Crooker v. Metallo

CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedOctober 4, 1993
Docket93-1370
StatusPublished

This text of Crooker v. Metallo (Crooker v. Metallo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crooker v. Metallo, (1st Cir. 1993).

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion


UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

___________________

No. 93-1370

STEPHEN S. CROOKER AND PAMELA A. CROOKER,

Plaintiffs, Appellees,

v.

PAUL METALLO, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellants.

__________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Frank H. Freedman, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

___________________

Before

Breyer, Chief Judge,
___________
Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
______________

___________________

Stephen S. Crooker and Pamela A. Crooker on brief pro se.
__________________ _________________
Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, and William J. Meade,
_________________ _________________
Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellants.

__________________
September 29, 1993
__________________

SELYA, Circuit Judge. The issue presented in this
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
______________

appeal is whether the defendants, parole officers, violated a

clearly established constitutional right of which a

reasonable person would have known when, in August 1989, they

arrested plaintiff Stephen S. Crooker at his home for sundry

parole violations. The officers conducted a protective sweep

incident to the arrest. Stephen Crooker and his wife,

Pamela, brought suit, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging

that the search violated their Fourth Amendment rights.

Particularly, they allege that, during the sweep, an officer

lifted their mattress from its box spring and looked between

the two.1 The district court denied the defendants' claim

of qualified immunity. The defendants appeal. We reverse.

When defendants executed the arrest warrant for Stephen

Crooker, they "possesse[d] a reasonable belief based on

specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the

rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant[ed]

the officer[s] in believing," that the Crookers' home

harbored an individual, one Vincent Tondryk, who "pos[ed] a

danger to the officer[s] or others." Maryland v. Buie, 494
________ ____

U.S. 325, 327 (1990) (citations omitted); see also Michigan
________ ________

____________________

1. The defendants deny that, in fact, the mattress was
lifted from the box spring. That factual dispute remains
unresolved. Our determination of the issue of qualified
immunity does not depend on resolution of that dispute as we
assume arguendo that the mattress search took place in the
________
manner asserted by the plaintiffs.

-2-

v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392
____ _____ ____

U.S. 1, 21 (1968). This reasonable belief permitted a

protective sweep of the premises, i.e., "a quick and limited
____

search of premises, incident to [the] arrest and conducted to

protect the safety of police officers or others." Buie, 494
____

U.S. at 327; see also United States v. Curzi, 867 F.2d 36, 39
________ _____________ _____

n.2 (1st Cir. 1989). The defendants, therefore, were

justified in searching the Crookers' home for Tondryk and

looking in places where Tondryk might have been hiding.

Although the district court so found, it nevertheless denied

the defendants' claim of qualified immunity on the ground

that the search between the mattress and box spring was not

within the proper confines of a protective sweep because it

would not be reasonable to expect a person to be hiding in

those environs. Thus, the court reasoned, the search was not

permissible in the absence of a search warrant.

It is true that Buie speaks of a protective sweep
____

"narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those

places in which a person might be hiding." Buie, 494 U.S. at
____

327. The facts of Buie, however, did not present the issue
____

of the permissibility of a limited search for accessible

weapons (which it is not unreasonable to expect might be

hidden between a mattress and box spring) conducted

simultaneously with the search for a dangerous confederate of

the arrestee. Thus, we cannot say, even today, that Buie
____

-3-

forecloses the possibility that such a scenario is lawful.

Indeed, the Second Circuit recently determined that a

protective sweep can include a search for weapons within easy
___

reach of an individual whom the officers have reasonably

concluded is dangerous. See United States v. Hernandez, 941
___ _____________ _________

F.2d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 1991); see also United States v.
_________ ______________

Lopez, 989 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1993) (upholding a weapons
_____

search where the police had ample basis for believing that a

dangerous weapon was lodged close by, that the defendant

might not be acting alone, and that the premises were not

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Michigan v. Long
463 U.S. 1032 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Davis v. Scherer
468 U.S. 183 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Anderson v. Creighton
483 U.S. 635 (Supreme Court, 1987)
Griffin v. Wisconsin
483 U.S. 868 (Supreme Court, 1987)
Robert A. Borucki v. W. Michael Ryan, Etc.
827 F.2d 836 (First Circuit, 1987)
United States v. Barbara J. Curzi
867 F.2d 36 (First Circuit, 1989)
United States v. Edward Cardona
903 F.2d 60 (First Circuit, 1990)
Henry H. Amsden v. Thomas F. Moran, Etc.
904 F.2d 748 (First Circuit, 1990)
Dinhora Quintero De Quintero v. Awilda Aponte-Roque
974 F.2d 226 (First Circuit, 1992)
United States v. Alexander Lopez
989 F.2d 24 (First Circuit, 1993)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Crooker v. Metallo, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crooker-v-metallo-ca1-1993.