Crawford v. Combs

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedMarch 4, 2020
Docket4:17-cv-03089
StatusUnknown

This text of Crawford v. Combs (Crawford v. Combs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crawford v. Combs, (N.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 CHRISTOPHER LEE CRAWFORD, 4 Case No. 17-cv-03089-YGR (PR) Plaintiff, 5 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S RULE v. 56(D) MOTION; DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 6 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SGT. COMBS, et al., WITHOUT PREJUDICE; DENYING THEIR 7 MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY AS Defendants. PREMATURE; DENYING ALL REMAINING 8 MOTIONS AS MOOT; AND SETTING DISCOVERY AND BRIEFING SCHEDULES 9 I. INTRODUCTION 10 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 11 § 1983. The operative complaint in this action is the amended complaint, in which Plaintiff 12 alleged constitutional rights violations at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”) where he was 13 previously incarcerated. Dkt. 28 at 1-2. Plaintiff named the following Defendants at PBSP and 14 the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”): CDCR Secretary Scott 15 Kernan; PBSP Captain M. Townsend; PBSP Sergeant Combs; and PBSP Correctional Officers 16 Oviatt and Spradlin. Dkt. 28 at 1-2; Dkt. 27 at 1. Specifically, Plaintiff claims arose from 17 Defendants’ alleged deliberate indifference to his safety needs stemming from an incident on April 18 13, 2016 in which Defendants Combs and Spradlin were interviewing Plaintiff relating to “his 19 alleged safety concerns” when they “deliberately forced Plaintiff out of his cell” and asked him in 20 front of other inmates whether he wanted to be housed at the Special Needs Yard (“SNY”). Dkt. 21 28 at 1-2. Plaintiff also alleged that Defendants Oviatt and Townsend took part in “conspiracies to 22 entrap[] [him] [by] deliberately questioning him in front of other general population inmates” 23 regarding his desire to be housed at SNY. Id. at 1. Plaintiff is seeking declaratory relief and 24 monetary damages. Id. at 2-3. 25 On January 14, 2019, the Court found that Plaintiff’s amended complaint stated a 26 cognizable claim that Defendants Combs, Spradlin, Oviatt, and Townsend were deliberately 27 indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety needs. Dkt. 31 at 2-3. The Court ordered service of the amended 1 complaint on the aforementioned Defendants, directed them to file a dispositive motion, and set a 2 briefing schedule. Id. at 3-7. Meanwhile, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s supervisory liability 3 claim against Defendant Kernan. Id. at 3. 4 Before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, motion to file under seal 5 confidential investigatory and medical records, and motion to stay discovery. Dkts. 41, 42, 45. 6 To date, Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 7 Plaintiff’s was directed to file an opposition by January 20, 2020—after being granted three 8 extensions of time to do so. See Dkt. 56. Instead, Plaintiff has filed a document entitled, 9 “Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Continuance.” Dkt. 59. The 10 Court will construe Plaintiff’s filing as a request under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) 11 (“Rule 56(d)”). See Garrett v. San Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515, 1518 (9th Cir. 1987) (discovery 12 motion was sufficient to raise issue of whether plaintiff was entitled to relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 56([d]))1; Hancock v. Montgomery Ward Long Term Disability Trust, 787 F.2d 1302, 1306 n.1 14 (9th Cir. 1986) (pending motion to compel discovery was sufficient to raise Rule 56([d]) 15 consideration). In response, Defendants filed a “Response to Plaintiff’s Fourth Motion for 16 Extension on Time to Oppose Motion for Summery Judgment,” in which they state that they “do 17 not oppose Plaintiff’s request for an extension of time.” Dkt. 60. 18 For the reasons outlined below, the Court rules as follows: (1) Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) 19 motion is GRANTED, and the parties shall comply with the discovery and briefing schedules set 20 forth in the Conclusion of this Order; (2) Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED 21 without prejudice to them filing a renewed motion for summary judgment after the parties have 22 conducted discovery, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(1); (3) Defendants’ motion to stay discovery is 23 DENIED as premature; and (4) all remaining pending motions are DENIED as moot. 24 25

26 1 Garrett cites to Rule 56(f), the subsection in which the provisions pertaining to a party’s 27 inability to present facts essential to justify its opposition formerly were set forth; as of December 1, 2010, the applicable provision is Rule 56(d). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a procedure by which a party 3 may avoid summary judgment when such party has not had sufficient opportunity to discover 4 affirmative evidence necessary to oppose the motion. See Garrett v. San Francisco, 818 F.2d 5 1515, 1518 ( 9th Cir. 1987). In particular, Rule 56(d) provides that a court may deny a summary 6 judgment motion and permit the opposing party to conduct discovery where it appears that the 7 opposing party, in the absence of such discovery, is unable to present facts essential to opposing 8 the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). A pending discovery motion is sufficient to raise a question as 9 to whether the party opposing summary judgment should be permitted additional discovery, even 10 if no request under Rule 56(d) has been made. See Garrett, 818 F.2d at 1518. 11 The Ninth Circuit has made clear that in cases involving pro se prisoners, summary 12 judgment is not favored when discovery requests for relevant evidence are pending. In particular, 13 the Ninth Circuit has noted:

14 Under Rule 56(f) [(the predecessor to current Rule 56(d))], the court may postpone ruling on a summary judgment motion where the 15 nonmoving party needs “additional discovery to explore ‘facts essential to justify the party’s opposition.’” Crawford-El v. Britton, 16 523 U.S. 574, 599 n.20 (1998) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(f)). Though the conduct of discovery is generally left to a district court’s 17 discretion, summary judgment is disfavored where relevant evidence remains to be discovered, particularly in cases involving confined pro 18 se plaintiffs. Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 1988); Harris v. Pate, 440 F.2d 315, 318 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J.) 19 (observing that the combined disabilities of self-representation and confinement hinder a plaintiff’s ability to gather evidence). Thus 20 summary judgment in the face of requests for additional discovery is appropriate only where such discovery would be “fruitless” with 21 respect to the proof of a viable claim. Klingele, 849 F.2d at 412. 22 Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 930 (9th Cir.

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