PUBLISH
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________ FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 97-8299 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________ 2/19/03 THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK D.C. Docket No. 1:96-CV-00102-WLH
SYLVIA CRAWFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant
versus
BRUCE BABBITT, SECRETARY of the DEPARTMENT of the INTERIOR,
Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _______________________
Before CARNES, Circuit Judge, KRAVITCH, Senior Circuit Judge, and MILLS*, Senior District Judge.
__________________ *Honorable Richard Mills, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
CARNES, Circuit Judge: In 1993, Sylvia Crawford, a former employee at the Fish and Wildlife
Service, a Division of the Department of the Interior (the “Agency”), was
sexually harassed by her supervisors and then retaliated against when she
complained about it. After Crawford filed an administrative complaint, the
Agency issued a final decision finding it had discriminated against her and
awarding injunctive relief. Crawford subsequently brought suit in federal
district court seeking compensatory damages. The court dismissed her claim at
the summary judgment stage of the proceedings. For the reasons set forth
below, we reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
Crawford worked for the Agency during the latter part of 1993. On
November 8, 1993 and December 28, 1993, she filed Equal Employment
Opportunity (“EEO”) discrimination claims with the Agency’s Office for Equal
Opportunity alleging that her supervisors had sexually harassed her and then
retaliated against her when she complained. An investigator for the Agency’s
Office of Human Resources investigated the claims. Among other things,
Crawford informed the investigator that she had developed physical and
emotional problems from the stress of the sexual harassment. The investigator
2 issued a Report of Investigation in February 1995. By letter dated February 23,
1995, the Agency’s Office of Human Resources sent Crawford the report and
informed her that she could request a final decision on her claims from the
Agency, with or without an administrative hearing before an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) administrative judge. On March 29, 1995,
Crawford requested an administrative hearing.
On May 30, 1995, Judge Davi, the EEOC administrative judge, informed
Crawford and the Agency that he had scheduled a pre-hearing conference on
July 17, 1995 and a hearing on July 25, 1995. At the pre-hearing conference,
the parties discussed their settlement negotiations. The Agency stated that it
would not consider monetary settlement for compensatory damages without
objective evidence of damages and sufficient causal connection between the
alleged discriminatory acts and Crawford’s alleged injuries. In addition, the
Agency requested Crawford’s medical records and any other documents she
intended to use at the July 25, 1995 hearing to support her claim for
compensatory damages. Crawford’s counsel did not provide the Agency with
the medical records, but did indicate that two doctors would testify at the
hearing to substantiate her claim for compensatory damages.
3 On July 25, 1995, Crawford’s counsel requested a continuance of the
hearing. Judge Davi denied the request and proceeded to renew settlement
discussions between the parties. The Agency again took the position that it
would not pay Crawford compensatory damages without objective evidence of
damages and causation. Judge Davi asked Crawford’s counsel whether the two
doctors he mentioned at the pre-hearing conference would be testifying at the
hearing. After learning that they would not be testifying, Judge Davi informed
Crawford that the hearing would proceed, but that without substantiating
evidence of damages, no compensatory damages would be awarded. Crawford
then elected to waive the hearing and requested a final decision from the Agency
on her claims. Prior to the issuance of its final decision, the Agency did not
request and Crawford did not submit any additional evidence.
The Agency issued its final decision on October 20, 1995. In the decision,
the Agency found it had subjected Crawford to sexual harassment and retaliation
in violation of Title VII and awarded her injunctive relief, costs, and attorney’s
fees. However, the decision was silent with regard to compensatory damages.
While acknowledging that Crawford stated that she “developed physical
problems from the stress of [her] supervisor’s sexual harassment,” the decision
4 did not discuss whether she was entitled to compensatory damages for those
injuries. The decision also informed Crawford that if she was dissatisfied, she
had the choice of filing an appeal with the EEOC or filing a civil action in
United States District Court. She chose the latter option.
On January 12, 1996, Crawford filed this lawsuit against Bruce Babbitt in
his official capacity as Secretary of the Interior. (For simplicity, we will refer
to Babbitt as the Agency). Crawford’s complaint referred to the Agency’s final
decision and alleged that as a result of the Agency’s discrimination, she had
suffered hospitalization and physical, mental, and emotional distress. The
complaint requested that the court (1) enter a declaratory judgment stating that
the Agency had discriminated against her in violation of Title VII, and (2) “enter
a judgment against the [Agency] for compensatory damages associated with the
undue stress suffered by Plaintiff as a result of the unlawful employment
practices of Defendant.”
After the parties consented to having the case tried before a magistrate
judge, Crawford moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.
She argued that the Agency’s final decision conclusively established the
Agency’s liability under Title VII and requested that the issue of compensatory
5 damages for her alleged physical and emotional injuries proceed to a jury trial.
The Agency responded that since compensatory damages were not awarded as
part of its final decision, Crawford could seek either (1) enforcement of the
Agency’s final decision but forego a claim for compensatory damages, or (2) a
de novo review of the entire dispute, including liability and damages.
On March 11, 1997, the magistrate judge granted Crawford’s motion for
partial summary judgment as to liability. In addition, although the Agency had
not filed a summary judgment motion, the magistrate judge dismissed
Crawford’s claim for compensatory damages. The court then entered a
judgment which ordered the injunctive relief set out in the Agency's final
decision and dismissed Crawford’s claim for compensatory damages. After
Crawford’s motion for reconsideration of that order was denied, she appealed,
contending that the magistrate judge had erred in dismissing her claim for
compensatory damages. The Agency did not cross-appeal the entry of judgment
in Crawford’s favor on the issue of the Agency’s liability for violating Title VII.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, using the
same legal standard employed by the district court. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. City
6 of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1117 (11th Cir. 1993). "Summary judgment is
appropriate if the record shows no genuine issue of material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When deciding whether
summary judgment is appropriate, all evidence and reasonable factual
inferences drawn therefrom are reviewed in a light most favorable to the
non-moving party." Witter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 138 F.3d 1366, 1369 (11th
Cir. 1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
The crux of Crawford's claim is that she is entitled to compensatory
damages for injuries she suffered as a result of the Agency's sexual harassment
and retaliatiory conduct in violation of Title VII. The issue is whether she can
rely on the Agency’s finding of discrimination to pursue her compensatory
damages claim in court, when the Agency did not award her compensatory
damages. We begin by discussing the statutory scheme and administrative
process which governs a Title VII discrimination claim brought against a federal
agency.
A. The Statutory Scheme and the Administrative Process
7 In 1972, Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., to extend its protection against employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin to most
federal employees. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) provides that "[a]ll
personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment . . . [in
federal agencies and other specifically listed areas of federal employment] shall
be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." A covered federal employee who has been the victim of an
unlawful employment practice under Title VII may file suit against her employer
in federal district court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). However, before
bringing suit, the aggrieved employee must exhaust her administrative remedies.
See Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832-33, 96 S. Ct. 1961,
1967-68 (1976).
In 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b), the EEOC is granted the authority to enforce
§ 2000e-16(a)'s prohibition of discrimination in federal employment "through
appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring of employees with or
without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this section." In addition, the
EEOC is given the power to "issue such rules, regulations, orders, and
8 instructions as it deems necessary and appropriate to carry out its responsibilities
under this section." Id. Acting under this grant of authority, the EEOC has
promulgated regulations designed to resolve claims of discrimination in federal
employment. Under those regulations, the procedures which a federal employee
must follow in order to pursue a charge of discrimination against a federal
agency are as follows.
A federal employee who believes she has been discriminated against in
violation of Title VII must first consult an EEO counselor within the employing
agency to try to resolve the matter informally. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a). If
that is unsuccessful, the EEO counselor notifies the employee of her right to file
a formal administrative complaint with the employing agency itself. See 29
C.F.R. § 1614.105(d).
Upon receiving the complaint, the employing agency conducts an
investigation in order to "develop a complete and impartial factual record upon
which to make findings on the matters raised by the . . . complaint." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.108(b). After completing the investigation, the agency gives the
complaining employee a copy of the investigative file. At this point, the agency
can make the employee an offer of “full relief.” (We will discuss the definition
9 of “full relief” later). If the employee rejects the offer of “full relief,” the agency
is required to dismiss the complaint. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(h). The
employee can then appeal to the EEOC or file a civil action in federal district
court. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.401(a).
If an appeal is taken to the EEOC, and the EEOC agrees that the agency’s
offer constituted “full relief,” then it must dismiss the appeal. See 29 C.F.R. §
1614.405. But if the EEOC concludes that the offer did not constitute “full
relief,” it issues a final written decision. See Id. “If the decision contains a
finding of discrimination, appropriate remedy(ies) shall be included." Id.
Although an employing agency has no right of appeal to federal court from an
EEOC final decision, see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504, the employee, if not satisfied
with the EEOC’s final decision, may file a civil action in federal district court.
See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c).
Alternatively, if the employing agency opts not to make an offer of “full
relief” at the conclusion of its investigation, it must notify the employee that she
has a right to either (1) request a hearing on her claim before an EEOC
administrative judge, or (2) receive a final decision on the claim from the
employing agency. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(f).
10 If the employee elects the first option, the administrative judge conducts
a hearing, issues “findings of fact and conclusions of law . . . [and] order[s]
appropriate relief where discrimination is found." 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). The
employing agency then has sixty days to reject or modify those findings or
relief ordered and issue its own “final decision.” See Id. The “final decision”
must “consist of findings by the agency on the merits of each issue in the
complaint and, when discrimination is found, appropriate remedies and relief."
29 C.F.R. § 1614.110. If the employing agency does not issue a final decision,
then the conclusions of the administrative judge and the relief ordered become
the agency’s final decision. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). On the other hand,
if the employee elects option two, she does not receive a hearing before an
EEOC administrative judge, and the agency must issue a “final decision” within
sixty days. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110.
Should the employee be dissatisfied with any aspect of the agency's final
decision, she may appeal it to the EEOC or file a civil action in federal district
court. Should she appeal to the EEOC, it must issue a final written decision. 29
C.F.R. § 1614.405. "If the [EEOC’s] decision contains a finding of
discrimination, appropriate remedy(ies) shall be included." Id. Although an
11 employing agency is stuck with an EEOC final decision and cannot have it
reviewed in federal court, see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504, an employee, if not
satisfied with an EEOC final decision, may file a civil action in federal district
court. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.408.
Now, we consider “full relief.” When either the employing agency or the
EEOC find that the agency discriminated against the employee, the agency must
provide the employee "full relief." See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(a). According
to the EEOC, full relief “shall include, but need not be limited to,”
nondiscriminatory placement with back pay and interest, elimination of any
discriminatory practices, “cancellation of unwarranted personnel action,” and
full opportunity to participate in [any] employee benefit denied” because of
discrimination. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(a),(c).
In addition, in claims where discrimination occurred after the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the EEOC requires agencies to award
compensatory damages as part of “full relief,” but only if the employee presents
certain objective evidence of injury. See Jackson v. United States Postal
12 Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01923399 (1992).1 The EEOC has issued a policy
guidance statement detailing the type of evidence an employee must present to
establish the injuries for which compensatory damages are awarded. See EEOC
POLICY GUIDANCE No. 915.002 S II(A)(2), at 10 (July 14, 1992). In
particular, the policy guidance statement notes that “[n]onpecuniary losses for
emotional harm are more difficult to prove than pecuniary losses,” and that the
EEOC “will typically require medical evidence of emotional harm to seek
damages for such harm in conciliation negotiations.” Id.
B. The District Court’s Dismissal of Crawford’s Claim for Compensatory Damages
With that overview of the statutory scheme and administrative process
governing Title VII claims against federal agencies in mind, we turn now to the
issue of whether the magistrate judge erred in dismissing Crawford’s claim for
compensatory damages. The magistrate judge relied on two grounds in
dismissing Crawford’s claim for compensatory damages. First, the judge found
that Crawford had failed to adequately raise the claim for compensatory
1 The EEOC has repeatedly affirmed the Jackson decision requiring agencies to award compensatory damages in the administrative process as part of ensuring that a discrimination victim receives full relief. See e.g., Carle v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01922369 (1993); Huhn v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 059440630 (1995); Johnson v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 01966242 (1997).
13 damages at the administrative level and was therefore barred from raising it in
district court due to her failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Second, the
judge ruled that Crawford’s reliance on the Agency’s final decision in her
motion for partial summary judgment precluded her from litigating de novo the
compensatory damages issue. The magistrate judge observed that, in essence,
Crawford was seeking to enforce the favorable parts of the Agency’s final
decision (the finding of discrimination and the award of equitable relief) while
at the same time litigating de novo the unfavorable parts (the failure to award
her compensatory damages). The judge reasoned that since Crawford had
elected to rely on the Agency’s final decision, she was bound to its terms.
Therefore, the judge concluded, because the Agency’s final decision did not
award Crawford compensatory damages, she could not recover those damages
in the district court.
The magistrate judge’s reasons for dismissing Crawford’s compensatory
damages claim are implicitly premised on the EEOC’s position, which we have
already described, that an employing agency can award an employee
compensatory damages in the administrative process as part of “full relief.” If
that position is wrong, if compensatory damages cannot be awarded in the
14 administrative process, then neither of the grounds upon which the magistrate
judge relied justify dismissal of Crawford’s claim for compensatory damages.
As to the magistrate’s first ground for dismissing Crawford’s claim for
compensatory damages, if such relief cannot be awarded in the administrative
process to begin with, it follows that an employee’s obligation to exhaust
administrative remedies cannot include a duty to request it. As for the second
ground for dismissal, if compensatory damages cannot be awarded in the
administrative process, then the absence of such an award in an agency’s final
decision cannot preclude a claim for compensatory damages in federal court.
If an agency cannot award compensatory damages in the administrative process,
its final decision obviously cannot dispose of a claim for compensatory
damages.
It follows that in determining whether the magistrate judge erred in
dismissing Crawford’s claim for compensatory damages, we must resolve the
threshold question of whether compensatory damages can be awarded in the
administrative process. We turn now to that issue.
C. Can Compensatory Damages Be Awarded in the Administrative Process?
15 Crawford’s attempt to recover compensatory damages from a United
States government agency raises sovereign immunity concerns. The United
States, as sovereign “is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued.” United
States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S. Ct. 767, 769-70 (1941). The
Government’s consent to be sued “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally
expressed.” United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S. Ct. 1349, 1351
(1980). Futhermore, “a waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity will
be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.” Lane v.
Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S. Ct. 2092, 2096 (1996). “[L]imitations and
conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly
observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.” Lehman v. Nakshian,
453 U.S. 156, 161, 101 S. Ct. 2698, 2702 (1981).
In 1972, Congress waived the federal government’s sovereign immunity
for violations of Title VII. However, that waiver was limited in scope; it did not
subject federal agencies to liability for compensatory damages. See Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. Not until
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did Congress expand the scope of its previous
waiver by subjecting federal agencies to liability for compensatory damages.
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (“In an action brought by a complaining party under
section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 or
2000e-16] against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional
discrimination . . . prohibited [by Title VII], the complaining party may recover
compensatory . . . damages as allowed in subsection (b) of this section . . . .”).
However, Congress expressly conditioned the expanded waiver by providing
that the government has a right to a jury trial on the issue of its liability for
compensatory damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (“If a complaining party
seeks compensatory . . . damages under this section[,] any party may demand a
trial by jury.”). The effect of that condition is a government agency may not be
held liable for compensatory damages unless it has the opportunity to have a
jury trial on the issue of its liability for those compensatory damages.
We have previously explained that EEOC decisions – not any statutory
provision – requires governmental agencies, when presented with certain
objective evidence of injury, to award an employee who is a discrimination
victim compensatory damages in the administrative process. In the EEOC’s
view, doing that is part of the process of ensuring the victim receives "full
relief." See Jackson v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No.
17 01923399 (1992). If the employing agency does not award compensatory
damages as part of its offer of “full relief,” the employee may appeal to the
EEOC, which purports to have the authority to order the agency to award
compensatory damages. An EEOC regulation provides that an award of
compensatory damages, whether from the agency in its final decision or from
the EEOC on an appeal from that decision, is binding against the agency and
cannot be appealed by it to federal court. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(a) (“A final
decision that has not been the subject of an appeal or civil action shall be
binding on the agency.”). That regulation is derived from 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
16(c), which provides that only “an employee . . . if aggrieved by the final
disposition of his complaint . . . may file a civil action as provided in section
2000e-5 of this title.”
The EEOC's requirement that compensatory damages be awarded in the
administrative process as part of “full relief” prevents an agency from obtaining
a jury trial on the issue of its liability for compensatory damages. As a result,
that requirement is inconsistent with Congress’ conditioning waiver of the
federal government’s sovereign immunity for compensatory damages on the
right to a jury trial.
18 “[L]imitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be
sued must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.”
Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 161, 101 S. Ct. 2698, 2702 (1981). In §
1981a, Congress has expressly conditioned its waiver of sovereign immunity on
the agency's right to have a jury trial on the issue of its liablity for compensatory
damages. Accordingly, unless Congress – not the EEOC or the courts –
provides otherwise, the waiver of sovereign immunity may not be expanded to
make an agency liable for compensatory damages in the administrative process
where there is no jury trial. Cf. Gibson v. Brown, 137 F.3d 992 (7th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the EEOC may not order a federal agency to pay compensatory
damages in the administrative process because it would deny the agency its right
to a jury trial under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a).
The Agency contends, however, that we should follow the lead of the Fifth
Circuit in Fitzgerald v. Secretary Veterans Affairs, 121 F.3d 203, 207 (5th Cir.
1997), and hold that compensatory damages may be awarded in the
administrative process. Our fundamental problem with the Fitzgerald decision
is that it did not confront the sovereign immunity constraints which we find to
be controlling on the question of whether compensatory damages may be
19 awarded in the administrative process. The Agency concedes that Fitzgerald did
not address the sovereign immunity issue, but nonetheless advances four
arguments, the first of which was relied on by the Fifth Circuit in Fitzgerald, to
support its position that compensatory damages may be awarded in the
administrative process. We find none of them persuasive.
First, the Agency points out that Congress granted the EEOC broad
powers in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 to award “appropriate remedies, including
reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate
the policies” of Title VII. The Agency then argues that when Congress passed
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and made compensatory damages available to
victims of employment discrimination, they became part of the arsenal of
remedies that the EEOC was empowered to award. Thus, the Agency
concludes, the EEOC’s requirement that an agency award an employee
discrimination victim compensatory damages where necessary for “full relief”
is merely an extension of the broad power that Congress conferred upon the
EEOC.
While we agree that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 gives the EEOC broad power,
that power has limits. In this case, Congress’ decision to define its waiver of
20 sovereign immunity for compensatory damage claims with the condition that an
agency have the right to a jury trial provides such a limit. The EEOC’s broad
power does not give it the right to extend the scope of Congress’ waiver of
sovereign immunity by tossing aside an agency’s right to a jury trial. The EEOC
cannot erase from the waiver of sovereign immunity a condition Congress wrote
into it.
Second, the Agency notes that both before and after the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, only an employee, not the federal agency, can
challenge the outcome of the administrative process, whether it be the agency’s
final decision or the EEOC’s final decision. Put another way, unless the
employee challenges the disposition of his complaint in the administrative
process by filing a claim in federal court, the agency is bound by the terms and
relief ordered in the agency’s or the EEOC’s final decision. That one-way
appealability rule is expressed in 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(a) (“[a] final decision
that has not been the subject of an appeal or civil action shall be binding on the
agency”), and it is derived from Title VII’s language which provides that only
“an employee . . . if aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint . . . may
file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of this title.” 42 U.S.C. §
21 2000e-16(c). The Agency argues that Congress’ awareness of the one-way
appealability rule when it made compensatory damages available in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 means Congress, in conditioning the waiver of sovereign
immunity on an agency having a right to a jury trial, must have recognized that
an agency would be unable to exercise its right to a jury trial if compensatory
damages were awarded in the administrative process.
The problem with this argument is that it assumes away the issue it
purports to resolve. The argument assumes that compensatory damages can be
awarded in the administrative process and then states that Congress must have
recognized that an agency would not be able to exercise its jury trial right if
damages were awarded against it in the administrative process. However, the
issue being resolved is whether Congress’ waiver of sovereign immunity allows
compensatory damages to be awarded against an agency in the administrative
process where the agency will not have access to a jury trial.
For reasons we have already discussed, we believe Congress’ deliberate
decision to condition its waiver of sovereign immunity on an agency having the
right to a jury trial precludes us from holding that compensatory damages are
available in the administrative process. Therefore, an essential premise of the
22 Agency’s second argument is wrong. At best, the Agency is arguing that
Congress impliedly waived sovereign immunity as to the award of
compensatory damages in the administrative process. However, waivers of
sovereign immunity are narrowly construed, and are not to be implied. See e.g.,
Lehman, 453 at161, 101 S. Ct. at 2702.
Third, the Agency argues a holding that compensatory damages may not
be awarded in the administrative process will prevent agencies from settling
cases in which employees seek compensatory damages, because paying such
damages in settlement would deprive the agencies of their right to a jury trial.
That argument is specious. Government agencies are free to agree to settle cases
on terms they deem fair and appropriate, and they may waive their statutory
rights in doing so. Nothing in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a prevents an agency from
waiving its right to a jury trial on the issue of its liability for compensatory
damages – whether in settlement or otherwise . However, the choice of whether
to waive the right to a jury trial in any particular case is a purely discretionary
decision to be made by the agency involved, not by the EEOC. Congress
provided federal government agencies with the right to a jury trial on
23 compensatory damages, and only the agency with that right can waive it in a
particular case.
Fourth, the Agency argues that the effect of holding compensatory
damages are unavailable in the administrative process is to undermine the
administrative exhaustion requirement and render the administrative process a
nullity. We disagree. Our holding is limited: compensatory damages are not
available in the administrative process. Our holding does not affect any other
aspect of the administrative process the EEOC has established to address Title
VII discrimination claims against a federal agency. A federal employee must
still exhaust administrative remedies for all types of relief she seeks other than
compensatory damages, the only type of relief for which Congress’ waiver of
sovereign immunity was conditioned on a federal agency having the right to a
jury trial.
D. Summary
To sum up, we hold that because Congress conditioned waiver of
sovereign immunity for compensatory damages on access to a jury trial,
compensatory damages may not be awarded in the administrative process in
which there is no jury trial and from which a federal agency has no right of
24 review in a forum providing a jury trial. Because compensatory damages may
not be awarded in the administrative process, an employee such as Crawford is
not required to raise compensatory damages as part of her duty to exhaust
administrative remedies. Moreover, an employee’s reliance on an agency’s final
decision cannot be dispositive of a claim for compensatory damages brought in
federal court.
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of our holding, the magistrate judge erred in dismissing
Crawford’s claim for compensatory damages. Accordingly, the part of the
judgment concerning compensatory damages is REVERSED, and the case is
REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. The
remainder of the judgment is AFFIRMED.