Cresson Consol. Gold M. & Milling Co. v. Commissioner

11 T.C. 192, 1948 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 102
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedAugust 23, 1948
DocketDocket No. 11529
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 11 T.C. 192 (Cresson Consol. Gold M. & Milling Co. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cresson Consol. Gold M. & Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 192, 1948 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 102 (tax 1948).

Opinion

OPINION.

Tyson, Judge-.

The Commissioner determined deficiencies of $5,-771.37 in income tax and $1,425.67 in excess profits tax for the calendar year 1940. The deficiencies are due to the disallowance of $24,047.36 of the amount claimed by the petitioner as a deduction for percentage depletion.

All of the facts have been stipulated and the stipulation of facts and attached exhibits are hereby adopted as our findings of fact.

The petitioner, a corporation of the State of Colorado, with its principal office at Colorado Springs, filed income and excess profits tax returns for the taxable year 1940 with the collector for the district of Colorado.

Since 1894 the petitioner has been engaged in mining and producing gold-bearing ore in the Cripple Creek Mining District, in Teller County, Colorado. For more than 20 years it has owned in fee simple approximately 85 acres of contiguous land in that district, comprising a single tract or parcel; and during 1940 and for many years prior thereto it conducted all mining operations thereon. The petitioner has never produced gold-bearing ores from any other land, nor has it ever owned or held, as lessee, any leasehold interest.

In the conduct of mining activities in 1940 the petitioner operated one shaft, one hoist, one plant, one ore house, one waste-rock dump, one blacksmith shop, one set of power lines, and one aerial tramline to the railroad siding. The petitioner owned all of such property and the entire mining operations were under the supervision of the petitioner’s mine superintendent.

During 1940 the petitioner carried on the mining operations under two plans which had been used by it consistently and without material change for a period of more than 15 years. Under one plan (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the petitioner’s own operations), the petitioner employed and paid for all labor and paid all operating costs and expenses. Under the other plan (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the contract operations), the petitioner operated through written agreements, known locally as “split-check” leases. These agreements were entered into with individuals, copartnerships, or corporations, and were not transferable. Approximately 26 of such agreements were in effect during 1940.

The persons with whom these agreements were made (hereinafter referred to as contractors) were granted the right for a definite term (usually one year) to exploit, develop, and mine gold-bearing ore within specified blocks or areas between or including certain levels of the mine adjacent to the shaft of the petitioner. The contractors’ mining operations could be reached through and conducted only by the use of the shaft and hoist of the petitioner. They were carried on in the upper levels of the mine, often immediately above mining operations conducted solely by the petitioner. In accordance with an understanding with the contractors, the petitioner furnished supplies, including powder, fuse, compressed air, timber, and drill steel, and it bore all of the expenses of operating and maintaining the shaft, hoist, ore house, surface labor, blacksmith shop, power lines, power costs, and the aerial tramline in connection with the mining operations in the areas covered by the agreements. All waste and nonmineral-bearing rock were hoisted and dumped at the sole expense of petitioner. The mining operations under the contracts were conducted under the management of petitioner’s superintendent. The contractors furnished the manpower or labor and some hand tools and machine drills for the conduct of the actual mining operations within the areas covered by the agreements. If the loading of the ore into the tramcars was done at the request of the contractors by employees of the petitioner, the contractors were required to pay the petitioner 10 cents per ton for such services. The minerals produced under the agreements were shipped to a gold reduction mill, which made direct payments to the petitioner and to the several contractors, according to the terms of the agreements. In all of the agreements it was agreed that petitioner should receive 50 per cent of the net mill returns, plus 1 per cent of the gross value of ores for general state property taxes, and that the contractor should receive 50 per cent of the net mill returns. The net mill return, as contemplated in the agreements, is the value per dry ton, less the 1 per cent above referred to, freight, treatment, and sampling charges.

The gross income from ores mined and sold under the contract operations during 1940 was $491,035.53. The petitioner received $234,518.08 and the contractors received $256,517.45 of that amount. The petitioner’s net income from such operations was $118,450.14. The gross income of the petitioner from ores mined and sold during 1940 under its own operations was $214,712.91, and its net income therefrom was $1,887,28, The petitioner’s combined gross income from its own and the contract operations was $449,2-30.99, and its combined net income therefrom was $120,337.42.

In its return for 1940 the petitioner reported $214,712.91 as gross receipts from ore sales and $234,518.08 as royalty income. In computing its net income in its return for 1940 the petitioner claimed percentage depletion in the amount of $60,168.71, which amount is 50 per cent of the combined net income of $120,337.42 and is less than 15 per cent of the combined gross income. The respondent treated the petitioner’s own operations as one “property” and its contract operations as one other “property,” and disallowed $24,047.36 of the deduction claimed by the petitioner. The respondent’s computation is as follows:

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In its return for 1934 the petitioner claimed, and the respondent allowed, depletion computed on the percentage basis; and, as part of its return for that year, the petitioner made a written election to have the depletion allowance computed with regard to percentage depletion. For each of the years 1934 to 1940, both inclusive, the petitioner claimed, and the respondent allowed, depletion computed on the percentage basis.

In computing percentage depletion for the years 1934 to 1939, both inclusive, the petitioner and the respondent treated all income from the mining operations as income from one “property,” by combining the income from the petitioner’s own operations and the income from the contract operations in computing the “gross income from the property” and the “net income from the property.” In its return for the taxable year 1940 the petitioner computed percentage depletion in the same manner as in the years 1934 to 1939.

The same mineral lands were operated and the same methods of mining were conducted thereon by the petitioner in each of the years 1934 to 1940, both inclusive.

Section 114 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes an allowance for depletion, in the case of oil and gas wells, coal mines, and metal mines, measured by a percentage of the income from the property. The provision applicable to coal and metal mines is contained in section 114 (b) (4), which is set forth in the margin.1

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Related

Lloyd Corp. v. Riddell
222 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. California, 1963)
Ruston v. Commissioner
19 T.C. 284 (U.S. Tax Court, 1952)
Tennessee Consol. Coal Co. v. Commissioner
15 T.C. 424 (U.S. Tax Court, 1950)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
11 T.C. 192, 1948 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 102, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cresson-consol-gold-m-milling-co-v-commissioner-tax-1948.