from the box spring. That factual dispute remains
unresolved. Our determination of the issue of qualified
immunity does not depend on resolution of that dispute as we
assume arguendo that the mattress search took place in the
________
manner asserted by the plaintiffs.
-2-
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392
____ _____ ____
U.S. 1, 21 (1968). This reasonable belief permitted a
protective sweep of the premises, i.e., "a quick and limited
____
search of premises, incident to [the] arrest and conducted to
protect the safety of police officers or others." Buie, 494
____
U.S. at 327; see also United States v. Curzi, 867 F.2d 36, 39
________ _____________ _____
n.2 (1st Cir. 1989). The defendants, therefore, were
justified in searching the Crookers' home for Tondryk and
looking in places where Tondryk might have been hiding.
Although the district court so found, it nevertheless denied
the defendants' claim of qualified immunity on the ground
that the search between the mattress and box spring was not
within the proper confines of a protective sweep because it
would not be reasonable to expect a person to be hiding in
those environs. Thus, the court reasoned, the search was not
permissible in the absence of a search warrant.
It is true that Buie speaks of a protective sweep
____
"narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those
places in which a person might be hiding." Buie, 494 U.S. at
____
327. The facts of Buie, however, did not present the issue
____
of the permissibility of a limited search for accessible
weapons (which it is not unreasonable to expect might be
hidden between a mattress and box spring) conducted
simultaneously with the search for a dangerous confederate of
the arrestee. Thus, we cannot say, even today, that Buie
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-3-
forecloses the possibility that such a scenario is lawful.
Indeed, the Second Circuit recently determined that a
protective sweep can include a search for weapons within easy
___
reach of an individual whom the officers have reasonably
concluded is dangerous. See United States v. Hernandez, 941
___ _____________ _________
F.2d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 1991); see also United States v.
_________ ______________
Lopez, 989 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1993) (upholding a weapons
_____
search where the police had ample basis for believing that a
dangerous weapon was lodged close by, that the defendant
might not be acting alone, and that the premises were not
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Related
Michigan v. Long
463 U.S. 1032 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Davis v. Scherer
468 U.S. 183 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Anderson v. Creighton
483 U.S. 635 (Supreme Court, 1987)
Griffin v. Wisconsin
483 U.S. 868 (Supreme Court, 1987)
United States v. Juan Guilbe Irizarry and Jose Garcia Rodriguez
673 F.2d 554 (First Circuit, 1982)
United States v. James I. Elkins and Carol A. Dichtel
732 F.2d 1280 (Sixth Circuit, 1984)
Robert A. Borucki v. W. Michael Ryan, Etc.
827 F.2d 836 (First Circuit, 1987)
United States v. Barbara J. Curzi
867 F.2d 36 (First Circuit, 1989)
United States v. Edward Cardona
903 F.2d 60 (First Circuit, 1990)
Henry H. Amsden v. Thomas F. Moran, Etc.
904 F.2d 748 (First Circuit, 1990)
Dinhora Quintero De Quintero v. Awilda Aponte-Roque
974 F.2d 226 (First Circuit, 1992)
United States v. Alexander Lopez
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