CRJ Realty Corp. v. Espinal

Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York

CRJ Realty Corp. v. Espinal

45 Misc. 3d 74, 997 N.Y.S.2d 211

CourtAppellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York

DecidedOctober 1, 2014

StatusPublished

This text of 45 Misc. 3d 74 (CRJ Realty Corp. v. Espinal) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

CRJ Realty Corp. v. Espinal, 45 Misc. 3d 74, 997 N.Y.S.2d 211 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2014).

Pincite

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Appeal from an order, dated October 10, 2013, deemed, pursuant to CPLR 5517 (b), to be taken from the subsequent order (same court and Judge), dated December 24, 2013, which, upon renewal, permanently stayed execution of the warrant, and so considered, order affirmed, with $10 costs.

Under the particular facts and circumstances of record in this nonpayment summary proceeding, Civil Court providently exercised its discretion and for good cause permanently stayed execution of the warrant of eviction so as to preserve the long-term (25-year) stabilized tenancy (see Parkchester Apts. Co. v Scott, 271 AD2d 273 [2000]; 102-116 Eighth Ave. Assoc. v Oyola, 299 AD2d 296 [2002]). Granted, the tenant’s substantial delay in releasing the rent funds held in escrow by her (now former) attorney constituted a material breach of the parties’ so-ordered settlement stipulation. However, the evidence presented by tenant on renewal unassailably established that the defaults in this regard resulted from prior counsel’s documented mental illness that “adversely affected his ability to function” (Weitzenberg v Nassau County Dept. of Recreation & Parks, 29 AD3d 683, 684-685 [2006]; see Avery v Caldwell, 55 AD3d 473 [2008]), and despite tenant’s repeated inquiries of counsel regarding the status of the case. In this posture, and considering that tenant timely deposited the rent funds into the escrow account and that her present counsel offered on renewal to make landlord whole by reimbursing it for the costs and reasonable legal fees incurred as a result of prior counsel’s derelictions, we find no cause to [76]*76disturb the court’s discretionary determination to permanently stay execution of the warrant.

Shulman, J.E, Hunter, Jr., and Ling-Cohan, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Appeal from an order, dated October 10, 2013, deemed, pursuant to CPLR 5517 (b), to be taken from the subsequent order (same court and Judge), dated December 24, 2013, which, upon renewal, permanently stayed execution of the warrant, and so considered, order affirmed, with $10 costs.

Under the particular facts and circumstances of record in this nonpayment summary proceeding, Civil Court providently exercised its discretion and for good cause permanently stayed execution of the warrant of eviction so as to preserve the long-term (25-year) stabilized tenancy (see Parkchester Apts. Co. v Scott, 271 AD2d 273 [2000]; 102-116 Eighth Ave. Assoc. v Oyola, 299 AD2d 296 [2002]). Granted, the tenant’s substantial delay in releasing the rent funds held in escrow by her (now former) attorney constituted a material breach of the parties’ so-ordered settlement stipulation. However, the evidence presented by tenant on renewal unassailably established that the defaults in this regard resulted from prior counsel’s documented mental illness that “adversely affected his ability to function” (Weitzenberg v Nassau County Dept. of Recreation & Parks, 29 AD3d 683, 684-685 [2006]; see Avery v Caldwell, 55 AD3d 473 [2008]), and despite tenant’s repeated inquiries of counsel regarding the status of the case. In this posture, and considering that tenant timely deposited the rent funds into the escrow account and that her present counsel offered on renewal to make landlord whole by reimbursing it for the costs and reasonable legal fees incurred as a result of prior counsel’s derelictions, we find no cause to [76]*76disturb the court’s discretionary determination to permanently stay execution of the warrant.

Shulman, J.E, Hunter, Jr., and Ling-Cohan, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

45 Misc. 3d 74, 997 N.Y.S.2d 211, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crj-realty-corp-v-espinal-nyappterm-2014.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack