Bernes, Judge.
David A. Crewey appeals from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to American Medical Response of Georgia, Inc. (“AMR”), an ambulance company, in his lawsuit alleging that AMR was negligent in its attempts to timely provide ambulance transport to Crewey following a heart attack. The trial court’s order was based upon its conclusion that AMR was afforded immunity under OCGA § 31-11-8, which shields emergency care providers from civil damages under certain circumstances. Because we conclude that the acts alleged to have been negligently performed by AMR fall outside of the purview of OCGA § 31-11-8, we reverse.
On appeal from the grant of summary judgment, we view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, construing all evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See
Pruette v. Phoebe Putney Mem. Hosp.,
295 Ga. App. 335 (671 SE2d 844) (2008). We review issues of
law de novo. See
Dept. of Human Resources v. Nation,
265 Ga. App. 434, 436 (594 SE2d 383) (2004).
So viewed, the evidence shows that on May 14, 2004, Crewey called 911 after experiencing chest pains and other symptoms consistent with a heart attack. Emergency medical personnel arrived on the scene and transported Crewey to Emory Dunwoody Medical Center (“Dunwoody”), where it was confirmed that Crewey was in fact suffering an acute myocardial infarction. The emergency cardiologist at Dunwoody performed some initial treatment on Crewey, but soon determined that Dunwoody did not have adequate resources to properly treat him. The cardiologist therefore ordered that Crewey be transported to the cardiac catheterization laboratory at Emory Heart and Vascular Center (“Emory”), where Crewey would be catheterized and undergo emergent angioplasty.
At 6:47 p.m., a nurse at Dunwoody contacted AMR to request transportation services pursuant to a contractual agreement under which the hospital agreed to make AMR its “first provider,” or the first company that it called for ambulance services (the “Contract”). The nurse informed the AMR operator that Crewey was suffering from an “[a]cute MI” and was in need of “a stat ambulance,” and further informed her that the ambulance had to be an “advanced unit,” requiring that it have at least one paramedic and be equipped with advanced life support equipment.
After the nurse rebuked the
AMR operator’s attempts to obtain Crewey’s insurance and other information by reemphasizing the need for a quick response, the AMR operator informed the nurse that AMR could not provide an advanced unit for at least one to one and one half hours.
In accordance with its company policy, the AMR operator agreed to “turn the call,” or help locate another ambulance service to provide the transport, but first requested that the nurse locate and provide Crewey’s insurance information. When a nurse supervisor contacted AMR shortly thereafter, however, the AMR operator indicated that AMR could not provide an ambulance for at least two hours, but agreed to furnish the nurse supervisor with telephone numbers of alternate ambulance services without first requiring Crewey’s insurance information; both women then began making calls to find
another transport provider.
Eventually, Dunwoody successfully found an alternative ambulance service to transport Crewey to Emory; however, the ambulance did not arrive at Dunwoody until 7:55 p.m. Upon his arrival at Emory, Crewey immediately underwent catheterization and angioplasty, but by that time he had suffered a large amount of damage to his heart. In the weeks and months that followed, Crewey continued to suffer complications, and ultimately received a defibrillator implant.
Crewey filed the instant lawsuit, alleging that AMR acted negligently in its attempts to provide him timely transportation services and that, as a result of the delay caused by AMR’s conduct, he suffered severe injury and damage to his cardiovascular system.
In support of its complaint, Crewey submitted an expert affidavit from his treating physician who opined that “[i]t took 67 minutes for transport [of Crewey] to begin when it should have taken 30 minutes or less,” thus resulting in a 37-minute delay of treatment. The doctor further averred that
based upon [his] education and [his] professional experience, it is [his] medical opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the 37 minute delay in transport of David Crewey on May 14, 2004 was the proximate cause of a substantial amount of the heart damage that Mr. Crewey now suffers. Further, that had Mr. Crewey been timely transported that the heart [catheter] would have taken place a long time prior to when it was eventually done. Specifically, the negligence of [AMR] resulted in an injury to Mr. Crewey. It is [his] opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the injury could have been avoided absent such negligence. . . . It is further [his] understanding and medical opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the damage to David Crewey’s heart was as a direct and proximate cause of the delay in transport from . . . Dun woody to [Emory] by [AMR], and these injuries, complications and damages would have been avoided had only transportation been timely implemented and received. That it is further [his] opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty this specific delay in treatment puts David Crewey at a greater risk for cardiac arrest, or even sudden death.
AMR moved for summary judgment, arguing that it did not breach any duty, in contract or in tort, to Crewey. The trial court granted AMR’s motion in part after concluding that AMR did not owe a contractual duty to Crewey; the trial court nonetheless denied AMR’s motion in part after holding that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether AMR owed Crewey a duty under the Restatement 2d Torts § 324A (a), (c).
AMR then filed a second motion for summary judgment, contending that it was nonetheless
immune from civil liability as an emergency care provider pursuant to OCGA § 31-11-8. The trial court granted AMR’s motion, and it is from this order that Crewey appeals.
The statutory immunity set forth in OCGA § 31-11-8 “was enacted as part of a comprehensive Act to provide the citizens of this state with efficient, safe and professional ambulance service.”
Anderson v. Little & Davenport Funeral Home,
242 Ga. 751, 754 (2) (251 SE2d 250) (1978). The statute provides, in relevant part:
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Bernes, Judge.
David A. Crewey appeals from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to American Medical Response of Georgia, Inc. (“AMR”), an ambulance company, in his lawsuit alleging that AMR was negligent in its attempts to timely provide ambulance transport to Crewey following a heart attack. The trial court’s order was based upon its conclusion that AMR was afforded immunity under OCGA § 31-11-8, which shields emergency care providers from civil damages under certain circumstances. Because we conclude that the acts alleged to have been negligently performed by AMR fall outside of the purview of OCGA § 31-11-8, we reverse.
On appeal from the grant of summary judgment, we view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, construing all evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See
Pruette v. Phoebe Putney Mem. Hosp.,
295 Ga. App. 335 (671 SE2d 844) (2008). We review issues of
law de novo. See
Dept. of Human Resources v. Nation,
265 Ga. App. 434, 436 (594 SE2d 383) (2004).
So viewed, the evidence shows that on May 14, 2004, Crewey called 911 after experiencing chest pains and other symptoms consistent with a heart attack. Emergency medical personnel arrived on the scene and transported Crewey to Emory Dunwoody Medical Center (“Dunwoody”), where it was confirmed that Crewey was in fact suffering an acute myocardial infarction. The emergency cardiologist at Dunwoody performed some initial treatment on Crewey, but soon determined that Dunwoody did not have adequate resources to properly treat him. The cardiologist therefore ordered that Crewey be transported to the cardiac catheterization laboratory at Emory Heart and Vascular Center (“Emory”), where Crewey would be catheterized and undergo emergent angioplasty.
At 6:47 p.m., a nurse at Dunwoody contacted AMR to request transportation services pursuant to a contractual agreement under which the hospital agreed to make AMR its “first provider,” or the first company that it called for ambulance services (the “Contract”). The nurse informed the AMR operator that Crewey was suffering from an “[a]cute MI” and was in need of “a stat ambulance,” and further informed her that the ambulance had to be an “advanced unit,” requiring that it have at least one paramedic and be equipped with advanced life support equipment.
After the nurse rebuked the
AMR operator’s attempts to obtain Crewey’s insurance and other information by reemphasizing the need for a quick response, the AMR operator informed the nurse that AMR could not provide an advanced unit for at least one to one and one half hours.
In accordance with its company policy, the AMR operator agreed to “turn the call,” or help locate another ambulance service to provide the transport, but first requested that the nurse locate and provide Crewey’s insurance information. When a nurse supervisor contacted AMR shortly thereafter, however, the AMR operator indicated that AMR could not provide an ambulance for at least two hours, but agreed to furnish the nurse supervisor with telephone numbers of alternate ambulance services without first requiring Crewey’s insurance information; both women then began making calls to find
another transport provider.
Eventually, Dunwoody successfully found an alternative ambulance service to transport Crewey to Emory; however, the ambulance did not arrive at Dunwoody until 7:55 p.m. Upon his arrival at Emory, Crewey immediately underwent catheterization and angioplasty, but by that time he had suffered a large amount of damage to his heart. In the weeks and months that followed, Crewey continued to suffer complications, and ultimately received a defibrillator implant.
Crewey filed the instant lawsuit, alleging that AMR acted negligently in its attempts to provide him timely transportation services and that, as a result of the delay caused by AMR’s conduct, he suffered severe injury and damage to his cardiovascular system.
In support of its complaint, Crewey submitted an expert affidavit from his treating physician who opined that “[i]t took 67 minutes for transport [of Crewey] to begin when it should have taken 30 minutes or less,” thus resulting in a 37-minute delay of treatment. The doctor further averred that
based upon [his] education and [his] professional experience, it is [his] medical opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the 37 minute delay in transport of David Crewey on May 14, 2004 was the proximate cause of a substantial amount of the heart damage that Mr. Crewey now suffers. Further, that had Mr. Crewey been timely transported that the heart [catheter] would have taken place a long time prior to when it was eventually done. Specifically, the negligence of [AMR] resulted in an injury to Mr. Crewey. It is [his] opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the injury could have been avoided absent such negligence. . . . It is further [his] understanding and medical opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the damage to David Crewey’s heart was as a direct and proximate cause of the delay in transport from . . . Dun woody to [Emory] by [AMR], and these injuries, complications and damages would have been avoided had only transportation been timely implemented and received. That it is further [his] opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty this specific delay in treatment puts David Crewey at a greater risk for cardiac arrest, or even sudden death.
AMR moved for summary judgment, arguing that it did not breach any duty, in contract or in tort, to Crewey. The trial court granted AMR’s motion in part after concluding that AMR did not owe a contractual duty to Crewey; the trial court nonetheless denied AMR’s motion in part after holding that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether AMR owed Crewey a duty under the Restatement 2d Torts § 324A (a), (c).
AMR then filed a second motion for summary judgment, contending that it was nonetheless
immune from civil liability as an emergency care provider pursuant to OCGA § 31-11-8. The trial court granted AMR’s motion, and it is from this order that Crewey appeals.
The statutory immunity set forth in OCGA § 31-11-8 “was enacted as part of a comprehensive Act to provide the citizens of this state with efficient, safe and professional ambulance service.”
Anderson v. Little & Davenport Funeral Home,
242 Ga. 751, 754 (2) (251 SE2d 250) (1978). The statute provides, in relevant part:
Any person, including agents and employees, who is licensed to furnish ambulance service and who in good faith renders emergency care to a person who is a victim of an accident or emergency shall not be liable for any civil damages to such victim as a result of any act or omission by such person in rendering such emergency care to such victim. ...
The immunity provided in this Code section shall apply only to those persons who perform the aforesaid emergency services for no remuneration.
OCGA § 31-11-8 (a), (c). “Emergency care” has been defined as “the performance of necessary personal services during an unforeseen circumstance that calls for immediate action.”
Anderson,
242 Ga. at 753 (1). And “[t]he statute is carefully drawn so as to grant immunity to providers of ambulance service only for their acts and omissions in rendering such emergency care.” (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 754 (2).
See Bricks v. Metro Ambulance Svc.,
177 Ga. App. 62, 69 (2) (338 SE2d 438) (1985).
AMR did not render “emergency care” as contemplated by OCGA § 31-11-8 (a).
To the contrary, it was AMR’s inability to provide Crewey with the necessary emergency care sought by Dun-woody that led to the series of events in question. See generally
Bricks,
177 Ga. App. at 69 (2) (holding OCGA § 31-11-8 inapplicable because claim of liability against the ambulance company was not founded upon the rendition of medical care). The record shows that the services undertaken by AMR in this case were taken on behalf of Dunwoody and were done pursuant to AMR’s written policy. This
factual scenario simply falls outside of the purview of the protection offered by OCGA § 31-11-8. See generally id. Thus, without expressing any opinion as to the question of AMR’s liability, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting it summary judgment on the basis of emergency care immunity.
Decided March 30, 2010.
Irwin M. Ellerin, for
appellants.
Hawkins & Parnell, Patricia M. Peters,
for appellee.
Judgment reversed.
Smith, P. J., and Phipps, J., concur.