Tom Glaze, Justice.
This case involves a dispute over the amount of compensation, if any, the appellee, Richard Courson, owes appellant, Crockett & Brown, P.A. (C & B), for its legal services. Courson was shot with a shotgun by a Thomas Averette, and as a result, Courson was totally blind in one eye and sustained a thirty percent loss of vision in the other. On July 5, 1989, Courson retained C & B to represent him in his claim against Averette. by signing a contract whereby (1) he agreed to pay C & B a retainer of $7,500, (2) he would pay an hourly fee up to $15,000 (including the $7,500 retainer), plus out-of-pocket expenses and, in addition, (3) C & B would receive ten percent of any recovery which exceeded $30,000. Courson paid the retainer fee amount to C & B, and five months later, C & B filed a negligence suit against Averette.
The events that led to this acrimonious litigation between C & B and Courson began after C & B demanded policy limits, $300,000, from Averette’s insurance carrier and when the carrier eventually responded a year later, January 17,1991, with a counter-settlement offer in the sum of $100,000. Courson immediately rejected the offer, but C & B suggested to Courson that the offer was reasonable. Afterwards, Courson’s relationship with C & B nose-dived. In fact, C & B then asked Courson to remit the balance of the fees and costs ($9,889.19) due under their July 5 agreement to which Courson responded that he was unable to pay. C & B informed Courson that, if he did not comply with their July 5 contract, he would have to enter a new agreement whereby C & B would receive one-third of any settlement reached at least sixty days before trial or forty percent if settled within sixty days of trial. Courson apparently indicated to C & B that he had signed and returned the agreement to C & B when, in fact, he had not done so. Instead, Courson hired other attorneys, William R. Wilson, Jr., Gary Corum and John Richard Byrd (W C & B), and notified C & B of its termination on March 11, 1991.
W C & B requested C & B to turn over Courson’s file, but C & B refused, stating Courson by this time owed it more than $21,000 in fees and expenses. C & B related it would release its file only when Courson performed his part of the contract. W C & B proceeded with their representation of Courson, which resulted in a $300,000 settlement with Averette’s insurance company. This settlement amount was placed into the court’s registry, and C & B brought its claim for recovery under its July 5 contract and further asked that a lien be placed on Courson’s cause of action. Courson responded, arguing C & B was not entitled to anything, including the $7,500 retainer paid it, because none of the work C & B performed inured to Courson’s benefit.
After conducting an extensive hearing bearing on the parties’ respective claims, the trial court held that Courson had discharged C & B for cause since (1) C & B failed to require Averette to disclose his insurance coverage or to determine whether or not punitive damages were covered, (2) members of C & B expressed displeasure with Courson when Courson refused the $100,000 offer, and (3) Courson was justified in being disturbed about the way in which his case was proceeding. The trial court further found that, under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-303 (1987), C & B'was entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee in the amount of $15,000 and costs incurred, $2,541.27, which should be credited with the $7,500 amount Courson already had paid. The court awarded C & B a lien upon Courson’s settlement proceeds and further ordered C & B to deliver Courson’s file to W C & B within ten days.
C & B brings this appeal, arguing three points for reversal. Courson cross-appeals, urging the trial court erred in two respects. We review these respective claims as the parties raised and argued them on appeal.
In considering C & B’s points, we have difficulty in reaching the merits of any of its arguments. First C & B seeks in this appeal to enforce not its July 5 agreement with Courson, but instead its purported amended and substituted agreement to which C & B claims Courson agreed, giving C & B a third of the $300,000 he eventually recovered in this cause. Among other things, C & B contends on appeal that Courson had stated that he had signed the new contract submitted to him by C & B, and he was estopped to deny it. However, in reviewing the record, we cannot find where this contention was ever presented to the trial court below. C & B conceded as much in oral argument. As we have repeatedly held before, this court will not countenance an argument raised for the first time on appeal. Lytle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 309 Ark. 139, 827 S.W.2d 652 (1992); Mini Creek Contractors, Inc. v. Grandstaff, 300 Ark. 516, 780 S.W.2d 543 (1989).
In its second point, C & B submits that the trial court erred in failing to enforce C & B’s request for a retaining lien, but this issue appears to be moot. As Courson submits in response, the trial court in its October 28, 1991 order directed Courson’s personal effects be returned and for his files to be copied and given toWC&B.C&B acceded to these directions, thereby making moot any prior dispute on this point between the parties.
Concerning C & B’s final point, it argues the trial court erred in failing to award it attorney’s fees under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308, since it prevailed in obtaining fees and costs under its July 5 contractual agreement with Courson. While C & B argues this issue on appeal, it simply failed to raise and obtain a ruling on this matter below. In a recent case where this court decided a similar request for attorney’s fees on appeal, we held that the burden of obtaining a ruling from the court is on the attorney requesting such fees and the objections and matters left unresolved below are waived and may not be relied upon on appeal. McElroy v. Grisham, 306 Ark. 4, 810 S.W.2d 933 (1991). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s rulings on direct appeal.
On cross-appeal, Courson argues that, because C & B was discharged for cause, the trial court erred in awarding any attorney’s fees to C & B. The trial court ruled that Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-303 (1987) entitled C & B to a reasonable fee for services rendered, plus costs. The trial court was correct.
In Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman, 294 Ark. 25, 741 S.W.2d 233 (1987), this court stated that a client’s exercise of the right to discharge an attorney with or without cause does not constitute a breach of contract because it is a basic term of the contract, implied by law into it by reason of the nature of the attorney-client relationship, that the client may terminate that contract at any time. Citing with approval the landmark case of Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9 (Calif.
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Tom Glaze, Justice.
This case involves a dispute over the amount of compensation, if any, the appellee, Richard Courson, owes appellant, Crockett & Brown, P.A. (C & B), for its legal services. Courson was shot with a shotgun by a Thomas Averette, and as a result, Courson was totally blind in one eye and sustained a thirty percent loss of vision in the other. On July 5, 1989, Courson retained C & B to represent him in his claim against Averette. by signing a contract whereby (1) he agreed to pay C & B a retainer of $7,500, (2) he would pay an hourly fee up to $15,000 (including the $7,500 retainer), plus out-of-pocket expenses and, in addition, (3) C & B would receive ten percent of any recovery which exceeded $30,000. Courson paid the retainer fee amount to C & B, and five months later, C & B filed a negligence suit against Averette.
The events that led to this acrimonious litigation between C & B and Courson began after C & B demanded policy limits, $300,000, from Averette’s insurance carrier and when the carrier eventually responded a year later, January 17,1991, with a counter-settlement offer in the sum of $100,000. Courson immediately rejected the offer, but C & B suggested to Courson that the offer was reasonable. Afterwards, Courson’s relationship with C & B nose-dived. In fact, C & B then asked Courson to remit the balance of the fees and costs ($9,889.19) due under their July 5 agreement to which Courson responded that he was unable to pay. C & B informed Courson that, if he did not comply with their July 5 contract, he would have to enter a new agreement whereby C & B would receive one-third of any settlement reached at least sixty days before trial or forty percent if settled within sixty days of trial. Courson apparently indicated to C & B that he had signed and returned the agreement to C & B when, in fact, he had not done so. Instead, Courson hired other attorneys, William R. Wilson, Jr., Gary Corum and John Richard Byrd (W C & B), and notified C & B of its termination on March 11, 1991.
W C & B requested C & B to turn over Courson’s file, but C & B refused, stating Courson by this time owed it more than $21,000 in fees and expenses. C & B related it would release its file only when Courson performed his part of the contract. W C & B proceeded with their representation of Courson, which resulted in a $300,000 settlement with Averette’s insurance company. This settlement amount was placed into the court’s registry, and C & B brought its claim for recovery under its July 5 contract and further asked that a lien be placed on Courson’s cause of action. Courson responded, arguing C & B was not entitled to anything, including the $7,500 retainer paid it, because none of the work C & B performed inured to Courson’s benefit.
After conducting an extensive hearing bearing on the parties’ respective claims, the trial court held that Courson had discharged C & B for cause since (1) C & B failed to require Averette to disclose his insurance coverage or to determine whether or not punitive damages were covered, (2) members of C & B expressed displeasure with Courson when Courson refused the $100,000 offer, and (3) Courson was justified in being disturbed about the way in which his case was proceeding. The trial court further found that, under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-303 (1987), C & B'was entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee in the amount of $15,000 and costs incurred, $2,541.27, which should be credited with the $7,500 amount Courson already had paid. The court awarded C & B a lien upon Courson’s settlement proceeds and further ordered C & B to deliver Courson’s file to W C & B within ten days.
C & B brings this appeal, arguing three points for reversal. Courson cross-appeals, urging the trial court erred in two respects. We review these respective claims as the parties raised and argued them on appeal.
In considering C & B’s points, we have difficulty in reaching the merits of any of its arguments. First C & B seeks in this appeal to enforce not its July 5 agreement with Courson, but instead its purported amended and substituted agreement to which C & B claims Courson agreed, giving C & B a third of the $300,000 he eventually recovered in this cause. Among other things, C & B contends on appeal that Courson had stated that he had signed the new contract submitted to him by C & B, and he was estopped to deny it. However, in reviewing the record, we cannot find where this contention was ever presented to the trial court below. C & B conceded as much in oral argument. As we have repeatedly held before, this court will not countenance an argument raised for the first time on appeal. Lytle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 309 Ark. 139, 827 S.W.2d 652 (1992); Mini Creek Contractors, Inc. v. Grandstaff, 300 Ark. 516, 780 S.W.2d 543 (1989).
In its second point, C & B submits that the trial court erred in failing to enforce C & B’s request for a retaining lien, but this issue appears to be moot. As Courson submits in response, the trial court in its October 28, 1991 order directed Courson’s personal effects be returned and for his files to be copied and given toWC&B.C&B acceded to these directions, thereby making moot any prior dispute on this point between the parties.
Concerning C & B’s final point, it argues the trial court erred in failing to award it attorney’s fees under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308, since it prevailed in obtaining fees and costs under its July 5 contractual agreement with Courson. While C & B argues this issue on appeal, it simply failed to raise and obtain a ruling on this matter below. In a recent case where this court decided a similar request for attorney’s fees on appeal, we held that the burden of obtaining a ruling from the court is on the attorney requesting such fees and the objections and matters left unresolved below are waived and may not be relied upon on appeal. McElroy v. Grisham, 306 Ark. 4, 810 S.W.2d 933 (1991). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s rulings on direct appeal.
On cross-appeal, Courson argues that, because C & B was discharged for cause, the trial court erred in awarding any attorney’s fees to C & B. The trial court ruled that Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-303 (1987) entitled C & B to a reasonable fee for services rendered, plus costs. The trial court was correct.
In Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman, 294 Ark. 25, 741 S.W.2d 233 (1987), this court stated that a client’s exercise of the right to discharge an attorney with or without cause does not constitute a breach of contract because it is a basic term of the contract, implied by law into it by reason of the nature of the attorney-client relationship, that the client may terminate that contract at any time. Citing with approval the landmark case of Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9 (Calif. 1972), this court further related the California rule that there is no injustice in awarding a discharged attorney the reasonable value of the services he or she rendered up to the time of discharge. The Fracasse court noted that this rule preserves the client’s right to discharge his attorney, and yet acknowledges the attorney’s right to fair compensation for work performed.
Although Courson argues that attorney’s fees should only be awarded an attorney who is discharged without cause, the better rule follows that related in Fracasse above, namely, an attorney discharged with or without cause can recover the reasonable value of his or her services to the date of discharge. The North Carolina Court of Appeals sets out a number of opinions taking this view. See Covington v. Rhodes, 38 N.C. App. 68, 247 S.E.2d 305 (1978); see also Sohn v. Brockington, Fla. App., 371 So.2d 1089 (1979); Tobias v. King, Ill. App., 406 N.E.2d 101 (1980); Phelps v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Co., 70 Ill. App.2d 89, 217 N.E.2d 519 (1966); Trenti, Saxhaug v. Nartnik, 439 N.W.2d 418 (Minn. App. 1989); In Re Estate of Poli, 134 N.J. 222, 338 A.2d 888 (1975).
Courson next contends that the amount of attorney’s fees awarded C & B is excessive and not reasonable. Courson argues that, if C & B is found entitled to an attorney’s fee award, the court should hold the amount could never exceed the $7,500 Courson initially paid. As mentioned earlier, the court awarded that amount and another $7,500, plus $2,541.29 costs — a total of $17,541.29.
This court has held that, among the pertinent considerations in determining the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee, not specifically fixed by contract, are: (1) the attorney’s judgment, learning, ability, skill, experience, professional standing and advice; (2) the relationship between the parties; (3) the amount or importance of the subject matter of the case; (4) the nature, extent and difficulty of services in research; (5) the preparation of pleadings; (6) the proceedings actually taken and the nature and extent of the litigation; (7) the time and labor devoted to the client’s cause, the difficulties presented in the course of the litigation and the results obtained. Robinson v. Champion, 251 Ark. 817, 475 S.W.2d 677 (1972). In making these determinations, both the trial court’s and this court’s experience and knowledge of the character of such services may be used as a guide. Id. Considerable weight is to be given the opinion of the judge before whom the proceedings are conducted. Id.
Courson argues that C & B misunderstood the law relevant to his case and neglected to develop the case so that it would be ripe for settlement. He asserts the evidence reflects C & B browbeat and coerced him to accept an inadequate settlement offer. After Courson refused the offer, he experienced strained relations with C & B, causing him to hire new counsel. Courson said that C & B then refused to provide file information to Courson’s new counsel.
C & B presented the trial judge with considerable evidence and exhibits reflecting the legal services it rendered Courson. C & B’s documents showed its hourly fee to the time of discharge totaled $22,300. C & B showed it researched Courson’s case, drafted complaints and various other routine pleadings, motions and briefs. C & B made a demand for $300,000 — the limits of Averette’s homeowner’s liability policy. It received in return , an offer to settle for $100,000, which was refused by the client. Then, C & B began to research a structured settlement and that research is amply supported in the record. C & B argues that the arrived at structured settlement would have been worth approximately $343,000 over the long term, and was valued as worth $142,000 in present value. In fact, C & B asserts that, at the time of discharge, it had just informed Courson that C & B had begun work on attempting to bargain for an “annuity for life with cost of living escalators.”
C & B showed that it had arranged and taken the depositions of Courson; Averette; Sam Smith, Sheriff of Chicot County; Donnie Dotson, the Game & Fish officer who arrested Averette; and Dr. Chen, the admitting physician who did surgery on Courson. C & B argues that its efforts educated Averette’s counsel and that the settlement offers made were not mere nuisance offers. Also, C & B asserted that it was in continuous contact with the numerous hospitals and doctors who had treated Courson. The billable hours records also reflect that C & B spent a considerable amount of time talking to and writing Courson’s many creditors.
From the foregoing, we cannot say the attorney’s fees awarded by the trial court were excessive or unreasonable for the services C & B rendered in this matter. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs.
Dudley and Newbern, JJ., dissent.