Crawford's Auto Ins. v. State Farm Mutual

301 A.3d 911

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: June 20, 2023
• Docket: 1197 EDA 2022
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S33033-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

CRAWFORD'S AUTO CENTER, INC. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE : No. 1197 EDA 2022 INSURANCE COMPANIES :

Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 2020-09139-CT

CRAWFORD'S AUTO CENTER, INC. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE : No. 1198 EDA 2022 INSURANCE COMPANIES :

Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 2021-07843-CT J-S33033-22

CRAWFORD'S AUTO CENTER, INC. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE : No. 1199 EDA 2022 INSURANCE COMPANIES :

Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 2021-07844-CT

CRAWFORD'S AUTO CENTER, INC. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE : No. 1200 EDA 2022 INSURANCE COMPANIES :

Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 2021-07848-CT

CRAWFORD'S AUTO CENTER, INC. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE : No. 1201 EDA 2022 INSURANCE COMPANIES :

Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 2021-07862-CT

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CRAWFORD'S AUTO CENTER, INC. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE : No. 1202 EDA 2022 INSURANCE COMPANIES :

Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 2021-07863-CT

CRAWFORD'S AUTO CENTER, INC. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE : No. 1203 EDA 2022 INSURANCE COMPANIES :

Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 2021-07869-CT

CRAWFORD'S AUTO CENTER, INC. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE : No. 1204 EDA 2022 INSURANCE COMPANIES :

Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 2021-07870-CT

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CRAWFORD'S AUTO CENTER, INC. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE : No. 1205 EDA 2022 INSURANCE COMPANIES :

Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 2021-07871-CT

CRAWFORD'S AUTO CENTER, INC. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE : No. 1206 EDA 2022 INSURANCE COMPANIES :

Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 2021-07872-CT

CRAWFORD'S AUTO CENTER, INC. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE : No. 1207 EDA 2022 INSURANCE COMPANIES :

Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 2021-07873-CT

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CRAWFORD'S AUTO CENTER, INC. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE : No. 1208 EDA 2022 INSURANCE COMPANIES :

Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 2021-07875-CT

CRAWFORD'S AUTO CENTER, INC. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE : No. 1209 EDA 2022 INSURANCE COMPANIES :

Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 2021-07876-CT

CRAWFORD'S AUTO CENTER, INC. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE : No. 1210 EDA 2022 INSURANCE COMPANIES :

Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 2021-07877-CT

-5- J-S33033-22

CRAWFORD'S AUTO CENTER, INC. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE : No. 1211 EDA 2022 INSURANCE COMPANIES :

Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 2021-07878-CT

CRAWFORD'S AUTO CENTER, INC. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE : No. 1212 EDA 2022 INSURANCE COMPANIES :

Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 2021-07879-CT

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED JUNE 20, 2023

Crawford’s Auto Center, Inc. (“Crawford’s”) appeals from the orders

granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance Company (“State Farm”) in these sixteen consolidated cases.1

____________________________________________

1 On June 28, 2022, this Court granted Crawford’s motion to consolidate these

cases.

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Additionally, Crawford’s claims that the trial court erred in sustaining State

Farm’s preliminary objections and requiring Crawford’s to file separate

complaints.2 We affirm.

Crawford’s initiated a single breach of contract action against State Farm

asserting that twenty State Farm insureds had assigned their rights under

their auto insurance policies to Crawford’s, and State Farm owed Crawford’s

payment for repairs it made to the insureds’ vehicles. See Complaint,

12/10/20, at 2-3 (unnumbered).3 After State Farm filed preliminary

objections to the complaint, Crawford’s filed a first amended complaint. State

Farm filed preliminary objections to the first amended complaint asserting

improper joinder of the twenty cases and the insufficient specificity of

Crawford’s pleading. See State Farm’s Preliminary Objections to Complaint,

7/19/21, see also Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(3), (5). The trial court sustained State

Farm’s preliminary objections and gave Crawford’s twenty days to refile its

claims as separate actions. See Order, 9/10/21 at 2 n.1.

2 Although the order sustaining State Farm’s preliminary objections is not a

final order that disposed of all claims and of all parties, see Pa.R.A.P. 341(b), (c), Crawford’s claim concerning the September 10, 2021 order is reviewable because the court has entered final orders dismissing Crawford’s complaints. See K.H. v. J.R., 826 A.2d 863, 870-71 (Pa. 2003).

3 At the time of the final order from which it appeals, Crawford’s was pursuing

claims relating to sixteen of those insureds. See Crawford’s Brief at 6 n. 1.

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Crawford’s then filed sixteen individual complaints against State Farm,

attaching to each a sample State Farm policy (“the policy”) and documents

relating to the costs of its repairs and the assignments of rights from the

insureds. See Second Amended Complaints, 10/6/21.4 State Farm filed

preliminary objections asserting that the one-year suit limitation provision in

the policy barred Crawford’s breach of contract claims. See State Farm’s

Preliminary Objections to Amended Complaints, 11/18/21, at 2.5 Crawford’s

opposed the preliminary objections, asserting that State Farm prematurely

raised an affirmative defense; Crawford’s also claimed that the suit limitation

provision could be “subject to the defenses of waiver and estoppel” and that

its enforcement would be “unconscionable.” See Crawford’s Briefs in Support

of Opposition to Preliminary Objections, 12/6/21, at 4-9 (unnumbered). The

4 Crawford’s chose not to file reproduced records in all sixteen cases, but states that the language in all sixteen policies is the same. See Crawford’s Brief at 7 n.2.

5 Specifically, Crawford’s relied on the following provision in the policy:

13. Legal action may not be brought against us until there has been full compliance with all provisions of this policy. In addition, legal action may only be brought against us regarding:

****

c. Physical Damage Coverages if the legal action relating to these coverages is brought against us within one year immediately following the date of the accident or loss.

Exhibit A to Amended Complaints, 10/6/21, at 42-43 (emphasis in original).

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court overruled State Farm’s preliminary objections, holding that the suit

limitation provision could only be properly pled as new matter in responsive

pleadings. See Orders, 12/14/21, at 2 n.1 (unnumbered). State Farm then

filed answers and new matter in each case raising its defense based on the

one-year suit limitation provision. See State Farm’s Answers and New Matter

to Amended Complaints, 1/3/22, at 9-12.

Crawford’s replied to the new matter. Crawford’s admitted that the

asserted losses occurred outside of the one-year suit limitation provision but

claimed that the applicability of the provision stated a conclusion of law. See

Crawford’s Replies to New Matter, 1/25/22, at 2 (unnumbered). State Farm

filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in each of the cases asserting

that the suit limitation provision in the policy barred the claims. See State

Farm’s Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings, 2/10/22, at 2-6. Crawford’s

filed a brief in opposition in which it conceded that “the date of loss occurred

over one-year prior to bringing this action,” but asserted both the existence

of unknown and disputed facts as to the unconscionability of the suit limitation

provision and waiver and estoppel affirmative defenses to the enforcement of

that provision. Crawford’s Briefs in Opposition to State Farm’s Motions for

Judgment on the Pleadings, 3/1/22 at 6 (unnumbered). On March 18, 2022,

the trial court entered the orders granting State Farm’s motions for judgment

on the pleadings. Crawford’s timely appealed, and it and the trial court

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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On appeal, Crawford’s presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court commit error of law and/or abuse of discretion in issuing the . . . Order, granting . . . [State Farm’s] Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings related to . . . [Crawford’s,] finding that the Suit Limitation Provisions contained in the subject policies are valid and conscionable without allowing [Crawford’s] the benefit of discovery?

2. Did the trial court commit error of law and/or abuse of discretion in issuing the . . . Order . . . granting [State Farm’s] Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings related to [Crawford’s] arguments related to Waiver and Estoppel of the Suit Limitation Provisions?

3. Did the trial court commit error of law and/or abuse of discretion in granting [State Farm’s] Preliminary Objections and issuing the September 10, 2021 Order, requiring [Crawford’s] to refile its original claims into separate actions?

Crawford’s Brief at 5.

In its brief, Crawford’s combines its discussion of its first and second

questions presented. Crawford’s argues in its first and second questions

presented that the court erred by granting judgment on the pleadings because

although the insureds’ policy with State Farm had a one-year suit limitation

provision, the court denied Crawford’s the opportunity to take discovery to

explore four potential affirmative defenses to the enforcement of that

provision. Crawford’s combined issues assert that the trial court erred in

granting judgment on the pleadings because questions of facts existed about

the affirmative defenses of the unconscionability and ambiguity of the

provision, and further asserts that State Farm’s conduct may have implicated

the affirmative defenses of waiver and equitable estoppel. For purposes of

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clarity, we separately address each of the four affirmative defenses Crawford’s

combined first two issues assert as a basis to reverse the trial court’s grant of

judgment on the pleadings.

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1034 governs motions for

judgments on the pleadings which are in the nature of a demurrer; any party

may move for judgment on the pleadings within such time as not to

unreasonably delay the trial. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1034(a); Consolidated Coal

v. White, 875 A.2d 318, 325 (Pa. Super. 2005). This Court has recently

stated that judgments on the pleadings:

may be entered when there are no disputed issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This Court’s scope and standard of review of an appeal from the grant of judgment on the pleadings is plenary, and we must determine whether the action of the court below was based on clear error of law or whether there were facts disclosed by the pleadings which should properly go to the jury. Our review, therefore, is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law.

Monroe v. CBH20, LP, 286 A.3d 785, 796 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc)

(internal citations, quotations, and indentation omitted). This Court reviews

the non-moving party’s well-pled allegations as true. Only those facts

specifically admitted by the non-moving party may be considered against it.

See Sejpal v. Corson, Mitchell, Tomhave & McKinley, M.D.’s, Inc., 665

A.2d 1198, 1199 (Pa. Super. 1995) (internal citation omitted). The Court will

affirm the grant of a motion for judgments on the pleadings “when the moving

party’s right to succeed is certain and the case is so free from doubt that trial

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would clearly be a fruitless exercise.” Jones v. Erie Insurance Exchange,

282 A.3d 1139, 1143 (Pa. Super. 2022) (internal citation omitted).

Regarding its first two affirmative defenses, Crawford’s asserts the trial

court abused its discretion by granting judgment on the pleadings because a

court could find the one-year suit limitation provision in the policy

unconscionable, and because Crawford’s was “not privy to all communications

between [State Farm] and its insured,” and thus could only conditionally

assert possible unconscionability. See Crawford’s Brief at 14-16.

The court found that the policy included a one-year suit limitation

provision whose interpretation raised a question of law and Crawford’s failed

to support its unconscionability claim with any legal authority. The court also

stated that clear and unambiguous contractual terms must be given effect.

See Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/22, at 5-6.

We discern neither a clear error of law nor the existence of facts that

must be decided by a jury. Crawford’s does not provide any authority for the

proposition that a one-year suit limitation provision is unconscionable. The

case law is to the contrary and generally holds that such provisions are valid

and sustainable. See Prime Medica Associates v. Valley Forge Ins. Co.,

970 A.2d 1149, 1158 (Pa. Super. 2009); see also Fennell v. National

Mutual Ins. Co., 603 A.2d 1064, 1068 (Pa. Super. 1992) (acknowledging an

“unbroken line of authorities” upholding the validity and enforceability of such

provisions). Given that clear line of cases, we cannot find error based on

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Crawford’s speculation that there might have been conversations between

State Farm and the insureds that would have rendered the policy

unconscionable.

Crawford’s second, third, and fourth affirmative defenses assert,

respectively, the ambiguity of the suit limitation provision, State Farm’s waiver

of the application of that provision, and equitable estoppel relating to that

provision. Before reaching a review of those issues, we must determine

whether Crawford’s preserved them for our review. Issues not raised in the

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Additionally, claims not raised in a statement of errors

complained of on appeal, Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), or a statement of questions

presented, see Pa.R.A.P. 2116, are waived.

Crawford’s did not assert the alleged ambiguities in the suit limitation

provision in its pleadings or responses to State Farm at the trial court level,

its Rule 1925(b) statement, or its statement of questions presented. Thus,

Crawford’s waived that claim, first raised on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a);

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (stating that “issues not included in the [1925(b)]

Statement . . . are waived”); Pa.R.A.P. 2116 (providing that “[n]o question

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will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or

is fairly suggested thereby”).6

Crawford’s next asserts the existence of issues of fact concerning its

assertions of waiver and estoppel; as to both affirmative defenses it

acknowledges its failure to provide “concrete factual allegations” to support

the claims but says that it could not do so because it was not privy to the

discussions between State Farm and its insureds relating to the underlying

claims. See Crawford’s Brief at 22-23. These claims too are unreviewable.

6 Even were the claim reviewable, it would lack merit. The interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law. See Pennsylvania Manufacturers Indemnity Company v. Pottstown Industrial Complex LP, 215 A.3d 1010, 1014 (Pa. Super. 2019); see also Windows v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 161 A.3d 953, 957 (Pa. Super. 2017) (stating that the trial court determines as a question of law whether written contract terms are clear or ambiguous). A contract is ambiguous “if it is reasonably susceptible of different constructions and capable of being understood in more than one sense. The ‘reasonably’ qualifier is important: there is no ambiguity if one of the two proffered meanings is unreasonable.” See id. (citation omitted). When a policy’s terms are clear and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the policy’s language. See Pennsylvania Manufacturers Indemnity Company, 215 A.3d at 1015.

It is not a reasonable reading of the phrase “Legal action may not be brought against us until there has been full compliance with all provisions of this policy” that the word “us” could refer to either the insured or State Farm as Crawford’s claims. See Crawford’s Brief at 17-18. Similarly, it is not reasonable that the reference to “full compliance” could refer to State Farm’s compliance. See id. at 18-19. The policy language clearly contemplates that actions are to be brought by the insureds against State Farm after the insureds have fully complied with all the provisions of the policy. The policy provision is thus not ambiguous.

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A party must preserve an affirmative defense of waiver in response to

new matter. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1030(a), 1032(a); see also Wiley v. Brooks,

263 A.3d 671, 675 (Pa. Super. 2021) (stating that affirmative defense must

be raised in response to new mater so that the issues in the dispute may be

sharpened at an early stage). The court found that State Farm raised the suit

limitation provision as new matter, and Crawford’s did not assert waiver in

reply. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/2/22, at 5. See Trial Court Opinion,

5/12/22, at 4-5. Crawford’s thus failed to plead waiver in response to State

Farm’s new matter, and thus waived that affirmative defense. See Pa.R.Civ.P.

1032(a).7

As a fourth affirmative defense, Crawford’s asserts equitable estoppel.

As with the affirmative defense of waiver, a party must assert a claim of

7 Even if reviewable, this claim would have no merit. Crawford’s cannot excuse its duty to provide factual support for its waiver assertion by claiming that it was not privy to possible conversations between State Farm and the insureds. “It is the duty of a party asserting a cause of action to use all reasonable diligence to properly inform himself of the facts and circumstances upon which the right of recovery is based and to institute suit within the prescribed period.” See Kelly v. Carman Corporation, 229 A.3d 634, 647 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). Further, an assignee has no greater rights than the assignor, see Crawford Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Commonwealth, 888 A.2d 616, 619-20 (Pa. 2005), but stands in the shoes of the assignor, see Citimortgage, Inc. v. Barbezat, 131 A.3d 65, 69 (Pa. Super. 2016). Crawford’s, therefore, had a duty to inform itself of the insured’s conversations, if any, with State Farm. It cannot convert its failure to perform its duty into a basis to overturn the grant of judgment on the pleadings. The court found that Crawford’s failed to state a factual basis to support a waiver defense, and that its assertions that State Farm’s conduct or communications “may have” induced actions or inaction by the insureds did not satisfy its pleading burden.

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estoppel in response to new matter. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1032(a). See also

Devine v. Hutt, 863 A.2d 1160, 1169 (Pa. Super 2014) (stating that defenses

to statutes of limitation such as estoppel are waivable and must be raised in

reply to new matter that asserts the statute as an affirmative defense).

Crawford’s failed to assert estoppel in response to the suit limitation provision

and therefore waived its claim. See Pa.R.A.P. 1032(a). Moreover, Crawford’s

failed to exercise its duty of due diligence as an assignee to discover any

alleged conversations between State Farm and its insureds and cannot defeat

judgment on the pleadings by asserting that such conversations may have

occurred. Therefore, Crawford’s waived review of that claim as well. See

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1032(a), Devine, 863 A.2d at 1169.

In addition to its four affirmative defenses, Crawford’s additionally

claims that the court erred by dismissing its complaint without leave to amend.

See id. at 24. We note that the decision to grant or deny permission to amend

is within the trial court’s discretion. See Debbs v. Chrysler Corp., 810 A.2d

137, 148 (Pa. Super. 2002). Where it is clear that leave to amend would be

futile, dismissal is proper. See In re Estate of Luongo, 823 A.2d 942, 969

(Pa. Super. 2003). Additionally, although amendment of a complaint is to be

liberally allowed, a party must request the right to amend. See d’Happart

v. First Commonwealth Bank, 282 A.3d 704, 737-38 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(citing Werner v. Zazyczyny, 681 A.2d 1331, 1338 (Pa. 1996), for the

propositions that a plaintiff waives a request to amend by failing to raise it in

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the trial court, and that the trial court is not required, sua sponte, to order or

require a party to amend its pleading). Here, Crawford’s did not request leave

to amend its complaint. See d’Happart, 282 A.3d at 738.8

Crawford’s advances one final assertion regarding affirmative defenses

in its discussion of its first two questions presented. It argues that unknown

or disputed facts existed because the record does not contain the specific

policies State Farm had with the insureds. See Crawford’s Brief at 26-28.

Crawford’s did not raise this claim in its Rule 1925(b) statement or its

statement of questions presented and thus waived it. See Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b)(4)(vii); Pa.R.A.P. 2116.

Even if reviewable, the claim lacks merit. As the court stated, the

pleadings in the case included as to each claim the policy with the one-year

suit limitation provision, the date of loss, and the date Crawford’s commenced

the actions. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/22, at 4. Crawford’s itself states

that the language contained in all sixteen policies is the same, and that it

limited the reproduced record to the lead docket. See Crawford’s Brief at 7

n.2. Crawford’s cannot argue on appeal that the sixteen policies may have

8 Even were the claim not waived, it would not merit relief.That Crawford’s can only offer speculation when it has already filed multiple amended complaints and had the opportunity to speak with the insureds sufficiently demonstrates that amendment would be futile. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by not sua sponte ordering Crawford’s to amend its complaint. See d’Happart, 282 A.3d at 738.

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contained differing language. Crawford’s chose to attach the sample policy to

its amended complaints and did not assert harm from the absence of the

individual policies. Crawford’s thus cannot on appeal oppose judgment on the

pleadings on the basis that the individual insurance policies are not of record.9

Crawford’s third question presented asserts the court’s error in

sustaining State Farm’s September 2021 preliminary objections to its single

complaint pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(5) and ordering Crawford’s to refile

its claims as sixteen separate actions, impairing judicial economy. See

Crawford’s Brief at 34. Given our disposition of Crawford’s affirmative

defenses to the grant of judgment on the pleadings, even if the court’s ruling

had been incorrect,10 Crawford’s has not demonstrated that the ruling had any

effect on the outcome; thus any error was harmless. See Vine v. Com.,

State Employees’ Retirement Bd., 9 A.3d 1150, 1164 (Pa. 2010) (stating

that an appellate court will not disturb a judgment, order, or decree for

harmless error).

Order affirmed.

9 The court rejected this claim citing its September 2021 order and accompanying footnote. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/21, at 3.

10 The trial court found that the inclusion of the then-twenty unrelated actions

in a single count in a single action was improper, because, inter alia, proof that would establish the merits of any one claim would be distinct from the evidence to establish the merits of any other claim. See Order, 9/10/21 at 2- 3 n.1.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 6/20/2023

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