Cromwell v. New York City Department of Social Services

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Cromwell v. New York City Department of Social Services

239 A.D.2d 299, 658 N.Y.S.2d 24, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5724

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 29, 1997

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 239 A.D.2d 299 (Cromwell v. New York City Department of Social Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Cromwell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 239 A.D.2d 299, 658 N.Y.S.2d 24, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5724 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).

Pincite

Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Louis York, J.), entered November 30, 1995, which, in an action for common-law fraud and under 42 USC § 1983 seeking damages for emotional injuries suffered by plaintiffs, an infant and her aunt, due to defendant City Department of Social Services’ failure to comply with a Family Court order that purportedly directed it to deliver the infant to the aunt in Florida, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

We agree with the IAS Court that not until the Family Court decision of December 1989 could plaintiff aunt have possibly known that, as found therein, defendant had violated the July 1987 Family Court order purportedly directing placement of the infant with the aunt by placing the infant with a foster family, had lied to the aunt about such foster placement and its efforts to further the aunt’s adoption of the infant, and had lied and altered files at the 1989 hearing. Accordingly, the date of such decision marked the accrual of both the aunt’s section 1983 (see, Eagleston v Guido, 41 F3d 865, 871, cert denied 516 US 808) and common-law fraud claims (CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]), rendering both timely, as well as her notice of claim (see, Matter of Orsell v Board of Educ., 23 AD2d 703). We also agree with the IAS Court that while defendant’s placement of the infant with a foster family was a discretionary, nonactionable act (Tango v Tulevech, 61 NY2d 34, 40), its alleged mendacity in dealing with the aunt and at the 1989 hearing state a cause of action under both Federal and State law. We have considered defendant’s other arguments and find them to be without merit. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Sullivan, Nardelli and Tom, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Louis York, J.), entered November 30, 1995, which, in an action for common-law fraud and under 42 USC § 1983 seeking damages for emotional injuries suffered by plaintiffs, an infant and her aunt, due to defendant City Department of Social Services’ failure to comply with a Family Court order that purportedly directed it to deliver the infant to the aunt in Florida, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

We agree with the IAS Court that not until the Family Court decision of December 1989 could plaintiff aunt have possibly known that, as found therein, defendant had violated the July 1987 Family Court order purportedly directing placement of the infant with the aunt by placing the infant with a foster family, had lied to the aunt about such foster placement and its efforts to further the aunt’s adoption of the infant, and had lied and altered files at the 1989 hearing. Accordingly, the date of such decision marked the accrual of both the aunt’s section 1983 (see, Eagleston v Guido, 41 F3d 865, 871, cert denied 516 US 808) and common-law fraud claims (CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]), rendering both timely, as well as her notice of claim (see, Matter of Orsell v Board of Educ., 23 AD2d 703). We also agree with the IAS Court that while defendant’s placement of the infant with a foster family was a discretionary, nonactionable act (Tango v Tulevech, 61 NY2d 34, 40), its alleged mendacity in dealing with the aunt and at the 1989 hearing state a cause of action under both Federal and State law. We have considered defendant’s other arguments and find them to be without merit. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Sullivan, Nardelli and Tom, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

239 A.D.2d 299, 658 N.Y.S.2d 24, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5724, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cromwell-v-new-york-city-department-of-social-services-nyappdiv-1997.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack