3 Case No.: 2:25-cv-00917-JAD-MDC Angel Michael Crockford, 4 Plaintiff Order Resolving Motions, Directing 5 v. Renewed Briefing on the County’s Motion to Dismiss, and Striking Rogue Filings 6 Clark County Department of Family Services, et al., [ECF Nos. 32, 36, 39, 42, 58, 55, 62, 72, 75, 7 85, 92] Defendants 8
9 Pro se plaintiff Angel Michael Crockford sues the Clark County Department of Family 10 Services, several County employees,1 and his ex-wife Alicia Renee Cuscianna2 for the wrongs he 11 believes he’s endured over the course of a contentious child-custody dispute. The docket in this 12 case has exploded with filings since it was initiated just three months ago. I issue this order to 13 clean up the docket, advise the pro se parties of some rules they must follow, and resolve 14 ancillary motions to the pending motion to dismiss and motion for a temporary-restraining order 15 and preliminary injunction, which will be resolved in due course. 16 17 18 19 20 21 1 I refer collectively to the County defendants as “the County” for clarity’s sake only. In doing 22 so I express no opinion about the validity of the County defendants’ argument in their motion to dismiss that Clark County must be named as a defendant in this case. 23 2 Alicia is identified in the complaint as Alicia Crockford. Because it appears that she has changed her name, I refer to her as Cuscianna throughout this order. 1 Discussion 2 A. ECF Nos. 38 and 39 are struck, and ECF No. 49 is Crockford’s operative response 3 to the County’s motion to seal.
4 In early July, the County filed a motion to seal its response to Crockford’s still-pending 5 motions for a temporary-restraining order and preliminary injunction.3 Crockford opposed that 6 motion because he believed that the County was attempting to withhold the documents from 7 him.4 He also moved to compel the County to provide those documents to him.5 And he filed a 8 separate response to the merits of the County’s motion, arguing that it seeks to seal more than 9 required.6 The County moved to strike that motion because Crockford had already filed a 10 response.7 11 This flurry of motions stems from Crockford’s misunderstanding of what the County 12 sought to do with its motion to seal. He believed that the County was attempting to seal the 13 documents from his view.8 After the County clarified that was not its intent and confirmed that it 14 gave Crockford all of the sealed documents,9 Crockford moved to strike his initial response and 15 his motion to compel and to clarify that his merits response should be considered as the only 16 response to the motion to seal.10 17 18
3 ECF No. 32. 19 4 ECF No. 38. 20 5 ECF No. 39. 21 6 ECF No. 49. 7 ECF No. 55. 22 8 See ECF Nos. 38, 39. 23 9 ECF No. 46. 10 ECF No. 62. 1 The County doesn’t oppose Crockford’s motion to strike and agrees that his merits 2 response should be considered his operative response to its sealing motion.11 So, because the 3 parties agree that Crockford’s earlier filings on this matter should be struck, I grant Crockford’s 4 motion and strike those filings. Crockford is advised that if this situation comes up in the future, 5 he may simply file a notice withdrawing his own filings—he need not move to strike them. And
6 because the County agrees that Crockford’s merits response should be considered as his only 7 response to its motion to seal, I deny as moot its motion to strike that document. The County is 8 advised that it could have also withdrawn its motion to strike once it determined that it was no 9 longer justified in seeking that relief. 10 B. The County’s motion to seal its response to Crockford’s injunction motions is 11 denied without prejudice to its ability to refile the motion and the documents that warrant sealing in accordance with Ninth Circuit standards and this court’s local 12 rules.
13 The County’s motion to seal seeks to seal the entirety of its response to Crockford’s 14 injunction motions and its attached Exhibit 1—which contains various documents from the 15 underlying state-court cases—based on its representations that the documents contain child- 16 welfare-service and medical records that should not be made public.12 Crockford opposes 17 because sealing the entire response is too broad and “the public has a compelling interest in 18 understanding how the child welfare system is used—at times allegedly abusively—under color 19 of law.”13 He asks that most of the documents be unsealed in a redacted form.14 20 21 11 ECF Nos. 81, 82. 22 12 ECF No. 32. 23 13 ECF No. 49 at 4. 14 Id. at 9. 1 “The public has a ‘general right to inspect and copy public records and documents 2 including judicial records and documents.’”15 “Although the common law right of access is not 3 absolute, ‘[courts] start with a strong presumption in favor of access to court records.’”16 A party 4 seeking to seal judicial records attached to dispositive motions like the injunction motions at 5 issue here17 can overcome the strong presumption of access by providing “sufficiently
6 compelling reasons” that override the public policies favoring disclosure.18 “When ruling on a 7 motion to seal court records, the district court must balance the competing interests of the public 8 and the party seeking to seal judicial records” and “articulate a factual basis for each compelling 9 reason to seal.”19 10 The County moves to seal the entirety of its response and 61-page exhibit because they 11 contain child-welfare-service records and medical information.20 It relies on Nevada Revised 12 Statute (NRS) 432B.280, which states that “information maintained by an agency [that] provides 13 child welfare services, including . . . reports and investigations . . . is confidential”21 and 14 NRS 432B.290(2)(e), which permits child-welfare agencies to provide that information to a
15 16 15 In re Midland Nat. Life Ins. Co. Annuity Sales Pracs. Litig., 686 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 17 2012) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns., Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)). 16 Id. (quoting Foltz v. St. Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). 18 17 For sealing purposes, the Ninth Circuit considers dispositive any motion that “is more than 19 tangentially related to the underlying cause of action.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Crockford’s injunction motions 20 and the County’s response obviously meet that definition, and both parties agree. See ECF Nos. 32 and 49 (both analyzing the sealing issue under the compelling-reasons standard). 21 18 In re Midland, 686 F.3d at 1118; see also Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2006). 22 19 In re Midland, 686 F.3d at 1119 (citations omitted). 23 20 ECF No. 32 at 3. 21 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 432B.280(1). 1 “court other than a juvenile court, for in camera inspection only, unless the court determines that 2 public disclosure of the information is necessary for the determination of an issue before it[.]”22 3 It also argues that some of the information in the exhibits contains private medical information.23 4 I have reviewed the sealed response and exhibits in camera, and I conclude that, though 5 there are compelling reasons to seal portions of the County’s exhibit that contain child-welfare
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3 Case No.: 2:25-cv-00917-JAD-MDC Angel Michael Crockford, 4 Plaintiff Order Resolving Motions, Directing 5 v. Renewed Briefing on the County’s Motion to Dismiss, and Striking Rogue Filings 6 Clark County Department of Family Services, et al., [ECF Nos. 32, 36, 39, 42, 58, 55, 62, 72, 75, 7 85, 92] Defendants 8
9 Pro se plaintiff Angel Michael Crockford sues the Clark County Department of Family 10 Services, several County employees,1 and his ex-wife Alicia Renee Cuscianna2 for the wrongs he 11 believes he’s endured over the course of a contentious child-custody dispute. The docket in this 12 case has exploded with filings since it was initiated just three months ago. I issue this order to 13 clean up the docket, advise the pro se parties of some rules they must follow, and resolve 14 ancillary motions to the pending motion to dismiss and motion for a temporary-restraining order 15 and preliminary injunction, which will be resolved in due course. 16 17 18 19 20 21 1 I refer collectively to the County defendants as “the County” for clarity’s sake only. In doing 22 so I express no opinion about the validity of the County defendants’ argument in their motion to dismiss that Clark County must be named as a defendant in this case. 23 2 Alicia is identified in the complaint as Alicia Crockford. Because it appears that she has changed her name, I refer to her as Cuscianna throughout this order. 1 Discussion 2 A. ECF Nos. 38 and 39 are struck, and ECF No. 49 is Crockford’s operative response 3 to the County’s motion to seal.
4 In early July, the County filed a motion to seal its response to Crockford’s still-pending 5 motions for a temporary-restraining order and preliminary injunction.3 Crockford opposed that 6 motion because he believed that the County was attempting to withhold the documents from 7 him.4 He also moved to compel the County to provide those documents to him.5 And he filed a 8 separate response to the merits of the County’s motion, arguing that it seeks to seal more than 9 required.6 The County moved to strike that motion because Crockford had already filed a 10 response.7 11 This flurry of motions stems from Crockford’s misunderstanding of what the County 12 sought to do with its motion to seal. He believed that the County was attempting to seal the 13 documents from his view.8 After the County clarified that was not its intent and confirmed that it 14 gave Crockford all of the sealed documents,9 Crockford moved to strike his initial response and 15 his motion to compel and to clarify that his merits response should be considered as the only 16 response to the motion to seal.10 17 18
3 ECF No. 32. 19 4 ECF No. 38. 20 5 ECF No. 39. 21 6 ECF No. 49. 7 ECF No. 55. 22 8 See ECF Nos. 38, 39. 23 9 ECF No. 46. 10 ECF No. 62. 1 The County doesn’t oppose Crockford’s motion to strike and agrees that his merits 2 response should be considered his operative response to its sealing motion.11 So, because the 3 parties agree that Crockford’s earlier filings on this matter should be struck, I grant Crockford’s 4 motion and strike those filings. Crockford is advised that if this situation comes up in the future, 5 he may simply file a notice withdrawing his own filings—he need not move to strike them. And
6 because the County agrees that Crockford’s merits response should be considered as his only 7 response to its motion to seal, I deny as moot its motion to strike that document. The County is 8 advised that it could have also withdrawn its motion to strike once it determined that it was no 9 longer justified in seeking that relief. 10 B. The County’s motion to seal its response to Crockford’s injunction motions is 11 denied without prejudice to its ability to refile the motion and the documents that warrant sealing in accordance with Ninth Circuit standards and this court’s local 12 rules.
13 The County’s motion to seal seeks to seal the entirety of its response to Crockford’s 14 injunction motions and its attached Exhibit 1—which contains various documents from the 15 underlying state-court cases—based on its representations that the documents contain child- 16 welfare-service and medical records that should not be made public.12 Crockford opposes 17 because sealing the entire response is too broad and “the public has a compelling interest in 18 understanding how the child welfare system is used—at times allegedly abusively—under color 19 of law.”13 He asks that most of the documents be unsealed in a redacted form.14 20 21 11 ECF Nos. 81, 82. 22 12 ECF No. 32. 23 13 ECF No. 49 at 4. 14 Id. at 9. 1 “The public has a ‘general right to inspect and copy public records and documents 2 including judicial records and documents.’”15 “Although the common law right of access is not 3 absolute, ‘[courts] start with a strong presumption in favor of access to court records.’”16 A party 4 seeking to seal judicial records attached to dispositive motions like the injunction motions at 5 issue here17 can overcome the strong presumption of access by providing “sufficiently
6 compelling reasons” that override the public policies favoring disclosure.18 “When ruling on a 7 motion to seal court records, the district court must balance the competing interests of the public 8 and the party seeking to seal judicial records” and “articulate a factual basis for each compelling 9 reason to seal.”19 10 The County moves to seal the entirety of its response and 61-page exhibit because they 11 contain child-welfare-service records and medical information.20 It relies on Nevada Revised 12 Statute (NRS) 432B.280, which states that “information maintained by an agency [that] provides 13 child welfare services, including . . . reports and investigations . . . is confidential”21 and 14 NRS 432B.290(2)(e), which permits child-welfare agencies to provide that information to a
15 16 15 In re Midland Nat. Life Ins. Co. Annuity Sales Pracs. Litig., 686 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 17 2012) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns., Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)). 16 Id. (quoting Foltz v. St. Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). 18 17 For sealing purposes, the Ninth Circuit considers dispositive any motion that “is more than 19 tangentially related to the underlying cause of action.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Crockford’s injunction motions 20 and the County’s response obviously meet that definition, and both parties agree. See ECF Nos. 32 and 49 (both analyzing the sealing issue under the compelling-reasons standard). 21 18 In re Midland, 686 F.3d at 1118; see also Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2006). 22 19 In re Midland, 686 F.3d at 1119 (citations omitted). 23 20 ECF No. 32 at 3. 21 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 432B.280(1). 1 “court other than a juvenile court, for in camera inspection only, unless the court determines that 2 public disclosure of the information is necessary for the determination of an issue before it[.]”22 3 It also argues that some of the information in the exhibits contains private medical information.23 4 I have reviewed the sealed response and exhibits in camera, and I conclude that, though 5 there are compelling reasons to seal portions of the County’s exhibit that contain child-welfare
6 reports and information concerning allegations of minor abuse before a juvenile court, the bulk 7 of the County’s response and omnibus exhibit do not appear to contain any such information. 8 Much of the County’s response discusses facts that have nothing to do with child-welfare reports 9 and investigations, and many of the exhibits are merely court minutes discussing various 10 proceedings related to the state-court custody cases at issue here. But because the County filed 11 one exhibit containing several different documents, it’s difficult to assess where one exhibit ends 12 and another begins, and which ones should be sealed. The County’s omnibus exhibit, attached as 13 part of the base document, also violates this district’s Local Rule IA 10-3, which makes it 14 impossible for the court to maintain the seal on some portions of the document but not others.
15 So, because the County failed to narrowly tailor its sealing request to the information that should 16 be sealed, and because the manner in which the County filed its response prevents the court from 17 unsealing the portions that don’t appear to satisfy the compelling-reasons standard, I deny its 18 motion to seal. 19 But because some of the County’s documents do contain sensitive information, I am 20 ordering a do-over. The County must take another look at its response and exhibits and apply a 21 more narrowly tailored approach to its sealing request. It must break up its “Exhibit 1” into 22
23 22 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 432B.290(2)(e). 23 ECF No. 32 at 3. 1 distinct exhibits for each document provided, and it must determine which of those exhibits 2 actually warrant sealing. The County must update its footnote references to those exhibits in its 3 response, but it may not make any substantive changes to the content of its response. And, 4 because it’s clear that sealing the entire response isn’t warranted here, the County must propose 5 redactions to its response that are limited only to the content that it contends should be sealed.
6 The County may file under seal only the unredacted version of its response and the specific 7 exhibits that it contends warrant sealing; it must file the redacted response on the public docket. 8 The amended response and exhibits must comply with LR IA 10-3 and IC 2-2(a)(3): the County 9 must provide an index of exhibits; each exhibit must include a cover sheet describing the 10 exhibit’s contents; and each exhibit must be attached as a separate file (not as part of the base 11 document, and not grouped together). The County must also file a renewed motion to seal 12 explaining in more detail why the particular documents it identifies should remain sealed within 13 10 days of this order. 14 C. Defendant Alicia Renee Cuscianna’s joinder to the County’s motion to dismiss is not an appropriate way for her to answer Crockford’s complaint, so the joinder is 15 denied and all filings relating to that joinder are struck.
16 Pro se defendant Alicia Renee Cuscianna has appeared in this case but has not yet filed 17 an answer or other responsive pleading to Crockford’s amended complaint. Instead, she filed a 18 “notice of joinder” to the County’s motion to dismiss.24 “Allowing one party to join another 19 party’s motion is a matter well within the district court’s substantial case management 20 discretion.”25 Some courts in this district allow a party to join in a motion “when either (1) the 21
22 24 ECF No. 42. 25 Apothio, LLC v. Kern Cnty., 599 F. Supp. 3d 983, 1002 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (quoting United 23 States ex rel. Ambrosecchia v. Paddock Lab’ys, LLC, 855 F.3d 949, 956 (8th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up)). 1 parties are so similarly situated that filing an independent motion would be redundant, or (2) the 2 party seeking joinder specifically points out[] which parts of the motion apply to the joining 3 party, the joining party’s basis for standing, and the factual similarities between the joining party 4 and the moving party that give rise to a similar claim or defense.”26 5 Cuscianna’s notice of joinder does not satisfy these standards, and I exercise my
6 discretion to deny it. The County defendants’ dismissal arguments relate to the claims against 7 them, not her, and the differences between the claims against the parties and their statuses as 8 state and individual actors render much, if not all, of the County’s motion inapplicable to the 9 claims against Cuscianna. Cuscianna’s reply in support the County’s motion to dismiss 10 elucidates these differences. She argues that Crockford’s opposition to the County’s motion 11 doesn’t “allege specific conduct attributable to” Cuscianna.27 That’s because the motion to 12 dismiss doesn’t discuss any of Crockford’s allegations against Cuscianna. And she 13 acknowledges that the opposition doesn’t sufficiently argue that she should be subject to § 1983 14 liability.28 In Crockford’s complaint, he alleges that Cuscianna is liable under § 1983 under the
15 joint-action doctrine, which may permit a civil-rights action against a non-state actor if the 16 plaintiff can show that she is “jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action.”29 17 That legal doctrine does not apply to the County defendants, so they did not analyze it in their 18
19 26 Tatung Co., Ltd. v. Shu Tze Hsu, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1138, 1151 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (collecting cases). 20 27 ECF No. 72 at 2. 21 28 Id. 29 ECF No. 1 at 51; Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27–28 (1980). I make no finding at this stage 22 about whether Crockford’s joint-action allegations are sufficient to maintain a § 1983 claim against Cuscianna. I mention it here only to explain why Crockford’s claims against Cuscianna 23 are legally distinct from those that he lodges against the County and will require separate analysis. 1 motion to dismiss. If Cuscianna believes that the claims against her cannot withstand dismissal 2 for any reason, she must file her own motion to dismiss focusing on the factual allegations and 3 legal claims that Crockford has lodged against her. 4 So, to summarize what the court will and will not consider when addressing the County’s 5 motion to dismiss, I deny Cuscianna’s joinder, strike Crockford’s response to her joinder,30 strike
6 her reply in support of the County’s motion to dismiss,31 and deny as moot Crockford’s motions 7 to file a surreply to Cuscianna’s now-struck reply.32 Cuscianna will have the opportunity to file 8 her own responsive pleading to Crockford’s amended complaint. Her responsive pleading— 9 whether that takes the form of a motion to dismiss or an answer—must be filed by Friday, 10 August 29, 2025.33 11 D. Crockford’s motion for entry of clerk’s default against defendants Parrish 12 Sampson, Michele Fisher, and Megan Miller is denied.
13 Crockford moves for entry of clerk’s default against CPS caseworker Parrish Sampson, 14 CPS supervisor Michele Fisher, and Assistant District Attorney Megan Miller, contending that 15 they have “failed to plead or otherwise defend” themselves against his claims under Federal Rule 16 of Civil Procedure 55(a).34 The County responds that the Attorney General is representing all of 17 the defendants employed by the County and that the motion to dismiss filed at ECF No. 31 was 18 filed on behalf of each County defendant, so Sampson, Fisher, and Miller have responded to 19 20 30 ECF No. 56. 21 31 ECF No. 72. 22 32 ECF Nos. 85, 92. These motions appear identical. 33 See ECF No. 47 at 4 (extending Cuscianna’s deadline to respond to the amended complaint by 23 45 days from July 15, 2025). 34 ECF No. 58. 1 Crockford’s amended complaint. Crockford retorts that he sued those defendants in their 2 individual capacities, so they must respond individually.35 3 NRS 41.0339 permits the attorney general to “provide for the defense . . . of any present 4 or former . . . officer or employee of the State or political subdivision . . . in any civil action 5 brought against that person based on any alleged act or omission relating to the person’s public
6 duties or employment . . . .”36 Though Crockford sues the individual County defendants in their 7 individual capacities, its clear from the allegations in the complaint that he sues them because of 8 work they did (or failed to do) in their capacities as County employees. He confirms as much in 9 his reply in support of his default motion when he reiterates that he sues these individuals for 10 actions they took under color of state law.37 The Attorney General’s Office is representing them 11 against those allegations, as state law permits it to do. And the motion to dismiss filed by the 12 County defendants clearly moves to dismiss the claims against Sampson, Fisher, and Miller.38 13 So, because Sampson, Fisher, and Miller have responded to Crockford’s amended complaint 14 through their attorney at the Attorney General’s Office, FRCP 55(a) has not been triggered and
15 Crockford is not entitled to an entry of clerk’s default against them. 16 17
18 35 ECF No. 84 at 2. 19 36 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.0339(1). 37 ECF No. 84 at 5. Crockford’s insistence that the distinction between personal-capacity suits 20 and official-capacity suits under § 1983 law requires that a state official must personally represent herself in personal-capacity suits is incorrect. Whether sued in her personal or official 21 capacity, a § 1983 defendant is sued for actions taken “under color of state law,” meaning that they took those actions within the scope of their public employment. All the actions that 22 Crockford ascribes to the individual defendants were directly related to their roles as CPS or DA employees. So state law permits the Attorney General’s Office to represent them, and it has 23 done so by filing a responsive pleading on their behalf. 38 See ECF No. 31 at 6. 1 E. The court reminds the parties of their obligation to follow this district’s local rules. 2 1. Briefs are limited to a motion, one response, and one reply. Supplemental 3 documents and surreplies are not permitted without leave of court.
4 A review of the bloated docket in this case warrants a reminder to the parties that they 5 must carefully review and abide by this district’s local rules and the Federal Rules of Civil 6 Procedure. All litigants—including those representing themselves—are held to the same 7 requirement that they follow the court’s procedural rules.39 Particularly relevant to this case are 8 the local rules governing what may and may not be filed, what may only be filed with leave of 9 court, and the page limits this court imposes on filings. A party filing a motion is limited to 10 filing the motion, which must be supported by a memorandum of points and authorities that 11 “state[s] with particularity the grounds for seeking the order” and “state[s] the relief sought,”40 12 and a reply. The party opposing that motion may file one response, which must also contain 13 supporting points and authorities, to the motion.41 14 “Surreplies are not permitted without leave of court” and “motions to for leave to file a 15 surreply are discouraged.”42 Supplemental “pleadings, briefs, authorities, or evidence” must also 16 not be submitted without an accompanying motion seeking leave to file those documents.43 A 17 party moving to file supplemental briefing must support their motion with a showing of good 18 cause explaining why the information contained in the supplement could not have been brought 19
20 39 See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Pro se litigants must follow the same rules of 21 procedure that govern other litigants.”). 40 Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1); L.R. 7-2(a). 22 41 L.R. 7-2(b). 23 42 L.R. 7-2(d). 43 L.R. 7-2(g). 1 in the original briefing and why the information requires consideration by this court.44 2 Crockford did not follow that rule for at least one document: ECF No. 36. It purports to contain 3 additional evidence in support of Crockford’s injunction motions and his response to the 4 County’s motion to dismiss.45 So I strike that document without prejudice to his ability to seek 5 leave to refile that document in accordance with the local rules.
6 2. In the future, all documents filed with this court must comply with the page 7 limits established by Local Rule 7-3.
8 Motions, responses, and replies must also comply with the page limitations set out in the 9 local rules. With the exception of summary-judgment motions, all motions and responses are 10 limited to 24 pages double spaced, and replies are limited to 12 pages.46 There are strict rules 11 that a party must follow to exceed the court’s page limits. A motion to exceed page limits must 12 not exceed three pages, “must be filed before the motion or brief is due[,] and must be 13 accompanied by a declaration stating in detail the reasons for, and number of, additional pages 14 required.”47 The moving party must show that there is good cause to grant its request.48 15 It is only the rare brief that requires an extension of the page limits. Crockford’s 16 response49 to the County’s motion to dismiss—for which he belatedly50 seeks leave to exceed the 17
44 Id. 18 45 ECF No. 36. 19 46 L.R. 7-3(b). 20 47 L.R. 7-3(c). 48 Id. 21 49 See ECF No. 59. 22 50 The fact that Crockford filed his motion to exceed the page limits after he filed that response is grounds alone to deny his motion. But I overlook that procedural deficiency this time only to 23 focus on why his request isn’t supported by good cause. I also note that Crockford’s motion also seeks leave to exceed the page limit on his response to the County’s motion to stay discovery. The magistrate judge has since granted the County’s motion to stay, ECF No. 83, so I consider 1 24-page limit—is not that rare brief. The County’s nine-page motion to dismiss focuses on 2 seven discrete legal reasons why it contends that Crockford’s complaint must be dismissed.51 3 Even providing some leeway considering Crockford’s pro-se status, it is well within his ability to 4 respond to those arguments within 24 pages. Crockford’s motion to exceed page limits by about 5 57 pages focuses on the “extraordinary complexity, constitutional magnitude, and factual depth
6 of this civil-rights action” as the reasons to extend the page limit.52 I do not discount 7 Crockford’s assertion that these are important issues, but the fact that his complaint alleges 8 constitutional claims does not make his case exceedingly complex or alone warrant an extension 9 of the page limits. This court handles cases alleging a wide array of constitutional violations 10 daily, and most of the litigants in those cases are able to adhere to the district’s page limitations. 11 And while Crockford’s complaint alleges facts spanning several years, that is not a 12 sufficient reason to exceed the page limit for this particular document. Crockford’s opposition 13 need only respond to the specific arguments raised in the County’s dismissal, and most of those 14 arguments do not depend on the facts of the case. They instead focus on legal principles that the
15 County believes bar Crockford’s suit. When resolving a motion to dismiss, the court will 16 analyze the facts alleged in the complaint alongside the arguments that the parties made in their 17 briefs. Crockford need not repeat factual detail in his response that isn’t directly relevant to the 18 County’s arguments—I will be aware of those details because I will read his complaint. 19 With all that said, I will consider Crockford’s 81-page response as a one-time courtesy 20 to him, recognizing his pro se status and the fact that he has been showing a concerted effort to 21
22 that portion of Crockford’s motion to be denied as moot. I also advise Crockford that, in the future, he must file separate motions for each type of relief he requests. See L.R. IC 2-2(b). 23 51 ECF No. 31. 52 ECF No. 75 at 2. 1 follow the procedural rules of this court in subsequent filings.53 But he is cautioned that this 2 courtesy will not be extended again, and it is unlikely that I will grant any future motions to 3 exceed the page limits. So while I deny his motion to exceed the page limit because it is 4 untimely and does not establish good cause, I will nevertheless consider his 81- page response 5 when ruling on the County’s motion to dismiss.
6 Conclusion 7 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the County defendants’ motion to seal [ECF No. 8 32] is DENIED without prejudice to their ability to file a renewed motion that complies with 9 Ninth Circuit standards, this district’s local rules, and this order within 10 days. Crockford may 10 file a response to the motion to seal, not to exceed 24 pages, within 14 days after service of the 11 motion. The Clerk of Court is directed to MAINTAIN THE SEAL on ECF No. 33 until further 12 order. 13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Crockford’s motion to strike [ECF No. 62] is 14 GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to STRIKE ECF Nos. 38 and 39.
15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the County’s motion to strike [ECF No. 55] is 16 DENIED as moot. 17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Alicia Renee Crockford/Cuscianna’s joinder 18 to the County’s motion to dismiss [ECF No. 42] is DENIED, and all briefs related to that filing 19 must be struck. The Clerk of Court is thus directed to STRIKE ECF Nos. 56 and 72. 20 21
22 53 See ECF No. 75 (moving to exceed the page limit after the County argued that he violated the local rules); ECF Nos. 85, 92 (moving to file a surreply instead of simply filing one). I’ll also 23 consider his 84-page reply in support of his injunction motions, despite the fact that it is also woefully oversized. See ECF No. 44. Crockford’s motions to file a surreply in response to ECF No. 72 [ECF Nos. 85 and 92] are 2|| thus DENIED as moot. 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Crockford’s motion for the entry of clerk’s default against defendants Parrish Sampson, Megan Miller, and Michele Fisher [ECF No. 58] is DENIED. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Crockford’s motion to exceed the page limit for his response to the County’s motion to dismiss [ECF No. 75] is DENIED. Nevertheless, the court 8] will consider his oversized response for the purposes of resolving the County’s motion as a one- 9|| time courtesy. 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to STRIKE ECF No. 36 because it is a supplement filed without first seeking leave of court as required by Local Rule 7- 2(g).
US. Distkict Ju) ge eager Dorsey 14 Atgust 8, 2025 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23