Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-17-00358-CR
Cristian YEPEZ, Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee
From the 406th Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas Trial Court No. 2014CRN001641-D4 Honorable Oscar J. Hale, Jr., Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Beth Watkins, Justice
Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Beth Watkins, Justice
Delivered and Filed: July 3, 2019
AFFIRMED
A jury found appellant Cristian Yepez guilty of murder and tampering with evidence and
assessed punishment at thirty years’ and fifteen years’ confinement, respectively. On appeal,
Yepez argues: (1) the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony; (2) the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Yepez’s motion to suppress; (3) the trial court erred in denying Yepez’s
request to include a concurrent cause instruction in the jury charge; and (4) the evidence is
insufficient to corroborate accomplice witness testimony. We affirm. 04-17-00358-CR
BACKGROUND
An unidentified caller contacted 9-1-1 and reported a domestic disturbance between a male
and a female at an apartment complex in Houston, Texas. Fifteen minutes later, another 9-1-1
operator received an anonymous call regarding the same domestic disturbance. The second caller
stated a woman, later identified as Janette Pantoja, came outside of the apartment and told the
caller she had been kidnapped and the kidnapper had killed her three-year-old daughter Jasleen.
Officer Daniel Lunceford of the Houston Police Department responded to the disturbance and
spoke to Pantoja. Officer Lunceford described Pantoja as crying hysterically. Pantoja stated her
boyfriend, Yepez, had hit her with a closed fist, and Officer Lunceford observed bruising above
her eyebrow. Pantoja also told the officer she was from Chicago and Yepez was keeping her
against her will after killing her daughter, Jasleen, when they were in Laredo. Officer Lunceford
took Pantoja to the police station, where Detective Robert A. Klementich questioned her.
Detective Klementich was already familiar with Pantoja. Over the past couple of weeks,
he had been working on a missing child case with the Chicago Police Department, which reported
the missing child’s mother and the mother’s boyfriend – Pantoja and Yepez – were staying with
Yepez’s relatives in Houston. Pantoja’s relatives had contacted the Chicago Police Department
about the missing child after Pantoja and Yepez returned to Chicago from Laredo without the
child. According to Pantoja’s relatives, Pantoja and Yepez told her family the child had been
kidnapped. The Chicago police gave Detective Klementich two Houston addresses, and Detective
Klementich sent officers to both locations. At the second location, one of the investigating officers
encountered a group of individuals, which included a woman who gave the officers a false name
and acted “squirrely.” Later, Detective Klementich and the investigating officers received
photographs of Pantoja and Yepez from the Chicago police and realized the woman they
encountered was Pantoja. However, when the investigating officers returned to the location,
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Pantoja was no longer there. When Detective Klementich subsequently met Pantoja at the police
station, he knew Pantoja was from Chicago and connected to the missing child case. He questioned
Pantoja concerning Jasleen’s whereabouts, and she stated Yepez had assaulted her at the Houston
apartment and killed Jasleen when they were in Laredo.
Detective Klementich dispatched two officers to bring Yepez to the station for questioning.
He believed he had probable cause to arrest Yepez for assault family violence. He also believed
he had enough information to detain Yepez to investigate Jasleen’s whereabouts. After the
dispatched detectives arrested Yepez for assault family violence and unlawful restraint, they
brought him to the police station. Detective Klementich informed Yepez of his Miranda rights.
Although Yepez initially waived his Miranda rights, during the interview he indicated he wanted
to speak to a lawyer. Detective Klementich ended the interview and informed Yepez he was going
to be charged with unlawful restraint. Detective Klementich then left, leaving Yepez handcuffed
in the interview room.
Approximately an hour later, Yepez asked to speak to the detectives and told them Jasleen
had been kidnapped. Yepez then changed his story and told the detectives that on the day Jasleen
died, she had been swimming at the motel pool when they were in Laredo. After swimming, she
started throwing up and was highly irritable and crying. Yepez stated that when he, Pantoja, and
Jasleen returned to the motel room, he put Jasleen in “timeout” and placed her face to the wall to
calm her down. She continued to cry and throw up until she collapsed and lost consciousness.
Yepez said he contacted a man who helped him bury the body.
Detective Klementich contacted the Laredo Police Department and shared Yepez’s
statements about burying Jasleen’s body. Laredo Police Detective Greg Cantu drove to a specified
location – an empty lot near a gas station – where he found a child’s skeletal remains. Detective
Cantu secured the scene, contacted his supervisor, and waited for a crime scene investigator to
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arrive. Chief Medical Examiner Dr. Corinne Stern arrived at the scene and determined the empty
lot had recently been cleared, exposing the remains. Dr. Stern collected the remains and sent them
to Dr. Oscar Harrell Gill-King, a forensic anthropologist who analyzed the remains to determine
the cause of death. Dr. Gill-King identified the remains as Jasleen. In his report, Dr. Gill-King
indicated the skull displayed signs of “perimortem vertical loading,” and concluded the child’s
death was caused by her skull striking a static object.
A grand jury indicted Yepez for felony murder, serious bodily injury to a child, and
tampering with evidence in connection with Jasleen’s death. At trial, the State argued Yepez
murdered Jasleen by striking her head with blunt force. The defense argued she died due to dry
drowning, after which Yepez and Pantoja panicked and buried the body. The jury heard testimony
from several witnesses including Pantoja, the detectives and officers working on the case, and Dr.
Gill-King. Pantoja testified Yepez grabbed Jasleen by her ankles, held her upside down, struck
her head against the bathroom floor and later against the bathroom sink. Pantoja testified Jasleen
reacted by “just sitting” on the countertop. Pantoja testified Yepez then took Jasleen to another
room and slammed the bathroom door, leaving Pantoja in the bathroom. Thereafter, she heard
another bang and Jasleen was unconscious when she opened the door. She testified she
unsuccessfully attempted CPR, but Jasleen never regained consciousness. Ultimately, Pantoja
explained Yepez decided to bury the body.
In addition, Dr. Gill-King testified he determined the child’s cause of death was homicide
caused by vertical loading. The forensic anthropologist also testified the injuries to Jasleen’s skull
were consistent with someone holding her by the ankles with her head hanging down and then
hitting her head against a hard surface. On cross examination, Dr. Gill-King further opined that
earth moving equipment used to clear the lot where Detective Cantu found the remains did not
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cause the injuries to Jasleen’s body. The jury also saw photographs of Jasleen’s remains and
watched a videotape recording of Yepez’s statements made to Houston police.
At the charge conference, Yepez requested a jury instruction on concurrent cause, arguing
the evidence showed the child died from dry drowning. The trial court denied the request. The
jury found Yepez guilty of felony murder and tampering with evidence. Yepez appealed.
ANALYSIS
Expert Testimony
In his first issue, Yepez argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Dr. Gill-
King’s expert testimony regarding the child’s cause of death. Yepez claims Dr. Gill-King’s
testimony was unreliable because the scientific theory and technique he used were not valid and
there was a large analytical gap between the evidence and his proffered opinion.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s decision on the admission of expert testimony for an abuse of
discretion. Rhomer v. State, No. PD-0448-17, 2019 WL 408186, at *3 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 30,
2019). “[A] trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to any guiding rules or
principles or acts arbitrarily or unreasonably.” Id. We will uphold the trial court’s ruling on the
admission of evidence unless it lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Layton v. State,
280 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
Applicable Law
A witness who qualifies as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
may testify if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in
understanding the evidence or determining a fact issue. TEX. R. EVID. 702. The proponent of the
testimony must establish by clear and convincing proof that the proffered testimony is sufficiently
relevant and reliable to assist the factfinder in reaching an accurate result. Vela v. State, 209
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S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). To assess the reliability of an expert’s opinion based
on a hard science, the Court of Criminal Appeals has set forth the three-prong Kelly test, requiring
that “(1) the underlying scientific theory be valid, (2) the technique applying the theory must be
valid, and (3) the technique must have been properly applied on the occasion in question.”
Rhomer, 2019 WL 408186, at *4 (citing Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992)). In addition, courts should consider:
(1) the extent to which the underlying scientific theory and technique are accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community, if such a community can be ascertained;
(2) the qualifications of the experts testifying;
(3) the existence of literature supporting or rejecting the underlying scientific theory and technique;
(4) the potential rate of error of the technique;
(5) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique;
(6) the clarity with which the underlying scientific theory and technique can be explained to the court; and
(7) the experience and skill of the person(s) who applied the technique on the occasion in question.
Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573.
When expert testimony concerns a field of study outside the hard sciences, the Court of
Criminal Appeals instructs us to apply the Nenno test to evaluate the reliability of an expert’s
testimony. Rhomer, 2019 WL 408186, at *5 (citing Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1998), overruled on other grounds by State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999)); Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). “The Nenno test
asks whether (1) the field of expertise is a legitimate one, (2) the subject matter of the expert’s
testimony is within the scope of that field, and (3) the expert’s testimony properly relies upon
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and/or utilizes the principles involved in the field.” Rhomer, 2019 WL 408186, at *5; Weatherred,
15 S.W.3d at 542. In applying this framework, we must refrain from developing rigid distinctions
between “hard” and “soft” sciences, because the distinction between various types of testimony
can be blurred. Morris v. State, 361 S.W.3d 649, 654 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Under either the
Kelly or Nenno test, reliability should be evaluated by referencing the standards applicable to the
particular professional field in question. Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 274 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010).
Application
Dr. Gill-King identified himself as a forensic anthropologist who analyzes skeletal remains
to identify people and determine their cause of death. He testified forensic anthropologists are
generally contacted by authorities to examine remains. When the remains are brought to him, he
inventories the material, cleans it, and analyzes it. He explained that forensic anthropologists use
various cleaning methods depending on the situation. He added that sometimes authorities provide
background information regarding the scene where the remains are found, and he prefers to have
limited information regarding the facts of the case to avoid bias. After analyzing the material, he
creates a biological profile and writes a report with his interpretations. He explained that forensic
anthropologists make objective and subjective observations, and their reports are not subject to a
formal peer review process. He further added that no standards of practice have been established
to guide forensic anthropologists on how to make interpretations, but official standards of practice
are being developed.
Turning to the instant case, Dr. Gill-King testified he received a “nearly complete
skeletonized remains of a human infant” to examine along with information that the Laredo police
discovered the remains in a shallow grave. He explained the remains were in an advanced state of
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decomposition because they were recovered in a shallow grave and were exposed to a high level
of bacteria, which accelerated the decomposition process.
Dr. Gill-King also testified the remains displayed no sign of antemortem trauma,
eliminating any indication that the child had old injuries or was abused over an extended period.
He opined the remains displayed perimortem trauma – trauma that occurred at the time of death.
Such trauma was significant to Dr. Gill-King because it could explain the cause of death. In this
case, he observed “the skull was broken in several pieces.” He also noted it exhibited a diastatic
fracture – breakage at a suture – at the top of the head and fractures on both sides. According to
Dr. Gill-King, these characteristics – multiple fractures, diastasis, and fractures on the sides of the
skull – constituted three of the five key criteria forensic anthropologists use to indicate signs of
“cranial death” – death caused by a head injury or injuries.
Dr. Gill-King further testified the fractures in Jasleen’s skull were consistent with fractures
caused by vertical loading, an injury that occurs when the skull strikes a static object, transferring
energy from the top of the skull, down through its base, and along the spinal axis. For support, he
pointed to the diastatic fracture, an area where a small piece of bone was pressed in when Jasleen’s
skull struck a static object. He explained diastasis is a classic sign of head trauma in infant deaths.
He further explained the fractures at the base of Jasleen’s skull and radiating out from her spine
indicated that her head had been struck against a static object. When her skull was struck against
the static object, the shock travelled through her body and transmitted force through the base of
the skull, resulting in the fractures. He ultimately concluded the injuries were static as opposed to
dynamic, highlighting that the terms “static” and “dynamic” were widely used in his field.
Yepez contends Dr. Gill-King’s testimony was unreliable because the scientific theory and
technique he used were not valid. Specifically, Yepez argues Dr. Gill-King’s report was not
subject to peer review and another expert disagreed with the report’s conclusions. However, the
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Court of Criminal Appeals has stressed that “the absence of peer review does not necessarily
undercut the reliability of the testimony.” Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 562. Rather, any doubt created
by the absence of peer review goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. Id.
Similarly, disagreement between experts also goes to the weight of the evidence, and the jury can
believe one expert over another. See Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
Yepez also argues Dr. Gill-King’s testimony was unreliable because a large analytical gap
existed between his opinion and the underlying facts. According to Yepez, Dr. Gill-King’s opinion
did not coincide with the State’s theory that Yepez killed Jasleen by striking her head against a
static object. We disagree. After Dr. Gill-King opined the child’s fractures were perimortem and
caused by static force, he specifically testified the injuries would be “consistent with” someone
holding a child upside down and striking the child’s head against a hard surface, like the floor. He
testified that based on his experience with examining remains of injured children, he believed
Jasleen died after her head was struck against a static object.
The record reflects Dr. Gill-King based his opinion on a methodology generally used by
forensic anthropologists when analyzing skeletal remains and on his years of experience analyzing
skeletal remains and injuries in children. See Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 274. And although Dr. Gill-
King stated his report was not subject to peer review, the record is clear that he based his opinion
on principles relevant in his field of study. See Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 562; Coble, 330 S.W.3d at
274. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. Gill-King’s
expert testimony regarding Jasleen’s cause of death. We therefore overrule Yepez’s first
argument.
Motion to Suppress
Next, Yepez argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he
made to the Houston police. According to Yepez, the statements constituted fruit of the poisonous
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tree because they were the product of a warrantless arrest made without probable cause. He further
contends the subsequent Miranda warnings the police gave him at the police station did not
sufficiently attenuate the taint of the unlawful arrest.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. State
v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). A trial court abuses its discretion if its
decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or “outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Id. In
reviewing the ruling, we apply a bifurcated standard. Brodnex v. State, 485 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2016). We afford almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical
facts and mixed questions of law and fact that turn on the weight or credibility of the evidence. Id.
We review de novo the trial court’s determination of pure questions of law and mixed questions
of law and fact that do not depend on credibility determinations. Id. If, as here, the trial court
makes express findings of fact, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling and
determine whether the evidence supports those factual findings. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d
442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Probable cause requires an officer to have a reasonable belief that, based on the facts and
circumstances within the officer’s personal knowledge, or of which the officer has reasonably
trustworthy information, an offense has been committed. Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 901–
02 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Probable cause must be based on specific, articulable facts rather than
an officer’s mere opinion. Id. To determine whether probable cause exists, we use a totality of
the circumstances approach. Id.
When, as here, a defendant argues his warrantless arrest was illegal, the proper inquiry is
whether the arrest fell within one of the statutory exceptions to the warrant requirement. Stull v.
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State, 772 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Here, the parties dispute whether the Houston
police were authorized to make a warrantless arrest under the family violence exception outlined
in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(a)(4). That
exception authorizes an officer to arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has probable cause
“to believe the person committed an offense involving family violence.” Id. An offense involves
family violence if there is evidence the actor committed acts intended to result in physical harm,
bodily injury, or assault against a victim with whom the actor has or has had a dating relationship.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.004, 71.0021(a). “The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine generally
precludes the use of evidence, both direct and indirect, obtained following an illegal arrest.”
Monge v. State, 315 S.W.3d 35, 40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (internal quotations omitted).
The trial court found that Houston police officers had probable cause to believe Yepez
committed an act of family violence against Pantoja. At the motion to suppress hearing, the trial
court heard evidence that two anonymous people called 9-1-1 to report a domestic dispute. The
first caller specifically told the 9-1-1 operator it sounded “like he is beating her.” The other caller
stated he saw Pantoja run outside, where she told the caller Yepez was hitting her. The court also
heard testimony from Officer Lunceford, one of the officers dispatched to the scene, who testified
that when he arrived, Pantoja was crying hysterically. Officer Lunceford also testified he observed
bruising above Pantoja’s eyebrow and that Pantoja told him Yepez hit her with a closed fist. This
information was relayed to Detective Klementich, who spoke with Pantoja when she arrived at the
police station. He testified he personally observed marks on Pantoja’s face and that Pantoja told
him Yepez had physically restrained her. Based on this information, he dispatched two officers to
arrest Yepez for family violence.
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The dispatched officers both testified they received information that there had been a
physical altercation between Yepez and Pantoja, leaving Pantoja with injuries to her face. The
dispatched officers further testified that when they arrived at the apartment to arrest Yepez, they
spoke to a neighbor who showed them a cell phone video of the altercation. The video depicted
the couple fighting inside the apartment. One of the officers testified, “[y]ou could see the blinds
moving, her kicking and try to get away. You could see Mr. Yepez actually come out, peek out.”
When viewing this evidence under a totality of the circumstances approach, the officers had
probable cause to believe Yepez had committed an act of family violence against Pantoja and arrest
him for that offense. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 14.03(a)(4); Torres, 182 S.W.3d at 901–02.
Yepez argues the family violence exception outlined in article 14.03(a)(4) applies only
where an officer needs to defuse a situation immediately. Nothing in article 14.03(a)(4) imposes
this requirement. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 14.03(a)(4). Rather, article 14.03(a)(4) permits
an officer to make a warrantless arrest if the officer has probable cause to believe: (1) the suspect
has committed an assault; (2) the victim of the assault is a member of the suspect’s family or
household; and (3) the assault resulted in bodily injury to the victim. See id.; see Randolph v.
State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 773 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.) (outlining three requirements of
article 14.03(a)(4)). Here, the record reflects the officers had specific, articulable facts to
reasonably believe Yepez had committed an assault, Pantoja and Yepez were involved in a
relationship, and the assault resulted in a bodily injury to Pantoja. Accordingly, the State met its
burden to justify this arrest pursuant to article 14.03(a)(4).
Yepez finally argues Detective Klementich could not make a probable cause determination
because he could not rely on Pantoja’s untrustworthy statements. The record, however, reflects
Detective Klementich did not rely only on Pantoja’s statements that Yepez hit her when making
his probable cause determination. He also relied on the information relayed to him by Officer
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Lunceford, his own observation of the marks on Pantoja’s face, and the information from the
Chicago police investigation that Pantoja was living with Yepez in Houston. Based on these facts
and circumstances, we hold Detective Klementich had probable cause to believe Yepez had
committed an act of family violence against Pantoja. See Torres, 182 S.W.3d at 901–02. Having
determined the Yepez’s arrest was not illegal, we further hold his subsequent statements to the
Houston police were not fruit of the poisonous tree. See Monge, 315 S.W.3d at 40
Jury Charge Error
Yepez contends the trial court erred in denying his request to include a concurrent cause
instruction in the jury charge. Yepez argues he was entitled to this instruction because he presented
evidence that the child died from dry drowning.
We review a claim of jury charge error in two steps. See Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437,
440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). First, we determine whether there is error in the charge. Id. Second,
if there is error, then we review the record to determine whether the error caused sufficient harm
to require reversal. Id.
We review a trial court’s decision to exclude a defensive instruction in the charge for an
abuse of discretion. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc).
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant’s requested instruction. Bufkin
v. State, 207 S.W.3d 779, 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction
on a defensive issue if the issue “is raised by the evidence regardless of the strength or credibility
of that evidence.” Farmer v. State, 411 S.W.3d 901, 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Where the evidence shows another cause of the same result, the trial court is required to
give a statutory instruction on concurrent cause. Robbins v. State, 717 S.W.2d 348, 351–52 (Tex.
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Crim. App. 1986). This instruction provides that “[a] person is criminally responsible if the result
would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another
cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of
the actor clearly insufficient.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.04(a). To be entitled to a concurrent
cause instruction, the evidence must show the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient by itself to
produce the result, and the actor’s conduct was clearly insufficient by itself to produce the result.
Id. The concurrent cause must be “another cause” in addition to the actor’s conduct, i.e., an
“agency in addition to the actor.” Robbins, 717 S.W.2d at 351 n.2. In contrast, an alternative
cause “is simply a different version of facts, one which negates at least one element of the State’s
case.” Barnett v. State, 709 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
Throughout trial, Yepez denied striking Jasleen and argued Pantoja fabricated allegations
that he held Jasleen over the sink and slammed Jasleen’s head against it. According to Yepez,
Jasleen died because of dry drowning. This contention that dry drowning caused the child’s death
presents an alternative cause and does not entitle Yepez to a concurrent cause instruction. See
Robbins, 717 S.W.2d at 351 n.2. That is because Yepez’s contention that Jasleen died as a result
of dry drowning is not “another cause” of Jasleen’s death in addition to Yepez’s conduct, but rather
is a different version of facts that explain her death. See id. (recognizing concurrent cause not
presented where actor denies committing charged conduct); Barnett, 709 S.W.3d at 652.
Accordingly, because no concurrent cause was presented, Yepez was not entitled to a concurrent
cause instruction. See Farmer, 411 S.W.3d at 906. We therefore overrule Yepez’s third issue.
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Accomplice Witness Corroboration
Finally, Yepez contends the evidence is insufficient to corroborate Pantoja’s accomplice
witness testimony. According to Yepez, there was no independent evidence that corroborated
Pantoja’s allegation that he struck Jasleen’s skull on a hard surface.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A conviction obtained based on accomplice testimony must be supported by sufficient
corroborating evidence tending to connect the defendant to the offense committed. TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 38.14. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to corroborate accomplice
testimony, we eliminate the accomplice testimony and examine the remaining portions of the
record to determine if there is any evidence that tends to connect the defendant with the
commission of the offense. Malone v. State, 253 S.W.3d 253, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The
corroborating evidence need not, standing alone, rise to the level of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. The evidence must simply link the defendant to the commission of the offense and
show that a rational juror could conclude the evidence sufficiently “tended to connect” the
defendant to the offense. Simmons v. State, 282 S.W.3d 504, 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
Accordingly, corroborative evidence need not be legally sufficient in itself to establish a
defendant’s guilt. Casanova v. State, 383 S.W.3d 530, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
In determining the question of corroboration, courts view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict. Perez v. State, 437 S.W.3d 610, 616 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no
pet.). Evidence tending to connect the accused to the commission of the offense may be
circumstantial. See Smith v. State, 332 S.W.3d 425, 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Insignificant
circumstances can satisfy this standard as there is no precise rule governing the amount of evidence
required to corroborate accomplice witness testimony. Perez, 437 S.W.3d at 616 (citing Gill v.
State, 873 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)).
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Even excluding Pantoja’s accomplice testimony, the State introduced evidence connecting
Yepez to the crime. The record reflects that Jasleen was last seen in Laredo at a motel with Yepez
and Pantoja. The jury heard testimony from the motel clerk, who testified Pantoja, Yepez, and a
child who fit Jasleen’s description were staying at the motel. The jury also heard testimony from
Pantoja’s friend, who testified she spoke with Pantoja and Jasleen on the phone while they were
staying at the Laredo motel with Yepez. The record further reflects that when Pantoja and Yepez
returned from Laredo to Chicago, Yepez told several people, including Pantoja’s father, that
Jasleen had been kidnapped. Yet, as the investigation unfolded, Jasleen’s remains were found in
a shallow grave in an empty lot in Laredo near the motel where the three stayed. When asked by
the police about Jasleen, Yepez stated Jasleen died from dry drowning and admitted to burying
Jasleen at that location. The jury also heard testimony from Dr. Gill-King, who opined that Jasleen
died because the top of her head was struck against a static object.
When viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold this evidence
tends to connect Yepez with Jasleen’s murder. See Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 442. The evidence
clearly places Yepez at the Laredo motel when the offense was committed. It also establishes that
Yepez told different stories about Jasleen’s disappearance. Proof that an accused was at the scene
when an offense was committed coupled with other suspicious circumstances is sufficient to tend
to connect an accused to a crime. See id. Accordingly, the evidence of Yepez’s presence coupled
with his kidnapping and dry drowning stories and his admission that he buried Jasleen – tends to
connect Yepez to the motel room where Pantoja testified Yepez killed her daughter. We therefore
overrule Yepez’s final issue.
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CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Beth Watkins, Justice
Do Not Publish
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